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I have said that the soul is not more than the body,  
And I have said that the body is not more than the soul,  
And nothing, not God, is greater to one than one’s self is, 
And whoever walks a furlong without sympathy walks to his own 
funeral, drest in his shroud, 
  And I or you pocketless of a dime may purchase the pick of the  
earth, 
And to glance with an eye or show a bean in its pod confounds the 
learning of all times, 
  And there is no trade or employment but the young man following 
   it may become a hero, 
  And there is no object so soft but it makes a hub for the wheel’d 
   universe, 
  And I say to any man or woman, Let your soul stand cool and 
   composed before a million universes. 
   - Walt Whitman 
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Preface  
In the preface of my master’s thesis from 2003 I wrote that it was “my belief that the 
emerging discipline of organizational improvisation now fully deserves the attention of 
organization theorists and practitioners” (p. i). My assertion still stands. Although 
improvisation has indeed received some attention from both scholars and practitioners in 
many domains, a good deal remains to be done to consolidate it as a field of research. My 
dissertation is meant as a contribution towards this within the domain of organization theory, 
and the rationale for this study is that everyday organizing can be seen as a process of 
improvisation.  
 
In order for its potential to be realized, improvisation must be made practically relevant for a 
more general public than, say, jazz musicians and actors. In this dissertation I hold that in 
order for this to happen, improvisation must be grounded in philosophy so as to avoid some of 
the eclecticism and narrow instrumentalism that characterizes parts of the field. Building on 
the works on improvisation by scholars such as Karl E. Weick, Donald Schön, Mary J. Hatch, 
Claudio U. Ciborra, Jack Petranker and Ronald E. Purser, I simultaneously bring the concept 
into philosophy and back into practice. The simultaneous move of theory and practice is 
facilitated by the non-dualistic philosophies of American pragmatism and Heideggerian 
hermeneutics. Under the common label of “Practical philosophy” these frameworks provide 
fertile ground for a refined version of improvisation tied to the emergent properties of 
everyday complexity-in-the-becoming, and it is through these lenses of emergent corporality, 
emotionality and sociality I have conducted a study of everyday organizing amongst hospital 
managers. 
 
From a theoretical stance I argue that organizing is profoundly improvisatory; that it amounts 
to far more than remarkable and somewhat romantic instances of pure spontaneity and 
creativity. I see improvisation as inevitable in everyday practice, as practitioners are corporal 
beings of flesh and blood who seek to, and are compelled to, spontaneously make sense, 
contextualize knowledge and create genuine novelty. This is why I prefer going into the 
shades of improvisation as a living phenomenon rather than to make it a quantitative 
discussion of “either-or”.  
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An overall empirical aim behind this dissertation is to open a window on typical day-to-day 
work situations for practitioners in order to get a better grasp of the use of improvisation as a 
sensemaking tool in authentic organizing practice. As a consequence, mine is a story of 
everyday defeat and bravery, of hopeless dilemmas, of boredom and endless paperwork, of 
humour and conflict. And, at the very least, the narratives and analyses presented may 
contribute towards reducing some of the solitude of organizing: the feeling that one is alone in 
experiencing interruption, dilemma and complexity in different forms. 
A personal and professional background 
I remember clearly how, nearly a decade ago, while giving the best part of my time and 
energy to working as a middle level manager, I felt the lack of models and theories that might 
help me understand everyday problems. The management formulas I had been taught at 
various business schools seemed to merely hover above real life issues, thus failing to provide 
the necessary lenses for authentic understanding. As a manager, I was involved in and 
responsible for a variety of OD-projects, organizational and cultural change –processes, and 
system implementations, all of which had in common a goal of effectivity and efficiency. In 
the midst of all this, my co-workers and I complained about lacking the time to do real work 
on account of “putting out fires”. I often blamed myself for being a bad planner when 
something unexpected occurred, and I spent many nights trying to catch up with 
administrative issues and planning activities. Typically, however, the next day did not go as 
planned, which resulted in emotional tension and stress. In desperate attempts to achieve 
stability and other utopian goals, unexpectedness was seen not only as undesirable, but even 
as unnecessary and avoidable: as a sign of bad organizing.  
 
As a freshman I turned to central management for advice. The remedy invoked was simply 
more planning, more systems, more control, and more structure; but rather than improving, 
the situation just got worse. Not only did people respond negatively to yet new regimes and 
structures – some out of fear of losing their position, others from sheer exhaustion – but as 
more time was spent on linear organizing; on thinking first and acting later, less was spent on 
everyday operations. After numerous attempts at improving the linearity of organizing, I 
finally decided to resign from my position. I did so pondering many questions; most of them 
in some way related to the pitfalls of the strict thinking-before-action organizing that was 
encouraged and performed. In particular, I remember wondering about the point of theory, 
given the fact that the discrepancy between theory and practice was so radical. 
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A few years later, during my course of further management studies, my supervisor handed me 
a paper written by Michael Zack (2000) on the topic of metaimprovisation. The paper was a 
critique of the contributions to a symposium in Vancouver, Canada, in 1995 called “Jazz as a 
Metaphor for Organizing in the 21st Century”. It was later published as a special edition in 
Organization Science (1998) under the heading “Jazz as a Metaphor for Organization 
Theory”. As Karl E. Weick and Mary J. Hatch – two authors in which I had already taken a 
special interest – were amongst the most prominent of the contributors, Zack’s paper lured me 
into a domain that has captivated my professional attention ever since. Being an amateur 
musician, I had for a long time speculated on the parallels between organizing and jazz 
improvisation; and combined with a lifelong interest in philosophy, ideas soon began to 
emerge that have ultimately culminated in this dissertation.  
 
Over the last few years I have worked with improvisation in many arenas. The sheer variety 
of practitioners with whom I have had the pleasure to discuss the concept has given me 
confidence and faith in the fruitfulness of it, and after the empirical study I am more 
convinced than ever that focussing on improvisation is an important contribution to 
understanding organizing practice. In that regard, it is of special importance to me that the 
practical insights gained from improvisation have emerged from a solid basis in philosophy, 
and thus a deeply held personal desire to bring theory into practice has been realized. Thus I 
have sought to achieve a dual ambition: firstly to get in touch with authentic work practice 
through improvisation, and secondly to develop a concept of improvisation based on the 
traditions of western philosophy. It is my opinion that the former was made possible by the 
latter, and that the latter would be of little worth if not pursued in order to achieve the former. 
Indeed, the research process has evolved precisely in such a reflexive, hermeneutical manner, 
as theory has fertilized practice and vice versa. Hence, it would be no exaggeration to claim 
that simultaneously practicing theory and theorizing about practice has contributed greatly to 
my own personal growth.  
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Summary 
In my Ph.D. dissertation I study the nature of improvisation in everyday organizing practice, 
and how improvisation relates to technical rationality. I go about this study by means of a 
two-step strategy: the first strategy is a theoretical elaboration of organizing as improvisation, 
and the second an empirical study of improvisation in everyday organizing practice amongst 
eight department managers and one section manager in a large Norwegian hospital called 
InSitu. This summary follows the structure of the dissertation, presenting essential theoretical 
insights first. Next follows a summary of the methodological approach of this study, and 
finally, I present the main insights and findings from the empirical analysis.  
 
Through a preliminary literature study I found that the existing conceptualizations of 
improvisation were unsuitable as a sensemaking tool for an empirical study of improvisation 
as an everyday organizing phenomenon. Consequently, I saw it as a crucial part of my 
dissertation to contribute to such conceptualization, and as indicated I have attempted to do so 
from two angles: Firstly through a study of the domain of practical philosophy – a 
philosophical perspective associated with American pragmatism and supplemented by 
Heideggerian hermeneutics; and secondly by means of an empirical study of organizing 
amongst hospital managers. I accentuate that it is the hermeneutical combination of 
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philosophy, theory and empirical research that has led up to the findings, conceptualizations 
and insights of this dissertation.  
 
In the first part of my thesis I develop a framework of improvisation called “The improvising 
man”. I emphasize that this is not an attempt to break with leading theoreticians of 
improvisation such as Karl E. Weick (1979, 1989, 1995, 1998, 2001) and Mary Jo Hatch 
(1997, 1999), but to build on the theories of these authors and further expand on them from a 
philosophical standpoint. In my view, these attempts do not succeed in conceptualizing 
improvisation as a feature of everyday life, as they tend to overfocus on the phenomenon in its 
pure and exceptional forms. “The improvising man” represents, however, a thesis that 
improvisation is an inextricable feature of human practice, and hence, of organizing 
processes. From this stance I seek to overcome a perspective on improvisation as an either-or 
phenomenon. In this regard I build on authors such as Schön (1987, 1991), Ciborra (1999), 
Purser and Petranker (2005), and Petranker (2005), who conceptualize improvisation as the 
fundamental, everyday phenomenon from which organizing activities flow. Although sharing 
the same grounds, I have concentrated on certain aspects of improvisation that these authors 
do not focus on, so as to deepen the concept and facilitate understanding of authentic 
organizing practice.  
 
I end up defining improvisation as “spontaneous and hermeneutical sense-making via 
external action”. Three words are particularly important here: spontaneity, sensemaking, and 
external. First of all, as practical philosophy builds on a non-dualistic premise of mind and 
body (Peirce 1974a, 1974b), I argue that spontaneity can be seen as a cornerstone of 
existence. Spontaneity implies being “glued to” the present (Dewey 1929; Bergson 1944; 
Gadamer 1975; Heidegger 1996; James 2007), and from this perspective spontaneity and 
emotionality are inevitable traits of the human body, and thus, of improvisation. In my view, 
however, improvisation is more than mere corporal existence (spontaneity). Improvisation 
entails creativity: It is a process of hermeneutical and dialogical sensemaking (Weick 1989, 
1995, 1998, 2001). Contrary to Weick’s (1995) celebrated theory of retrospective 
sensemaking, however, I suggest that sensemaking is “improspective” in essence. This 
implies that making sense is fundamentally a way of looking into the present, rather than 
backwards at the past (Ciborra 1999; Petranker 2005). Moreover, I hold that improvisation 
concerns creative attempts to make a difference in the external world. Improvisation is more 
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than thinking and improspecting: It implies acting sensibly in the physical and irreversible 
sense (Weick 1998).  
 
I argue that the purity of improvisation varies with regard to two aspects: 1. the degree of 
spontaneity; and 2. the genuineness of creativity. By the former I indicate that even if all 
(creative) action is spontaneous to some extent (The improvising man), the degree of 
spontaneity in sensemaking processes varies according to the perceived distance between 
thought and action. The shorter the delay, the more spontaneous the appearance of the action; 
and I should emphasize that measuring this is not a matter of quantification, but of qualitative 
evaluation. Secondly, the purity of improvisation is depicted by the extent of genuine and 
open-ended creativity, which is also a qualitative measure. This means that for improvisation 
to become pure, creative actions must take on a quality of contextual problem definition – of 
resolving complexity – or of genuine innovation, or both, rather than mere technical problem 
solving and routine. The purest form of improvisation can be labelled flow: a phenomenon 
where spontaneity and creativity reach such high levels that radical transformation happens in 
real time (Csikszentmihalyi 1990).  
 
Improvisation is always based upon something, and I choose to call this something “tools”. In 
accordance with practical philosophy I see tools as instruments to achieve certain ends 
(Dewey 1929; Schön 1991), and in general, all aspects of embodied forehaving, such as 
memories, skills and language can be used as tools in improvisation. More specifically, as this 
is a study of organizing, I have given special attention to what Schön (1987, 1991) in 
conceptual terms speaks of as “technical rationality”, which as a phenomenon reflects 
instances where action flows from the basis of a preset thought-model. In an organizational 
context, examples of such technical rational models can be administrative issues like routines, 
structures, plans, and systems. In the light of improvisation and tools I suggest that technical 
rationality can be seen from two angles: either as a model of action that is chosen contextually 
and used as a tool, or as a model that is followed blindly. In the first version technical 
rationality can be part of an improvisatory organizing process of doing whatever the situation 
requires, whereas in the latter it takes the form of a taken for granted paradigm in which 
context has little significance. These ideas on technical rationality both result from the 
theoretical study of practical philosophy and from the empirical study of InSitu managers.  
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As opposed to Ciborra (1999), Purser and Petranker (2005), and Petranker (2005), authors 
with which I share a similar perspective on improvisation, I have conducted an empirical 
study of improvisation as an everyday phenomenon. Methodologically, my empirical research 
is conducted from a strategy of “qualitative ethnographic social research” (Vidich and Lyman 
2000). From this standpoint I use the method of “shadowing” (McDonald 2005), and follow 
in the footsteps of eight department managers and one section manager at InSitu hospital. In 
accordance with the research strategy the field notes are written within a genre of “narrative 
ethnography” (Tedlock 2000). In order to obtain a good grasp on the managers’ organizing 
reality in terms of both “theory-in-use” and “espoused theory” (Argyris and Schön 1974, 
1996), I compare my observations with in-depth interviews. Using an interview-guide, the 
interviews are a mixture of what Fontana and Frey (2000) call structured and unstructured, in 
which each of the managers engages in exchanges about their typical everyday practice. 
Following McDonald’s (2005) and Fontana and Frey’s (2000) notes on ethnographic research, 
I also conduct frequent informal interviews so as to obtain continual intersubjectivity between 
myself and the managers.  
 
In the process of empirical analysis I realized that in order to be able to categorize qualitative 
experiences of improvisatory organizing practice amongst managers, I had to make a 
distinction between “pure” and “sufficiently pure” improvisation. Moreover, as I found 
improvisation in practice to vary between proactive and reactive forms, Taylor’s concepts of 
“negative” and “positive” freedom (1985) inspired me to separate between negative and 
positive improvisation, both of which I regard as sufficiently pure forms of improvisation in 
practice. Negative improvisation occurs when complex events compel the individual to react, 
whereas positive improvisation represents a more voluntary and proactive form of action. In 
the negative version, then, improvisation is a tool to resolve uninvited complexity, and in the 
positive form, improvisation is a tool to achieve continual improvement, knowledge growth, 
and innovation.  
 
I want to emphasize that I propose no natural or categorical distinction between positive and 
negative improvisation, as it is difficult to say in a given situation what comes first, want or 
need; or indeed, whether the one can at all be separated from the other. Another important 
point is that both negative and positive improvisation are based in emergent contextuality, a 
fact which separates them from the kind of linear organizing action where technical models 
are followed blindly. From this perspective, the improvising practitioner attempts to act 
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spontaneously in accordance with the context of his present whereabouts, thus signalling an 
attitude of improspection and context-sensitivity: He/she acts negatively because he/she has 
to; or positively, because a personal desire drives him/her.  
 
In the case of InSitu managers I find negative improvisation in their dealing with vague and 
ambiguous situations, in their simultaneous handling of multiple events-in-the-becoming 
(turbulence), in their dealing with unpredictability and the unexpected, and in the complexity 
of social and emotional interaction. Often, positive improvisation is found under similar 
circumstances, as the managers display an attitude of context-sensitivity, continual 
improvement, and knowledge growth, which they seem to carry out in practice in the pursuit 
of effective organizing. Positive improvisation is also found in play, idea-making processes 
and humour. 
 
A third finding is that managers typically act from a basis in the here-and-now, rather than 
acting blindly on the basis of an abstract model. In general, everyday work life for managers 
seems to be centred on processes of creating sense, interpreting, defining, and improvising. 
This has encouraged me to separate between “good” and “pure” improvisation, and with the 
former category I attempt to capture contextual and practical wisdom – a wisdom which can 
often be quite impure with regard to improvisation, but still improvisatory in essence. With 
regard to the relationship between improvisation and technical rationality (Schön 1987, 1991), 
good improvisation implies that technical rational models such as structures and systems are 
used as tools, and not as “restraint jackets”. For the outsider, good improvisation may seem 
like strict routine even if it is not; and in good improvisation, routines are breathed into life 
for contextual reasons, not followed blindly for acontextual reasons. Consequently, 
improvisation may involve elements of technical rationality, which shows that it does not 
categorically contradict it, and the key lies in “use” (tool) as opposed to “blindly follow” 
(restraint-jacket). 
 
Weaving these findings together, I find that in practice, good improvisation can be impure, 
but it can be recognized by an observer in the sufficiently pure forms of negative and positive 
improvisation. I emphasize that all the new concepts that have grown out of the empirical 
analysis are in line with ”The improvising man” as a philosophical framework, and for me, 
their value lies in their ability to facilitate the conceptualizing of improvisation as an 
empirical phenomenon. In short, I made these conceptualizations as I saw that everyday 
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organizing practice is not always exceptionally pure, but still essentially improvisatory in 
form.  
 
To sum up, my study concerns improvisation – improvisation in all its fluent facets of 
everyday practice, and of good improvisation, not only improvisation as rare instances of 
spontaneous and radical transformation (e.g. “flow”). Based on my observations of organizing 
amongst InSitu managers I suggest that improvisation is the rule rather than the exception. 
Not only do social and emotional factors continually create an atmosphere of complexity, of 
unpredictability and ambiguity, that is reactively handled and organized through 
improvisation; but in addition, the managers actively pursue an improvisatory approach to 
creating knowledge, improving services, and ensuring (technical) workability. I have found 
that as contexts vary, problems vary, and that whereas some situations require immense 
efforts of pure improvisation, others are more technical and closed. Thus, in some instances it 
can be good improvisation to employ impure improvisation in order to achieve workable 
solutions. With regard to workability, this indicates that administrative measures such as 
computer systems, bureaucracy, and plans are used as tools of improvisation and not as 
restraint-jackets: They are made to work in context rather than followed blindly.  
 
My observations of practice, of theories-in-use, are in harmony with the espoused theories of 
managers, as they typically proclaim an attitude of positive improvisation, and hold context-
sensitivity and improvisation to be amongst the most important qualities in relation to 
organizing. Both theories-in-use and espoused theories, however, seem to contradict the 
language managers use in practice and in interviews, which seems to be heavily influenced by 
technical-rational metaphors. In other words, the managers seem to lack an adequate 
vocabulary to describe their own practice, as they tend to use systems metaphors and 
analogies instead of an improvisatory language. This point is reinforced by the fact that there 
seems to be an immense systemic pressure to cut budget expenditures by implementing 
political reforms, directives, and computer systems, and much weight is typically put on 
planning, routine-making, and bureaucracy. Not surprisingly, such issues have great influence 
on the official agenda and on management talk. As a consequence, I suggest that the 
framework of “The improvisation man” can contribute positively to a more authentic dialogue 
over everyday issues. An improvisatory vocabulary can play an important role in providing 
both a language close to the practical realities of the field and in preventing technical 
rationality from becoming too dominant in terms of “Managerialism”, which represents a 
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reified and taken-for-granted form of systems thinking (Carter and Mueller 2002; Mueller and 
Carter 2005, 2007). Improvisation is a language of contextuality and has room for all kinds of 
rationality (except the reified one), and as such it may facilitate a realistic, multifaceted, and 
balanced conversation on organizing and potentially contribute to higher effectivity as a 
result.  
 
To conclude, from my perspective organizing is not so much a matter of either employing 
improvisation or not doing so. It is not a question of either employing technical rationality or 
not, or of imposing administrative measures like planning, routine, structure or not. Rather, it 
is a matter of how organizing as a process of improvisation can make use of these and utilize 
them intelligently in the unique and emergent setting at hand. And as it seeks truth in the 
contextual rather than in the acontextual, organizing as improvisation implies a countermove 
against reified systems thinking and technical organizing taken to the extreme, i.e. against 
Managerialism.  
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Chapter 1. Organizing as improvisation: A background  
 “Abstractions detached from practice distort or 
obscure intricacies of that practice”.  
(Brown and Duguid 1991, p. 40). 
Research focus and anchorage 
Field of literature  
With this dissertation I want to make a contribution to organization theory. Within the domain 
of organization theory I take special interest in Weick’s (1979, 1995, 2001) perspective on 
organizing as a process of sensemaking. In particular, there is one aspect of Weick’s 
organizing as sensemaking perspective that has caught my attention: Improvisation (Weick 
1998, 2001). In the spirit of Weick’s writings on organizing and improvisation the rationale 
for my dissertation is that everyday organizing can be seen as a process of improvisation, and 
I have made a theoretical and empirical study to authenticate this. 
 
Although it is Weick’s theorizing about organizing and improvisation which has triggered and 
inspired this dissertation, there are some aspects within Weick’s thinking that I have found 
somewhat inconclusive and insufficient as my reading and thinking have evolved. One of 
these aspects concerns Weick’s strong interest in the retrospective nature of sensemaking (and 
improvisation). Another concerns what I regard as an overfocus on rare and exceptional 
instances of pure improvisation, as well as on radical transformation, accompanied by a 
categorization of less pure forms as non-improvisatory. For my purpose of studying everyday 
organizing practice this focus on pure improvisation seems too limited, and both theoretically 
and empirically much of my work has involved to widen the scope and to see how 
improvisation can be valuable as an organizational construct under less exceptional 
circumstances than covered by Weick’s work. In short I have tried to build a theory of 
improvisation as an everyday phenomenon, rather than, as in Weick’s case, as an exceptional 
phenomenon.  
 
A third aspect is particularly evident in the two classics “The Social Psychology of 
Organizing” (1979) and “Sensemaking in Organizations” (1995), and concerns what I see as 
an underemphasis on emotionality. Although Weick, Kathleen M. Sutcliffe and David 
Obstfeld later address these issues in the paper “Organizing and the process of sensemaking” 
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(2005), they do so only briefly, and I would therefore argue that there is still a need for giving 
emotionality a more central position in sensemaking theory, and for linking it more closely to 
improvisation. These are a few examples of what may be seen as theoretical gaps in Weick’s 
understanding of improvisation. Other authors have tried to fill some of them (for example 
Kamoche et al., 2002), leaving yet others open. My study attempts to fill these gaps, and as 
much as Weick provides a professional fundament and creative inspiration for me in that 
regard, I have found it of great value to bring in insights from philosophy and, naturally, from 
other authors on improvisation.  
 
My ideas and interpretations of theory differ from Weick’s with respect to certain crucial 
areas, but without a creative dialogue with Weick’s writing, my project would not have been 
possible. Also, it was mostly Weick’s (and partly Ralph D. Stacey’s (2000, 2001)) reference 
to the pragmatist philosopher George Herbert Mead (1967) that led me into the domain of 
American pragmatism, which marked a theoretical turning point for me. From a lasting 
interest in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1992, 1994) philosophy, I was now able to identify in 
American pragmatism very similar conceptions, and I discovered their common basis in 
human existence as “praxis”. Further literature studies led me to Martin Heidegger’s (1996) 
thinking, which also emerges from a similar fundament in praxis (Okrent 1988). Identifying 
important bonds between European and American philosophy, I started seeing the outlines of 
what is often labelled “practical philosophy” – a non-dualistic process philosophy that takes 
human action as the theoretical point of departure (Joas 1996); as opposed to, say, ontological 
objective being (see explanation of “non-dualism” and the “ontological objective” in chapter 
six). Exploring the depths of several versions of practical philosophy gave me the necessary 
tools to expand on and add to existing improvisation theory. In particular, different practical 
philosophical notions of corporality, spontaneity, emotionality, creativity, and functionality 
have contributed to renewing and synthesizing my contribution to a holistic theory of 
improvisation, and it is in holding all these different notions together that my contribution can 
be valuable.  
 
Working with practical philosophy has allowed me to synthesize a theory of improvisation 
which defines it as a general trait of existence, and thus of organizing, rather than as a rare 
phenomenon that occurs under special circumstances. This work, however, only brought me 
half the way, and as part of my aspirations of contributing to build a practically relevant 
theory of organizing as improvisation I conducted an empirical study. 
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Choice of empirical context: InSitu hospital managers in everyday practice 
My study emerged in a hermeneutical manner (Heidegger 1996). It builds on both existing 
theory and data from an empirical study of organizing as improvisation conducted especially 
for this dissertation. In order to produce such an empirical study I needed to find somewhere 
to conduct it. In theory, many options were open, but I wanted to avoid some of the types of 
research context used in existing improvisation research, and to bring a fresh approach to the 
study of improvisation. I wanted to avoid, for example, improvisation as found in 
improvisational theatre (Crossan and Sorrenti 1997), jazz music (Weick 1989, 1998, 2001; 
Hatch 1997; Barrett 1998; Bastien and Hostager 1988, 1992; Zack 2000; Alterhaug 2004), 
radical change processes in organizations (Orlikowski 1996; Orlikowski and Hofman 1997), 
radical innovation (Bastien and Hostager 1988; Cunha and Kamoche 2001), and temporary 
projects (Leybourne 2006), and to test the relevance of improvisation in a more everyday 
setting that resembled “ordinary” life on the whole. Preferably, for reasons to do with my 
scholarship, the setting should be a public organization, or at least an organization dealing 
with considerable amounts of administrative work. This coincided with my work experience 
from administration and management, as well as with my profound interest in organization 
and administration theory. The principal matter for me was to bring the two aspects together: 
organization and administration on one side, and improvisation on the other. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
The background for this dissertation is a lasting interest in how activities such as planning and 
systemizing are related to improvisation – in how improvisation can be related to the use of, 
for instance, structures and routines in an administrative work environment. This interest has 
emerged over many years as I have experienced that discussions around planning and 
structure, for instance, often follow an either-or logic. Many times, I have seen people listing 
improvisation on one hand; and planning, routine and structure on the other, as if they were 
separate traits. As argued by for instance Crossan and Sorrenti (1997), Ciborra (1999), and 
Alterhaug (2004), some speak of improvisation as if represents a form of inferior action that 
occurs when planning breaks down, indicating that improvisation is action without 
preparation or plan. Following this line of reasoning, an image can be portrayed of 
administration as unrelated to improvisation; i.e. one can either have administration or 
improvisation. My personal work experience, however, contradicts this, and since I lacked a 
proper vocabulary to address this paradox, I soon developed an interest in organization theory 
– and more specifically in Weick’s (1979, 1995, 1998, 2001) sensemaking perspective, which 
to a large extent builds on his insights from practical philosophy. 
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As ideas in their pure form, of course, a separation between administration and improvisation 
is understandable, and in Fayol’s (Urwick 1934) and Taylor’s (1967) writing, for instance, the 
ambition was to create models and systems of objective, universal value from which efficient 
practice could be effectuated. Donald Schön (1987, 1991) has described this kind of linear 
thinking through his notion of technical rationality, which he sees as a rule-bound form of 
organizing action that strictly follows an administrative model or procedure. In this light, then, 
early administrative theory could be said to follow the logic of technical rationality, which is 
an idea I give much attention in this dissertation since it opposes an important insight from the 
sensemaking perspective: that ideas, models and systems in their pure form cannot be 
implemented as such in practice. This sensemaking perspective indicates quite a different take 
on administration than the one exposed in the early classics. And from years of philosophical 
and theoretical studies I had a crude hypothesis that administration, if seen from a 
sensemaking perspective, might be close to improvisation. In this particular project, then, in 
order to find interesting and usable empirical data, I started looking for a practice context that 
fulfilled two needs: Firstly, it had to involve administrative work practice where plans, 
routines, structures and systems were of great concern; and secondly, it should be the kind of 
work-place where radical transformation and/or innovation were not the primary objectives. 
Again, I was more interested in exploring how typical everyday work life evolved through 
organizing practice and how improvisation could be related to this, than in artistic creation, 
(product) innovation and radical change. 
 
Through contacts in my research network I was allowed admittance to a large Norwegian 
hospital. Instead of choosing only one particular department or sub-department, I soon 
realized the advantage of casting my net more widely in that sense, so as to ensure variety as 
well as similarity. This is why I primarily ended up studying several top-level hospital 
managers/administrators (department managers), and why I also chose to include one section 
manager. In addition, I spent a few days observing two medical practices for the sake of 
getting a feel for the hospital context (and because I was curious). By studying a group of 
eight department managers (DMs) and one section manager (SM) from the same hospital and 
with similar formal responsibilities and role structures, I believed I would get rich, varied and 
comparable data on the relation between administration and improvisation in everyday work 
practice. Variety would flow from the fact that different DMs would have different 
professional focuses related to the medical area of their respective departments. An equally 
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important concern, however, was to ensure sufficient similarity between the informants with 
regard to administrative responsibility and role structures. All being part of the hospital 
director’s joint management group, I anticipated that DMs would share important general 
administrative concerns both with regard to the hospital as a whole and their respective 
departments. Studying a selection of DMs would therefore provide important contextual 
correspondence, and in that regard strengthen the validity of my findings about the managers 
as a “group”. 
 
From an initial three-hour long conversation with the hospital director, I had high 
expectations that precisely the traditional aspects of organization theory, such as the use of 
structures, plans, routines and systems, played a significant role in the work (i.e. everyday 
practice) of DMs. The initial theoretical separation between administration and improvisation 
would therefore be put to a scrutinizing test, and I saw this as an exceptional opportunity to 
study the role of improvisation in authentic organizing practice. A reason for not choosing 
other professional groups such as nurses or doctors lower down in the hierarchy was to avoid 
to the largest extent possible the intricacies of, and problems related to, patient anonymity. In 
addition, I saw initially a significant risk in not being allowed to be present during, and thus 
observe, patient treatments. For that reason, studying DMs appeared to be a more logical and 
cost-efficient approach with lesser risk of being denied access. I wanted to exploit the fact that 
I had considerable personal experience from administrative practice, and believed that I had 
valuable prior knowledge about the administrative language in use amongst DMs. Having to 
learn in detail a range of unfamiliar contexts of medical practice seemed unnecessarily 
difficult and incommodious considering that I had the chance to follow DMs who to a great 
extent carry out administration as a central part of their jobs.  
Studies of managerial behaviour 
My contribution is first and foremost to the fields of organization theory and improvisation, 
but I did not choose just any practical context for studying improvisation as much as one 
particular kind of context, namely managers in everyday settings. Thus, due to my choice of 
empirical context, there are certain parallels between my research and research on 
“managerial behaviour”; a field that deals explicitly with the nature of managerial work (for 
example Carlson, 1951; Stewart, 1967; Mintzberg, 1970, 1973, 1994; Kurke and Aldrich, 
1983; Kotter, 1986; and Tengblad, 2002, 2006). In this section I will address a selection of 
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this literature; give an account of its content on a general level; and try to point out similarities 
to and differences from my study.  
 
It seems natural to start with Sune Carlson (1951), who can be seen as a pioneer in the 
systematic research on the behaviour of managers in daily work. In his study of Swedish 
business executives from a range of different branches, Carlson takes an explicit interest in 
making note of and theorizing from emergent everyday details, rather than using “. . . 
necessary hypotheses to arrange [his] observations in a neat theoretical system” (Carlson 
1951, p. 9). In that respect Carlson’s descriptive approach differs significantly from early 
management theory, which Carlson claims is more concerned with general speculations 
regarding the functions of the executives than with actual descriptions of their work. In a 
similar attempt to that of Carlson, Rosemary Stewart (1967) sets out to study how managers 
spend their time, and in that regard to investigate the variation between different management 
jobs. She does this from a hypothesis that the previous management literature is too general to 
be of help in deciding how managers should be selected and trained. This slightly more 
normative approach is to some extent contrasted by, but still in the same vein as, Henry 
Mintzberg’s (1973) classic descriptive study, where he uses a technique of structured 
observation to study five chief executives, resulting in the formulation of 10 management 
roles and 13 propositions about the characteristics of managerial work. (Mintzberg’s (1973) 
study is later replicated and confirmed by Kurke and Aldrich (1983)). Later, in what he claims 
is the largest study of its kind ever conducted, John P. Kotter (1986) follows a similar 
approach to that of Carlson, Stewart and Mintzberg, except that his research focus is on 
general, rather than top, managers. Lastly, and more recently, another researcher who shares 
the interest in the nature of managerial work is Stefan Tengblad (2006). In his comparative 
study of four Swedish CEOs Tengblad builds on the work of Carlson (1951) and sets out to 
make a comparison to Mintzberg’s (1973) study. The scope of Tengblad’s work is to 
investigate whether or not apparent changes in management discourse have contributed to 
changes in everyday practices. 
 
In some ways, the field of managerial behaviour is related to my studies of organizing as 
improvisation, but important and fundamental differences can be pointed out. Firstly, we do 
not share the same methodological approach. Whereas the authors on managerial behaviour 
employ a structured approach of quantifying certain elements in the manager’s context, and of 
to some extent using qualitative data as a backdrop to quantitative results (for example 
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Mintzberg, 1973), I do not operate with quantifiable categories. Mine is not a time-study of 
certain categories of managerial behaviour, such as the amount of or the time spent on 
correspondence, meetings, or telephone conversations, or the length of working hours 
(Carlson 1951; Mintzberg 1973; Stewart 1967; Tengblad 2006), to name a few. In contrast, I 
have conducted a narrative ethnographic study (Tedlock 2000) of improvisation as a 
qualitative, emergent practical phenomenon, which for reasons explained above was 
conducted amongst hospital DMs.  
 
Authors on managerial behaviour find structure in a selection of specific empirical categories 
for purposes of quantification. Structure in my study, however, flows from working 
systematically with a sensemaking perspective (Weick 1979, 1995, 1989, 1998, 2001). Thus, 
as opposed to Carlson (1951), I do have a vision of systematic theory. More specifically, my 
analyses are not accidental: they are related to improvisation. An important difference from 
studies on managerial behaviour is that in my observations I have tried to let the context speak 
for itself to the greatest extent possible (Geertz 1973), and as part of the narrative 
ethnographic tradition I have simultaneously tried to bring to the surface my personal views, 
reflections and perceptions (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2008). I have done this partly from a 
desire to present rich and multifaceted narratives; and partly to avoid covering up the 
inevitable forehaving that has accompanied the observations (Schwandt 2000). Rather than 
employing preset categories such as meetings and telephone conversations, I operated with 
ideas from improvisation theory and practical philosophy. These ideas were explicitly 
addressed during the interviews, and more specifically they included unpredictability, 
complexity, context-sensitivity, spontaneity, and creativity, as well as the role of plans, 
organizational structures and routines in everyday practice – matters of special concern for a 
theory of organizing as improvisation as I initially saw it. Next, from my analysis many more 
related themes and topics emerged, and before writing out a revised version of organizing as 
improvisation – which was to large extent spurred by the empirical study – I had some 200 
N’Vivo categories at my disposal; all of which were systemized logically through the use of 
N’Vivo software. The last, and most important, task then begun: to systemize these further in 
relation to improvisation. I ended up with significant revisions in my original concept of 
improvisation, as well as some new conceptions of improvisation pertinent to the particular 
context of InSitu DMs.  
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Secondly, and related to the first point, my dedication to organizing as improvisation comes 
first, and the particular empirical context later; whereas in the field of managerial behaviour 
there seems to be a primary and more general occupation with managers as such. Consider 
for example this statement by Carlson (1951): 
 
. . . I have, above all, lacked a theoretical system in which to arrange the observations I have 
made. . . . As a first implication of the present study on further research I would, therefore, 
place the desirability of developing a systematic theory of executive behaviour. With such a 
theory at our disposal, it would become much easier to arrange the necessary empirical 
research in its proper place (Carlson 1951, p. 115).  
 
In a way, I have followed Carlson’s incentive as I have in my dissertation attempted to 
theorize coherently about the executive behaviour that I have observed, but I have done so 
with a framework of improvisation in mind. My contribution is not primarily aimed at 
management behaviour as such, however, but at all kinds of administrative practices that can 
use improvisation as an interpretative lens. My work has been about contributing to building a 
theory of organizing as improvisation from:  
 
1. Empirical data. 
2. Philosophy and existing theory of improvisation.  
 
The neatness of my conceptualizing is open for discussion, but my attempt is to construct a 
logical, coherent, and functional theory of improvisation that aligns with practical experiences 
and which is also consolidated in philosophy. What comes first of the two, an interest in 
practice or in philosophy? The question is rhetorical and misleading. My interest is in both, 
and philosophically I would argue that there can be no theory without practice, and vice versa 
(see chapters three and six). I want to add, however, that as a student of practical philosophy I 
am more taken by theory that deals with authentic practice, than with ideal concepts of dualist 
philosophy (see chapter six). In that sense, for me practice comes first, but as stated by Lewin 
(1951), “. . . there is nothing so practical as a good theory” (p. 169).  
 
The third and major difference between the studies of managerial behaviour I have referred to 
and my own, is closely related to the previous two: Whereas the studies of managerial 
behaviour are centred on quantifiable categories, and lack a systematic theory in which to 
frame their observations, I am fundamentally qualitative in my approach, and I try to develop 
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a framework of improvisation to make sense of my observations. These two aspects, however, 
are only made possible from a paradigmatic standpoint of sensemaking, as opposed to a 
paradigm of decision-making. Carlson (1951), Stewart (1967), Mintzberg (1973, 1994), 
Kotter (1986) and Tengblad (2006), however, all display an explicit focus on decision-making, 
and are devoted to showing characteristics about the milieu in which managers gather 
information, and make strategies and decisions. This is reinforced by Tengblad (2006), who 
argues that Mintzberg (1973) pursues a doctrine of “rational administrative behaviour” which 
places Mintzberg within the “stability camp” (p. 1441). Also Mintzberg (1994), who builds on 
Marples (1967) in his critique of Carlson (1951) and Stewart (1967) for their constricted focus 
on pre-quantification and time-studies, ends up arguing that the manager should be studied as 
a decision maker so as to account for the manager’s “output” as well as “input” (Mintzberg 
1994, p. 89). As a last note, in a review of Mintzberg’s (1973) study, Weick (1974) points out 
that Mintzberg employs a stimulus-response view, and that his research approach stems from 
a decision-making perspective. This is a very important difference from my sensemaking 
study, and as Weick et al. (2005) explain: “Sensemaking is about the interplay of action and 
interpretation rather than the influence of evaluation on choice. When action is the central 
focus, interpretation, not choice, is the core phenomenon.” (p. 409).  
 
According to Weick et al. (2005), the discrepancy between the two perspectives is of 
substantial importance, and depending on which one is employed, different facets of practice 
will be addressed, investigated and theorized upon. The important matter for Weick et al. is 
that it is on a paradigmatic and conceptual level sensemaking and decision-making are seen 
as antagonists. In practice, however, sensemaking may involve decision-making; but from a 
sensemaking perspective, this is seen as part of a more fundamental process of creating 
identity and meaning. As a consequence, a “decision” is merely a fraction of the deep-seated 
processes associated with the dialogical “self” (Mead 1967). To sum up, it is from this 
difference in fundamental perspective I hold that my study differs from studies of managerial 
behaviour. Paradigmatic differences and their consequences for the conceptualization of 
improvisation is dealt with in chapter six; and the discussion on sensemaking versus 
decisionmaking is also an important part of my analysis (chapters seven to ten).  
 
Although there are important differences between the research on managerial behaviour and 
my own research – differences which predominantly have to do with my anchorage in the 
sensemaking perspective and my motivation to build a theory of organizing as improvisation 
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– there are similarities as well. Some of these have already been implied, such as a shared 
focus on practical authenticity as opposed to the early generalizations of management and 
administration theory. As discussed earlier, the similarity in research context is particularly 
evident (i.e. managers), even if the prime motive for choosing such a context differs. Other 
central similarities in observations, findings, and insights are referred to throughout my 
analysis. On the occasions where the opposite is the case, this is naturally addressed as well.  
 
To sum up, improvisation from a sensemaking perspective has from the very start been my 
principal interest, as I have wanted to contribute to the field of research on organizational 
improvisation. This field seems to have had a peak in the 1990s (for example Weick 1993a, 
1993b, 1998, 1999; Hatch 1997, 1999; Barrett 1998; Bastien and Hostager 1992; Brown and 
Eisenhardt 1997, Crossan and Sorrenti 1997; Moorman and Miner 1995, 1998a, 1998b; 
Ciborra 1996, 1999; Orlikowski 1996; and Orlikowski and Hofman 1997); but it has also 
received some attention in the new millennium (for example Hatch 2000; Zack 2000; Weick 
2001; Kamoche et al. 2002; Kanter 2002; Purser and Petranker 2005; Petranker 2005; and 
Leybourne 2006). Although my branch of research belongs to organization theory, it is also a 
valuable contribution if my research can contribute to the field of managerial behaviour. In 
principle, the implications from my study are usable for all organizations, for all levels of 
organizations, and to all sorts of practitioners who are interested in improvisation as a 
phenomenon. Thus my study contributes towards: 
 
1. A general understanding of how improvisation evolves in organizing practice, with 
special regard to organizing in a social milieu, which in my study is found to be linked 
to ambiguity, vagueness, turbulence, corporality, spontaneity, emotionality and 
unpredictability. This is further linked to creativity in the form of problem definition 
and meaning-making (chapter nine). 
2. A more specific understanding of the relationship between improvisation in organizing 
practice and the practical employment of administrative instruments such as routines, 
structures, systems and management models (chapter ten).    
 
In these opening sections I have tried to explicate the scope of and motivation behind my 
study. I have also indicated how my theoretical study has been fuelled by my empirical 
project, and vice versa, and provided some examples of this. I hope this can be of aid in the 
succeeding discussions, so as to carve out a red line through my argumentation. As for the 
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logical place to start, it seems to me to be the kind of early linear thinking about organizing 
that my take on sensemaking and improvisation seeks to supplement and contrast. It is to this 
subject I turn next. From a general discussion on how a sensemaking perspective differs from 
early thoughts on organizing, I indicate how a sensemaking view can be developed into a 
theory of organizing as improvisation, and from this basis I derive the particular research 
goals and the research question of my study.  
Challenging the early linear model of organizing  
To understand the potential contribution and impact of organizing as improvisation it may be 
useful to gain an overview of the kind of linear thinking an improvisational view attempts to 
complement. As throughout the dissertation I study different aspects of improvisation and 
organizing, however, central issues in linear organizing thinking will reappear and be 
discussed many times over; which is why in this opening chapter only key aspects will be 
addressed, and on a somewhat general level. I have chosen one of Weick’s (2001) detailed 
discussions in “Making Sense of the Organization” as my point of departure for identifying 
these key aspects. Here he addresses the limits to what he refers to as the architectural design 
of organizing:  
 
Organizational design modelled along the lines of architectural design is viewed as a bounded 
activity that occurs at a fixed point in time. The activity is largely decision making, 
concentrated in a small group, which translates intentions into plans. The plans are based on 
assumptions of ideal conditions and envision structures rather than processes. The structures 
are assumed to be stable solutions to a set of current problems that will only change 
incrementally. (Weick 2001, p. 57).    
 
With roots in the early doctrine of “homo economicus” (Blaug 1992), such an architectural 
design is what in the following will be associated with a linear perspective on organizing. 
Central in this orthodox doctrine are elements of technical rationality (Schön 1991), as 
emphasis is put on ideal conditions of stability and structure, and on plan(ning) before 
execution (thinking before acting), thus depicting linearity in time. An early formulation of 
linear organizing is found in Fayol’s seminal work on “administrative theory” (Urwick 1934), 
which depicts a technical rational image of administration where a strict logic governs 
organizing action. From such a strict linear focus on administration “decision-making” (for 
example Simon 1968; March and Simon 1993; Cyert and March 1992) and “control” (for 
example Ouchi 1979, 1980; Eisenhardt 1985) are topics that are given much attention. In the 
 12
same manner, as argued by Stacey et al. (2000) and Stacey (2001, 2003), prediction is given 
much emphasis as a tool for making forecasts of the organizational future. In linear thinking 
prediction is facilitated through careful analysis of systemic elements in the internal and 
external environment which subsequently can be “monitored” and “manipulated” objectively 
as a consequence of management decisions (Stacey et al. 2000; Stacey 2001, 2003). Finally, 
as the linear approach focuses on facets of organizations as “systems” and “entities” (Weick 
2001; Andersen 2000), dualisms are set up between “manager” and the “organization” (for 
example Senge 1990), and between “choice” and “action” (for example Simon 1968; March 
and Simon 1993; Cyert and March 1992). A last example of dualism in the linear approach is 
the one between “individual” and “culture”, of which Griffin (2002) holds Schein (1992) to be 
a central advocate. 
 
Many of the basic assumptions in the linear view have been challenged and nuanced over the 
years. For example, the assumption of rationality was, at least seemingly, considerably 
nuanced in Herbert Simon’s (1968) classic theory of limited rationality. One might ask, 
however, what the word limited should be compared to; and the answer can be found in the 
concept “homo economicus”, which builds on a premise of absolute rationality (Simon 1968). 
As a critique of the assumptions of “homo economicus” Simon argues that rationality cannot 
be thought of in such ideal terms, as it is restrained by people’s ability to process information, 
by physiological factors, and by values (p. 40). I would argue, however, that this view is 
problematic with regard to at least two aspects:  
 
1. What and where is this rationality, or this striving for rationality, that is not restrained? 
 What does it look like, and  
 Where is it to be found, if not in an ideal universe?  
2. Where can the objective information that Simon claims is processed be found? 
 Can objective information be identified as such?  
 
For now I shall not move further into the dualistic rhetoric of early organizing thinking, as 
this is a topic dealt with later (chapter five). Still, the previous questions may serve as creative 
stimulators and indicate an alternative epistemological direction to the linear approach.  
 
In Donald Schön’s (1991) vocabulary linear thinking is referred to as technical rationality, 
which he claims is the dominant epistemology in thinking about professions and the 
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institutional relations of research, education, and practice. James March and Herbert Simon 
seem to support this claim, and 35 years after the first publication of the branch standard 
Organizations they state in the foreword of the 1993 edition that the original intention was 
to: ”. . . list generalizations (preferably true ones) and to asses the empirical evidence 
supporting them” (March and Simon 1993, p. 1). Having consolidated their root in a technical 
rational paradigm, they continue by claiming:  
 
If there were any general pronouncements we would want to utter today, it would be that no 
events during this long period have shaken the foundations of organizations or organizations 
theory so roughly as to make them unrecognizable, or even greatly distorted . . . . the new 
phenomena we have observed, and perhaps most of the new concepts as well, fit without too 
much Procrustean squeezing or folding into the earlier framework that was designed to hold 
them. That is one reason (among many) why we limit ourselves to these comments instead of 
rewriting the book. (March and Simon 1993, pp. 1-2).  
 
If we are to believe the authors of this highly influential treatise, its basic assumptions persist 
and have at least not until the early nineties been challenged significantly by alternative 
theories. I would like to point out, however, that newer contributions within decision-making 
theory seem to have softened some of its core assumptions and taken in central insights from 
sensemaking theory. For example, in March (1994) and March and Olsen (2004) the focus is 
changed from a “logic of consequences” to a “logic of appropriateness”, and phenomena like 
identity and interpretation are given much attention. But even if much has happened within 
the tradition of decision-making, and even if there has been a great expansion of alternative 
thinking, such as in post-modern theory, symbolic-interpretative theory, and complexity-
theory to name but a few (see for example Stacey 2003; Hatch 2004), I argue that there is still 
a need to provoke and renovate organization theory, and that one way to go about this might 
be through a non-dualistic sensemaking view of improvisation. First I would like, however, to 
sum up some of the most important aspects of what I identify as the intrinsic values of linear 
(technical rational) organizing:  
 
 14
  
 
Elements:  Examples: 
Preoccupation with nouns:  Organization, structure, plan, culture, system, routine and 
administrative models of any kind 
Preoccupation with dualisms: Manager versus organization, individual versus culture, plan 
versus action, talk versus action 
Linear thinking: Analysis Æ prediction Æ plan Æ strategy Æ action Æ 
evaluation/control  
Systems thinking and technical 
management: 
A-contextual prescription, objective analysis, plan, 
implementation, control, quantification and reductionism, 
rational choice and decision-making 
Table 1.0 Elements in linear organizing 
  
The elements in table 1.0 have inspired a range of different schools and directions within 
organization theory, and by facilitating a structured conversation on organizational topics they 
have made a tremendous contribution. One might say that in promoting its ideas, linear 
thinking has succeeded in comprising a language that stretches beyond social and cultural 
differences. But as argued by Berger and Luckmann (1991) ideas may be taken for granted as 
representatives of objective reality, and as a consequence taken too far. More specifically, 
concerning the organizational field of research, Schein (1996) argues that what has been 
missing in organization studies is:  
 
. . . the anchoring of our concepts in observed reality . . . . We have gone too quickly to formal 
elegant abstractions that seemingly could be operationally defined and measured, i.e., 
centralization-decentralization, differentiation – integration, power, etc., and failed to link these 
to observed reality. I say “seemingly” because in the effort to define such concepts, we often 
relied on further abstractions, i.e., questionnaire responses, and began to treat the 
abstractions as the reality. Not only does this create fuzzy theory and research that is made 
significant only by massaging the data statistically, but the results are often useless to the 
practitioner. (p. 232). 
 
Karl Weick’s (1979, 1995, 2001) theories on organizing as sensemaking can be seen as a 
countermeasure to such a tendency of alienation and exaggerated abstraction within linear 
organization theory, and based on a process view on organizations Weick was amongst the 
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first to develop a concept of organizing as improvisation. Going into more detail I will now 
address what new insights such a process view can offer; and what is more important, I will 
address its relevance from a process perspective in terms of the development of an 
improvisational view.   
Process thinking: Towards an improvisatory concept of organizing 
Let me start off with a personal comment: My interest in organizing as improvisation stems 
from a desire to contribute to a language that facilitates authentic contextual understanding of 
day-to-day practical organizing. In that regard I hold that a language other and more profound 
than the technical rational is of the essence; we need a different vocabulary to understand 
everyday organizational life than the one provided by strict linear thinking. Constructing such 
an alternative language is not so much a new idea, as it is one of increasing importance – both 
because the world is about to become a different place than before, and because linear 
thinking continues to be very influential within organizing theory and practice. Inspired by 
Hatch (1999) my dissertation is thus less about doing something that has not been done before, 
than it is about doing something worth doing again.  
 
From a linear viewpoint, organizing is thought of roughly in the way Christopher Robin from 
the books about Winnie the Pooh approaches the topic: “. . . organizing is what you do before 
you do something, so that when you do it, it is not all mixed up” (Milne 1992). Alternatively, 
expanding on Weick (1979, 1995, 2001) and Schön (1991) organizing can be seen as 
something we engage in continuously. In the latter case organizing is not so much a matter of 
thinking first and (mechanical) execution later, but rather of evolving, ongoing action 
involving varying degrees of creativity and spontaneity. From this viewpoint, organizing may 
be projected as a form of sensemaking process, but in order to be labelled organizing it 
presupposes external action or the intention of such: there is always something in the social or 
physical world that is organized. In this regard Weick’s (1979) classic definition of organizing 
offers great insight: 
 
. . . organizing . . . is defined as a consensually validated grammar for reducing equivocality by 
means of sensible interlocked behaviors. To organize is to assemble ongoing interdependent 
actions into sensible sequences that generate sensible outcomes. (Weick 1979, p. 3).  
 
Expanding on Weick’s definition, organizing takes place on the inside and the outside of 
individuals, and it evolves as a reflexive process of producing objectives and solving 
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problems, some more vague and ambiguous than others. In Weick’s definition the words 
consensus, interlocked behaviour, and interdependence are central, thus highlighting 
organizing as a social practice. What is somewhat less explicit in this definition, however, is 
that in spite of its fundamentally social nature, consciousness can often emerge in isolation. 
Likewise, it is hardly self-evident that organizing presumes an organizational context. To 
organize a living room, for instance, means something else in everyday speech than managing 
an organizational development project in a hospital. Weick’s (1989) view on organizing, 
however, is very wide and general, and does not discriminate between contexts: 
 
To organize anything means to impose order on it, whether what is being arranged are ideas, 
closets, people, or time. To organize ideas is to make them more orderly and one way to make 
them more orderly is to arrange them into stories that explain and justify commitments. (Weick 
1989, p. 245) 
 
As a label, then, organizing may be used in all kinds of situations, but it means something 
unique in all of them. Still, in general organizing presupposes an intention of creating sense 
and order involving the use of reflective capacities and mindful action, which are the elements 
that are primarily given attention in the following. Inspired by Weick (1979, 1989, 1995) and 
Weick et al. (2005) I understand organizing as externally oriented acts of sensemaking 
carried out in the private, social, and organizational sphere, and to further narrow it down, 
my interest in this study concerns organizing in an organizational setting. 
 
If organizing implies making sense of and acting in an organizational context, it signifies 
organizations as themes of conversation (Stacey 2001; Shaw 2002), as communities of 
practice (Lave and Wenger 1991; Wenger 2004), rather than as entities. What an organization 
is, then, is a somewhat peculiar question. Organizations do not exist as such, but as social 
arenas of joint sensemaking. Following the thoughts of Berger and Luckmann (1991) and 
Scott (2001), an organization could be seen as emerging through acts of institutionalization, 
and it becomes recognizable as an object to the extent that patterns of (organizing) action are 
developed that are clear enough to provide sense. In the same vein, Weick et al. (2005) 
suggest that organizations are talked into existence. From this view organizations are social 
constructions upheld by interacting individuals, and they remain organizations for as long as 
they are perceived as such by workers, owners, the government, customers, and other 
stakeholders. In Czarniawska-Joerges’ (1992) words: 
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Organizations are nets of collective action, undertaken in an effort to shape the world and 
human lives. The contents of the action are meanings and things (artefacts). One net of 
collective action is distinguishable from another by the kind of meanings and products socially 
attributed to a given organization. (p. 32).  
 
What, then, can be learned by studying how organizational constructions are brought to life? 
Posing this question implies directing focus towards everyday practice and organizing as an 
emergent phenomenon (Mead 1967). Doing this produces a subtle change of attention from “a 
sociology of nouns towards a sociology of verbs” (Chia 1996). Shifting the focus from the 
ever passing and temporary objects of consciousness to the process of producing such opens 
up a rich source of knowledge. For example, studying a structure or a plan will always be a 
somewhat outdated project, as reality has already moved on (Weisbord 1988). Thus, in the 
following reflections organization as a noun will be de-emphasized, benefiting the concept of 
organizing as practice, as process. And following the general approach to organizing as 
explicated by Weick (1989) and Weick et al. (2005), I end up with a similar view to that of 
Orlikowski (2002) who sees everyday practice of organizational members as the source from 
which organizing is constituted.  
 
What happens if we contrast a process view with linear thinking? A fuller attempt to answer 
this will be given in chapter five, but to get some guiding ideas I shall indicate a few points. 
First of all, from a process perspective organizing is vastly more than thinking and planning 
before action. With regard to the seminal works of Simon (1968) and March and Simon 
(1993), a process view seeks beyond the concept of (bounded) rational decision-making 
(Ciborra 1999). And as it builds on verbs rather than nouns it marks a difference from the 
Carnegie-school’s portrait of organizations as arenas where problems and solutions are 
meshed together like entities (nouns) in a garbage can (Cohen et al. 1972). Furthermore, 
routines, structures and systems – which are root concepts in a linear perspective (see table 
1.0) – are from a process point of view merely temporary constructions in an ongoing flow of 
organizing activities (see chapter five).  
 
In my view, a process view is not abstract, but concrete, as it focuses on authentic ongoing 
practice: on people meeting and communicating on both a conscious and unconscious level as 
they are brought together in processes of joint sensemaking (Mead 1967; Blumer 1969; 
Weick 1995, 2001; Lave and Wenger 1991; Wenger 2004). They come to these processes 
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with certain intentions for the future which are simultaneously influencing and being 
influenced by everyday actions (Stacey et al. 2000; Stacey 2001). And if we perceive 
everyday organizational life as a dynamic feature, organizing will always differ between 
contexts (Purser and Petranker 2005). Sometimes it will involve planning and routine 
behaviour; other times calculation and implementation of models; and yet other times it will 
presuppose genuine spontaneous action and risk taking behaviour with little anticipation or 
preparation. Thus, as it is defined as sensemaking activities targeted at the external sphere 
(social or not), organizing can be seen as a process of improvisation. This may seem a radical 
statement, but as a guiding thesis for the following discussions it gives a clear idea of where I 
am heading. And perhaps it will seem less radical as some of the core issues are sorted out in 
the succeeding chapters.   
Research goals and research question 
From the assumption that organizing can be seen as a process of improvisation I have derived 
the following two research goals for my project:  
 
1. To achieve and verbalize an understanding of the nature of improvisation in everyday 
organizing practice and of how this relates to complexity and context.  
2. To achieve and verbalize an understanding of the nature of technical rationality in 
everyday organizing practice and of how this relates to improvisation. 
 
In my opinion, understanding everyday organizing presumes a perspective which is close to 
actual practice and which takes into consideration the inevitable complexity in which 
organizing is embedded: a dynamic framework that acknowledges the genuine emotional, 
creative, and structuring efforts typical for everyday practice. From a basis in theoretical 
analysis I attempt to provide such a framework, and I suggest that “The improvising man” 
serves as an appropriate name for it. Within this framework improvisation is defined as 
spontaneous and hermeneutical sensemaking via external action. Subsequently, the 
framework and the proposed definition provide grounds for a sensemaking tool for 
understanding authentic work practice. I have chosen to formulate this tool through the 
following research question: 
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One cannot look at all things simultaneously, not even if one wants to. And a way of seeing is 
a way of not seeing (Poggi 1965), but that does not stop us from seeing in the first place. To 
highlight certain traits of practice – in this case the hermeneutical, emotional, spontaneous and 
creative – is not, however, equivalent to categorically denying the validity of all others. Thus, 
as much as improvisation encourages certain angles and perspectives, it is not my intention to 
push aside alternative views, but to supplement them.  
What is the nature of improvisation in everyday organizing practice and how does 
improvisation relate to technical rationality? 
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The structure 
“And the seasons they go ‘round and ‘round 
And the painted ponies go up and down 
We're captive on the carousel of time 
We can't return we can only look behind 
From where we came 
And go round and round and round 
In the circle game” 
- Joni Mitchell 
 
The purpose of chapter 1 is to position and contextualize my dissertation theoretically and 
philosophically: to provide a rough sketch of its assumptions, foundations, inspirations and 
findings, to set the tone for the succeeding chapters, and indicate a red line throughout the 
study. I start by giving an overview of the scope and motivation behind my study; the field of 
literature that I relate to; the empirical context I have chosen and the reasons for this; and 
finally, I also include a short discussion of the paradigmatic stance that underpins my research. 
Four points sum up these opening sections: firstly, that mine is a study of organizing as 
improvisation; and secondly, that it is conducted from a sensemaking, not a decision-making, 
perspective. Thirdly, I explain how the choice of hospital managers as my objects of study 
comes as a consequence of an interest in the relation between administration and 
improvisation in organizing practice; and fourthly, I show how my project differs in important 
regards from studies of managerial behaviour – a field that has some similarities to mine, but 
which works from different assumptions and motivations. Towards the end of chapter 1 I 
provide an introduction to some early and very influential perspectives on organizing that I 
seek to complement; and inspired by the seminal work of Karl E. Weick, I indicate in broad 
terms an alternative concept of organizing as improvisation. Finally, I present the research 
goals and research question for my study. 
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview and discussion of the most prominent of the existing attempts 
to conceptualize organizational improvisation, with particular focus on Karl Weick’s work. 
The discussion builds on a premise that existing attempts provide insufficient basis for 
understanding the richness of improvisation in authentic everyday organizing, and I suggest 
that improvisation can be re-conceptualized, embellished and turned into a more fruitful 
concept.  
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In chapter 3 I present a philosophical backdrop in order to facilitate such a re-
conceptualization. Here, the works of the American pragmatists are of special importance, and 
their line of practical philosophy is supplemented by insights from hermeneutics and 
phenomenology.   
 
In chapter 4 I build up a framework of improvisation which I call “The improvising man”. 
This chapter is written in the fashion I myself would have liked to be introduced to the topic 
of organizing, improvisation, and sensemaking, combining an extensive epistemological 
anchorage with an interest for the emergent practicalities of everyday life. Lastly in chapter 4, 
I expand on the role of tools in improvisation, and discuss how improvisation relates to 
Donald Schön’s (1991) concept of “Technical rationality”.  
 
Chapter 5 picks up where chapter 1 left off and sets out to bring the insights from chapters 2, 
3 and 4 into the domain of organizing. As an introduction, I make some reflections on the 
limits to the concept of “change” as a root-concept for organizing, and argue that 
improvisation might provide an alternative and fruitful point of departure. To underpin this 
claim, I subsequently address and re-conceptualize some of the most important topics of 
organization and administration theory via the framework of “The improvising man” (chapter 
4). These topics include routine, structure, planning, and system. Picking up the discussion on 
improvisation and technical rationality from chapter 4, I argue that all four of these may be 
seen as tools in a process of improvisational organizing rather than as control instruments. 
Towards the end of chapter 5, I compare organizing as improvisation to management, and two 
possible perspectives on management are sketched out: one as a measure of improvisation, 
and the other as a more idealized form: Managerialism. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the methodology, theoretical and empirical, supporting this dissertation 
from start to end. Much energy is devoted to emphasising the reflexive and hermeneutical 
relationship between my form of theoretical and empirical research. Building on the 
philosophical insights from chapter 3, I begin with a section on the philosophy of science, 
thus providing a crucial foundation for the dissertation with regard to methodology, process, 
content, and structure. Two points sum up the contents of chapter 6: Firstly, I discuss the role 
of non-dualism in the philosophy of science, and show how this affects my research – which 
makes use of a social ethnographic strategy, and qualitative shadowing and in-depth 
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interviews as research methods. Here, I accentuate how non-dualism presumes an 
interpretative approach which emerges hermeneutically as a reflexive process between theory 
and empirical data. Secondly, I present the empirical context, which includes nine managers 
at a major Norwegian hospital called InSitu; and explain the details of the research process 
from start to end. Since chapter 6 involves a detailed account of the practical research process, 
it works as a natural introduction to chapters 7 – 10 which consist of an empirical analysis and 
discussion of organizing as improvisation amongst InSitu Hospital managers. As they 
illuminate different aspects of the same research experience, I see these four chapters as an 
integrated whole.  
 
Chapter 7 deals with the typical context, complexity and challenges faced by InSitu managers 
on an everyday basis. There are many reasons for including an opening chapter on 
contextuality alone: Firstly, this provides an introductory overview of characteristics of the 
research context. Secondly, a study of contextuality displays the multitude of challenges 
InSitu managers encounter in everyday life, and by postponing an elaborate discussion of the 
way these challenges are enacted and dealt with, a more intuitive understanding of 
improvisation may emerge. And thirdly, as a consequence of the two former, discussing 
contextuality in isolation allows for a detailed view of what the InSitu context is not; namely a 
pre-ordered, stable, calm or unequivocal arena.  
 
Chapter 8 presents some key theoretical issues that came out of the empirical analysis of 
InSitu managers. These issues emerged as a result of a need to explicate practical facets of 
improvisation that were not covered by my early concept of “The improvising man”, and in 
that regard they contribute both towards expanding this framework and making it more 
practically applicable. Firstly, I separate between “pure” and “sufficiently pure” improvisation, 
so as to facilitate the identification of improvisation in other, and more ordinary, settings than 
for example jazz music and improvisational drama. Secondly, inspired by Taylor (1985), I 
propose a separation between “positive” and “negative” improvisation as I have found that in 
organizing practice the improvisation can sometimes be of a more proactive and voluntary 
(positive) nature; while at other times it is more reactive and involuntary (negative). Lastly, as 
a normative contribution, I suggest a separation between “pure” and “good” improvisation, as 
I have observed instances where practical wisdom and action evolve through rather impure 
forms of improvisation. This last discussion expands from an empirical stance on the 
theoretical discussion in chapter 4 and 5 of improvisation and technical rationality.  
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Improvisation implies enactment of context, and as context is inextricably tied to 
improvisation the two cannot be categorically parted. This is the central theme of chapter 9, 
where I link the context of InSitu managers to improvisation. Chapter 9 follows the structure 
from the two previous chapters and presents narratives that in my view are highly illustrative  
of negative and positive improvisation and the way this relates to contextual ambiguity, 
clustering of events, emotionality, and unpredictability.  
 
In chapter 10 I continue and expand further on the discussion from chapters 4, 5 and 8 on the 
role of technical rationality in everyday improvisation, and how the use of administrative 
models relates to good improvisatory practice. Here I present and discuss some findings from 
the empirical analysis regarding perception, perspective, and functionality. Finally, I conduct 
an analysis of the InSitu managers’ espoused theory, theory-in-use, and language-in-use, and 
propose some areas where the managers can improve their organizing processes.  
 
In chapter 11 I present my conclusion based on the empirical findings and theoretical 
discussions and sketch out some implications for future practice and research. 
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Chapter 2. Organizational improvisation  
Introduction 
This chapter deals with some of the most influential of the previous attempts to conceptualize 
organizational improvisation, and through a review of these I attempt to give grounds for a re-
conceptualization of improvisation and its role in everyday organizing. As a key line of 
argument I hold that improvisation in most of these early attempts is seen as a rare and 
exceptional phenomenon, and that their focus is mostly towards improvisation in its pure 
forms. As will be elaborated in chapter three and four my dissertation proposes a much 
broader approach, and instead of seeing improvisation as something that occurs only under 
special circumstances I suggest to redefine improvisation as a philosophical trait of existence 
that is always present to some extent in everyday practical life. It is from this basis I hold that 
the authors on improvisation who are presented in the current chapter provide a too narrow 
view, although I make use of many of the same ideas as them, such as spontaneity, creativity, 
and intuition. For example, in chapter three I propose with basis in “practical philosophy” that 
spontaneity and creativity are necessary conditions of humanity, something which indicates 
that improvisation, which emerges from these phenomena, also is a ground condition of 
humanity. This contradicts the authors who will be presented in this chapter as they seem to 
be occupied merely by high degrees of spontaneity, creativity or both, something which 
implies that improvisation from their view is a temporary phenomenon which is either present 
or not.  
 
As my theoretical interest in organizing as improvisation was initially inspired by Karl E. 
Weick, his work receives special attention. Somewhat paradoxically, however, some of the 
greatest analytical problems I have encountered when working with the concept of 
improvisation have also in many ways been spurred by Weick’s work. Even if I disagree with 
many of his assumptions, however, Weick has certainly made me think hard, and some of my 
deepest reflections have come about as a result of identifying analytical problems in Weick’s 
work. Weick continues to be a major inspiration for me, and his reflections on organizing, 
sensemaking, sociality, identity, and improvisation are still at the core of my studies.  
 
In the title of this chapter I use the term “organizational improvisation”. This is in line with 
Kamoche et al.’s (2002) comprehensive work Organizational Improvisation where they 
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review most of the existing theory of improvisation in organizational theory. Inspired by 
Weick’s (1989) more general take on organizing, however, I prefer in my work to use the 
term “organizing as improvisation”. A reason for this is that I want to avoid a possible 
connotation embedded in the term “organizational improvisation”: namely that improvisation 
takes on a special form in organizations as opposed to its occurrence in other parts of 
everyday life. In other words, when working conceptually with improvisation as a general 
phenomenon in chapters two and four, I do not want to discriminate between social life in 
general and organizational life in particular.  
 
As a last note, I should make clear that in this chapter I do not attempt to make a full review of 
improvisation in organizational research. Kamoche et al. (2002) have already done this 
meticulously. My focus is directed towards important aspects in most conceptualizations of 
improvisation, such as spontaneity, creativity and intuition, and as indicated I build on these 
aspects in my own work, although mostly from a fresh angle. In addition to expanding on and 
discussing the findings from Kamoche et al.’s thorough review, I give special attention to 
some of the contributions which have become classics in the field, for example Weick (1995, 
1989, 2001), Hatch (1997), and Crossan and Sorrenti (1997). These authors, and others, are 
also discussed in appropriate places throughout the dissertation. Thus, rather than a full 
treatise of improvisation as a phenomenon, this opening chapter on organizational 
improvisation constitutes more of a starting point for raising certain fundamental issues.   
 
It seems natural to begin this discussion on organizational improvisation by asking: What is 
improvisation? Weick (2001) explains that the term derives from the Greek proviso which 
means to provide in advance, but as im is put in front of proviso the meaning becomes quite 
the opposite: to provide the unexpected. Weick’s positive version of the epistemological 
character of improvisation sets us off in the right direction, and I shall later return to some of 
the important connotations embedded in it. But first I want to present a few other popular and 
influential definitions of improvisation – from which I will draw and discuss four vital 
characteristics.  
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Composing on the spur of the moment (Schuller 1986, p. 378). 
 
. . . on-the-spot surfacing, criticizing, restructuring and testing of intuitive understandings of 
experienced phenomena (Schön 1987, pp. 26-27).  
 
. . . intuition guiding action in a spontaneous way (Crossan and Sorrenti 1997, p. 157).  
 
. . . composition converg[ing] with execution (Moorman and Miner 1998b, p. 702). 
 
Improvisation consists of deliberately chosen activities that are spontaneous, novel, and 
involve the creation of something while it is being performed (Miner et al. 1996 in Weick 2001, 
p. 286)  
 
Holding up these definitions against each other I observe strong similarities between them, 
and generally speaking, spontaneity, creativity, intuition, and action are recurrent dimensions. 
In the following I will give a presentation of these dimensions and discuss how they have 
been treated in the expositing literature on improvisation and organizing. Next, in chapter four, 
I shall explore the significance of all of these phrases from a practical philosophical position: 
expand upon them and see how they can be seen as connected and mutually constitutive. Thus, 
my ambition is not primarily to signal a break with the definitions above, but to potentially 
deepen and widen their meanings and their practical application via an integrative 
philosophical framework. 
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Hatch’s concept of improvisation 
In Hatch’s (1997) view, improvisation is a process of spontaneous and intuitive sensemaking. 
Inspired by Crossan and Sorrenti (1997), Hatch (1997) bases her concept on the two 
dimensions of intuition and spontaneity, from which she proposes the following framework of 
improvisation:  
 
 
As I read Hatch (1997), she sees spontaneity as more or less equivalent to impulsivity, and 
regards intuition as an unconscious process based on embellished experience. Based on these 
two dimensions Hatch constructs a grid of four sub-dimensions: copying, faking, interpreting, 
and ultimately, improvisation. From my point of view these are interesting and mind-sparking 
categories that are in many ways essential to understanding improvisation as a practical 
phenomenon. Still, a few critical objections may be raised – not so much in terms of what 
Hatch’s dimensions imply, but more in terms of what they leave out; or rather: how they are 
apt to be interpreted.  
 
Firstly, seeing spontaneity as analogous to impulsivity represents a problem in the sense that 
uncommonness might be interpreted into it; it is open to the interpretation that improvisation 
is merely something that happens in rare instances. In one sense this seems quite plausible, as 
it intuitively rhymes with the way improvisation is often talked about in everyday speech – as 
a kind of ad hoc action, for instance when planning breaks down (Crossan and Sorrenti 1997; 
Ciborra 1999; Alterhaug 2004). In the same vein Hatch (1997) might be understood as 
suggesting that impulse action is something that can somehow be avoided, rather than it being 
Interpret   Improvise 
 
 
 
 
Copy    Fake 
High 
 
 
Intuition 
 
 
 
Low 
Low  Spontaneity  High 
Model 2.0 Hatch’s (1997) positioning of improvisation  
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a natural part of existence (Ciborra 1999; Purser and Petranker 2005; Petranker 2005). 
Likewise, Hatch’s (1997) use of the phrase intuition in her framework might come out as 
something exceptional, almost magical, as in everyday lingo we are not strangers to 
associating intuition with the likes of supernatural talents; as a sixth sense – for example 
women’s intuition. My point is that the way Hatch presents the two concepts of spontaneity 
and intuition might contribute to blurring improvisation as a real life phenomenon, at worst 
even mystifying it.  
 
Presenting three categories that are not improvisation and one that is, though they are all part 
of the same framework, potentially reifies the signal that improvisation is rare and exceptional. 
Notice how in Hatch’s case a four-dimensional philosophical framework is more basal than 
improvisation: rather than a typification or gradation of improvisation her framework seems 
to represent more of a positioning of it alongside three other phenomena. It is my impression 
that Hatch, deliberately or not, elevates improvisation as a somewhat unique or exceptional 
skill/practice that supersedes other and more ordinary forms of action; forms that are 
important as building blocks on the way to mastering improvisation as a form of artistic 
brilliance. As a consequence, improvisation seems to come out as equivalent to pure 
improvisation. Again, this can be a practically valid, or even educative, way of perceiving 
improvisation in some respect, but in my view it is not exhaustive. It is therefore my 
perception that Hatch is in danger of overstating the kind of dualistic “either-or” thinking 
typical for the orthodoxy she wants to escape: She focuses more on particularly pure forms of 
improvisation than on the phenomenon as an everyday feature. A small excerpt may help 
highlight this point:  
 
In playing the head musicians usually interpret rather than improvise, which means that they 
play a recognizable or familiar line, perhaps giving it their own stylistic mark, but not really 
altering the basic ideas in any particular innovative way. (Hatch 1997, p. 183). 
 
Note the focus on the altering of basic ideas and on genuine innovation, which underpins the 
claim that improvisation is something out of the ordinary. And even if this is intended 
metaphorically as Hatch derives her inspiration from creative art forms like jazz 
improvisation and improvisational drama, the analytic distinctions made in a 2 x 2 grid 
separates improvisation from other modes of action, and potentially reifies it as something 
rare and exceptional rather than as everyday emergent and normal. I do not see Hatch’s 
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approach to improvisation as a way of Being-in-the-world (Heidegger 1996) or an ordinary 
way of organizing (Ciborra 1999), which is my primary interest in this dissertation, but as a 
particular form of organizing that is either present or absent. In chapter four I will expand on 
this argument and argue that the kind of perspective Hatch (1997) presents is a limited one as 
it does not include improvisation as an evolving phenomenon which naturally takes form in 
organizing in its many shades of everydayness. 
Weick’s concept of improvisation 
Four degrees of improvisation 
Weick (1998) is possibly closer to a more nuanced approach than Hatch as he advances 
through the thoughts of Lee Konitz (Berliner 1994) and separates between 4 degrees of 
improvisation, starting with the least pure, interpretation, and continuing with embellishment, 
variation, and finally, (pure) improvisation. What strikes me as contradictive, however, is that 
Weick says that all four categories are degrees of improvisation, but at the same time he 
argues that only the purest of them is, in fact, improvisation. This latter notion seems to be 
Weick’s main argument, and in the following it is on his view that improvisation is 
synonymous with pure creativity and radical altering that I will focus my attention.  
 
As in Hatch’s (1997) and Crossan and Sorrenti’s (1997) case, typifying can go a long way, 
but objections may be raised against it. It seems, for instance, that instead of recognizing the 
inevitable presence of process and creativity in everyday life as such, the less explicit forms 
of improvisation in practice are also somewhat downgraded by Weick (1998). Again, his 
emphasis seems to be less on emergent contextuality than on one particular kind of context; 
one that is pure with regard to genuine creativity. Taking his inspiration from Berliner’s (1994) 
elaborate study of jazz music, Weick (2001) argues explicitly that musicians only improvise 
when they “. . . radically alter portions of the melody or replace its segments with new 
creations bearing little, if any, relationship to the melody’s shape. . . .To improvise, therefore, 
is to engage in more than paraphrase or ornamentation or modification.” (p. 287).  
 
As in Hatch’s (1997) case, Weick’s stance is perhaps not so strange considering the source of 
inspiration he draws upon, namely jazz improvisation, and as a consequence he ends up with a 
concept similar to Hatch’s. And having partly denoted improvisation as a radical altering of 
structures, Weick says the following in an effort at pointing out the limitations to the concept: 
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The intention of a jazz musician is to produce something that comes out differently than it did 
before, whereas organizations typically pride themselves on the opposite, namely, reliable 
performance that produces something that is standardized and comes out the same way it did 
before. It is hard to imagine the typical manager feeling “guilty” when he or she plays things 
worked out before. (Weick 2001, p. 300). 
 
Again, for Weick’s critique to be valid it must come from a specific view on improvisation: 
something reserved for the few or a method or competence that can be employed in specific 
settings and/or which occurs only in rare instances. And the jazz metaphor seems to be a 
representative example. An importunate question, however, is whether jazz music itself lives 
up to the criteria indicated by Weick.  
 
Weick (2001) explains that there is great variation between different jazz traditions, different 
performers, and performances. Following this line of reasoning, it can be argued that much of 
the music that is presented under the jazz label is quite distant from radical altering of 
melodies with little or no relationship to the melody’s shape. Perhaps it is only under 
exceptional circumstances that the jazz metaphor itself displays the characteristics that are 
necessary for it to be called improvisation, for instance in the case of free jazz (Zack 2000)? 
To single out jazz improvisation, then, as a special trait of genuine creativity – of breaking 
rules, patterns and harmonies; of disrupting rhythm and progression – may provide a biased 
image of jazz music, as it is not always improvisationally “pure”.   
 
To be sure, both Hatch (1997) and Weick (1998) argue that jazz does not always display high 
levels of creativity and/or spontaneity, but they still tend to make improvisation synonymous 
with its purest forms. It is precisely this focus that I would like to question as I ask to which 
extent jazz is a suitable metaphor for everyday organizing practice. Can it at worst even be 
exaggerated? For instance, even if it can spur new perspectives, to which extent is 
archetypical jazz improvisation comparable to the everyday work reality of most people? 
Especially since jazz is commonly associated with the genuine and radical elements that 
define its creative and expansive boundaries, I fear that as a metaphor it may (at worst) 
alienate as much as it facilitates. In other words, even if jazz is more than pure jazz 
improvisation, the former is often associated with the latter, so as to comprise an image of the 
rare, exceptional and elitist (Mirvis 1998), and it is often this image that is transported out 
metaphorically; a point that Hatch and Weick (1998) discuss in a special edition of 
 31
Organization Science dedicated to improvisation. And finally, even if theorists use jazz and 
not merely jazz improvisation as the metaphor, they often place improvisation at the extreme 
end of the scale: improvisation is seen less as an emergent property than as a particular kind 
of radically innovative and creative emergence.  
Improvisation and retrospection 
There is another aspect of Weick’s concept of improvisation I would like to give some 
attention. This concerns the dimension of “retrospection”, which according to Weick (1979, 
1995, 2001) constitutes the essence of sensemaking, and hence improvisation. Retrospection 
is meticulously explicated in Weick’s “Sensemaking in organizations” (1995), where he 
erects seven hypotheses that are crucial to understanding the sensemaking process. The 
hypotheses sum up the essential dimensions in sensemaking as being:  
 
1. Grounded in identity construction 
2. Retrospective  
3. Enactive of sensible environments  
4. Social 
5. Ongoing 
6. Focused on and by extracted cues 
7. Driven by plausibility rather than accuracy 
  
Characteristics number one, three, four and five above are hypotheses that I build on 
explicitly in the succeeding chapters, together with other important insights from “practical 
philosophy”, in an attempt to develop a comprehensive framework of improvisation. Number 
two, however, is at odds with my view on improvisation, and as the current chapter is about 
positioning and pointing out a need for theory-building in the field of improvisation, I choose 
to deal with it here.  
 
In an article in the Academy of Management Review in 1996, Dennis A. Gioia and Aja Mehra 
give a review of Weick’s Sensemaking in organizations (1995), and as much as they praise 
the book for being an intellectual challenge, they also provide some criticism. First of all they 
argue that Weick overplays the significance of retrospection as opposed to prospection. 
Secondly, they criticize Weick for not dealing properly with the role of emotions in 
sensemaking. The latter is a criticism that I agree with, and which I address later in chapter 
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four. Considering the former, for Gioia and Mehra’s criticism to be valid, it must contradict 
the essential (and philosophical) role of retrospection, which is the cornerstone of Weick’s 
argument. In my view it does, and the following quote provides a point of departure for my 
succeeding discussion on the limits of retrospection as the essence of sensemaking:  
 
. . . if sensemaking were not also prospective, we would be forever at a loss when asked 
where we want to go. (Gioia and Mehra 1996, p. 1230). 
 
If sense can only be made retrospectively, an implication is that there is no way to predict 
what will happen in the future (Weick 1995). This has implications for organizing, as 
unpredictability will create complexity that must be dealt with in everyday practice. The way 
emerging unpredictability is dealt with, Weick (1995) argues, is through enactment, which is 
a process in which human actions bracket or punctuate an ongoing stream of reality. 
 
The concept of enactment has a touch of realism in its emphasis on bracketing and 
punctuating. To cope with pure duration, people create breaks in the stream and impose 
categories on those portions that are set apart. (Weick 1995, p. 35).  
 
Furthermore, with reference to Heidegger’s (1996) concept of throwness Weick claims that 
sensemaking is ongoing (characteristic number five). The fact that something seems to have a 
start and an end is thus a product of enactment (characteristic number three); that cognitions 
are categories imposed on pure duration (Bergson 1944). After having enacted brackets of 
reality, these can later be sensed retrospectively by a creative mind, Weick argues. Enactment 
is therefore a process in which people produce part of the environment they face.  
 
In characteristic number two, Weick argues that it is impossible to know anything except in 
retrospect. This implies that a thought (noun) is only a thought to the extent that it is 
bracketed and “thought through” (verb), which is something that can only be discovered 
backwards. A sentence, for instance, can only be recognized as a sentence at the point when 
its last letter, its last verbal sign, is uttered. This is a way of stating the obvious – that 
something must happen before it has happened – and from this it is intuitive to picture 
cognition as a retrospectively enacted bracket with an identifiable beginning and end, which 
in retrospect can appear to be linear. Linearity is thus a product of a retrospective mind, and 
can only be identified standing in a present looking backwards. 
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In the following, however, I aim to show that characteristic number two is inherently 
contradictive, and secondly, that it contradicts point number five, indicating that Weick 
integrates two incompatible concepts into the same theory. I want to present two models to 
illuminate these intricacies. The first model gives an illustration of characteristic number 2: 
that sensemaking is essentially retrospective.  
 
Model 2.1 illustrates the key point in retrospective sensemaking that one needs to think a 
thought through, speak a whole sentence, in order to make sense of it backwards as a bracket. 
The thought is not sensible as a thought until it has been discovered retrospectively. As a 
verbal illustration of this phenomenon Weick (1979, 1995, 2001) uses the following phrase, 
“How can I know what I think until I see what I say?” It is as if the cognition itself, the 
bracket, has an extension in time – that it stretches out, so to speak. Simultaneously Weick 
argues that until the time of retrospective discovery the thought is merely a sensory process – 
an act of the body. Weick (1995) explains: “Actions are known only when they have been 
completed, which means we are always a little behind or our actions are always a bit ahead 
of us” (p. 26). Logically this would imply that meaning is based on actions that are formed 
over time, which makes good sense to the extent that the past has an opening for meaning as 
opposed to being meaning in itself. The logic of retrospection as a philosophical strategy, 
however, implies that cognition is in itself a process. It starts at (T=0), continues, and stops at 
COGNITION = BRACKET 
T = 0 T = 1 
RETRO- 
SPECTION 
Model 2.1 Retrospective sensemaking  
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(T=1), as it were, and only then can it be discovered backwards. It is the cognition, the speech, 
the meaning, that takes form, not the sensory process of producing temporal cognitions. This 
equals saying that cognition is both process and noun. The contradiction I speak of, then, is 
not that sensemaking happens over time, and that it makes use of the past. The contradiction is 
that meaning can only be found in the past, and that actions cannot be apprehended and made 
cognisant in situ. In my view this makes cognition inauthentic as it does not belong to the 
present, but the past. This also contradicts Berger and Luckmann (1991), who build on Mead 
(1967) as well, and explain bracketing as a temporary phenomenon of the present; and it 
contradicts Wittgenstein’s (1992, 1994) concept of language as a bracketing “tool”.  
 
In retrospective sensemaking cognition must be finalized to become real, but who, then, is the 
one making sense? The process of sensemaking is carried out by an intelligent agent, but who 
is this agent? Could it be that the body unconsciously manufactures thoughts which only later 
can be made conscious by the mind? Surely this would account for the possibility of 
unconscious cognitions: the capability to know below the level of awareness. Such a 
conception, however, seems essentially dualistic, and potentially eradicates the meaning of 
cognition as a temporary bracket. For how can it be possible to know without knowing? If this 
were possible, life would be like a dream, with no way to wake up (Petranker 2005).  
 
Consider another model which portrays characteristic number three in Weick’s (1995) theory: 
 
 
PROCESS OF THINKING
COMPLEXITY 
Model 2.2 Bracketing
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The difference between the two models is that in the latter model meaning is continually 
bracketed in the present, and not retrospectively after it has occurred. The hypothesis that 
sensemaking is an ongoing process (characteristic number five) aligns with Berger and 
Luckmann’s (1991) concept that consciousness is a capacity to digitalize an analogous and 
ongoing process of emerging complexity; Bergson’s (1944) concept of true duration and 
“becoming”; and James’ (2007) image of “stream of experience”: that nothing is itself even 
for an instant. As Weick (1995) himself explains, however, we cannot understand anything as 
process. We cannot experience pure duration. We can only grasp reality through the practical 
appliance of conscious action. Thinking is process, but thought is object. To make sense is to 
use the conscious capacity to piece together a meaningless flow of occurrences into practical 
concepts. Sensemaking, then, is best thought of, as Weick points out, a process of bracketing 
an ongoing flow of senseless experiences. And even if making sense is something that 
happens over time, the produced bits and pieces (cognitions) are nothing more than temporal 
snapshots (Weisbord 1988). They are objects working as vessels of sense. Bracket in this 
sense is a temporal accomplishment, and it has no start or end. Bracketing is based on a 
momentary perception of reality, which flows from earlier actions, but this does not make it 
fundamentally retrospective. Being doomed to always look backwards is categorically 
different from using the past to make sense of the present.  
 
If sensemaking is fundamentally retrospective, it would imply that a thought is 100% 
constructed backwards, but where does this leave the present? Is not the body always situated 
in a passing present (Gadamer 1975)? How is it possible to be authentic (Heidegger 1996) 
when thoughts are always made in the past? Weick’s hypothesis of retrospection implies that 
you are not conscious when you are authentically present, because the present is in fact not 
experienced. This implies that the agent is blind (Gioia and Mehra 1996; Petranker 2005), as 
authenticity occurs at some point after the body was authentic, which would mean that the 
present is never the present, but the past. Thus, Weick operates with two versions of the 
present: one in which the body produces sense (although senselessly); and one after that, 
where the body is cognisant of the present which is essentially the past. The logical 
asymmetry dwells in the claim that if you are to be authentic in the continual sensemaking 
process, in the producing of meaning, you have no possibility of being authentic in the present, 
where in fact you experience authenticity. Characteristic number two of retrospection 
therefore contradicts number three (bracketing) and five (ongoing).  
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To sum up, the contradiction in Weick’s (1995) theory of retrospective sensemaking dwells in 
the postulate that cognition exists over time and must be ended before it makes sense 
backwards (i.e. “How can I know what I think until I see what I say”). As a metaphor, 
cognition is from Weick’s viewpoint like a train of interconnected coaches, and not until the 
whole train has passed (T=1) can you give a plausible account of it. Cognition must be 
completed, it must be thought through, before it can become cognition, and only then, at the 
end of it, can it be discovered retrospectively by a creative mind. This implies that it is not 
mindless action or earlier thoughts that provide grounds or horizons for retrospective 
cognition, but that the cognition itself is a process. Of course I, too, realize that something 
must happen before it has happened, but philosophically I would argue that something is not 
made cognisant as an object that stretches out over time, but rather, continually in the present 
as temporary brackets (model 2.2). In other words, there seems to be a mixture in Weick’s 
theory between cognition as process and cognition as a noun (bracket). To state that sense is 
made over time does not imply that sensemaking (i.e. a process) equals cognition (i.e. a noun). 
From my perspective, sensemaking is a process from which cognitions are conceived 
perpetually, and thus cognitions can only appear as momentary and temporary punctuations: 
as snapshots (Weisbord 1988). As Weick says, actions leading up to cognition are not 
equivalent to meaning. Meaning is always new, and it is glued to the present, not the past 
(Bergson 1944). The past opens up horizons for meaning in the present, but it does not 
determine it.   
Improspection – an alternative to retrospection 
As opposed to fundamental retrospection – that the only way of knowing is through observing 
the past – my interpretation of authors like Bergson (1944), Mead (1967), Berger and 
Luckmann (1991), Joas (1993), Heidegger (1996), and Vermersch (1999) is that we know 
what we are thinking the moment we are thinking it. Other authors have made the same 
suggestion (for example Ciborra 1999; Petranker 2005; Heron and Reason 2001; Park 2001; 
Senge et al. 2004). As Purser and Petranker (2005) elegantly put it, Weick’s (1995) thought-
after-action equals the old mechanistic thought-before-action in that the underlying strategy is 
“know outside the flow” (p. 245). As I have argued, however, cognition cannot be clutched on 
to in the same manner as time cannot be clutched on to. Sense is not categorically made 
backwards: it is a spontaneous experience repeating, or rather reconstructing, itself over time. 
Mead (1967) is very clear on this point as he suggests that it is the spontaneous “I” of the 
present that opens up for choice and authentic being, and that the “me” of the past (memory) 
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plays a dialogical role in the present (see chapter three for a closer examination of Mead’s 
thinking). The key word is dialogue, which opens up for the unknown of a dynamic present, 
as opposed to being “. . . doomed to live out our lives gazing at the wall in Plato’s cave” 
(Petranker 2005, p. 247). From Weick’s (1995) perspective, however, choice is impossible. 
Choice is already made at the time you discover it, but in Petranker’s (2005) words: “Does it 
really have to be this way?” (p. 245).  
 
An instrumental, pragmatist interpretation of mental objects (brackets) implies that they are 
not meaningful in themselves, but that they provide meaning in context as they are 
experienced by a body situated in a particular time and space: in a “situation” (Gadamer 1975; 
Joas 1993). A bracket is not an empty vessel, however. It does not encapsulate meaning as a 
shell or container (Dewey 1929). On the contrary, a bracket is in itself sense, bringing 
together content and instrument, as it were. Moreover, content presents itself in the way that it 
is successfully interpreted as contextual meaning. In other words, the sensemaking vessel, 
although used for the purpose of “transporting” sense, cannot be separated from sense as such. 
It is always experienced by someone as something (Berger and Luckmann 1991), which 
means that it can only be realized as meaning, just as meaning can only be achieved through 
and as significant symbols (Mead 1967). The messenger is the message (i.e. Heidegger’s 
(1996) “Dasein”), so to speak, and the message is in the philosophical sense always old news 
(Purser and Petranker 2005). As a consequence, a “problem” does not happen chronologically 
before meaning is shaped. Neither does the solution. As indicated by Joas (1996), the solution 
is simultaneously the problem and its meaning.  
 
As a philosophy about the deepest characteristics of meaning, I propose a theory of 
“improspective” as opposed to retrospective and, for that matter, prospective sensemaking. 
This is merely a re-statement of bracketing: that sense is made and experienced spontaneously 
as and through temporal objects; not categorically towards the past (retrospective) or the 
future (prospective). Improspection captures the spontaneity of Mead’s (1967) “I” as well as 
the “me”, as the past (me) influences spontaneous sense (I), but does not dictate it. This does 
not, however, exclude the possibility of either retrospection or prospection. Clearly, intention 
can be directed backwards towards history as well as forward towards an imagined future, and 
in practice we do both. What is different about improspection is that it opens for the 
possibility to look into, act in and make sense of the present, and to the extent that this is 
accomplished, sensemaking takes the form of improvisation (see chapter four). From a 
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philosophy of retrospection it is impossible to reflect in action (Schön 1991), as you will 
inevitably arrive late (Petranker 2005). Improspection builds on the premise that thinking is in 
itself action, and it is immediate and authentic. I inhabit my own story: I do not unveil it 
backwards.  
 
Improspection reflects Heideggerian (1996) throwness in a different way than argued by 
Weick (1995), as it captures the essence of immediate being rather than past existence. Weick 
interprets Shütz’s (1967) argument that attention “. . . presupposes an elapsed, passed-away 
experience” (p. 51) as a rationale for sense always being made after experience. I take a 
different view. What Shütz is indicating is that cognitions made by attention (i.e. Mead’s “I”) 
are continually put in the past (i.e. Mead’s “me”) due to their temporality. They are, however, 
made in a passing present, and at that temporal point they make sense in the here-and-now: 
not categorically by looking back at them, but by being filled by them continually. 
Improspection is a concept related to Tulku’s  (1994) “future infinitive”, which captures the 
essence of “. . . ‘never arriving’ of the future” (p. 93). Improspection is in a way a 
reconceptualization of Heidegger’s (1996) “Dasein” and Mead’s (1967) “self”, and indicates 
that improvisation may play a more essential role than in Weick’s (2001) view. Weick 
accentuates that “The importance of retrospect for improvisation imposes new demands that 
suggest why organizational improvisation may be rare” (p. 291). Thus, Weick uses 
retrospection as grounds for arguing that improvisation is nothing in the way of a fundamental 
trait of existence, but a rare phenomenon. This contradicts my attempt with this dissertation, 
which is to argue the opposite. By toning down the importance of retrospection in favour of 
improspection we get quite a different image. Improvisation is not exclusively a rare, 
exceptional or elitist phenomenon: rather, it is a fundamental trait of existence (Ciborra 1999). 
 
To sum up, I argue against Weick (1995) and hold that if sensemaking is seen as essentially 
retrospective, it becomes inauthentic and non-improvisatory. Sensemaking through 
improspection, however, opens up for the possibility that contextual and spontaneous 
improvisation is a basal characteristic of existence. These are the thoughts that I will bring 
into chapter four where I present the framework for “The improvising man”. The following 
quote from Petranker (2005) sets the tone: 
 
. . . the knowing that lets us improvise speech comes from the lived story of who we are, how 
things are, and what is happening (p. 250). 
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Other influential attempts to conceptualize organizational improvisation 
In one sense intensely creative art forms, such as jazz improvisation, can through their vitality 
and explicitness teach us a lot about improvisation in its less pure forms (Crossan and Sorrenti 
1997; Hatch 1997; Weick 1989, 1998, 2001), but if theoretical reflection never leaves the 
metaphorical level the metaphor might be taken literally – as if the only true forms of 
improvisation are found in its archetypes. In this light Kamoche et al. (2002) make an attempt 
to widen the scope of organizational improvisation beyond the mere elaboration of metaphors. 
In an extensive analysis of the literature on improvisation in the anthology “Organizational 
Improvisation” they address and discuss most of what has ever been written on the topic with 
relevance for organizations. And as a key line of argument, Kamoche et al. claim that a wider 
and more integrative understanding of improvisation as a practical phenomenon is needed 
than what they refer to as first, second and third generation improvisation theory – generations 
in which Crossan and Sorrenti (1997), Hatch (1997) and Weick (1998) are all situated. In a 
critique of earlier generations of organizational improvisation theory they charge authors with: 
“. . . limiting themselves to quoting from jazz theory (e.g. Weick 1998) or to embellishing 
second stage definitions (Hatch 1997) . . . . Weick’s will of ‘not pushing jazz as much as […] 
pushing improvisation’ remains, even in later generations’.” (Kamoche et al. 2002, p. 98).  
 
And from a meticulous and enlightening discussion on the most central of the existing 
definitions of improvisation, Kamoche et al. propose the following: “Improvisation is the 
conception of action as it unfolds, by an organization and/or its members, drawing on 
available material, cognitive, affective and social resources” (p. 99). The authors end up with 
this definition as a short résumé of their discussion. It is supposed to counter the many 
attempts to import jazz somewhat prematurely and normatively into organization theory; and 
is also intended as a critique of “. . . treating only radical departures from plans as 
improvisational”, which would “. . . amount to treating [improvisation] as a punctuated 
equilibrium phenomenon” (p. 108). At first glance, then, it would seem that Kamoche et al. 
are pursuing a genuinely new understanding of improvisation (that amongst other things seeks 
beyond the dichotomies of routine and plan on one side and improvisation on the other). A 
conceptual problem with their definition, however, concerns how an organization in itself 
might act without the involvement of its members? For this to be possible, must not Kamoche 
et al. presume an image of organization that is not a process of interaction between people, 
but an objectified entity? As will be argued in the following, Kamoche et al.’s argumentation 
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seems to contain a latent contradiction as on the one hand they explicitly criticize what they 
call “positivist assumptions” of improvisation, and on the other hand are themselves 
indicating a similar type of assumptions.  
 
Another inconsistency in Kamoche et al.’s argumentation is traceable as referring to Miner et 
al. (1997) they hold that for improvisation to be triggered, a phenomenon must be perceived 
as unexpected and unplanned for; and following Ciborra (1996) they argue that the 
phenomenon must even be cumulatively unplanned for, meaning that there can exist no 
predefined script to handle the event. Moreover, based on Moorman and Miner (1995) and 
Argyris and Schön (1992) they argue that not only will improvisation be hindered if the event 
is highly familiar, but also if it is highly unfamiliar. Furthermore, Kamoche et al. argue that in 
order for improvisation to occur there must be a need for speedy action, in which case the 
event can be seen as either a problem or an opportunity, which is also a central issue in 
Moorman and Miner (1998). Is there not in all of these cases a tendency towards precisely the 
kind of rareness of improvisation that the authors crave to shake off? Are not Kamoche et al. 
(2002) close to enunciating precisely the kind of radical departure they are explicitly trying to 
avoid? For what about the typical practical situation, where unexpectedness and complexity 
come in smaller portions? What about routines that never stay exactly the same, and plans that 
are continually, contextually and creatively revised-in-action? If these are not instances of 
improvisation, what are they? “In situations where an adequate routine does exist, then 
improvisation will be highly unlikely”, Kamoche et al. (p. 118) argue. Seeing, as do Pentland 
and Reuter (1994), routines as grammars, Kamoche et al. continue with a claim that routines 
can be embellished and combined in countless possibilities (a point that is thoroughly 
elaborated later in the dissertation). But the authors do not go so far as to say that routines 
cannot be employed entirely technically, and that in practice, some element of spontaneity and 
improvisation is inevitable. Only if it is used in a somewhat artistic manner can a plan or a 
routine amalgamate with practice as improvisation, they induce. In all other instances, where 
the degree of creativity is far less obvious, improvisation will not occur. One might ask, then, 
to which extent do Kamoche et al. really differ from Weick and the other “third generation 
authors” (Kamoche et al. 2002)? 
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Yet another sign of the contradiction in Kamoche et al.’s argumentation can be found in their 
warnings about getting too involved with improvisation: 
 
. . . organizations that rely on improvisation to handle unexpected events may themselves 
create those events, falling in a never-ending spiral of complexity and deteriorating 
manageability, in a way close to what happens when a jazz musician cannot find a way to 
cohere an improvisation around the underlying score of a song. Over-reliance/addictiveness 
on improvisation can be another negative consequence of its practice. (Kamoche et al. 2002, 
p. 128.  
 
In the case of Kamoche et al., then, we can trace a taken for granted view of improvisation as 
a non-stopping quest for the genuinely new, the extraordinarily creative, which is hardly 
representative of all practical situations as such. In fact, it seems that this is yet another issue 
indicating these authors’ somehow unsuccessful attempt to mould a more wide-reaching 
approach to improvisation than those of their predecessors. To point out that improvisation 
might have negative consequences is merely an implicit and trivial remark of how practice 
and sensemaking do not always succeed – that all theories do not work. What is worse, 
however, it indicates what is thoroughly explicated in Moorman and Miner’s (1998a) work: 
that improvisation can be treated as an autonomous being; as a phenomenon in its own right 
that is either present or not, either effective or not, dependent on the presence of certain 
objective and quantifiable factors.  
 
As an illustrative example, these authors in their objectivist jargon suggest a research 
approach that “. . . could develop a more general framework of the antecedents and 
consequences of improvisation” (Moorman and Miner 1998a, p. 14). Similarly, in Moorman 
and Miner (1998b) a dualistic attempt is made to explicate and quantify improvisation as a 
collective phenomenon (entity), and their only criterion for improvisation is spontaneity in the 
sense of little or non-existing (quantifiable and linear) time lag between thought and action. 
As a temporary conclusion with regard to both Kamoche et al. (2002) and Moorman and 
Miner (1998a, 1998b), what immediately strikes me as mind sparking and functional 
definitions are to some extent contradicted by the authors’ succeeding discussions. More 
specifically, it seems that Kamoche et al. lapse into a perspective on improvisation as an 
autonomous feature that can be turned on and off, and when it is on, when it is objectively 
triggered, it involves exceptionally high degrees of spontaneity and/or genuine creativity. 
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However critical to, say, the positivist views on improvisation they purport to be, Kamoche et 
al. still end up with the following conclusion after a long, intricate and interesting discussion: 
 
[Improvisation] happens whenever an organization faces an occurrence it perceives as 
unexpected for which it does not possess any kind of preplanned course of action and which is 
perceived as requiring fast action, this occurrence is perceived as either a problem or an 
opportunity. (Kamoche et al. 2002, p. 115).   
 
Summarized, it is hard to see how the frameworks of Moorman and Miner (1998a, 1998b), 
Crossan and Sorrenti (1997), Hatch (1997) and Weick (1998) are in any considerable degree 
improved or significantly altered, which leads me to the following pertinent question: Is it 
possible to build up a discussion that is loyal to Kamoche et al.’s desire to widen the 
perception of improvisation, which can draw on the many fruitful definitions that are 
presented in this section in a creative manner, but which is more nuanced and far-reaching 
than the existing attempts? Is it possible to conceptualize improvisation in such a manner that 
it becomes more than exceptional (and radical) real time transformations-in-action and indeed 
different from the concept of improvisation as an objective phenomenon? 
 
In the succeeding chapters I shall develop a concept of improvisation from key elements in 
practical and hermeneutical philosophy. As a key point of argument I am more taken with the 
inevitable position of improvisation in everyday life, and with the variety and nuances of 
improvisation in practice and in good improvisation, than with improvisation in its pure and 
exceptional forms. In particular, I propose in chapter four “The improvising man” as a 
practically applicable framework; a collection of philosophical assumptions; that concerns 
and reaches further into the emergent details of everyday life. This approach is comparable to 
that of Schön (1987, 1991), Ciborra (1999), Purser and Petranker (2005) and Petranker (2005), 
who build on the same philosophical foundation as I do (i.e. pragmatism, hermenutics and 
phenomenology). As a consequence, I share many basic assumptions about improvisation 
with these authors, and many of my reflections are deeply inspired by them. For instance with 
regard to the general issues of improvisation and time, problem definition, and the use of tools 
there are strong connections between my study and theirs, and I would especially like to 
emphasize the common bond between us in regarding improvisation as a cornerstone of 
existence, and thus, of organizing practice.  
 
 43
I have, however, chosen to include and deepen many theoretical aspects that they have not, 
such as the role of spontaneity, emotionality, and tools in improvisation. Furthermore, I have 
made an in-depth study of improvisation related to organizational topics such as routine, 
structure, plan, and system, and reflected upon how functionality can be achieved through 
improvisation. All of these issues are treated somewhat differently from, but in the same spirit 
as, the approach of the previously mentioned authors. This is why I have chosen to 
incorporate them into my discussion, rather than to discuss the authors and their contributions 
in separate sections. In that sense they are used both as support and source of inspiration for 
the structure I would like to present. Finally, I would like to emphasize that unlike Schön 
(1987, 1991), Ciborra (1999) Purser and Petranker (2005), and Petranker (2005) mine is an 
empirical study, and that as a consequence I have been forced to anchor my theoretical 
reflections in practice. As a result of this fact, several new concepts of improvisation in 
everyday organizing have emerged (see chapter eight). Together with, and as part of, my 
empirical findings these new concepts comprise a bridge between the philosophical anchorage 
that I share with the aforementioned authors and improvisation as a practical, empirical and 
contextual phenomenon.  
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Chapter 3. Practical philosophy: an epistemological 
backdrop for improvisation 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a context for my take on organizing as improvisation, and is important 
as a backdrop for understanding why I end up with the specific elements of spontaneity, 
creativity, emotionality and sociality in my synthesis of improvisation (next chapter). My 
angle to improvisation emerges from an interest in practical philosophy. More specifically, I 
build upon the school of American pragmatism, most commonly associated with philosophers 
such as Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey and George H. Mead. In the following 
I will attempt to present a general overview of this school, particularly focusing on those 
aspects that are vital for developing a workable concept of improvisation. Finally, I will 
present some key aspects from Martin Heidegger’s hermeneutics. It is my view that 
Heidegger’s thoughts can provide an important supplement to the pragmatist school and thus 
enrich my conception of practical philosophy and, ultimately, of improvisation.   
Pragmatism and non-dualism 
Unlike traditional Western philosophy American pragmatism is constructed upon an anti-
Cartesian dogma of rejecting the possibility of uncovering ontologically objective truth. By 
many regarded as the founder of American pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce addresses 
these questions in the following way:  
 
We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually 
have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by 
a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence this initial 
scepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt; and no one who follows the 
Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs which 
in form he has taken up. It is, therefore, as useless a preliminary as going to the North Pole 
would be in order to get to Constantinople by coming down regularly upon a meridian. A 
person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reasons to doubt what he began by 
believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on 
account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not 
doubt in our hearts. (Peirce 1974a, pp. 156-157). 
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A key point for Peirce is mistrust in Descartes’ alleged path to universal truth (see chapter six 
for a detailed discussion of Descartes’ “naïve rationalism”). Does this mean that Peirce lapses 
into “naïve empiricism” (Russell 1995)? Such objections have indeed been raised against the 
kind of anti-dualistic philosophy Peirce and the pragmatists represent. Discussing the impact 
of James’s pragmatism, for instance, Bergson (1992) says the following: 
 
One may raise objections to [pragmatism] – and I myself should make certain reservations 
concerning it: but no one will challenge its depth and originality . . . . People have said that the 
pragmatism of James was only a form of scepticism, that it lowered truth, that it advised 
against and discouraged disinterested scientific research. Such an interpretation will never 
enter the heads of those who read his work attentively. (p. 218). 
 
By expanding more thoroughly on the school of pragmatism I shall seek an answer to these 
objections. Note, however, that as pragmatist thought spread in several directions, it is hard to 
identify the pragmatist school as one single philosophy. Still, the different versions of 
pragmatism share a general conception concerning an opposition to the Cartesian split 
between body and soul, subject and object (Joas 1993). Hence, the core of the pragmatist 
school may be labelled a non-dualistic philosophy, which implies a disintegration of Cartesian 
dualism, as the notion of transcendental or objective truth cannot be proven outside of human 
thought and action. This way of thinking recognizes the inevitability of embodiment in all 
human rationality, and that objective truth can never be reached by a creature incapable of 
rising above and objectively transcending its own body (Dewey 1929).  
 
As a seemingly naïve statement the pragmatists claim that we cannot free ourselves of our 
bodies, but should look, rather, at the body as the natural starting point for philosophical 
investigations. In other words, it is impossible to accept Descartes’ dualist argumentation as 
self-evident unless, perhaps, from a deeply held religious faith. Certainly, we can talk about 
what is outside, and even in a way live and participate on the outside (in the social and 
physical sphere), but only by using our insides. Our outsides can only be reached from within, 
thus collapsing the dichotomy between the two. In short, from the perspective of non-dualism 
nothing can be said to be objectively true, as the path to reality always goes through a 
corporal being.  
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Mead’s theory of “the self” 
To learn more about how the pragmatists explain the human condition I will take as my point 
of departure pragmatist George Herbert Mead’s (1967) conception of “the self”. Mead 
encourages us to base our philosophical investigations on the living human body situated in 
complex and emergent surroundings, and it is because humans are equipped with the tool of 
consciousness that we are enabled to escape complexity and discover ourselves as individuals. 
More specifically we do this, Mead explains, through our capacity to take the role of others, 
and through communicating our intentions back to them. This is a reflexive process of 
exchanging significant symbols, implying any sign or gesture that communicates “the same” 
meaning to everyone involved. “The same” appears in quotation marks to signal a focus on 
intersubjectivity rather than objectivity, indicating meaning that works socially in a practical 
context (Peirce 1966b). We learn the meaning of significant symbols by experiencing them in 
real-life contexts, and as we grow older our vocabulary continues to expand. To be conscious 
of ourselves, then, implies a continuous process of self-creation; illustrating that 
consciousness does not exist in itself, but that it is seen, rather, as a continuous capacity to 
create objects – to objectify through “enactment” (Weick 1995). Hence, self-consciousness 
should be understood as the incessant creation and recreation of oneself as an object (Joas 
1993).  
 
Understanding consciousness is imperative in the pragmatist school, and strongly influenced 
by Mead’s philosophy Berger and Luckmann (1991) say that consciousness is: “. . . always 
intentional; it always intends or is directed towards objects. We can never apprehend some 
putative substratum of consciousness as such, only consciousness of something or other.” (p. 
34). As soon as consciousness is directed towards an object, the object is already gone and 
only exists as memory which must be reconstructed to once again come into sight (Mead 
1967). This is another way of showing that objects exist as temporary constructions, since the 
future continues to arrive and cognitions are continually outdated (James 2007). 
Reconstructions are not solid or 100% identical to each other, but always slightly unique since 
they are created as static representations by a body (of flesh and blood) in flux. Uniqueness is 
thus inevitable, and sometimes even massive, as is the case when we recognize something as 
genuinely original or new in practical life. In Bergson’s (1944) words ceaseless “. . . duration 
means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new” (p. 
28). According to Bergson the human condition is therefore one of becoming. As a 
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consequence, the present can be thought of as a feeling of momentary existence, of throwness 
(Heidegger 1996), rather than, say, as a derivate of linear time. In Mead’s vocabulary this is 
explained in the manner that the self is an emergent quality: a dialogical phenomenon 
between the “I” of the present and the objectified “me” of the past; and it does not exist in 
itself as an entity. This bears close resemblance to Heidegger’s argument that Being should be 
seen as an emergent and practical property which only exists in the becoming as a capacity of 
understanding [Dasein] (Okrent 1988).  
 
The “I” in Mead’s (1967) view represents the capacity to continually construct and 
reconstruct oneself (and the world) as an object, a “me”, and it can never be clutched as such. 
Thus, self-consciousness is a dynamic feature of reflexivity and involves acting towards one’s 
own body and person. Thus, thinking or sensemaking is regarded as a form of practice or 
action. In this light “everyday practical life” can be understood as the creative processes of 
making sense and identity from which “existence” is constituted (Okrent 1988). Moreover, 
creativity is always directed towards something, and this something is regarded as a temporal 
object of creation based on contextual interpretation, not as a given (Berger and Luckmann 
1991). As soon as the object is created it becomes part of the “me”, which can be understood 
as memory in everyday speech. Spontaneity, then, is a vital property of the “I”, as a capacity 
to think and act freely in situ and within context. Spontaneity is therefore an essential trait in 
improspection; in the incessant punctuation of pure duration for the sake of creating form and 
identity (Bergson 1944; Purser and Petranker 2005).   
Non-dualism and complexity  
Thinking, the pragmatists claim, is triggered when the self runs into problematic situations 
(Joas 1993, 1996). Similarly, existentialist philosophers argue that death anxiety is the most 
profound of all human problems, and an intriguing and elaborate treatise on existential death 
and anxiety is found in William Large’s (2002) paper “Impersonal existence: a conceptual 
genealogy of the ‘there is’ from Heidegger to Blanchot and Levinas.” Translated into a 
pragmatist perspective such existential anxiety can be seen as the driver of sensemaking due 
to the need to establish identity and reduce chaos whenever it is experienced by the human 
body – a weapon to preserve the self, so to speak (Weick 1995). In a way, then, meaning-
making can be conceived as a process of creating problems, of recognizing within oneself that 
something is challenging and must be dealt with. Hence, if we did not think, we would not 
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experience problems. As soon as we do, though, we have an urge to find solutions: to balance 
the situation and re-establish peace and tranquillity (Joas 1996). 
  
 
Making sense is seen by the pragmatists as equivalent to (re-)creating order, coherence and 
predictability from complex or meaningless experiences: to create logic from complexity and 
chaos, to form knowing from not-knowing. Thinking is a way of projecting an image of the 
past and the future, and as we prefer understanding to chaos we try to create the future in 
advance to avoid problems. This is a way of ensuring continuity between the present and the 
future, to avoid surprises and produce predictable outcomes.  
 
Experiencing complexity and non-sense means not being able to create meaning in a situation: 
Existence becomes meaningless. Philosophically the pragmatist would argue that meaning can 
never be disclosed objectively through technical measures (non-dualism). Thus, wrapped 
around any bracket of meaning there is always complexity in the sense of meaninglessness 
(see model 3.0), even though this may not be recognized except in situations of extreme 
uncertainty. Complexity in the non-dualistic sense therefore reflects the fundamental problem 
of not-knowing or being able to uncover philosophically objective truth (Joas 1996). Via 
sensemaking activities one is, however, capable of producing functional structures of reality. 
Such structures emerge in such a way that they are logical within their own parameters – they 
work as instruments with which to categorize reality in a logical and predictable manner, and 
the more sophisticated the logic the more complicated it becomes. Thus, as Kvaløy Setreng 
(2006) argues, one should be careful not to mix “the complicated” with “the complex”, as the 
The 
complicated
 
The complex (meaninglessness) 
Model 3.0 Complexity and the complicated 
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former emerges through activities designed to fill the void of not knowing. Complexity, 
however, points to circumstances where no meaning can be found or trusted to exist.  
 
Complexity is what is experienced when for example there is perceived to be no structure, 
when structures break down, or workability for some reason disintegrates; when structures 
are changed into something that is not yet defined; or when different structures clash together 
erecting contradictions and paradox – incidents that severely challenge predictability, 
coherence and identity. Trust, then, is not solely a matter of clarity, but of (perceived) 
functionality: When someone says they do not know which structure to employ, they may 
possess clear images or ideas of feasible alternatives, but they do not know which ones will 
work; they have no trust in structural workability. And this is a matter of complexity. In other 
words, complexity concerns uncertainty and meaninglessness as it appears when structure 
itself is at stake, which, consequently, triggers structuring efforts.  
 
Discussing complexity or meaninglessness in philosophical terms can easily turn into an 
abstract and alienating exercise. Meaninglessness, for instance, may have such strong 
connotations that it sets our minds to larger issues than we usually associate with everyday 
practice. And indeed, the way of the pragmatists can be non-intuitive and hard to grasp in an 
institutionalized reality of strong structures; a reality in which things and situations are on the 
whole quite easily interpreted and understood, as the degree of complexity is not too 
overwhelming. How often do we for instance address the deepest philosophical issues of 
identity, meaning and objectivity in practical work life?  
 
However, meaninglessness and complexity is more than, or rather, less grandiose than, 
matters of life and death, of great anxiety, troubled minds, and chaotic bewilderment. To get a 
more practical hold of complexity in everyday management, for instance, I suggest reading 
chapter seven where I present several stories of complexity and explain how I see different 
forms of complexity characterising everyday situations for managers. A typical trait in most 
of these stories is that complexity is often more subtle and implicit than what can easily be 
captured in abstract philosophical terms. Typically, everyday complexity is found in dealing 
with open-ended problems with no given solutions. More specifically, I have in my empirical 
study found it in negotiations of intersubjectivity, in misunderstandings, linguistic ambiguity, 
emotional communication, and in different forms of unpredictability – matters that are deeply 
intertwined and connected. Furthermore, my study presents narratives on how complexity is 
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tied to sensemaking and improvisation, and the way this emerges on an everyday level 
through different language symbols.  
Pragmatism is a practical philosophy 
What makes pragmatism a practical philosophy? In order to see this I return to Mead (1967) 
and a more general theoretical discussion on consciousness and complexity. As a key issue 
Mead claims that the human body makes sense by means of significant symbols, and that 
there are no limits to what these symbols may be. Anything that the brain uses as a 
meaningful property is regarded as significant, be it an odour, a sound, a written sign, a shape, 
or simply a hand-gesture (Joas 1993). Note that the significant symbol must be used to 
provide sense. It does not have meaning in itself. Its sense is rather tied to a practical context 
in which the individual has learnt to appreciate its value as a tool. A hammer becomes a 
hammer only as you imagine its use in a practical situation (Okrent 1988). This reflects a key 
element in pragmatist thought: that the individual through her body is inevitably tied to 
(practical) emergence. Even if one’s thoughts wander off into the most abstract of landscapes, 
there is still your body of flesh and blood performing the thinking (Joas 1997). Hence, one 
cannot be sure of anything in a transcendent or absolute manner. You might crave for absolute 
or objective knowledge, but still you can only talk about the objective as it appears in your 
subjective mind (Blumer 1969).  
 
From the point of view of the pragmatist the objective is fundamentally subjective, and any 
form of correspondence theory of truth, which is the main vessel in for example the positivist 
school, becomes futile. Searle (1995), however, argues in favour of a non-dualistic 
correspondence theory, but this is only possible if the concept of truth changes from one of 
objective ontology to one of practical epistemology. Instead of truth being approached 
through means to uncover the suprahuman and transcendental, practical epistemology implies 
that the closest one can come to truth is via practical trial and failure. Thus it is via practical 
experience that a concept of truth might emerge: something which takes form as theories 
about the world are continually constructed and refined (see chapter six). In a way, then, it is 
not so much a question of truth, as it is of practical use: “does this theory work as a signifier 
of reality?” A theory, then, does not have to be proven objectively – there is no requirement 
for such – but its workability must be proven in practice. With reference to science, Dewey 
(1929) says the following:  
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. . . in the practice of science, knowledge is an affair of making sure, not of grasping 
antecedently given surities. What is already known, what is accepted as truth, is of immense 
importance; inquiry could not proceed a step without it. But it is held subject to use, and is at 
the mercy of the discoveries which makes it possible. It has to be adjusted to the latter and not 
the latter to it. When things are defined as instruments, their value and validity reside in what 
proceeds from them; consequences not antecedents supply meaning and verity. Truths 
already possessed may have practical or moral certainty, but logically they never lose a 
hypothetic quality. (p. 154).   
 
Establishing practically workable theories is equivalent to producing meaning or knowledge, 
and it is never accomplished on a permanent basis (Bergson 1944). This is, rather, a lifelong 
ongoing accomplishment (Weick 1995). Moreover, it is simultaneously a solitary and a social 
process, where the solitary part is also socially triggered and structured (Joas 1996). The 
notion of sociality as a precursor for meaning-making and identity is as Wenger (2004) puts it 
far from being trivially true. To see this we consult Mead (1967), who argues that the very 
process of creating meaning and identity begins as the infant at some point recognizes her 
mother as a person. The process continues as the infant recognizes herself as being capable of 
influencing the situation as a person – she has a will of her own. This is, of course, a 
speculative theory, but it provides a fruitful starting point for further thinking. The key point 
is that the process of identity-shaping is initially social, and continues to be so as the 
individual communicates with others as well as herself as an object (me). Meaning is 
therefore primarily to be perceived as a social property, and to the extent that (the stuff of) 
social interaction becomes meaningful for all the individuals involved, intersubjective 
meaning is established. Consequently, what becomes intersubjectively accepted is regarded as 
the social truth, which can be any symbol that works in the physical and social context at hand. 
In short, from this viewpoint objective truth is exchanged with intersubjective and practical 
functionality (Dewey 1929; Joas 1993).  
 
As it is at the core of the pragmatist school and at the essence of building up an understanding 
of improvisation, I shall dwell some more upon “functionality”. What does it mean that a 
theory, a symbol, can be true only to the extent that it works? Does it imply ontological 
relativism or solipsism? No, but it implies epistemological relativism, simply meaning that we 
cannot apprehend an object as such, only as it appears to us (inter)subjectively (Blumer 
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1969). By epistemological relativity is implied that no questions are necessarily asked about 
the existence of ontologically objective truth, only about our ability to produce positive 
knowledge of reality. In the case of ontological relativism, however, reality is categorically 
denied existence, which is a most extreme point of view. It implies that individuals are the 
creators of everything as such – that the reality we know only exists in our imagination, which 
is far from the pragmatist’s epistemological relativism. It is also far from ontological 
objectivism. Ontological relativism and objectivism are both, however, within the same logic 
and thus rhetoric, only at different ends of the scale. Both are dualist conceptions, and 
whereas the one argues that reality exists objectively, the other claims the opposite. They are 
both part of an ensnaring rhetoric, of a language game (Wittgenstein 1992, 1994) which is 
potentially more deceiving and cunning than it is illuminating: one which I have labelled the 
ontology game (see model 3.1).  
 
 
Unlike the dualist the pragmatist does not address the basic ontological questions directly: he 
does not say that something IS or IS NOT, as this would amount to tautological nonsense. For 
example, when Heraclitus argues that everything is in flux and nothing exists, this reflects 
philosophical solipsism. When the pragmatist, however, says that meaning is made by a 
contextually bound subject, it means that everything might be in flux or it might be stable, but 
since comprehension of “everything” must come about through and as human cognition, 
ontological questions can never be addressed in an objectively truthful manner. Flux is for the 
pragmatist the result of non-dualism, as the body strives to create stability under 
circumstances of ceaseless duration (Bergson 1944; Purser and Petranker 2005; James 2007). 
Being unavoidably embodied, rationality is bound to a life in flux, making flux an 
epistemological experience rather than an ontological fact. Everything is in flux because it 
seems so, not because de facto it is so.  
 
Once again, a pragmatist perspective entails that everything must be sensed (in both meanings 
of the term) through and from corporality, thus making the ontological objective a somewhat 
Non-existence (Is not) Existence (Is) 
Model 3.1 The ontology game 
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unrewarding and futile construct. Perhaps there exists something “objective” outside of us or 
perhaps not: we cannot know anything about it, and about the things we cannot know 
anything about we should hold our tongues (Wittgenstein 2001, § 7). What we do know, 
however, is that something seems real, and that it continues to do so. Although we cannot be 
sure whether something exists objectively or not, we repeatedly have real experiences in 
everyday life. Reality is that which seems real, and for that reason it is far from relative in any 
given situation. But not everything seems real, all theories do not work: To be seated in an 
airplane 10000 feet above ground feels like a real experience of flying, and a theory claiming 
the opposite would prove itself wrong in context. For if one decided to jump out, one would 
probably face some rather unpleasant consequences.  
 
Some theories work, others fail. I know this because I have tried, made errors and made sense 
of my experiences. I cannot say whether or not my theories are real in an objective sense, but 
they work as real for me in practical and social life, and most of them I seldom question. I 
could, though, if I had to, presumably without hard feelings, because I know that they are 
tentative in their constitution. After all they are only theories, temporary knowledge, produced 
as workable hypotheses. Theories have a function, and the function is inevitably tied to a 
practical context of which we can only talk through theories (Dewey 1929). This is why 
pragmatism is a practical philosophy. Pragmatism depicts that practical activity is the basic 
way of being (Okrent 1988), which implies that to be engaged in a practice (to act) means to 
be creative (Joas 1996).   
 
To sum up, as theories are tied to practical contexts, and the body is the creator of theories, it 
follows that the pragmatist sees the body as contextually bound. The conscious thought is 
brought to life by a body communicating with itself and a (perceived) outside world, which 
the body is also part of. The body is simultaneously the “I” and the “me” evolving 
dynamically and dialogically creating the self (Mead 1967), and the self is thus essentially 
improspective, not retrospective or prospective. Choice reflects the capacity of the “I” to 
spontaneously change the course and create sense, but as it is restricted by the bodily memory, 
choice can only be made within contextual parameters (Joas 1996). Free will, the ability to 
make choices, is only free within the constraints of (contextual) memory. It is impossible to 
get rid of one’s memory and skills altogether, just as it is impossible to free oneself of one’s 
own corporality.  
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Heidegger’s pragmatism 
To round off this chapter I would like to present some general reflections on Martin 
Heidegger and his work Being and Time (1996), which can be claimed to contain many of the 
same practical philosophical elements as the works of the pragmatists. This argument is 
particularly well explicated in Mark Okrent’s book Heidegger’s Pragmatism from 1988. As a 
first note it is intriguing to see how, concurrent with the pragmatist view, through his concept 
of “Dasein” Heidegger describes the transcendent qualities of existence as “corporal 
situatedness”. In Heidegger’s view Dasein represents the true form of “being” which is 
constituted as “throwness” into a world of complexity. Equipped with the tool of rationality 
Heidegger argues that Dasein, the ontological human condition, comes into existence as it 
makes sense of complexity from the grounds of certain fore-having. “Fore-having” bears 
close resemblance to memory, or “me” in Mead’s (1967) vocabulary, as it is never static, but 
an emerging property changing and being changed by momentary experience. This reflexivity 
of changing whilst simultaneously being changed is seen by Heidegger (1996) as a circle of 
hermeneutics, which is not just a method of circular understanding to be turned on and off by 
will, but the very way we exist in the world as sensible creatures. Sensemaking cannot take 
place in a vacuum: rationality does not exist in itself as an objective transcendent character, 
only as a latent or practically realized human capacity: Dasein. 
 
With Being and Time (1996) Heidegger claimed to have reinvented Western philosophy in 
that he proclaims a redefined approach to ontology. His is not a version of some transcendent 
outside. For Heidegger ontology concerns an unavoidable and incessant existential 
transcendence emerging from a capability to provide and shape context in a perceived outer 
landscape of “extants”. Existence is transcendence, Heidegger says (Nicolaisen 2003). 
Rationality involves creating oneself as well as the encompassing outside as objects through 
the intellectual means of the individual body. The parallels to pragmatism are irreducible.  
 
Somewhat ironically Heidegger’s Dasein, the concept of existence as ontological 
transcendence, implies a rejection of the ontology game of dualists; ironical in the sense that it 
is an ontologically conceived language that provides the basis for both the dualist strand and 
Heidegger’s somewhat contradictive ontological position. Heidegger’s rejection and 
polemical redefinition of dualist ontology might be a minor challenge to the familiar and 
sophisticated reader of philosophy, but for everybody else the rhetorical grip of re-erecting 
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ontology as “non-ontology” is not self-evident but quite intricate and even to some extent 
paradoxical. In this regard the American pragmatists, who precede Heidegger historically, can 
be credited for making use of a more intuitive language: one that does not emerge from and 
within orthodox western philosophy as much as it opposes it. My claim is that with regard to 
comprehending the substance of non-dualism, “playing an epistemological game” is a more 
grounded and intuitive approach than “playing an ontological game”. The former does not 
emit the sense of philosophical struggle that can be sensed in Heidegger’s work as he appears 
to be trying to shake off an orthodox linguistic system whilst simultaneously remaining 
faithful to its pillars. And indeed it is the privilege of the outsider – in this case in the 
geographical, cultural and hence the philosophical sense – not to yield to the tradition which 
one opposes. Whereas Heidegger gives the impression of seeking to change the system from 
within and with the use of the conventional system, the Pragmatists’ privilege is to present a 
new system and new linguistics altogether. Even though the two canons concur 
philosophically in non-dualism, they do so from different frameworks: one ontological and 
the other epistemological. 
 
From the philosophical perspectives of pragmatism and Heidegger’s hermeneutics I have 
attempted to give an overview of practical philosophy. The point of doing so has been to 
illuminate some traits of existence which are essential to understanding the role of 
improvisation in everyday practice. In the following I will build upon these traits and try to 
form a synthesis of improvisation as a philosophical phenomenon: “The improvising man”. 
My ambition with “The improvising” man is to show that practical philosophy implicitly 
places improvisation at the heart of practical life, and to point out some implications for the 
understanding of organizing and work practice.  
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Chapter 4. The improvising man  
 
“Admittedly, some people wouldn’t be caught dead 
talking about souls and spirits. But even for those 
people who would explicitly reject the notion of a 
body-soul split, dualist assumptions still frame how 
these issues are thought about. You can see this 
when people appeal to science to answer the question 
"When does life begin?" as if this is an empirical 
question, and an objective answer would settle the 
moral debate once and for all.”  
(Bloom 2004, p. 3).  
Introduction 
My ambition with this chapter is to push the existing definitions of improvisation from 
chapter two further and to synthesize a new working definition based on the insights from 
practical philosophy. The heading of the chapter is a wordplay containing two central 
concepts throughout the history of organization theory: “economic man” (homo economicus) 
(Blaug 1992) and the somewhat refined successor “administrative man” (Simon 1968). 
Organization theory is the topic for chapter five, and for now these two doctrines merely 
provide inspiration for an alternative concept, “The improvising man”, which the forthcoming 
part is dedicated to enunciating. From the basis of practical philosophy, improvisation will be 
presented as the natural way of existing in life as a corporal and rational being. The insights 
generated from this chapter are next brought into the domain of organization theory (chapter 
five), and some important implications are sketched out, challenging previous literature.    
 
I do not question that man behaves in a technically rational way for larger or smaller parts of 
his given time, thereby providing empirical foundation for simplistic models like “economic 
man” and “administrative man”, but in my view, generalizing these into universal theories of 
existence reflects an act of philosophical vulgarization. Players of the ontology game might 
not be aware of the determinism in philosophical dualism, but as dualism is taken for granted, 
man is somewhat deprived of abductive rationality which precedes and reaches beyond mere 
technical calculation (Feyerabend 2002). Of course there is an “evil” asymmetry subduing this 
discussion: ontology game players will refuse to change their stance as will the non-dualist, so 
which of the two reflects the more humble and scientific approach? In my view, it depends on 
 57
philosophical intention. The humble approach is the one which follows the open-endedness of 
creativity and rationality, and which criticizes and falsifies for the sake of genuine curiosity 
and progress. Non-dualist methodology is about precisely those things, and from this 
perspective, in which abduction is the root concept (Peirce 1966a, 1966b, 1974a, 1974b), not 
induction or deduction, all theories are welcomed; all other than those of absolutism. In 
Peirce’s (1974a) words: “Deduction proves that something must be; Induction shows that 
something actually is operative; Abduction merely suggests that something may be.” (p. 106). 
 
Basically, “The improvising man” represents a set of philosophical assumptions concerning 
how sense is abducted improspectively through external and irreversible action. It emerges 
from the non-dualist tradition of practical philosophy, and is not meant as an attempt to give 
all answers. Rather, “The improvising man” is meant to provide an alternative language and 
concept of improvisation that might contribute to genuine curiosity and progress within the 
organizational field. I will suggest from a conceptual analysis that improvisation can be 
defined as spontaneous and hermeneutical sensemaking via external action. All parts of this 
definition will be addressed under specific sections, with particular focus on spontaneity on 
one hand and the aspects of external sensemaking and creativity on the other. Next, I will 
attempt to show how both of these dimensions are connected to the practical philosophical 
ideas of corporality, emotionality and sociality and how these can be further expanded from a 
hermeneutical viewpoint. This conceptual analysis of improvisation will ultimately lead to the 
theoretical framework of “The improvising man”.  
 
Before I move on to exploring what I hold as crucial facets of improvisation and start 
constructing a working definition, I will repeat the basal insight from practical philosophy that 
reality is constructed on the basis of individual bodies (inter-)acting sensibly in more or less 
complex surroundings (Mead 1967). As reality is never 100% stable, given or predictable, and 
100% equal reconstruction of action is impossible, there will inevitably be some degree of 
complexity embedded in every lived context. This non-dualistic complexity might be 
comprehended as ambiguity, uncertainty or even meaninglessness. With this as our basis, let 
the following idea be of guidance in the succeeding discussions: Striving for sense and 
identity under complex circumstances calls for an enduring capacity to improvise: to act 
spontaneously and creatively.  
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Spontaneity  
Simply put, for action to become improvisation it needs to be spontaneous: Spontaneity is a 
prerequisite for improvisation. To understand this, one must first get a deeper grasp of 
spontaneity, which I see as quite an intricate concept. Let us presume that spontaneity can be 
addressed in two interrelated ways:  
 
 Version 1. As an inextricable feature of existence connected to the possession of a 
situated body.  
 Version 2. As a qualitative measure of the degree to which the mind addresses a 
specific here-and-now. 
 
However cryptic this might seem at first, the message is quite simple: even if practical 
philosophical non-dualism states that humans are always glued to a present in-the-becoming 
through the corporality of our being (version 1), the degree to which that present in-the-
becoming is actually addressed consciously (version 2) varies between situations. I shall deal 
with both of these in greater detail and study their relevance to improvisation. 
Version one: Spontaneity as a feature of existence (a philosophical argument) 
From a practical philosophical point of view consciousness is perceived as a continued 
reconstruction of objects in ever-passing surroundings (Bergson 1944; Weick 1995; Berger 
and Luckmann 1991; Purser and Petranker 2005). As a consequence, each situation in 
everyday life is somewhat unique, just as the body is dynamically unique – one might say that 
the body is situated (Gadamer 1975; Joas 1993), and that situatedness implies continual 
freshness through spontaneity. In other words, the body is spontaneous through its 
unbreakable tie to a present-in-the-becoming (Bergson 1944). From this perspective, 
spontaneity is not an occasional or rare event, but an inextricable feature of corporality: 
Having, or indeed being, a body of bones, flesh and blood (and emotions), presumes 
spontaneity in one way or the other. If only to a minimal extent in some situations, the body is 
a contextually bound and ever evolving phenomenon, and thus spontaneity is tied to existence 
as emotion to rationality and body to soul. As shall be argued, however, the degree of 
spontaneity varies between different everyday practical situations, but in order to claim this 
one must initially have accepted spontaneity as an inexorable feature of existence, perhaps as 
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the most central part of practical philosophy. In short: Spontaneity is always there, but to 
varying degrees.  
Version two: Spontaneity as a practical measure of situational focus (a practical 
argument) 
Much as I share the view of other authors that spontaneity is an important constituent of 
improvisation (Crossan and Sorrenti 1997; Hatch 1997; Miner et al. 1997), I argue that seeing 
spontaneity from different angles produces crucial insights. My suggestion is that the 
philosophical angle concerning spontaneity as situated corporality can serve as a fundament in 
this regard. From this fundament, however, emerges another and more practical angle, as we 
are able to contrast spontaneity with prospection: the ability to think logically in a-contextual 
metaphysical systems and to project scenarios upon an imagined past, present or future. Thus, 
in order to think spontaneously one needs to go the opposite way of, say, prospection, which 
focuses on the ability to abstract from the present. Spontaneous thinking is about 
improspection, and involves thinking in the present on the present (Purser and Petranker 
2005). We learn from practical philosophy that as the inside of corporality is burdened with a 
perpetually constructed outside, spontaneity and difference are expected features of human 
action no matter how abstract the nature of the thinking in a given moment. But sometimes 
thought is sufficiently directed towards the present (the degree of improspection is substantial) 
so as to be qualitatively measured as spontaneous rather than abstract. To act spontaneously 
implies, then, to address and act upon what is becoming in the here and now (to “improspect”) 
rather than upon something in the near or distant future (prospect) or past (retrospect), or 
solely in abstract terms as in the case of formal science. One might for instance perceive 
mathematical rules either as givens or as creative points of departure, but in any case 
mathematical thinking is to a significant degree disconnected from the context at hand and in 
that regard more prospective than improspective.  
 
My argument is simple: the shorter the interval in perceived time between cognition and 
external action, the more spontaneity stands out; and vice versa, the more thoughts wander 
into abstractness the less spontaneous any succeeding action (Miner et al. 1997). Unlike 
Miner et al., however, I have no intention of measuring such a hypothesis in quantitative 
terms, in linear time. In the words of Ciborra (1999): “. . . improvisation defies measurement 
and method. It surfaces and vanishes ‘on the spur of the moment’” (p. 86). What determines 
the degree of spontaneity according to this view is a qualitative and contextual evaluation.  
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With concern to a practical philosophical concept of improvisation spontaneity is of the 
utmost importance. In part, improvisation might be understood as subjected to the same logic 
as spontaneity: The less spontaneous conscious and intelligent action is, the less 
improvisatory it is. Note the important part played by “intelligent” here, for there can be no 
improvisation without the involvement of creative consciousness; a point that will be further 
substantiated in the next section. Without (self-)consciousness we are reduced to pure 
spontaneity, to corporality in the animalistic, biological sense (Stacey et al. 2000). This is the 
case with pure emotionality, as action is not “delayed” by cognition at all, and concerns, of 
course, all aspects of existence that escape consciousness at any given time. Hence, whenever 
cognitive capabilities are incapacitated action becomes mindless, and can sooner be defined as 
behaviour (Nyeng 2004). Mindless, automatic behaviour in one instance can, however, at any 
point become the object of attention in the next. In the case of facial expressions, for instance, 
they may be unconscious at one time but as we look at ourselves in the mirror we become 
attentive to our appearance with the potential to become aware of and to change it.  
 
As human beings our focus of consciousness changes over time between objects in the outer 
and the inner sphere as does the degree of concentration within each aspect of attention, 
indicating that it is impossible to single out some naturally given limit to the scope of 
cognition and control. In that regard cognition is fluent and contextual. And with regard to 
improvisation the point is that trying to control our own body through conscious deliberations 
potentially creates a delay from thought to action, and the longer the delay the less 
improvisatory is action. Note, however, that no matter how long the delay is, corporality is 
involved in all thinking, thus making spontaneity (and therefore improvisation) an inevitable 
part of existence: a feature which is always there even if the degree of explicitness varies. 
This is in harmony with Ciborra’s (1999) argument that improvisation is “. . . situated 
performance where thinking and action emerge simultaneously and on the spur of the 
moment” (p. 78). In other words there is always an element of spontaneity in prospection (and 
retrospection), and thus, rather than being categorically separated, the two concepts (in 
practice) emerge together – in shades of grey if you will. This is a way of saying that 
sensemaking is essentially improspective, and is closely related to Purser and Petranker’s 
(2005) term “deep improvisation”. In my view it takes more than spontaneity and 
improspection to label something as improvisation. As indicated by Ciborra (1999) external 
action is needed, and this will be addressed in the succeeding sections. 
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Improvisation as creative action 
As I see improvisation as a sensemaking activity there is good reason as to why I should make 
some more reflections on creativity. It seems that creativity is one of the buzz-words of our 
time, as scientists, consultants and businesses are striving to understand its nature. The 
importance of creativity is rather obvious when we come to think of it, as a dominant societal 
trend today seems to evolve around entrepreneurship, innovation, knowledge development, 
growth and management, to name but a few (Styhre 2003). From a non-dualistic perspective 
no recipe can be given for the secrets of creativity. Such a recipe would reflect a dualist 
approach, as it would entail a search for ontologically objective truth. How can we think about 
creativity, then, in a way that catches the depths of existence while remaining useful as a 
practical concept? My attempt to answer emerges from practical philosophy. According to the 
pragmatist philosopher Hans Joas (1996) creativity is realized in practice as sensemaking. Put 
differently, creativity involves making sense in more or less complex situations, and the point 
I will be making is that in practical life creativity is realized as improvisation. Thus there can 
be no improvisation without the use of creative sensemaking capabilities; that is, of 
consciousness and imagination. Expanding on Dewey (1934) Joas (1996) says that:  
 
Imagination is creative because it recognizes the possibilities contained in the world and 
contributes towards their being made reality: ‘The new vision does not arise out of nothing, but 
emerges through seeing, in terms of possibilities, that is of imagination, old things in new 
relations serving a new end which the new end aids in creating.’ (p. 143). 
 
In Joas’ portrait of pragmatism creativity flows from what I have defined as improspection, 
and involves such things as defining what is happening here and now; what is the smart thing 
to do; and how can the complexity of the present be overcome so as to (re-)establish sense and 
identity. Weick (1995) argues that to discover who you are and create identity at any given 
moment is at the core of creativity; consequently it is a property of all individuals. And as the 
capacity to create meaning evolves in physically (and socially) contextualized interaction 
between the spontaneous I and the Me of the past (i.e. improspection), it follows that 
creativity is not a static feature, but a dynamic and reflexive quality of punctuating pure 
duration (Bergson 1944). The way creativity unfolds can be seen as enactment (Weick 1995), 
indicating that the physical and social world is not discovered passively, but created actively. 
As a consequence people produce part of the environment they face, which signals the 
essential role of creativity as constitutive of reality.  
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In the same pragmatic vein, Joas (1996) proposes that unlike automatic behaviour, all action 
is creative to some extent; and the Norwegian philosopher Hans Skjervheim (2001) terms this 
the “irreducibility of meaning in action”. Creativity is in other words the essence of action. As 
a consequence, creativity becomes a cornerstone of human existence; an inevitable feature 
that continuously and contextually varies in quality as the individual deals with upcoming 
situations and problems of infinite difference:  
 
The original state is not reflection, and then we decide on action. The original state is action, 
and it happens that we have to reflect on our pre-reflective impulses. I would say that’s the 
pragmatists’ idea, and we can only find a way out of this situation by creatively producing 
solutions for this situation. . . . the "I" in Mead’s model of the personality was intended to 
describe situations of creativity. (Hans Joas cited in an interview at Freie Universität Berlin, 21. 
of September 1999). 
 
So far I have argued that from a practical philosophical point of view human existence 
evolves in practice as spontaneous, creative action. One important insight from this is that 
creativity is always spontaneous and contextualized. Sensemaking is improspective. Secondly, 
the degree of spontaneity and creativity varies with the context: in a given practical situation 
an individual is more or less spontaneous and more or less creative. By the latter it is 
indicated that different situations are characterized by different forms of creativity, some more 
genuine, non-technical and in that sense demanding than others; a point which will later be 
discussed in detail in relation to the purity of improvisation. In the next section, however, 
another aspect indicated in these last two sections is addressed: for action to become 
improvisation some kind of practical manifestation in the external world is required, making 
its consequences final and irreversible.   
Thinking is action – Improvisation is external, irreversible action  
An important aspect for Weick (1998) is that improvisation is irreversible by nature. Inspired 
by Weick I see irreversibility as an inevitable feature of the corporal perspective that practical 
philosophy suggests. External action cannot be taken back as soon as it is performed. You can 
always perform new acts, but former action is for ever manifested physically and in some 
settings socially. The understanding of improvisation that I pursue builds on a conception that 
acting spontaneously in the external world is somewhat different from “acting within the 
mind”. Both must be labelled action because they happen over time and are not static 
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representations that can be apprehended as such or stored in any way (Joas 1996): 
consciousness is a putative stream (Berger and Luckmann 1991). The only things that are 
static and which can be stored as entities are the artefacts of sensemaking, the externalizations 
of significant symbols, of abstractions. Needless to say a hand gesture can be stored on video 
tape, an articulated sound on audio tape, a written sign on paper and so on. None of these, 
however, are inherently meaningful: Symbols must be used as instruments in the process of 
knowing, communicating and sensemaking (Mead 1967). Note that “process” comes about as 
a result of viewing sensemaking as perpetual creative action (Weick et al. 2005) and not as a 
static entity of some kind. Process theory and practical philosophy are thus two sides of the 
same coin.  
 
Not all action is irreversible in the practical sense, as for instance in the case of abstract 
reflection that never escapes the inside of the mind (“acting within the mind”). In the purest 
forms of abstraction (future or past) tentative scenarios can be tested out before they are 
potentially put into practice. Unlike abstract reflection, in order to become improvisation 
action must be manifested in the external world, and when this happens improvised action 
cannot be taken back or reversed in any way. In general, any action in(to) the external world 
has a character of irreversibility, which indicates that improvisation plays a crucial role in 
everyday practical life. The final and explicit facets of improvisation should be underlined, 
noting that improvisation always makes a difference in the social and physical settings at hand, 
whether one intends it to do so or not. This makes improvisation contextual in the sense that it 
involves tying bonds between the body’s outside and inside – it involves the risk of 
encountering (instant) physical and social resistance.   
 
In some ways I would prefer, say, “The hermeneutic man” to “The improvising man”, but it is 
my impression that improvisation covers themes that are even more practically oriented. It is, 
however, important to note that the two, as they are explicated in this dissertation, do not in 
any way stand in conflict with each other. Rather, they work as mutual supplements in crucial 
ways, as the one helps the understanding of the other. The most important reasons for 
choosing “The improvising man” over “The hermeneutic man” stem from the creative 
potential inherent in “improvisation” as a verb. It is my opinion that “to improvise” is more 
easily assimilated into everyday speech than “to hermeneuticize”. In addition, improvisation 
brings with it an external and contextual focus which is emphasized through the concept of 
irreversibility. Improvisation is more than mere thinking; it implies thinking and making 
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sense through spontaneous external action. Hermeneutics, however, does not explicate such a 
strong focus on “the outside”, but is better thought of as a philosophical framework providing 
the grounds for improvisation as a theoretical concept. 
 
Spontaneity, creativity and irreversibility: these words depict the three major constituents of 
improvisation the way I conceptualize it from a practical philosophical perspective. “The 
improvising man”, then, points to the inevitability of improvisation in human practice as it 
comes to life through spontaneous, creative, and external action. Just as these three 
dimensions are inextricably tied together, however, many other topics can be addressed to 
deepen this internal relationship and to understand the quality of improvisation in everyday 
life. In this regard I will in the following deal with the issues of emotionality, hermeneutical 
intuition, and sociality. Finally, in attempt to widen the scope of improvisation theory, I will 
address the topic of purity in improvisation.   
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Emotionality  
 
We do not have a choice as to whether we are to be emotionally present or not . . . . Nothing 
like a mood-less existence for the human being exists [my translation]. (Nyeng 2006, p. 125)  
 
Spontaneity and irreversibility describe important features of improvisation as the natural way 
of existing in the world as a corporal, physical being. A third and closely related issue is 
emotionality. Although they briefly mention the affective dimensions of improvisation, 
Kamoche et al. (2002) do not provide an elaborate account of the role of emotion and feeling 
in human practice. Neither does Weick (1989), who claims that “. . . what [the organization 
depicted in the organizing model] is not, however, is a place where emotion is prominent and 
available as a guide to action and interpretation.” Later, Weick (1995) merely links emotions 
to interrupted action in accordance with what can be interpreted from his view on 
improvisation as an either-or concept. Similarly when Weick et al. (2005), based on a critique 
by Magala (1997), re-address the aspect of sentiments in sensemaking, they link it to violation 
of expectancy and subsequent discrepancy and argue that “. . . further exploration of emotion 
and sensemaking is crucial to clear up questions such as whether intraorganizational 
institutions are better portrayed as cold cognitive scripts built around rules, or as hot 
emotional attitudes built around values.” (p. 419). Encouraged by Weick et al.’s invitation, I 
will in the following make an attempt to conduct such further exploration, and the point of 
departure is the exact opposite to that of Weick (1989), who denies the prominence of 
emotion in improvisation.  
 
In an attempt to consolidate emotion in organizing as improvisation at a fundamental level, I 
would like to pursue an intriguing approach to emotionality which is inspired by Dewey 
(1929), Mead (1967), Strauss (1993), Fløistad (1993), Fineman (1993, 2000, 2005), Damasio 
(1994, 1999), Heidegger (1996) and Stacey (2001). I start with Stacey (2001), who based on 
the pragmatist Mead (1967) and the neuroscientist Damasio (1994 and 1999) develops an 
intriguing argument, claiming that: “Feelings . . . are rhythmic patterns in a body . . .” (p. 83). 
Feelings, then, can be seen as continuous physiological and non-significant processes which 
are unavoidable in, and thus colour, all human action (Dehlin 2005). A similar approach is 
offered by Heidegger (1996), who explains that there can be no form of human existence 
without it being tuned in a particular way. In an analysis of Heidegger’s way of thinking, the 
philosopher Guttorm Fløistad (1993) suggests that: “. . . all perception, all understanding 
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inevitably emerge from a mood or a way of being situated, or if you will, from a state of 
mind.” (p. 196). 
 
Similar to the thought of Stacey (2001), which is heavily induced by pragmatist philosophy, I 
interpret Heidegger’s elements of tuning and mood as matters of emotionality. Dewey (1929) 
is particularly clear on the inevitability of seeing emotion as physiological processes below 
the level of awareness – processes which make cognition (and thus improvisation) possible to 
begin with:  
 
Apart from language, from imputes and inferred meaning, we continually engage in an 
immense multitude of immediate organic selections, rejections, welcomings, expulsions, 
appropriations, withdrawals, shrinkings, expansions, elations and dejections, attacks, wardings 
off, of the most minute, vibratingly delicate nature. We are not aware of the qualities of many 
or most of these acts; we do not objectively distinguish and identify them. Yet they exist as 
feeling qualities, and have an enormous directive effect on our behaviour. If for example, 
certain sensory qualities of which we are not cognitively aware cease to exist, we cannot stand 
or control our posture and movements. In a thoroughly normal organism, these “feelings” have 
an efficiency of operation which it is impossible for thought to match. Even our most highly 
intellectualized operations depend upon them as a “fringe” by which to guide our inferential 
movements. (Dewey 1929, p. 299).  
 
As a short summary of Dewey’s practical philosophy, my interpretation is that from his 
viewpoint, every cognition is wrapped in emotion. Thus, as improvisation is a cognitive 
activity, I regard improvisation as inevitably emotional rather than as a mere outcome or as a 
feature of some situations – an approach that is in fact indicated by Hatch (1999) in her 
conception of emotionality of structure. This view is also supported by Fineman’s (2000) 
claim that: 
 
. . . we may collapse the rational/emotional distinction. Rationality is no longer the ‘master’ 
process; nor is emotion. They both interpenetrate; they flow together in the same mould. From 
this perspective there is no such thing as a pure cognition; thinking and deciding is always 
brushed with emotion, however slight . . . . We may be dimly aware of these [emotional] 
processes, or they may be unconscious. (p. 11).  
 
In accordance with this non-dualist view, my perspective falls within a tradition which 
Fineman (2005) labels “interpretive” and of which Barbalet (1995), Fineman (2003), Gergen 
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(1999), Harré and Parrott (1996), Hochschild (1983) and Solomon (2002) – who all have in 
common a focus on the outside as well as the inside of emotions – are viable examples.    
 
Emotions might be portrayed as a source of complexity and unexpectedness. In theory there is 
no limit to the scope of cognition, but in practice one can only be conscious of one thing at a 
time, thus leaving major parts of the body “unmonitored” (Strauss 1993). Thus, emotions 
continuously create a sphere outside the range of cognition that nonetheless is communicated 
to other individuals, as argued in Stacey’s (2001) concept of emotions as rhythmic patterns 
that do not necessarily reach the conscious mind. Furthermore, Stacey claims that in social 
interaction non-significant gestures are communicated either attentively or inattentively, and 
to the extent that the latter is the case a process of protoconversation occurs; a reflexive 
phenomenon of pure emotionality. This view is similar to what Fineman (2000) refers to as 
emotional contagion, or the “catching” and passing-on of emotion (Doherty 1998; Verbeke 
1997), and harmonises with Finemans’s (2006) observation that emotions are “everywhere”. 
Likewise, in Stacey’s elegant vocabulary, he explains how bodies unavoidably resonate with 
each other in an emotional way, a phenomenon which can never be apprehended or controlled 
by the conscious mind. It is as if there is an unaddressable world outside of our attention 
guiding and potentially creating obstacles for meaningful interaction and thus constraining 
predictability. These obstacles or problems should not automatically receive a negative 
connotation, however, as they are inevitable and natural parts of existence: they are amongst 
the very stuff that defines us as human beings.  
 
Rather than disturbances or intrusions, these emotions, and the passions in general, are the 
very core of our existence . . . (Solomon 1993, p. xvii).  
 
According to pragmatism we cannot grasp or address what is outside of attention at a given 
time, but it is a mistake to disregard it in hypothetical terms and in terms of the effects it 
might have on practice. Indeed, the stuff we actually do grasp cannot be apprehended as such 
(Blumer 1969). It cannot be neatly put into objective boxes or categories and proven outside 
of the individual mind. As a consequence, we can never grasp our emotions objectively, as 
paradoxically they are apprehended as and through processes of exchanging non-significant, 
and hence emotional, symbols themselves. This brings us to yet another crucial aspect of 
emotionality, for there is another way of understanding non-significant communication, 
namely as the kind of (hidden) interaction that makes interaction at all possible on a 
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significant level (Dewey 1929). For how is mutual understanding and sensemaking possible, 
if not through the emotional capacity to take the role of the other – to use the language of 
Mead (1967)? There is always a non-significant component, so to speak, in every significant 
symbol. And the latter emerges as and through the former, though at the same time seemingly 
different from it. Reflect upon the following: how might empathy be explained if not as a 
bodily emotional capability hidden from our deepest apprehension? It is perhaps impossible to 
grasp exactly what makes us capable of mutual understanding, but there is hardly any 
question that we do have this capability. It is my view that any form of ontological 
reductionism will not provide the answer here; rather the opposite. As we dig deeper and 
deeper into the perceived entities of nature, the scope only increases for discovering even 
smaller entities, for reductionism has no limits. Rather, we should concentrate on what seems 
real, which for all practical purposes is real enough: that we are able to communicate and 
understand each other. 
 
Emotionality in the sense of corporal processes implies that 100% exact bodily reconstruction 
is impossible (Strauss 1993). Hence, from a practical philosophical view, the vital point is not 
to associate consciousness with a thing or a system, but rather with a bodily latent capacity to 
(re)discover oneself and the world. Consciousness is the product of a living, creative and 
emotional body, not something apart from it. 
 
If he says he knows what he is going to do, even there he may be mistaken. He starts out to 
do something and something happens to interfere. The resulting action is always a little 
different from anything which he could anticipate. This is true even if he is simply carrying out 
the process of walking. The very taking of his expected steps puts him in a certain situation 
which has a slightly different aspect from what is expected, which is in a certain sense novel. 
(Mead 1967, p. 177). 
 
But perhaps 100% consciousness-in-action is not an ideal we should strive for to begin with? 
The capacity to think while performing other actions unconsciously is a very important 
characteristic of the human body. Imagine, for example, driving a car without the capability to 
trust your automatic responses while simultaneously solving emerging problems with your 
mind. It is because of this capacity to learn by automating and internalizing behaviour that we 
are able to free our minds to do other things simultaneously – things which themselves may 
become automated over time (Molander 1996). Thus, the more you learn and the more skills 
you develop, the more tools are available to help you learn even more. Going in the opposite 
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direction of Simon (1968) who claims that “. . . the individual is limited by those skills, habits, 
and reflexes which are no longer in the realm of the conscious” (p. 40), I argue that the more 
tools you have incorporated into your automatic and bodily memory, the more capable you 
are of making sense and acting accordingly in new, complex situations: that is, of improvising.      
 
Indeed, it may not be going too far to say that the very possibility of mental development is 
based upon this temporal/spatial contour equivalence between inner physiologically based 
feeling dynamics and externally presented stimuli. (Stacey 2001, p. 103).  
 
To sum up, physiological processes can be classified and explicated as emotional processes, 
and since consciousness is a physiological process, cognition is fundamentally emotional, too 
(see model 4.0).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, a more specific type of emotions may be addressed, namely the kind of feelings 
that are given concrete labels in everyday life such as jealousy, happiness, anger and so forth. 
Feelings in this sense represent the body’s explicit perception and labelling of itself as a 
contextual being, and they can thus be termed “cognitive feelings”. They are practical 
expressions of how we experience our own body in a given moment. 
 
Emotional conditions do not occur as emotions, intrinsically defined as such; they occur as 
“tertiary” qualities of objects. Some cases of awareness or perception are designated 
“emotions” in retrospect or from without, as a child is instructed to term certain perceptual 
situations anger, fear, or love, by way of informing him as to their consequences. (Dewey 1929, 
p. 304) 
Physiological (non-significant) 
processes inevitably creating 
moods 
 Tuned cognition 
through 
significant symbol 
Model 4.0 Emotions 
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The phenomenon of cognitive feelings is outside the scope of this dissertation, however, and I 
suggest reading Dewey (1929), Damasio (1999), Dehlin (2005), and Nyeng (2006) for a fuller 
treatise.  
 
Mead (1967, pp. 78-79) argues that interpretation is a physically facilitated process, and that 
consciousness involves becoming aware of the experiences of your own body. Consciousness 
may therefore be translated as the capacity to sense one’s emotions and recognize them as 
one’s own. This is an interesting theory of how the body is able to construct identity, and is 
analogous to Weick’s (1995) interpretation of Mead (1967) that the body creates sense 
through sensory processes that are the resultants of motor processes. The difference is that 
Weick interprets this as a signifier of retrospectivity, whereas I follow a practical 
philosophical approach (i.e. Heidegger 1996; Gadamer 1975; Bergson 1944) and interpret 
Mead’s theory as one of improspection (see chapter two). In any case, as physiology is seen 
as emotionality (Stacey 2001), there can be no cognitions without emotions, as the dualism of 
body and thought collapses, and the purest emotional state is consequently the unconscious 
one – pure in the sense that rationality, the conscious thought, is not involved. 
 
To make an analytic distinction between mind and body does not imply that mental activity is 
different than bodily activity, except that generally it is internal and therefore unobservable, 
although there may be external signs that this action is going on or has already occurred. 
(Strauss 1993, p. 113). 
 
The Cartesian dogma associates the cognitive with the human, and the emotional with the 
animalistic (see chapter six). This may be a fruitful dualism, but the point of the matter from 
the perspective of practical philosophy is to understand that the one is basically the other. As 
humans we have the ability to create ourselves as living identities; but we are still animalistic 
bodies doing it, except it seems that we are more advanced than, say, other mammals (Mead 
1967). We may only be conscious of one object at a time, and everything else falls into the 
shadows of unawareness (Berger and Luckmann 1991). Our bodies are continually making 
gestures and carrying out complicated tasks. Some of them we may control, others not. For 
every thing we do control, there is a myriad of emotional and unconscious processes making 
it possible. (Therefore, control may be a poor choice of word. Perhaps we should talk of 
“influence” instead, as spontaneity and free will always depend on context?) Only the objects 
of our attention are real to us, and they are only real through the company of moods 
(Heidegger 1996). Everything else continues without mindful influence. To ask if “the rest” is 
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still there, if it exists, is to fall into the trap of dualistic rhetoric; the ontology game: We only 
know what we know, and we only exist through corporal and tuned situatedness (Gadamer 
1975). It is thus futile and speculative to ask if the tree that falls in the woods without 
witnesses makes a sound or not. From experience the practitioner knows it does, even though 
it cannot be proven objectively. 
 
From the preceding discussion I conclude that there can be no such thing as “cold” or un-
affective improvisation, as there can be no cognition without emotion or mood. How, then, 
does emotionality influence improvisation? Emotionality not only influences improvisation, it 
facilitates it, or indeed, generates it: 
 
 Firstly, it is the ability to sense one’s own emotions that makes conscious actions 
possible to begin with.  
 Secondly, as will be further explicated in chapter four, improvisation rests upon the 
ability to internalize experiences as automatic behaviour or skills, which in turn frees 
the mind thus making room for creative action. As the body converts mindful actions 
into skills that can be performed unconsciously, the mind can redirect its focus onto 
new and different aspects in a lived context so as to increase the scope of 
improvisation.  
 Thirdly, the emotional capacity to store and reproduce experiences as meaningful 
associations makes it possible to recognize a new situation as somewhat similar to 
historical events. Using memory as a tool an individual is capable of identifying 
characteristics or patterns in real life contexts that in some ways are similar to past 
experiences. This is the topic for the next section, where I encourage the view that it is 
from emotional dispositions that intuition might be conceived.  
Hermeneutical movement and intuition  
In this section I will explore the dimensions of hermeneutics and intuition in improvisation, 
and see how they are internally connected. Just as emotions play an essential part in 
improvisation, I argue that intuition does, too, and that it does so in a hermeneutical manner. 
In a hermeneutic language foreknowledge establishes an embodied backdrop providing the 
grounds for new experience (Heidegger 1996). As an adverb hermeneutic describes a way of 
living and thinking, and as an adjective it describes a way of being – of existence. In both 
instances there is an accentuation of circularity between history, present and future from 
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which the rather vague but relevant term intuition can be understood. Parallel to 
hermeneutical philosophy Ludwig Wittgenstein (1994) describes the circularity of existence 
through the concept of “family resemblance”:  
 
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than ‘family resemblances’; 
for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, 
gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. (Wittgenstein 1994, § 
67).  
 
The strength in family resemblance as a metaphor is that it concerns a form of fluent 
similarity in appearance as opposed to identity in the technical-analytical sense. A key insight 
from Wittgenstein’s argument is that even though all situations are in essence new, they seem 
related or similar to each other as they are recognized through the lenses of the past. In that 
sense family resemblance represents meaning and coherence: it provides a fluent structure 
that binds past, present and future together. Furthermore, family resemblance is constituted 
hermeneutically, not only because the past (Mead’s “me”) shapes the present (Mead’s “I”), 
but because the present shapes the past. From this one might say that memory is given its 
structure from the lenses of spontaneous contextuality (improspection), and vice versa, that 
intuition is the power to establish memory-as-family-resemblance in the present. Accordingly, 
basing his writings upon improvisation in jazz music, Berliner (1994) argues that one should 
not put too much emphasis on spontaneity thus risking to neglect the importance of history as 
is depicted in hermeneutical emergence. In this regard intuition provides an essential premise 
for improvisation as illustrated in the famous statement by the legendary bassist Charles 
Mingus: “You can’t improvise on nothing, you must improvise on something.” (Kernfeld 1995, 
p. 40). 
 
Without collapsing into a retrospective view on sensemaking and improvisation, intuition 
provides a link to understanding how the past enters the present. In Mead’s (1967) words, 
intuition can be thought of as the capacity to use “me” in dialogue with “I”. And as a last 
comment on intuition: it highlights the fundamental role of emotions as the initiator and 
catalyst of improvisational sensemaking (Dewey 1929). How come? Because without the 
emotional apparatus to develop intuition (and automate behaviour), improvisation can never 
come about. As indicated, learning and developing experience is a physiological/mental 
process of enabling future intuition, and thus improvisation is only possible within the 
emerging parameters set by our (intuitive) bodies. 
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Social complexity and improvisation  
 
Sensemaking is never solitary because what a person does internally is contingent on others. 
(Weick 1995, p. 40) 
 
The subject of sociality and its connection to improvisation remains to be sufficiently 
explicated. Having constituted an implicit theme throughout these last sections I suggest that 
sociality be addressed through a discussion of identity-as-identification, equivalent to Mead’s 
(1967) concept of “the self”. The rationale for this is that improvisation can be seen as a 
social and externally oriented activity of creating sense and constructing identity (Weick 
1995; Weick et al. 2005): of identification. Understanding the impact of sociality on 
improvisation implies understanding how improvisation involves dialogical construction of 
identity and the role of social complexity in identification. 
 
Who we are lies importantly in the hands of others, which means our categories for 
sensemaking lie in their hands (Weick et al. 2005, p. 416). 
 
Underpinning this approach is a perception that identity emerges through a social process of 
sensemaking within and between individual minds (Mead 1967, p. 178). Take for instance 
Blumer (1969) who borrows from Mead in suggesting that the self is constituted as interaction 
with oneself as it “. . . is social – a form of communication, with the person addressing 
himself as a person and responding thereto” (p. 13). Similarly, also from the conception that 
identity is synonymous to “the self”, Weick (1995) suggests that identity can be seen as a 
process of identification, of making the world manageable and understandable through the 
enactment of meaning-patterns which emerge as social and internal dialogues. Following 
Giddens (1991) and Chappell et al. (2003), such a perspective encourages a separation 
between Mead’s concept of identification as a self (as a continuous effort to create meaning 
patterns) on one hand, and the modern and more specific phenomenon of self-identity (the 
process of constructing a conscious self-image) on the other (see model 4.1).  
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In the latter sense identity is always an explicit and reflexive projection of self in relation to, 
or rather as something different from, someone or something else. It involves creating 
dualisms; me-you, that-this, etc. so as to consolidate the self as a familiar and reliable entity 
over time. Hence self-identity reflects a reflexive dialogue around the explicit topic of oneself 
as a being, and the central question in self-identity is “who am I?”.  
 
Expanding on Giddens (1991), people do not always put themselves at the centre of their own 
attention – they do not always pursue self-identity. Rather, they tend to get absorbed in outer 
structures, in paintings, in girlfriends, in music, in mathematical calculation, in the eyes of 
others; in which case there need not be an explicit dualism between “me” and “that”. Rather, 
the subtle dualisms produced in meaning-making processes (except from those involving self-
identity) are of an implicit kind, a kind that reflects the dualistic nature of language games: 
that one thing derives its meaning through being the opposite of that which it is not. What is 
meant by such a cryptic sentence; how can non-dualism imply making dualisms? The answer 
is that identity involves creating and recreating mental objects, and any object is implicitly 
defined through its antagonism. Something can only exist as opposed to something else. If an 
object is claimed to exist, it inevitably has a diametric counterpart in non-existence – what the 
object is not. For example if I say I am something, in this case a student of organization 
theory, this implicates that I am not the opposite, namely not a student of organization theory 
or anything else that falls into this category. Of course I could be something else in another 
context, but this merely shows that a statement is meaningful only to the extent that it is so in 
Identity as a process of 
identification  
Self-identity 
Model 4.1 Identity as Mead’s “self” 
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context (Dewey 1929). It seems, then, that thinking and talking necessarily involves using 
dichotomies, as existence is always defined as the opposite of non-existence. Ergo, as an 
example, one meaning of “individual” could be “something different from a group”, but this 
requires the existence of a group, at least abstractly, that offsets the individual as such. 
    
As indicated, rather than focusing on the more narrow form of self-identity, I pursue in this 
section a notion of identity as a generic phenomenon, to use Giddens’ (1991) words, implying 
that identity is a process of meaning-making for the sake of preserving a self (Mead 1967; 
Weick 1995). And as we expand on the notion that identity is constructed through and as the 
ongoing dialogue between the “I” of the present and the “me” of the past, identity is a bodily 
process and not a static entity. Furthermore, we are reminded of the poet John Donne’s 
famous words that no man is an island, entire of itself; and so we are encouraged to consider 
the social aspects of identity-making and improvisation. On an everyday level the significance 
of sociality is obvious, as we spend much of the day participating in joint processes of 
sensemaking (Lave and Wenger 1991; Wenger 2004), in social language games (Wittgenstein 
1992, 1994). Underpinning and governing these games are certain rules that must be 
internalized convincingly if one is to be capacitated to take part (Hardy and Clegg 1996; 
Clegg 1975). Social rules are not deterministic and controlling in the analytical sense, 
however, but providers of social knowledge and signifiers of appropriate conduct (Mølbjerg 
Jørgensen and Dehlin 2006).  
 
In everyday life we take with us social rules and experiences into the private domain, 
continuing some of the discussions on an abstract, imagined level. For example, we may re-
picture a certain scenario from earlier and imagine different outcomes; we may negotiate 
internally the validity of certain societal imperatives; or we may simply continue abstract 
dialogues with friends or family whom we know so well that we are able to predict their 
responses and uphold an imagined conversation. As I see improvisation as a sense- and 
identity-making process (Weick 1995; Weick et al. 2005), there is no exception: Just as we 
improvise in situations where we are alone, we improvise in social situations. Indeed, taking 
part in social processes highlights the aspect of irreversibility in communicative actions, as 
the body is under close observation by others and its actions are prone to have social 
implications (Mead 1967). Moreover, under social influence, rather than in solitariness, 
improvisation might stand out more clearly as someone wittingly or unwittingly calls for your 
attention prompting you to act. This indicates an important point; that social situations 
 76
continually encourage the individual to react. And to the extent that the actions of others 
appear unexpectedly, producing complex situations in need of immediate resolution, 
improvisation can become increasingly spontaneous and pure.  
 
In everyday conversation there are a number of factors indicating that social complexity could 
be just around the corner. Take the case of misunderstandings, for example. Participating in 
social life is hardly a linear exercise; rather, it is permeated with vagueness. Under such 
circumstances it would not be strange if some meanings came out or were interpreted 
differently from what was intended. In this way misunderstandings reflect the fallibility of 
intersubjectivity (Mead 1967; Joas 1997). If you should misunderstand me, then both of us 
have failed in creating mutual agreement on meaning. Maybe it is more my fault than yours, 
or the other way around, but we do both play a role. Inescapably all parties involved in social 
interaction have a responsibility in creating mutual understanding, and every time we fail we 
are forced to improvise new understanding. In fact, considering the amount of vagueness in 
the terms we use, the variety of cultural backgrounds, the complexity of the human body, not 
to mention the myriad of language-games that can be played out, it might seem a wonder that 
we do indeed understand each other at all. This point can be reinforced by bringing in what I 
regard as the wonder of intersubjectivity itself, as it is impossible to universally prove how we 
are actually capable of taking each other’s roles (i.e. Mead 1967). This is, however, a rather 
speculative point of argument if taken too far: we certainly do understand each other and any 
speculation beyond this is not necessarily fruitful. My intention here is simply to direct focus 
towards the complexity of interaction rather than towards the orderly and taken-for-
grantedness of it in order to highlight the role of improvisation in everyday social life. And 
following the pragmatist thought, my thesis is that social complexity triggers improvisation 
for the sake of preserving identity. 
 
Misunderstandings are just one example of what initiates social complexity on a daily basis 
(Strauss 1993). One has only got to think of the many times one is having thoughts like the 
following: “Why did she do that?” “Do I care about this?” “What do I think of that?” “Does 
this make me angry, or does it make me sad?” “What could he possibly mean by that?” “Is 
she trying to make me laugh, or is she unwittingly funny?” “What will happen if a say that?”  
And so forth. The list could be made far longer but my point is simple: It can be argued that 
complexity is the very stuff that we struggle with most of the time in social situations, and not 
only in rare instances. A point of my empirical study is to direct attention towards such 
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everyday problematic issues that people run into all the time at work, and as a preview of the 
findings it seems that sociality is not a clear-cut matter with a few ambiguities, but a vague 
and ambiguous affair with moments of varying clarity (see chapter seven).  
Pure improvisation and flow 
As was argued in chapter two a lot of the literature on organizational improvisation seems to 
be centred on the phenomenon in its purest forms (for example Crossan and Sorrenti 1997; 
Hatch 1997; Weick 1998, 2001). My interest, however, is not primarily in purity as such. On 
the contrary, the preceding discussion has dealt with practical life on the whole – including all 
its colours and nuances – and indicated the role of improvisation in practice as an emergent 
and contextual phenomenon. In this section I intend to weave together some of the most the 
central aspects from the preceding discussion and investigate their role in pure improvisation. 
A discussion on purity is of interest because this seems to be a recurrent topic in the existing 
literature and because it might display more clearly how my approach can provide a 
supplement.  
 
Following a practical philosophical view I have through the previous sections identified 
several aspects that together constitute improvisation as a practical phenomenon. The current 
section concerns three of them in particular: spontaneity, creativity and intuition. As earlier 
indicated, spontaneity and creativity can be seen as qualitative parameters of improvisational 
purity: External action is typically more or less spontaneous and more or less creative, and 
Manner of 
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context: Degree 
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complexity 
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Model 4.2 Purity of improvisation 
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regarding the latter I have indicated that the purity of creativity is related to contextuality. 
Thus, I agree with Crossan and Sorrenti (1997) and Hatch (1997), that sheer spontaneity is in 
itself not enough to make improvisation pure. One might indeed achieve high degrees of 
spontaneity in action and in that sense be improvising, but this alone does not depict the 
degree of purity. For this, one must also consider the amount of certainty, familiarity and 
novelty in a given situation; in other words the degree of genuine creativity going into the 
sensemaking process. To perform context-sensitive and spontaneous action is indeed 
improvisation, but for it to become pure, the creative efforts involved must be considerable. 
Similar to, and greatly inspired by, Crossan and Sorrenti and Hatch, I take a dual approach to 
depicting the purity of improvisation (see model 4.2). Like these authors I hold spontaneity to 
be one of the two dimensions for measuring purity, but unlike Crossan and Sorrenti and Hatch 
who propose “intuition” as the other, I suggest “genuine creativity”. Let me explain why.  
 
Holding that intuition is related to contextuality and genuine creativity, to “giving something 
a stylistic mark”, Hatch (1997) argues that the higher the degree of intuition, the more 
improvisatory the action (provided there is a sufficient level of spontaneity). Thus, she 
implies that intuition and genuine creativity are synonymous expressions – to score high on 
intuition implicates to be genuinely creative. But how can this add up? In my view, Hatch is 
mixing pure improvisation with good improvisation. For instance, it is possible to come up 
with examples of situations where one is highly intuitive, but in which there is little genuine 
creativity involved. Take the example of driving a car, which typically draws heavily on 
intuition, but not necessarily on genuine creativity. One might have travelled a certain 
distance many times, and in situ experience little out of the ordinary. In this situation intuition 
is to a great extent “. . . guiding action upon something in a spontaneous and historically 
contextualized way” (Hatch 1997, p. 183), but there is not much complexity involved and 
hence there is little genuine creativity. Doing the right thing under such circumstances might 
be good improvisation, but not very pure. Suddenly, however, an accident may seize your 
attention requiring the capacity to come up with genuinely new and unfamiliar solutions. In 
such a situation intuition would be of the essence, but used and challenged in another way 
than the moment before. Ergo, purity of improvisation is perhaps not so much a question of 
intuition or not, but of how intuition is utilized, which seems to be quite a different approach 
to the one proposed by Hatch.  
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I argue that it is in those situations where pure spontaneity is merged with genuine creativity 
that improvisation reaches its highest peaks (see model 4.2). In these situations, intuition 
plays an important role as practical guidance, as a source of wisdom, as a power to establish 
sense, as a thermostat of social situations; but unlike Hatch I claim that it is not merely the 
case that “the more” intuition is involved in spontaneous situations, the purer the 
improvisation becomes. I see sensemaking as part of a hermeneutical movement between 
bodily memory (“me”), from which flows intuition, and spontaneous action (“I”). This 
implies that the less the intuition involved, the less the sensemaking taking place: Intuition is 
inevitably part of the sensemaking process; it is always present. Furthermore I argue that with 
regard to purity of improvisation, intuition must be utilized in a certain manner for it to 
increase. It is not enough, as Hatch argues, that spontaneous action is highly intuitive. For 
improvisation to become pure, intuition must be challenged and potentially reformed radically. 
Pure improvisation involves great struggle and/or creative transcendence, and might be both 
pleasant and unpleasant. As a consequence, pure improvisation involves spontaneity and high 
levels of intuition, but conversely, spontaneity and high levels of intuition do not presume 
creative ability in terms of handling or creating the genuine new. Thus, intuition can be 
related to practical wisdom, to good improvisation (see chapter eight); and only in rare 
instances involving great creative challenge does intuition play a certain role so as to 
comprise pure improvisation. The two most important qualities for qualifying something as 
improvisation, then, are from my point of view creativity and spontaneity; and intuition is 
conceptually subordinated the former: Different forms of creativity make use of intuition in 
different ways.  
 
I see a connection between my conception of “pure improvisation” and a phenomenon 
referred to as “flow”. Some authors have written about occasions on which we experience 
extreme intersubjectivity: a combination of genuine novelty and extreme clarity, on the 
borderline to transcendence. These are moments of remarkable social creativity and 
interaction, where the individual mind experiences being paradoxically both driven by and 
creator of the social, which is often categorized as flow, the zone, or peak performance 
(Csikszentmihalyi 1990). What can be said about this remarkable sort of experience?  
 
Devoted to creativity as a phenomenon, complexity theorists, for instance, use the term “edge 
of chaos” to describe a kind of situation where systems reach a state of spontaneous self-
organization from which the “genuine new” emerges (Prigogine and Stengers 1984; Stacey 
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1996; Brown and Eisenhardt 1998). Notice the difference in use of spontaneity here compared 
to in my practical philosophical approach, as complexity theorists seems to define it as a 
systemic character. According to their view, a system can be spontaneous, but in my view this 
is only possible for human beings. Complexity theorists imagine flow as a condition where 
forces of stability and forces of chaos balance each other optimally, thus making grounds for 
ontological (re)creation. Such thinking, I fear, contributes to complicate rather than clarify 
situations of pure spontaneous creativity, as they have a ring of objectivity; if interpreted 
analogically, that is. If interpreted metaphorically, however, “the edge of chaos” might be 
seen in the same manner as a horizon: as an ideal condition that cannot be reached or 
apprehended as such, but which is still visible and meaningful to us on an epistemological 
level (Gadamer 1975). Then again, “the edge of chaos” potentially undermines the essence of 
flow if it is seen as a state that can be reached in practice through controllable parameters. 
Flow, however, cannot through non-dualist lenses be apprehended as such, and it cannot be 
turned on and off by will. Flow occurs spontaneously as an emotional, social event, and whilst 
in flow there is a feeling of control – one which may disappear as soon as it arose. And it is 
exactly the feeling of transcendence and control which is important, not some form of 
dualistic ontological transcendence. Somewhat paradoxically explained there is no given or 
controllable pathway to flow, but when flow occurs it produces a sense of control that lasts as 
long as the circumstances permit. Flow is not totally governed by external forces nor by 
internal will – it is a genuinely reflexive and in that regard unpredictable phenomenon. And 
from an improvisational vocabulary, it is the sense of being lifted up from one’s body whilst 
at the same time controlling it perfectly that is interesting; a vivacious feeling of being in a 
new and unfamiliar, but still entirely controllable, place (Eisenberg 1990). Flow is 
improvisation in its purest.    
 
In this way, flow lucidly illustrates the significance of all the important aspects of 
improvisation highlighted in this conceptual analysis so far: irreversibility, emotionality, 
sociality, creativity, and of course spontaneity. But where does spontaneity fit in here; in what 
way is it characteristic in flow? One way to go about it is to regard the feeling of 
transcendence not as some mind-out-of-body experience, but quite the opposite, to realize in 
practice a perfect merger between mind and body – to experience in present terms what goes 
on in the present. Flow could be seen as a condition of being highly conscious of what is 
going on here and now on the inside as well as the outside; a bodily state of momentary 
perception taken to the extreme. In flow one is not thinking of what is to become of the future, 
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but is fully absorbed in the present. The body is somehow inside-out and outside-in, and 
attention, the capability to make momentary sense, is working on high speed transmission. 
Flow is a feeling of one’s mind being freed as the body continues on its own automatically; 
whilst in essence it is a simultaneous convergence of automatic and mindful action, of 
thinking in action on action rather than on future action. Resulting from flow is an “over-
consciousness”, not objective transcendence; one feels uplifted.  
 
Flow is a vivid metaphor for pointing out a typical though often misunderstood aspect of 
improvisation: that improvisation is about logging on to the present rather than rising above 
situations. By some, improvisation is merely regarded as a last solution, as a second-rate and 
somewhat downgraded activity of coping with unplanned events (Alterhaug 2004), as if all 
things could be accounted for in advance. Improvisation is what dim-witted practitioners do 
as they lack the superior mind of intellectuals to predict, analyse and plan, some might argue. 
It is something that happens ad hoc in the dualist sense; as if anything can occur in another 
way than somehow unpredictably. And conversely, leaning too heavily on art forms like 
experimental theatre and free jazz improvisation might achieve an attribute of rareness; the 
impression that improvisation is something reserved for the few; something extraordinary and 
magical. Indeed, these are all important aspects of improvisation: to improvise meaning in 
acute situations, to improvise artistic brilliancy, but from “The improvising man” perspective 
they are merely aspects of a more profound and unavoidable phenomenon. As creative and 
corporal beings we cannot help but being more or less logged on (Gadamer 1975; Joas 1993), 
and the fact that we are sometimes more than usually logged on simply points to practical 
variation between everyday situations. Life happens only in the present tense. “The 
improvising man” points this out: that individuals (spontaneously) pour themselves into 
everyday matters out of which ongoing narratives are constructed (Purser and Petranker 2005; 
Petranker 2005).  
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Tools of improvisation 
As we move on we will explore more of the inner characteristics of improvisation. An 
important premise is that to improvise is always to improvise upon something, which points 
out that sensemaking does not appear in vacuum. As Weick (2001) says: “The important point 
is that improvisation does not materialize out of thin air” (p. 290). If you are to improvise you 
need some tools to get you started. “Tools” represent means or instruments to accomplish 
certain ends, which in this setting means sensemaking and improvisation (Dewey 1929; 
Schön 1991). In accordance with Dewey (1929) I see language as the most fundamental tool 
of all, and all tools essentially as tools of language:  
 
Language is always a form of action and in its instrumental use is always a means of 
concerted action for an end, while at the same time it finds in itself all the goods of its possible 
consequences . . . . The invention and use of tools have played a large part in consolidating 
meanings, because a tool is a thing used as means to consequences, instead of being taken 
directly and physically . . . . As to be a tool, or to be used as a means for consequences, is to 
have and to endow with meaning, language, being the tool of tools, is the cherishing mother of 
all significance. (pp. 184-186).  
 
As a process, improvisation is nothing but the intelligent employment of available tools. The 
nature of improvisation, however, is restricted by the way such tools are perceived in practice. 
If they are seen as control instruments, the degree of improvisation may be low and action 
will become more technical rational. If they are seen as creative points of departure, as more 
or less usable instruments, improvisation is likely to appear more explicitly. 
Examples of tools in improvisation 
 
“Improvisation is prepared spontaneity”. 
(Norwegian jazz trumpeter Tore Johansen in 
2005)  
 
In improvisation, tools can be any form of significant symbols that function as carriers of 
meaning (Mead 1967). Tools represent hermeneutic forehaving (Heidegger 1996); they are 
the images or symbols in memory that unavoidably become part of and indeed define context 
as they are perpetually produced by the human body. Some of these symbols are associated 
with artefacts and can be stored as such, as is the case with written words and musical notes. 
Symbols of language such as these are not identical or objective in any sense. One might say 
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that they provide basis for meaning (both subjective and intersubjective) through “sufficient 
similarity”. According to philosophical non-dualism, the symbol does not stand alone; if it did 
it could not be spoken of (Blumer 1969). Rather, meaning is attached to the symbol as it 
comes to the individual mind (Joas 1993). The symbol and its meaning are inseparable, and 
thus the symbol always appears in new light. For example, Mead’s (1967) “mind” is the 
individualized focus of the communicational process – it is language behaviour on the part of 
the individual. In Mead’s (1967) terms “. . . there neither can be nor could have been any 
mind or thought without language” (p. 192) and language, the content of mind “. . . is only a 
development and product of social interaction” (p. 191). From this view language signs equal 
significant symbols, and when these are objectified in linguistic systems, they are expressed 
as and through linguistic symbols. Similarly, in the works of Dewey (1929), Peirce (1966a), 
Foucault (1981, 1989), Barthes (1991), and Merleau-Ponty (1996) language is seen as a living 
process of meaning-making in which linguistic signs provide tools (structures) of language to 
be used in communicative interaction. From a practical philosophical perspective, signs of 
language form the fundament for the expression of meaning, and it is the function of 
(linguistic) signs which is accentuated. 
 
Language, signs and significance, come into existence not by intent and mind, but by over-
flow, by-products, in gestures and sound. The story of language is the story of the use made 
of these occurrences; a use that is eventual, as well as eventful. (Dewey 1929, p. 175). 
 
Finally, in Stacey’s (2001) vocabulary, which builds on Mead (1967), language is also seen as 
expressed through significant symbols, and when these take the form of artefacts that are 
arranged in abstract systems, Stacey does not call them linguistic symbols but reified symbols. 
As I have a different take on the phenomenon of reification, and understand this as the taken 
for granted (Berger and Luckmann 1991), I prefer the term “linguistic sign”. 
 
Even the most familiar, the most threadbare and exhausted language symbol is drawn towards 
the context of its utilization. Any object needs a subject. Words must be uttered; they must be 
used as tools in language games (Wittgenstein 1992, 1994). There can be no sensemaking and 
no improvisation without tools. Significant symbols and artefacts do not mirror objective 
reality but are used as vessels for meaning (Dewey 1929). As an improvisatory rule, the more 
tools are available in your corporal and mental bag, the more prepared you are for real life 
encounters.  
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Misperceptions may be beneficial if they enable managers to overcome inertial tendencies and 
propel them to pursue goals that might look unattainable in environments assessed in utter 
objectivity. Because environments aren’t seen accurately, managers may undertake 
potentially difficult courses of action with the enthusiasm, effort, and self-confidence necessary 
to bring about success. Having an accurate environmental map may be less important than 
having some map that brings order to the world and prompts action (Sutcliffe 1994, p. 1374).  
 
Notice how Sutcliffe (1994) emphasises the importance of having a map, a tool, which does 
not have to correspond to some external milieu. Her point is rather that something is needed to 
bring order to the world, and that this something can be anything that proves useful, even 
misperceptions. This prompts the question of “what kind of tools can be pointed to as 
particularly relevant and useful in improvisation?” The answer is all kinds of tools: anything 
that can be objectified by the conscious mind, as any significant symbol can serve as 
instruments for creativity: an odour, a sound, a word, a feeling, but also structures, rules, 
routines and plans (Ciborra 1999; Weick 2001). Ideally, in theory, improvisation treats 
nothing as holy (Hatch 1999), though in practice it may be, due to contextual considerations. 
For example, bending the rules of society too much might not be understood as creative; 
rather, it would more easily be seen as immoral or even criminal. Having said this, however, it 
could be interesting to illuminate a few examples of tools that may or may not commonly be 
perceived as such.  
Experience & memory 
In “The improvising man” objects are treated as temporary constructions, including all 
imaginable theories of past, present or future scenarios (Berger and Luckmann 1991). The 
context at hand immediately becomes the context of memory, and has to be reconstructed as a 
theory to maintain its validity. Any theme of conversation is reconstructed continually 
through conversation, and always carries with it the potential of novelty (Stacey 2001). Given 
that the initial ambition is to maximize this potential, the mind can use conversational themes 
spontaneously to alter the setting. It is impossible to know how the mind does this. Abduction 
is in many ways a mystery, but on the other hand it is the most natural thing of all, as it is the 
source of reality (Peirce 1966a, 1966b, 1974a, 1974b; Joas 1996). Again, we are reminded 
that objects of the mind could easily be seen as givens (dualism), which by a long way 
deprives them of their instrumental character. And when this happens there is little room for 
imagination, besides uncovering some pre-ordered reality. Open and explorative imagination, 
however, is the very heart of “The improvising man”. Without it, it would be impossible to 
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create theories of our lived contexts – to be able to spontaneously sense what can be done to 
make things better (or as good as possible).  
Skills 
Travis: “Do you want me to drive?” 
Travis’ brother: “Sure, think you remember how?”  
Travis: “My body remembers.” 
(20th Century Fox, Paris, Texas by Wim Wenders 
1984) 
 
What is a skill? How is skill different from, say, experience? The question is rhetorical and 
misleading; skills are from a practical philosophical perspective products of experience and 
come to life as experience expands. A skill is the bodily capacity to master a task without 
having to use energy to focus on the skill itself (Schön 1987, 1991; Molander 1996). 
Following Dewey (1929), skills are habitualized patterns of action in the subconscious. 
Reading is a brilliant example. As the little boy learns how to see beyond the linguistic signs, 
beyond the letters, words and sentences, and immediately discovers the meaning that 
permeates them, he has developed the skill of reading.  
 
The pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function of mind is to project new and 
more complex ends – to free experience from routine and from caprice. Not the use of thought 
to accomplish purposes already given either in the mechanism of the body or in that of the 
existent state of society, but the use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action, is the 
pragmatic lesson. (Dewey 1917, p. 63).  
 
A capacity becomes a skill in the moment it does not need attentive control to be performed, 
which typically requires countless repetitions and trial and error. As the individual grows 
more skilful the embodied vocabulary is expanded and more activities can be performed 
without needing conscious guidance.  
 
These habitual effects become in turn spontaneous, natural, “instinctive;” they form the 
platform of development and apprehension of further meanings, affecting every subsequent 
phase and social life. (Dewey 1929, p. 302). 
 
This point must not be misunderstood, though, as if taken to imply that skills cannot be 
reached by the mind at all. Two things need to be pointed out: 
 
1. Skills are bodily capacities that can be realized in practice as automatic patterns of action.  
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2. Skills can be utilized in unique settings by the conscious mind, but need no conscious supervision 
as such. 
 
Without skills life would appear quite differently. One would have to learn and do every 
sequence of action from scratch every time it was to be performed, and the human body 
would be neither a particularly efficient nor effective creature. In this view efficiency comes 
from not having to use energy on similar activities, and effectivity from the contextual 
utilization (and refinement) of efficient skills, and without skills they are both invalidated 
(Molander 1996). In skills, then, lies the secret to technical rational behaviour, to the efficient 
performance of particular sequences of action (Dewey 1929). And furthermore, without skills 
there are no available capacities to be used in more complex processes of sensemaking. Skills 
capacitate the body to act creatively and improvise, but in themselves they are merely 
repetitive bodily readiness.  
 
On the basis of this one might think that the execution of skills would emerge as a technical 
and systematic routine. However, from the perspective of “The improvising man” this is not 
the case. Even if the performance of skills does not need conscious guidance, skills are not 
necessarily completely technical in the sense of being insensitive to context. Mead (1967) 
uses walking as an example: one might wander around in crowded streets thinking about what 
or where to have lunch, whilst coordinating partly unconsciously one’s actions to those of 
others to avoid collisions and simultaneously adapting every step to the contextual texture of 
the pavement under one’s feet. No two steps would be analytically identical even though 
automatically produced. Skills in the form of automatic behaviour implies adjusting to the 
present: balancing, coordinating and feeling. It is as if the body knows what to do without 
needing directions. A skill is very much like an autopilot in that sense, except that it is far 
more intricate through embodied contextuality. It is a skill to be able to hold a scalpel, but the 
scenario in which a scalpel is held is always different, and hence the skill must be developed 
and executed in a way that allows for variation. Often, however, variation is so tremendous 
that it cannot be coped with without conscious attention, and in those instances new 
experience is generated and hopefully assimilated by the body so that next time around the 
improved skill will be contextually functional (Dewey 1929). As a practical example, the 
following discussion between two surgeons at InSitu Hospital is quite illustrative of the 
relationship between practicing skills and the ability to perform well in context: 
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Geir, surgeon: - Making diagnoses in this line of surgery is quite a manageable task. Often the 
diagnosis is straightforward. But there is quite a lot happening at the same time here. Here we 
are braver than regular dentists because we do more of the same kind of operations. We 
make the operation area more visible by removing bone structure and folding out mucous 
membranes. We have a lower threshold for doing this kind of things. 
Anders, surgeon apprentice: - But making diagnoses is not always like this, straightforward I 
mean, in which case it is far more exciting. It is certainly not as if seeing one tonsil means 
seeing them all! Work by the volume is always better paid, but far less exciting. It pays better 
exactly because it is less exciting and monotonous. There are two things people go for: work 
conditions and professional challenges.  
Geir: - The same thing concerns jaws, wisdom-teeth etc. as for tonsils. For example in the 
case of inflammation and an enlarged tongue, surgery is made far more difficult. Anyway, the 
goal is to create an atmosphere of safety and confidence. This is half the work. And it is easy 
to become irritable if one doesn’t succeed. Then one has to learn techniques in order to hide it. 
The chief surgeon may easily stress the assistant physician, and it is important to be aware of 
the signals one sends out. Moreover, what matters above all is to create an understanding of 
the unique patient at hand. And there are large variations. Learning from experience is the 
most important, but experience must be adapted and adjusted to the unique patient. And 
having such scarce resources as we do here, it demands more of our skills as surgeons. 
Fumbling and irritation will be easily intercepted by patients and relations.  
 
Following the logic from the section on emotion in improvisation, no matter how much an 
individual thinks about his actions there are inevitably automatic patterns underpinning them. 
There can be no “pure” conscious action in the sense that it does not involve some inattentive 
emotional process (Dewey 1929). With skill the mind is freed to concentrate on other issues 
than the actual skill itself. As soon as you know how to read, for instance, you might read 
without having to pay attention to how to read. Still you are aware of the fact that you can 
read, and can therefore employ that skill whenever you wish. Moreover, you can direct 
attention towards the reading process itself and even internalize a new way of reading; 
perhaps through changing some bad habit, some ineffective way of consuming sentences and 
so forth.  
 
To sum up: In improvisation skills can be seen both as corporal, emotional facilitators of and 
as tools for creating new sense. Improvisation involves using whatever capacity lies readily at 
hand to find functional solutions and in the process widening further the vocabulary of skills 
(Ciborra 1999). In a sense, through improvisation one gets better at improvising. A set of 
skills is like a toolbox, a repertoire that the body brings with it, and the toolbox is maintained 
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and even further equipped through practical experience and usage (Dewey 1929; Schön 1991). 
In the opposite case the toolbox diminishes, which makes the body less capacitated to perform 
automatic action and improvisation. In any case practical effectivity or know-how can only be 
accomplished through improvisation, which presumes the potential to perform tasks 
efficiently.  
 
In a given moment one might be attentive or largely inattentive. If attentive, one might direct 
focus towards the context at hand and consider how it can be understood and dealt with (i.e. 
improspection). One might, however, as one initiates action start questioning the skill itself: is 
it sufficient or well enough developed for its intended application (Schön 1991)? In that case 
what could have been a mere automatic employment of skills might become a troublesome 
and somewhat sluggish execution of skills; a process less refined than was implied by the 
original bodily potential: thought might interrupt spontaneity, as it were. In the opposite case 
one might choose to trust one’s bodily capacities and recognize the sense of security they 
provide. This illuminates another crucial character of skills: they might provide grounds for 
self-confidence, risk taking and good improvisation (Molander 1996), and in that regard, 
skills are perhaps our most important tools.   
Contextual factors 
In the social sense context emerges as patterns of meaning changing as well as being changed 
by people participating in interaction (Mead 1967). With regard to improvisation, social 
patterns can be improvised upon infinitely. The ability to understand each other increases as 
sophisticated forehaving in terms of experience, skills and memory is developed. One must 
engage in social interaction in order to learn how people think and act (Dewey 1929; Blumer 
1969). And the more experienced one becomes, the more tools one has to work with and the 
better capable one becomes of reducing complexity in practical situations and creating 
understanding and even the genuinely new (Molander 1996). But context is more than social 
patterns of meaning. To the extent that physical attributes are associated with contexts of 
meaning, they can provide valuable sources of inspiration.  
 
Stated simply: if it can be thought of (be it social, abstract or physical), it can be used as a tool 
(Dewey 1929). Thus, physical objects should be viewed in the same manner as for example 
written artefacts. From the perspective of practical philosophy a word on a piece of paper is 
fundamentally no different from a bottle on the table. Both of them provide meaning as 
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images that are part of larger abstract systems. They are externalizations of memory; physical 
expressions of inner frameworks. Meaning is not inherent in either the written word or in the 
bottle, but is given to them through learning and practical usage (Dewey 1929; Heidegger 
1996). A word is meaningful only in the context of other words and linguistic rules. Language 
is arranged in a systematic way so that it may be explicated and provide meaning in real life 
contexts. Due to our ability to communicate with significant symbols (Mead 1967), we can 
express meaning through any kind of physical matter, which shows that language is much 
more than written or spoken words. Language is everything that can be used as carriers of 
meaning or vehicles of intention; any object that is associated with certain experiences; 
anything of social significance. 
 
Pragmatism proposes that we are incapable of thinking without signs. The principle ‘is, that, 
whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, image, conception, 
or other representation, which serves as a sign’. (Joas 1993, p. 61). 
 
The more spontaneously tools are used in practice, the more temporary is their meaning, and 
of course the purer the improvisation. Worth noticing is that physical entities can be 
exceptionally powerful tools, and that they may spark the mind in remarkably spontaneous 
ways. They can be manipulated, changed and rearranged, so as to create associations or 
trigger new patterns. In contrast, the more things are understood literally and taken for granted, 
the smaller the potential for spontaneous creativity (Schön 1991). Maybe the extraordinary 
power of physical manifestations has to do with their potential for being sensed by the whole 
body, and not only by the brain? This way physical entities are capable of being strongly 
associated with experience (by memory), so as to create a robust and diverse foreknowledge. 
And as foreknowledge expands dynamically, intuition is developed thus increasing the 
capability to see family resemblances (Wittgenstein 1994).  
 
If the ambition is to make improvements and create new knowledge, one could start with the 
substance of everyday life and see what can be made of it; much like a bricoleur that walks 
into the garage looking for gadgets and artefacts that can be put together to create novelty: 
 
The French word bricolage (which has no precise equivalent in English) means to use 
whatever resources and repertoire one has to perform whatever task one faces . . . .The 
defining characteristics of a bricoleur is that this person makes do with whatever tools and 
materials are at hand. (Weick 2001, p. 62). 
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Learning from the bricoleur we realize that improvisers must make do with what they have. 
As improvisers we can always get more, and we should, even, in order to expand our toolbox, 
but obviously contextual innovation must be based in what is at hand, be it of abstract or 
concrete nature. Bringing these tools to their best possible utilization implies purifying 
creativity, as is the way of the bricoleur. Weick (2001) urges us to understand that the 
bricoleur should not be understood as some “odd job man”: “. . . because considerably more 
knowledge about materials is assumed in the case of the bricoleur” (p. 62). In other words, 
the bricoleur is more like an expert, a highly creative practitioner, who twists and turns on 
ideas, functions and materials to make something new. But the image of the bricoleur should 
not be taken too far, Kamoche et al. (2002) warn us. Arguing that Weick (1993, 1999) makes 
improvisation synonymous to bricolage, they claim that he oversees the importance of 
spontaneity. Still, the attitude of the bricoleur is what is important here: to make do with 
whatever lies at hand in order to make sense and act in context; to improvise. 
Technical rationality and improvisation: Tools - guiding or controlling? 
To round off this section on the significance of tools in improvisation, I have chosen to 
include a short discussion on how different models of thinking lead to different ways of 
conducting practice. The models of thinking I am referring to are improvisation on one hand 
and “technical rationality” (Schön 1987, 1991) on the other. According to Schön (1991) the 
essence of technical rationality is to create a model for action first, and apply this model on a 
real-world problem afterwards. In Schön’s treatise of technical rationality he is occupied with 
how technical rational thinking has formed a paradigm that has become our predominant way 
of thinking about research, education and practice. His discussion is thus to a large extent on a 
philosophical level, as his message is to warn against technical rationality as a taken for 
granted societal paradigm in which there exists no concept of language as tools. If technical 
rationality becomes dominant as a paradigm, language, according to Schön (1991), follows 
the logic of Positivism, which implies that symbols of language are seen as objectively laden 
with meaning. In other words, in reified technical rationality, such as in Positivism, language 
is made autonomous, and it is argued that meaning is found in a transcendent and objective 
universe (see chapter six).     
 
As opposed to taking for granted technical rationality as a model for all practice, Schön 
follows a line of thought similar to Dewey’s (1929) in claiming that there can be no dominant 
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rigorous model for practice. Both of these authors see science, for example, more like an art 
form, in which theories and models are shaped in an ongoing and open-ended manner based 
on emerging contexts. Science from their perspective thus takes the diametrically opposite 
form of taken for granted technical rationality, and becomes a process of improvisation. At 
this point one might be led to think that I see improvisation and technical rationality as 
antagonists, but this is only true on a conceptual and abstract level, a point which this section 
is dedicated to enunciate. As such this section serves as a backdrop for chapters five, eight 
and ten, where I from a practical perspective attempt to argue that improvisation and 
technical rationality can be woven together. The clue lies in separating between technical 
rationality as a dominant, taken for granted, model for action and as a contextual measure. 
Doing this I will hopefully be able to show that under certain circumstances improvisation 
may involve following formal models, in which case the model of technical rationality 
becomes an instrument rather than a paradigmatic restraint jacket. The question for now, 
however, is: “How is technical rationality conceptually different from improvisation?” In 
order to provide an answer I will expand on Schön’s seminal work by using his generic 
concept of technical rationality and blend in the insights from the two earlier sections of this 
chapter which dealt with spontaneity and creativity. The point is to show that the conceptual 
difference between improvisation and technical rationality concerns intention and attitude 
with regard to spontaneity and creativity. The discussion is similar to Purser and Petranker 
(2005) who operate with improvisation both as a philosophical framework and as an art form 
(i.e. “deep improvisation”) which uses improspection consciously as a tool for contextual 
action such as organizing.   
 
Following Schön (1987, 1991) technical rational action is categorically different from an 
intention of acting spontaneously (see version 2 of spontaneity, pp. 59-60). In other words, on 
a conceptual level technical rationality involves disregarding the present from an intention to 
explore abstract inner images. Moreover, in the physical, external sense technical rationality 
reflects an intention of non-spontaneity and non-contextuality, as it involves first addressing a 
model for action, and then seeking to apply this model onto the external world (Schön 1991). 
With regard to creativity technical rationality involves a specific type of prospection which 
focuses on abstract existing ideas, systems and models rather than on free and open 
imagination. If we put these two aspects together technical rationality involves the intention of 
non-spontaneous prospection that is closed and analytical as opposed to open-ended and 
imaginative, and when put into action the analytical model controls succeeding action (Schön 
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1987, 1991). In other words, to follow a rule in a technical rational manner implicates rigid 
restrictions flowing from prospection on how to behave, and to the extent that these 
restrictions are actually pursued external action becomes technical-rational (see model 4.3). In 
principle, technical rationality implies that the rule works as a severely restricting tool, one 
that is obeyed and followed a-contextually rather than used creatively and spontaneously. 
Thus, if technical rational action is intended, the tool becomes more like a restraint-jacket 
than a creative instrument for open-ended, contextual action. 
 
 
In order to understand more about the conceptual nature of technical rational action, I will 
provide a few examples. Picture, for instance, the breakdown of some critical routine or 
system, a situation commonly associated with emergencies (which require immediate 
attention and intelligent action). A vital point here is that when systems fail the error must lie 
somewhere within the system; there must be a clearly defined fault. After all, ideally, a 
system is a web of interrelated functions that are all designed purposely, and system error 
means that one or more of these functions have failed. We must presume that the intention is 
to preserve and reconstruct the system, in which case the system governs and controls the 
process. For example, if an internal error occurs in an atomic plant the system cannot be 
simply wished away. Rather, it will provide a rigid frame for the chosen action and in that 
way control the problem solving process, which will consequently follow the logic and rules 
of technical rationality. This presumes, of course, that there is in fact an ambition to repair and 
maintain systemic operations, for example as is the case with so-called “heedful action” 
Intention External action
Open-ended & 
spontaneous 
(improspection) 
Technical 
rational 
Improvisation 
Technical 
rational action 
Model 4.3 A conceptual model of technical rationality 
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(Weick 2001). Since there is a system providing very clear and dominating frames and 
guidelines within which action must be chosen, the degree of complexity is likely to be low. 
No matter how complicated it appears, the error can be trusted to be found within the system.  
 
On the other hand, one reacts there and then to the emergency at hand and rapidly finds a 
solution, which basically requires at least some context-sensitivity and thus some degree of 
improvisation. But the degree of complexity involved is associated with experience and trust, 
with whether one feels on top of the situation or not. Having much experience means having 
access to a rich array of tools, thus creating an intricate rather than complex situation. 
Familiarity is a key word – the more familiar the less improvisatory. But if the system is not 
trusted to perform, functionality will have to be improved with no guarantee of success. 
Hence: The less trust, the more complexity (see chapter three). The experienced technician, 
however, knows where to look and he knows what works and what does not. He can be 
certain that rather than it primarily being a matter of meaninglessness underpinning the 
situation, a systemic intricacy needs to be uncovered via technical analysis and repaired. 
 
In practice, complexity stands out as a highly dynamical and fluid phenomenon – complexity 
for me is not necessarily complexity for you. Learning how to understand, compute and act in 
complicated systems, then, is initially to some extent a complex process, and continues to be 
so until the functions are so readily at hand that answers can merely be calculated. For a well-
trained practitioner a system breakdown is no more of an emergency than missing the bus. 
After all, a technical-analytical problem is not totally arbitrary, and solutions to the problem 
will always be found by following the rules; indeed they are defined by the rules.  
 
Ideally, and conceptually, technical rationality involves solving a problem through rule-based 
calculation and later to implement the solution in a context (Schön 1991); and I would like to 
emphasize that in practice this can be a very efficient way to act (i.e. “good practice”) – a 
matter which seems somewhat under-communicated by Schön. Say, if the engine of your car 
breaks down, you (hopefully) know that the error hides somewhere specific inside the engine, 
and knowing this limits the extent to which complexity can initially be involved. In many 
situations, rather than regard it as a chance to create something new, you would probably 
prefer to find and repair systemic errors. Alternatively, if in certain situations sense is made 
without pressure or guidance from a system or a cognitive structure (forehaving), the process 
becomes far more spontaneous and improvisatory. Here there is no final or defined goal for 
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creativity, which requires a different kind of thinking, one of using whatever is available as 
tools to create something new. Such an open attitude is closer to authenticity and artistic 
creativity than to mathematical analysis. Important key words here are attitude and intention, 
and the question concerns whether to follow a given set of rules or to use such rules as tools to 
create something new. To follow a rule or a routine blindly implies making little room for 
improvisation, and is very close to the ideal concept of technical rationality as explicated by 
Schön (1987, 1991). Conceptually, the technical rational terms “abstract” and “follow” can in 
the improvisational vocabulary be replaced by “contextual” and “create”. The ultimate aim of 
improvisation is not to uncover or maintain the existing, but to create the new: reactively 
because existing theories do not work (do not apply to the context), and there is no knowledge 
of any defined system or solution to turn to; and proactively because you try to make sure to 
be on top of whatever situation you are in. (The distinction between proactive and reactive 
improvisation is treated in detail in chapter eight.)  
 
On a conceptual level, in improvisation there is high degree of openness and spontaneity, 
whereas in technical action there is not. A rule is an abstract idea, and if interpreted literally 
and put into action, the action is likely to become static and repetitive. This is an important 
aspect of technical rationality; there is always one “right” answer and it is found in the old and 
established. Contrary to this, from the perspective of “The improvising man” abstract ideas, 
rules or systems should not be taken for granted. Rather they comprise tools and creative 
points of departure, and in that sense they hold a temporary, not a given, status. From an 
improvisatory view the range of possible solutions is, in theory, infinite; the mentality for a 
dedicated improviser might even be to find out how far one can go; what one can get away 
with within contextual limitations (Hatch 1999). In conceptual terms technical rational action, 
however, involves asking: “How can I succeed in maintaining the established?”  
 
I want to end this section by making two suggestions that will provide guidance for the 
succeeding discussions of this dissertation. Firstly, as argued by Schön (1991), technical 
rationality and improvisation as conceptual models of thinking and acting are antagonists. 
They are profoundly different frameworks for performing practice, and the purpose of this 
section has been to show this on a conceptual level. Secondly, however, within the framework 
of “The improvising man” and on a practical level, I will argue that technical rationality can 
be fitted in as a tool which is well suited for certain kinds of practice, and in this regard the 
two concepts are not antagonists. In this respect abstract models such as rules and structures, 
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which are essential for the execution of technical rational action, can be used in improvisation 
as tools (Ciborra 1999). I see great value in separating these two ways of thinking about 
improvisation and technical rationality. The distinction between the two is of the essence for 
the succeeding discussions of this dissertation, and will be expanded on in a number of ways. 
Suggesting a synthesis: The improvising man 
In this last section I will gather all the major insights from the different sections of this 
chapter, and merge them into a synthesis of improvisation. As argued in this chapter, 
improvisation can be used as a framework to understand the essential role of improvisation in 
all practice (Ciborra 1999), not only in those practices characterized by extraordinary 
creativity, spontaneity or both. How improvisation stands out as intended creativity and 
spontaneity, as explicit forms of improvisatory practices, is the topic for chapter eight. The 
synthesis of improvisation from practical philosophy (The improvising man), however, is 
more profound, and provides a set of assumptions from which improvisation can be 
understood as a “deep phenomenon” (Purser and Petranker 2005). 
 
Hermeneutics is loaded with a wide selection of denotations: for example as a label for a 
philosophical tradition, as a patterning of thought processes, as a particular humanistic 
perspective, and as a research methodology (Nyeng 2004). An intriguing aspect of 
hermeneutics irrespective of the chosen denotation is the way it binds past, present and future 
together. Hermeneutics depicts life as movement through situatedness (Gadamer 1975; Joas 
1993) in which past and future play significant roles as constituents (Heidegger 1996). It 
constitutes a break with linear time as a mathematical concept, but a continuance of linear 
time as an epistemological feature (Ciborra 1999; Purser and Petranker 2005). And above all, 
hermeneutics points out that life can only be lived through living, through being logged on to 
the present; and that the endeavour of living in the physical and social sphere is 
improvisational. Unlike “hermeneutics”, “improvisation” gains strength from being a term 
used by many in everyday life, and although its many interpretations differ radically and to 
some extent even contradict each other, I argue that improvisation might be shaped into a 
fruitful and mind-sparking doctrine. Being a familiar if ever disputable concept it provides a 
starting point for contemplation for others than students of philosophy, and in the preceding 
discussion I have sought to erect improvisation as a somewhat autonomous doctrine; to show 
that “The improvising man” has deeper implications than the more popular everyday and 
academic denotations of improvisation. Hence “The improvising man” aims at and represents 
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the unavoidable characteristics of spontaneity, creativity, emotionality, irreversibility and 
sociality in practical existence. In short, in accordance with Ciborra (1999), “The improvising 
man” proposes that improvisation is a feature of normality; not of rareness.  
 
As a synthesis of the preceding discussion improvisation might be defined as spontaneous 
and hermeneutical sensemaking via external action. In all of the other definitions that were 
presented in the beginning of this chapter spontaneity stood out – but mostly in the sense of 
pure spontaneity – as convergence between thought and action. But as I have tried to show, 
spontaneity can be seen as embodied contextuality: as an inextricable constituent of existence 
and not only as a somewhat rare feature. And this changes the perception of improvisation as 
it becomes something natural rather than exceptional in practical life-in-the-unfolding (see 
model 4.4).  
 
Encouraged by Kamoche et al. (2002) I hold a functional concept of improvisation should 
stretch further than solely serving as a metaphor for phenomena such as jazz improvisation, 
and I argue “The improvising man” meets this requirement. The concept of “The improvising 
man” gets its strength from being philosophically grounded rather than merely an interesting 
feature of, say, one particular practice, or as a competence with special value for just a few. 
This differs significantly from the way improvisation is spoken of as a method of innovation 
(for example Bastien and Hostager 1988; Kamoche et al. 2002), a rare instance of and 
competence in (artistic) spontaneity, creativity or both (for example Miner et al. 1997; 
Moorman and Miner 1998; Weick 2001; Kamoche et al. 2002), and/or intuition (for example 
The improvising man: Improvisation 
as a philosophical characteristic of 
existence  
Explicit, pure 
improvisation 
(flow) 
Model 4.4 The improvising man 
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Crossan and Sorrenti 1997; Hatch 1997). I argue that improvisation is more like a capacity-in-
the-becoming than a competence, and that it is an expected feature of everyday human 
activity which is never repeated exactly alike. In Strauss’ (1993) words: “Any specific 
situation in which action takes place will require some if only the smallest adjustment.” (p. 
194).  
 
I do support speaking of improvisation as a competence, a method or an instrument, and I do 
recognize that improvisation in some instances may hold a pure and exceptional quality (see 
model 4.4), but from my perspective this is just part of the extent to which improvisation 
embraces practice. From the framework of “The improvising man”, improvisation can be 
identified as a general trait of practical situations, even to some extent under the most routine-
like conditions. Thus it is implied that the definition of improvisation itself is less important 
than the philosophical framework it rests upon. I argue that in order to understand the 
elements in improvisation one needs a certain backdrop – that the different terms that 
comprise the concept must be unpacked and studied through philosophical lenses. Having 
made such an attempt it is my opinion that improvisation captures the very important features 
of contextuality, spontaneity and external sensemaking better than any other concept; and that 
by accentuating the hermeneutical element in improvisation, the importance of corporality, 
emotion, sociality and intuition is also explicated. Finally, I have built on the insights from 
pragmatism and shown how improvisation is a creative process of utilizing tools in context. 
Tools of improvisation can be anything found in our embodied forehaving which can be used 
as instruments to achieve certain ends (Dewey 1929; Schön 1991). 
 
As a framework “The improvising man” can open up an alternative and fruitful perspective on 
human practice. The presented synthesis is not primarily a brand new invention, however; 
rather, it is the natural consequence of contrasting different theories and framing them from a 
particular philosophical strand. Hence, my thoughts represent a continuance and hopefully an 
embellishment of the writings of authors such as Karl E. Weick, Mary Jo Hatch, Kamoche et 
al., Jack Petranker, Ronald E. Purser and Claudio U. Ciborra. In that respect my project of 
synthesizing improvisation into a working definition has not been very different from tidying 
up loose ends and presenting a holistic image that is true to the tradition of practical 
philosophy. Thus I hope to have overcome some of the eclecticism that characterizes the field 
of organizational improvisation as well as to have widened the scope of improvisation as a 
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concept. I use many of the same words as those who have inspired me, but I have tried to give 
some of them a deeper and more philosophically grounded content.   
 
In a nutshell, the view that “The improvising man” encourages is that the natural (and 
inevitable) course of human practice is constituted as embodied and contextualized 
spontaneity and creativity. These two phenomena are important constituents of human 
existence, thus making improvisation a cornerstone of being. From a practical philosophical 
perspective improvisation is carved out from a theory where action is per definition creative, 
and where creativity is persistently measured in terms of context and workability (Dewey 
1929; Joas 1993, 1996). Thus, to the extent that man behaves rationally in a social and 
physical reality, improvisation becomes the rule and not the exception. This is precisely the 
meaning of “The improvising man”: that improvisation is inevitable in practical life.   
 
In the next chapter I will deal explicitly with organization theory. The insights from practical 
philosophy and “The improvising man” are used to expand on previous concepts of 
organizational improvisation (see chapter two). Hence I will make use of Weick’s 
sensemaking perspective on organizing, blend in the insights from “The improvising man”, 
and build up an understanding of organizing as improvisation. Other influential and 
supplemental contributions to organizing and improvisation are also drawn into this 
discussion, so as to construct a robust concept of organizing as improvisation. For the sake of 
investigating theoretically the relationship between central elements in organization theory 
and improvisation, the discussion addresses the following topics: change, routines, structures, 
plans and systems. A key argument is that from a sensemaking perspective, as nouns these 
can be seen as tools of improvisation rather than as something separated from improvisation. 
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Chapter 5. Organizing as improvisation 
Organizing – once more from the top  
In this chapter I will bring in the concept of improvisation as it was explicated in chapter four 
(the improvising man), and carve out the implications for “organizing”. In chapter one I 
defined organizing as externally oriented acts of sensemaking carried out in the private, 
social, and organizational sphere, and I explained that my interest in this dissertation 
concerns organizing in an organizational setting. This is why this chapter deals with 
organization theory, and my ambition is to show how, on the basis of organization literature, a 
fruitful concept of organizing can be formed through a study of the connection between 
improvisation and technical rationality. More specifically this chapter shows how technical 
rationality can be related to a selection of fundamental administrative issues in the 
organization literature, which are then analysed and discussed under the concept of “The 
improvising man”. Ultimately this discussion leads out in a conceptualization of organizing 
as improvisation, a theoretical concept which is put to empirical scrutiny in chapters seven to 
ten (whereas chapter seven to nine deals with organizing in a general sense, chapter ten builds 
on the current chapter and is devoted to an empirical study of the role of technical rationality 
in organizing processes).  
 
As an introduction to the discussion of organizing and technical rationality, I start with a 
theoretical analysis of “change”. Here I conclude that improvisation may be a more suitable 
metaphor than change for understanding the epistemological characteristics of organizing. 
Next I deal with the central administrative matters of “routines”, “organizational structure”, 
“plans and unpredictability”, before I finally turn to “systems”. A key issue is to substantiate 
that organizing as improvisation is not so much a universal question of routine, structure, plan, 
system, control or not: it is not a discussion of either-or; just as it is not a question of the 
objectively right way to conduct these matters. Rather, organizing as improvisation is a 
question of how structural elements are perceived and utilized in practice.  
 
Recall the definition from chapter one: organizing implies externally oriented acts of 
sensemaking carried out in the private, social and organizational sphere (p. 16). Thus my 
take on organizing is not from a decision-making perspective, but from a sensemaking 
perspective in which improspection  – not retrospection or prospection – is the essence (see 
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chapter two). As a result, organizing is seen as spontaneous sensemaking activity for the sake 
of creating sense and identity. Another important distinction is that I follow Weick’s (1989) 
and Weick et al.’s (2005) view on organizing as a process of imposing order on chaos; of 
making sense; but to narrow it down I choose to study organizing as it is constituted in 
everyday practice in the context of organizations (see chapter one, p. 17). As a natural 
consequence, my theoretical study of organizing is conducted in relation to central elements 
in organization theory, which is the topic for this chapter.  
 
In the preceding chapters I have tried to build up an argumentation that defines improvisation 
as spontaneous and hermeneutical sensemaking via external action. As a logical consequence 
of my sensemaking perspective I can now offer the following definition of organizing as “a 
process of improvisation”. The guiding thesis is that organizing follows the same logic as 
improvisation and involves the same qualities: firstly it is inevitably more or less 
improvisational (The improvising man); and secondly it is in some instances quite explicit 
and pure (see model 5.1). Thus, there is always an element of improvisation in organizing 
(Ciborra 1999), but in practice, the degree of purity will vary between the more technical 
rational on the one side and the more spontaneous and genuinely creative on the other. With 
this in mind, I take as my point of study what seems to be a severely intricate and exciting 
triadic relationship between organizing, improvisation and change.  
Organizing as improvisation in line 
with The improvising man 
Organizing as 
explicit, pure 
improvisation 
Model 5.1 Organizing as improvisation 
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Organizing and change 
As it is my opinion that there is still a need to write and further elaborate on organizing theory, 
my aim resembles that of Czarniawska and Sevón (1996):  
 
In particular, we hope to go beyond the characteristically modernist opposition of materialism 
and idealism and the dichotomies which follow from it: social/technical, 
intentional/deterministic, subjective/objective . . . .The modernist dichotomies mentioned 
above find their reflection in two dominating images of organizational change: as a planned 
innovation and as an environmental adaption. (pp. 13-14). 
 
Although I share the ambition of Czarniawska and Sevón to go beyond taken for granted 
dichotomies, I want to go one step further and discuss the very applicability of the term 
“change”. In the existing literature on improvisation numerous scholars have related 
improvisation to change (Orlikowski 1996; Orlikowski and Hofman 1997; Brown and 
Eisenhardt 1997; Weick and Quinn 1999; Weick 2001; Tsoukas and Chia 2002; Cunha and 
Cunha 2003; Purser and Petranker 2005). From a non-dualistic framework, however, change 
might be an inappropriate root metaphor for understanding organizing as improvisation. I will 
not in this section provide a review of the field of organizational change. This is brilliantly 
done in Tsoukas and Chia (2002). Rather, I want to give a short philosophical analysis of the 
very concept of change and the way it ties in with improvisation. In my view, this is a suitable 
introduction to organizing as improvisation, and it can teach us something about what an 
improvisational vocabulary is not; and if it can simultaneously contribute in any way to the 
intricate debate on organizational change, this is a fruitful side-effect. Let me already at this 
point reveal my leading argument: Change is a root metaphor of ontology, whereas 
improvisation with its basis in meaning-making is a root metaphor of epistemology; and 
herein lies the difficulty. 
 
Change versus stability has been a recurrent theme of philosophy since the philosophers of 
ancient Greece. To see this we can recall the ontological debate between Parmenides and 
Heraclitus about the true nature of reality (Russel 1995). In order to prove the impossibility of 
change Parmenides claimed that what is is, and what is not is not, and that something cannot 
be and not be at the same time. Is this necessarily in conflict with Heraclitus’ “change is 
everything”? If change is possible it would mean that something must become what it is not, 
which clearly contradicts the first two axioms. As Heraclitus’ conception presupposes that 
nothing is in the first place (continuous change), how can nothing ever become something 
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other than nothing? At first glimpse it is only if one claims that something does or does not 
exist objectively to begin with, that change occurs as a problem. In short, if nothing is, then 
nothing changes, and if something is it cannot change, because then it would not exist to begin 
with. Thus, Parmenides is only in conflict with Heraclitus to the extent that ontological truth, 
stability, is clutched on to as a taken for granted axiom. But perhaps a deeper puzzle is 
whether continuous (Heraclitian) change is not just a disguised form of stability?  
 
Going a bit further into the intriguing dualistic rhetoric of ontological change, I would argue 
that change as a concept is only interesting to the extent that something stable exists, for 
without it there is nothing to be changed. Consequently, with regard to the philosophical quest 
for the ontological objective, change might become an intricate problem. How come? Firstly, 
to say that something exists ontologically could imply that change remains unaccounted for. 
After all, the dualist philosophy is fundamentally a philosophy about the stable and (pre)given 
(Dewey 1929). Alternatively, change itself can be portrayed as ontologically given, as the 
fundamental element of stability: stability is found in continuous change (Tsoukas and Chia 
2002). In both of these instances I would say there is little doubt that the rhetoric employed 
collapses the dichotomy of change and stability as meaningful concepts. In Orlikowski’s 
(1996) article on organizing as improvisation, for instance, a dualistic rhetoric is used, 
producing oddly contradictive phrases like “. . . stability is out, change is in” (p. 63). The 
reasons why I see this as contradictive are firstly, that stability is only meaningful as the 
antagonist of change – stability implies not-change; and secondly, that if stability means 
objectively not-change, and if change does not exist, neither can stability as its antagonist. 
There seems to be no way out of this dilemma from the dualist approach. Apparently, the 
dualist creates his own problem, a fundamental paradox so to speak, and seems not to be able 
to get out of it by the means of his own rhetoric.  
 
Confused as we may be by the polemics of dualism we should not neglect that the trust in 
ontological stability, in objective non-changing truth, has provided the fundament of much of 
modern organization theory, and technical rationality seems to continue as a prominent trend 
in social theory to this day (Schön 1991; Andersen 2000; Hagen 2000; Stacey et al. 2000; 
Stacey 2001). It would be strange if everyday practical life were not affected by this as well, 
especially through the way we typically think about organizing. Think of the words 
organization, structure and system, which clearly emphasize the static and ordered, and which 
if reified come to represent images of objective reality. It is possible that out of this a need has 
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emerged to find ways to alter the static and change it into new forms (Hatch 2004), such as for 
instance new organizational structures, new phases of systemic equilibrium etc. In other 
words, the need for change can be constituted by an excessive focus on the stable. But is it not 
impossible to rearrange what is already arranged objectively – can change and stability exist 
ontologically side by side; is change real? Can dualist philosophy show us a way out of this 
paradox?  
 
If we take as our point of departure the commonly held assumption that organizing implies 
some kind of change (Purser and Petranker 2005), I would argue that the paradox of change is 
unavoidable. But what if change is possible, one might ask, for example within certain stable 
parameters; what if it is possible to change something within a certain frame? Though this has 
an immediate ring of sense, I feel compelled to discard it, as it only signifies another level of 
reduction. We cannot forget the words of Parmenides: either something is, or it is not. To 
overcome this problem from the dualist viewpoint, one must continue to transcend infinitely, 
which is basically the method of reductionism in reverse. But what if everything we know is 
solely a matter of social construction, as argued by radical constructivism (Dewey 1929)? 
Certainly this must allow for a concept of change? No, because as already explicated it is no 
use talking about change if nothing actually exists to be changed. As we take a closer look, 
both of these examples imply playing the ontology game (see p. 52). 
 
So what is change; an epistemological feature brought about by impure human beings? 
Perhaps change is an illusion? If it is, then linear forms of organizing such as decision-making, 
planning, controlling and executing are also illusions. Contradictive to its purpose, then, it is 
therefore possible that the dualist conception of change contributes to confusion more than 
clarity. To repeat a very important point: one might speculate that the distinctive and 
substantial field of organizational change has in fact emerged from the need to shake off 
unrealistic assumptions of organizational stability (Hatch 2004). Confused by the dualistic 
self-inflicted controversy, I turn to non-dualistic practical philosophy for help to 
understanding what seems to be a deep mystery of organizing.  
 
However elegant some of the elaborations on organizational change, on the basis of its 
dualistic origins I argue that the concept is permeated with contradictions, and the closest a 
non-dualistic perspective might come to change is a perception or feeling of change. Such a 
perception is only possible, however, to the extent that some facet of reality has become 
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reified as stable, which is an illusion since from this perspective reality only exists through 
perpetually (re)created objects (Bergson 1944). Let us consider a few examples: Say that you 
had a clod of clay formed as a ball in front of you, and expressed a wish to change it into a 
cube. Would that not be a valid perception of change? No, because then you would have taken 
for granted that the original ball stayed objectively the same as you kept thinking about it as 
well as through the moulding-process, but again, from the stance of practical philosophy it 
does not. Rather, it is continually reconstructed as a sufficiently similar visual and tactile 
image, so when in fact you say that you want to change the ball, it has already become a new 
ball many times over, and the only way to see it as the old ball is via a reconstruction of 
memory; of how it used to be.  
 
. . . in reality the body is changing form at every moment; or rather, there is no form, since 
form is immobile and the reality is movement. What is real is the continual change of form: 
form is only a snapshot view of transition. (Bergson 1944, p. 23).  
 
An important point is that taking the role of “the old you” and your old relation to the old ball 
is a fundamentally inauthentic move, because it implies your artificially inhabiting (reifying) a 
space that no longer exists. In fact, in non-dualistic terms it never did exist as such, only 
through the active and temporary creation of spontaneous consciousness. The “old” ball of 
clay cannot change, because it is always new. And again, the feeling of change comes about 
as you are lured by yourself into believing that the ball was a stable entity. As a last objection, 
however, experience itself certainly changes, so at least there must be some sort of 
epistemological change? But from a practical philosophical perspective this is impossible as 
your experience is never yours to clutch onto. Recalling the message from Heidegger’s (1996) 
hermeneutics, experience is not a thing from the past that might or might not be altered. Past 
experience is a process of momentary construction of the past, and it is always constructed 
from the present, so it does not change; it is simply made anew and anew through a process of 
“I” using memory “me” as a tool (Mead 1967).  
 
Through non-dualist lenses it should be possible to see that the paradox of change is no more 
than a restatement of the problem of meaning and truth, and that as a root metaphor meaning 
is closer to practical reality than is change. Change is in one sense a meaningless and 
misleading construct because experience can only be comprehended as meaning; a concept 
which by its very nature implies incessant novelty: in Weickian (1995) terms, for example, an 
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enacted bracket is per definition temporary, so how can it change? A potential, desire or 
intention to make changes can be seen as another way of formulating free will or the 
spontaneous “I”: the capacity to inhabit and influence the present – to improvise. One cannot 
speak of either change or stability as such, only of that which seems to be stable and not. I 
shall refrain from repeating the intricacy of the ontological game, and merely point out that 
change versus stability is no exception in that regard: The debate of Parmenides and 
Heraclitus is a game of ontology in which “change” and “stability” are the game pieces. The 
paradox is resolved quite easily as change and stability are nothing more than reified 
constructs. Perhaps we need another root language for organizing, then, than the vocabulary 
of change, or more generally, of technical rationality?  
 
Contrary to Tsoukas and Chia (2002) I suggest that change might not be a fruitful starting 
point for a practically relevant discussion of organizing. It provides no solid ground on which 
to erect a theory of organizing. At worst, change might through an endless regress of 
reductionism create as many obstacles and controversies as it overcomes, and as indicated, the 
language of improvisation can contribute to clearing up many of these. As pointed out in 
chapters one to four, many authors have made such an attempt but they do not seem to bring 
to the table a sufficiently integrated and generic understanding. Through the concept of “The 
improvising man” I hope to contribute to both a philosophically grounded and practically 
realistic alternative. Once again to sum up: in practical philosophy meaning is always 
authentic, it is novel, and it has always passed. Reality does not change; it merely becomes 
(Bergson 1944). It is not completely random, and not completely rigid. Thus, improvisation is 
not fundamentally about making changes; it is about acting and making (new) sense.  
 
In order to see how an improvisatory language might further open new windows into the 
domain of organizing, I shall in the remaining theoretical reflections use improvisation as a 
framework to discuss some of the most significant administrative topics in organizing theory. 
Hopefully, it will become clear how from an improvisatory angle these can be rephrased and 
rearranged. More specifically, the concepts of routine, structure, plan and system will be 
analysed. A key insight is that practical organizing goes beyond either-or dichotomies (i.e. 
improvisation or plan, improvisation or structure, improvisation or routine, and improvisation 
or system). As organizing is seen as a process of improvisation, organizing might indeed 
involve high degrees of, say, structure and routine (see chapters eight to ten). For instance, 
routine is not seen as categorically different from improvisation, but as a sensemaking tool to 
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be utilized in context through improvisation. As another example of the following discussion, 
“blind routinization” is understood as a contra-improvisatory process of reconstructing the old 
for its own sake. But as action evolves through bodily gestures I argue that not even blind 
routinization manages to escape the emotional and spontaneous aspects of existence as 
explicated in “The improvising man”.   
Routines 
One way of looking at organizations as processes is as ongoing routines (March and Simon 
1993). How to understand routines, however, is not as clear-cut as it might seem, as pointed 
out by Pentland and Rueter (1994). Arguing that organizational routines “. . . occupy a critical 
position in organization theory” (p. 484), they end up defining routines as “. . . a set of 
functionally similar patterns” (p. 484). Four phrases are important in Pentland and Rueter’s 
ground-breaking definition: Firstly, “a set of” implies that routines come in plural; it is 
difficult to identify one routine. Rather, routines are understood as multiple, intertwined 
processes. Secondly, “functionally” would implicate that routines are not random, but rather 
instruments to accomplish some purpose. This separates Pentland and Rueter’s (1994) 
understanding from Nelson and Winter (1982), who are mainly occupied with the automatic 
and unconscious: 
 
The importance of the concept of organizational routine in our discussion and the parallel with 
individual skill have already been noted. We use ”routine” in a highly flexible way, much as 
“program” (or, indeed, “routine”) is used in discussion of computer programming. It may refer 
to a repetitive pattern of activity in an entire organization, to an individual skill, or as an 
adjective, to the smooth uneventful effectiveness of such an organizational or individual 
performance. (Nelson and Winter 1982, p. 97).  
 
The portrayal of organizations as routines makes Nelson and Winter’s view both innovative 
and mind-sparking. Still, as explicitly pointed out by Pentland and Rueter (1994), they seem 
to bring to the table a rather narrow and vague understanding of the concept, as “. . . routines 
are essentially automatic, executed without explicit deliberation or choice” (p. 488). Imagine 
that the everyday patterns of brushing your teeth, driving to work, and having lunch, to name 
a few, should not be seen as routines, only because they might involve consciousness. Unlike 
Nelson and Winter (1982), Giddens (1996) underscores the importance of functionality and 
mindfulness, and argues that: “Routine activities, as Wittgenstein made clear, are never just 
carried out in an automatic way” (p. 39). As a consequence, in order to understand routines, 
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one has to understand their practical applicability in everyday situations, which hardly 
emerges on an unconscious level alone. Still, there is something puzzling in Giddens’ 
statement, as he seems to have understood Wittgenstein in such a way that routines cannot be 
accomplished automatically. In other words, Giddens seems to have formulated something 
like an antagonism to Nelson and Winter (1982). A question emerges, then, as to how we 
should understand routines; as automatic patterns of behaviour or as highly conscious and 
repetitive action? Turning to practical philosophy for help, we soon realize that such an either-
or dichotomy can be avoided. Routines must not be either automatic or conscious, but can be 
performed both consciously and automatically. Recall from the perspective of “The 
improvising man” that there is an emotional component in all cognitions, elucidating 
automatic behaviour as an inevitable element of any routine (see model 5.2). Automatic 
behaviour depicts the kind of existence which slips the mind, including the physiological 
capacity itself to make sense and act mindfully (see chapter four). 
 
In the way Pentland and Rueter (1994) define routines, functionality is of the greatest 
importance, though they do not explicitly preclude automatic behaviour from their definition. 
Still, one might ask what they mean by functionality. Does their view accord with Giddens’, 
who claims that routines are never just automatic, but always epistemological and intentional 
undertakings? Or even more profoundly, is functionality meant to signify that routines play a 
role in providing identity and safety, as they are perceived to be some kind of catalysts of 
confidence? In order for this to be a fruitful theoretical point of departure, it is important to 
Routine: Automatic physiological and 
emotional processes 
Routine: 
Conscious 
processes 
Model 5.2 Routine
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note that sensemaking and routinization are not synonymous terms: sensemaking seen as a 
quest for identity (chapter four) is far more complex than merely the (blind) reconstruction of 
patterns. Had it not been so we would have been trapped in some sort of a Kafka-universe 
moving towards the future like a dumb machine or program. In short, meaning-making is 
more than routinization, as identity is more than reconstructed patterns of action. My point is 
that organizing involves routine behaviour, but there can be other ways of making the future 
predictable and the present comprehensible than creating and performing routines.  
 
The two last words of Pentland and Rueter’s (1994) definition have to some extent already 
been touched upon, but remain to be thoroughly explained, namely “similar” and “patterns”. 
To understand what constitute similar patterns, just imagine an industrial machine producing 
repetitive motions, or a conveyor belt crowded with people repeating more or less the same 
movements continuously. As we imagine these scenarios it is hard to see how action can 
become routine before it is actually and irreversibly performed repeatedly. Furthermore, the 
process of mastering and performing routines can be perceived as learning, and once learned, 
the routine inhabits the individual body as a potential for action. Following Wittgenstein 
(1992, 1994), this kind of learning involves internalizing and trusting a rule and is inevitably 
part of everyday life.  
 
In my view, to be generally applicable a definition of routines should be capable of capturing 
the individual as well as the social, the automatic as well as the attentive aspects of existence. 
Pentland and Rueter’s (1994) definition goes a long way towards doing this, but does it go far 
enough? If seen as repetitive or similar patterns providing some contextual or philosophical 
(identity-preserving) function, we understand that to some extent routines must be automatic 
as they presuppose a human body as an agent performing them. Furthermore, routines can be 
learned and performed attentively, but can also be exclusively automatic, in which case 
“automatic processes” may be a better word (see model 5.2). Is routine understood as 
automatic behaviour captured by Pentland and Rueter’s definition? If so, functionality must 
be interpreted on a philosophical level, for example as a bodily instrument to maintain life, 
through eating, breathing, sensemaking and so forth, somewhat in line with Dewey’s (1929) 
portrait of “habit”. When habits are interrupted, Dewey argues, consciousness is triggered as a 
capacity to solve problems – something which creates new habits through a continual process 
of learning. Consciousness, then, becomes the bodily, and consequently emotional, capacity 
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to embellish routine behaviour by solving the problem at hand; and as much as it alters the 
routine, it simultaneously grows from, and is made possible, by it: 
 
Organic and psycho-physical activities with their qualities are conditions which have to come 
into existence before mind, the presence and operation of meanings, ideas, is possible. They 
supply mind with its footing and connection in nature; they provide meanings with their 
existential stuff. (Dewey 1929, p. 290). 
 
From Dewey’s perspective, “routine-as-habit” has a fundamental function in human life, 
which he argues is inextricably tied to consciousness and its function of altering routine-as-
habit when disrupted – a function that is crucial in ensuring the survival of the human 
organism in its environment. This is a speculative theory, however, as it implicates applying 
functions on nature: i.e. the body is born with a function to survive and even unconscious 
processes take part in this function. Searle (1995) provides a critique of such teleological 
philosophy, and argues that we cannot say anything objectively about the function of 
automatic bodily processes. Still, one can make speculations, and in Dewey’s (1929) case he 
merely seems to propose a theory of how and why people make theories (i. e. abduction).  
 
If routine behaviour is sought after and performed intentionally I propose that intentional 
routinization can be a more specific term. (see model 5.3) This concept of routinization is 
inspired by Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration, and captures the intention-in-action 
whether the outcome is accomplished or unaccomplished routine behaviour. For example, one 
Intentional 
routinization 
 
 
 
Routine 
Model 5.3 Routinization 
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could want to routinize some process, but not succeed in doing so, or at least experience 
temporary problems in routinizing, in which case routinization describes the intent though not 
the actual outcome. Adversely, the intention can be successfully implemented in action, in 
which case routinization becomes routine. Needless to say, what is seen as successful 
routinization lies in the eyes of the beholder(s). Note that if the intention is not to routinize, 
routine behaviour might appear anyway, in which case there is an observed routine but no 
intentional routinization (see model 5.3).  
 
In the further exploration of organizing as improvisation I bring with me an understanding 
that routines and intentional routinization mean different things. In order to create as sharp a 
linguistic tool as possible I separate the two, but as shown in model 5.3 I still recognize and 
uphold their mutual connection. Furthermore, I suggest that routines can be both attentive and 
inattentive, and in the first case there is inevitably an inattentive, emotional component. 
Another notation I make is that routines do not exist as such outside of action, only as 
temporary ideas or rules potentially governing (routinizing) behaviour (i.e. Bergson 1944). If 
rules are seen as internalized automatic behaviour, they only become real if acted out; 
alternatively they remain as a bodily unleashed potential. Finally, I recognize that routines can 
be largely social, and when they are, they take the form of institutionalized behaviour, which 
is also partly automatic and partly conscious/automatic, depending on the situation. This is of 
course the case with organizational routines. But I do not to regard organizational routines as 
mathematically identical patterns, since routines (or any form of action) are never repeated in 
an exact manner (Mead 1967). Pentland and Rueter (1994) offer the following explanation: 
“Rules are not deterministic, but they constraint the set of possibilities . . . . Routines are like 
ruts in a well-travelled road. They do not exactly determine where the next wagon will go, but 
neither do they merely describe where past wagons have gone” (pp. 507-508). 
 
Organizational routines, then, can be comprehended as reconstructed patterns of social 
(inter)action. In a way they are what can be recognized from one situation to another as 
organizational identity. As Scott (2001) puts it on the basis of neo-institutional theory: 
“Routines are carriers that rely on patterned actions that reflect the tacit knowledge of actors: 
deeply ingrained habits and procedures based on inarticulated knowledge and beliefs” (p. 80). 
I have already discussed in detail the aspect of consciousness in routines, so let us focus on 
the word carriers in Scott’s definition. Carrier is a word that is intriguing irrespective of 
whether routines are conceived as unconscious patterns or not. The word emphasizes that 
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something is brought on from one moment to another, that something is reconstructed 
sufficiently similarly to be recognized. This brings to mind the “me” in Mead’s (1967) 
vocabulary and “foreknowledge” in the hermeneutic language (Heidegger 1996). 
Consequently, routines can be seen as reconstructed actions carrying the memory of 
organizational themes; or even more simple: Routines constitute the memory of organizations. 
I do not claim that an organization has a memory as such, but what we associate with an 
organization over time is to a significant degree found in its routines. This is, however, only a 
valid comprehension if actions are interpreted widely, in the pragmatist sense, to include 
thoughts, values and beliefs. Thus, routines would include “culture”, which is a far more 
comprehensive understanding than for example routines as technical work processes.   
 
Some might argue that to include culture in routines is taking the concept too far. However, 
the point here is not to present a closed definition of routines or culture, but to highlight the 
understanding of routines as part of organizational memory, continuously shaping and being 
shaped by social (inter)action. Secondly, I want to suggest that directing attention to a routine 
will merely provide old knowledge. Organizations are far more than their routines, and by 
focusing on “organizing” as a verb we might come closer to capturing the nature of 
continuous organization-making, in which routines are amongst the stuff guiding and creating 
everyday organizational (inter)actions. Routines are in one sense conversational themes, and 
they do not exist unless they are thought of, talked about, acted upon; in short, unless life is 
breathed into them. In Ciborra’s (1999) words: “At a sufficient level of granularity in the 
study of organizations, [improvisation] appears to be the very stuff market processes and 
hierarchical routines are made of.” (p. 80). 
 
Following Ciborra, as soon as routines are brought to life, they need to be reconstructed 
continually in an ongoing process of improvisation to continue existing, just like individual 
memory is nothing in itself but reconstructed ideas and associations brought to life in (unique) 
contexts (Mead 1967). Routines-in-practice are constructed and reconstructed through 
individual and social action in a present here-and-now. Thus, routines are inextricably tied to 
context. As bodies are never the same, routines can never be the same (Feldman 2000). Hence, 
I would argue there is much to be learned from how routines come to life in practice, and how 
they become associated with organizations. This, however, entails a much larger scope on 
organizing than only as routines. A routine will inevitably be old news, whereas organizing 
inevitably happens in real-time as a reflexive social process of improvisation. Thus, for 
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routinization to be effective it requires a context which emerges in a relatively predictable 
manner.  
 
Intentional routinization is a technical rational form of action in which the aim is to 
reconstruct the old as scrupulously as possible. Routinization involves already having made 
up your mind as to what is the correct form of action: the next step is rigidly defined by the 
previous step, and if this sort of action is taken for granted, blind Routinization occurs. From 
an improvisational perspective, however, routines should never be taken for granted as they 
can be improved upon infinitely. To improvise on a routine means to continually evaluate it in 
light of the perceived best way of action taking context into consideration. This means that 
even if action seems routine-like, the actual thought processes preceding or taking place in 
action can be improvisatory. A change from blind routinization to organizing as 
improvisation requires the ongoing careful and attentive look of a practitioner reflecting in-
action-on-action. It requires an improspective, investigative and diagnostic eye.  
 
Generally, if you feel spontaneous you are spontaneous. The fact that some routine to the 
outsider seems relatively unchanged and non-impulsive has little to do with any lack of 
subjective novelty actually involved. As argued in chapter two, novelty might be seen as a 
feature of continually evolving time. It resides in every moment, in the fresh experience of 
individuals. Hence, if old ways of doing things are continually chosen as still relevant, not to 
say the best way of acting, the process, however routine-like in form, is initiated and realized 
as improvisation. Routines could, of course, be reconstructed unwittingly, in which case 
improvisation does not occur. Improvised organizing, however, involves realizing that 
routines must be chosen anew again and again and adapted intelligently to emerging contexts: 
they must be made to work (Orlikowski 1996; Ciborra 1999; Tsoukas and Chia 2002). 
Improvisation presupposes regarding routine as temporal, as something to use and reflect 
upon and that can (and will inevitably) always be altered.  
 
In organizing processes routines can provide a sense of security (Molander 1996). Possessing 
a toolbox of routines means being prepared, and knowing that a routine lies readily at hand 
can contribute to pushing the practitioner forward onto new terrain (Czarniawska 1999); not 
to mention if something unexpected occurs, in which case routines can be rapidly mobilized 
to help clear the situation. Again, the improvisor does not simply apply the routine 
acontextually, but reconstructs and acts it out intelligently. For example, she might start acting 
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out the routine if only to see how far it can go, to see if it works or if it needs modification. In 
that way the routine works as a tool, as a grammar (Pentland and Reuter 1994). Using routine 
as a grammar implies learning from the resistance of physical and social factors, adjusting 
behaviour (and routine) accordingly, and finding appropriate ways to act.  
 
In sum, I regard routines as part of what we recognize as an organization over time; routines 
translate the past into future. As a noun a routine can be a temporary mental structure (a tool; 
a rule) potentially guiding future action, and as a verb it can be the practical realization of 
such structure in a context, in which case there is an inevitable component of improvisation. 
Organizational routines subsist as much in the spine as in the mind, as the body can remember 
in other ways than what is necessarily verbalized. But to concentrate on routine patterns alone 
(thus seeing routines as analytical entities) as the main constituent to organizing, is to neglect 
the spontaneous “I” of the present which continually makes routines come to life.  
 
A. Intention B. Activity C. Practical consequence 
1. Contextual sensemaking and 
action, which might imply 2. (below) 
Improvisational 
organizing 
2. Reconstructing the old from 
contextual grounds 
Improvisational, 
intentional routinization 
3. Reconstructing the old without 
considering context 
Reified/blind routinization
Varying degrees of 
repetitiveness (routine), but 
always some degree of 
spontaneity.  
Table 5.0 Routine in practice 
 
In line with Pentland and Rueter (1994) I hold that routines in the strict technical sense do not 
exist in practice; routines are the practical realization of memorized action and are subjected 
to hermeneutical processes of becoming (see column C in table 5.0). Organizing emerges as a 
process of mindful action, as improvisation, and to the extent that actions are reconstructed 
similarly organizing becomes routine (see row 1 in table 5.0). And if organizing in some 
situation involves some intention of reconstructing the old, we might talk about Routinization. 
In that sense Row 2 in table 5.0 is part of row 1 to the extent that Routinization is intended in 
a particular situation of improvisatory considerations. Row 3, however, is very different from 
the first two as in this case routinizing is followed blindly, reflecting an act of reification.  
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Organizational structure 
Structure is a recurrent theme in organization theory, and to its students structure is often 
presented as the skeleton upon which an organization is built or as a map of formal 
relationships (Daft 2001). Structure in this sense can be studied in artefacts such as 
organization charts and diagrams, and much like a freezing-up of the famous image of 
Xenon’s arrow in flux, structure reflects a snapshot of the organization (Weisbord 1988) as it 
is (descriptively) or as it should be (normatively). Descriptively, for example, structure can be 
used to communicate the different functions making up the organization, and as functions are 
tied together they create systems. Consequently, there is strict logic behind the way structure 
is built up, which is again related to the different tasks the organization performs at any time. 
Normatively, as it projects an image of the functions that should be fulfilled and how these 
relate to each other, structure can be seen as an administrative instrument or as a design of 
systems to ensure effective communication.  
 
As a background and inspiration for how structure can be conceptualized from an 
improvisatory view, I propose borrowing from Scott (1981), who categorizes two ways of 
seeing structure: one behavioural and one normative. In the behavioural model structure is 
seen as patterns of behaviour, which resembles Grennes’ (1999) view on structure as frozen 
channels of communication and coordination. In Scott’s normative model structure represents 
a value or incentive to act in a certain manner. As a practical example of the two denotations 
we might picture a set of interconnected organizational functions that encourage people to 
interact (normative structure), from which social systems of communication and action might 
emerge (behavioural structure). What is important in Scott’s argumentation is what I spot as 
an accentuation of structure as process in the sense that structure emerges through human 
practice, as opposed to the normative model where structure is merely an idea guiding action. 
Consequently, for a structure to become practically real, people must realize their systemic 
roles and act accordingly, and as will be shown, this is at the core of how structure can be 
related to improvisation.  
 
Scott’s point of departure bears close resemblance to Hatch (1999) and to Bosworth and 
Kreps (1986), who offer some very intriguing insights into structure-as-process versus 
structure-as-a-noun. As a noun, structure can provide an overview of the systemic character of 
organization, but it cannot reflect the organization as such. Hatch’s (1999) and Bosworth and 
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Kreps’s (1986) process view entails that the organization cannot be pointed out as a thing, as 
it is continuously moving on. Consequently, Hatch argues that structure-in-practice is never 
100% mathematically accurate, but ambiguous, temporary and emotional. As a noun, 
structure may be stored as an organizational artefact, say, as a chart or a flow diagram, but it 
exists in practice only to the degree that it is realized through human action in the becoming. 
Pursuing this line of thought structure as a noun can prove itself useful as a sensemaking 
instrument via its power to facilitate an intersubjective image of the organization, but it cannot 
ensure total control. Hence we see a close connection between structure and routines, as the 
former in the prescriptive sense can be seen as an unleashed potential of the latter; as an idea, 
or in the vocabulary of Pentland and Rueter (1994), a rule: “Routines occupy the crucial nexus 
between structure and action, between organization as an object and organizing as a 
process.” (p. 484). A rule may guide and govern activity (routinization), and the more so, the 
more visible the routines. Likewise, in the descriptive sense structure can be seen as a 
snapshot of organization and its routines. 
 
An implication from practical philosophy is that a rule cannot be perfectly reconstructed, 
either in mind or in action; which inevitably makes practice somewhat different from theory. 
No objectified structure can capture the richness of actual practice, though it can provide 
sufficiently adequate images. An objectified structure is an abstract and temporal idea, whilst 
an organization evolves through organizing processes. Organizing as improvisation may 
therefore be seen as structuring efforts, and as such it may vary from the fairly precise 
fulfilment of some formal structure to the utmost chaos. In practical organizing there might 
not even be a structure to begin with, at least not a formal one. From this we can derive an 
important non-dualistic message: structure should not be seen as an ontologically objective 
entity. Although it might be seen as a thing, it cannot be proven to exist in itself. It is, rather, a 
guiding label, one that can be used to communicate an intention. Structure is only a restraint-
jacket to the extent that it is allowed to be so by practitioners. Structure is a tool of 
improvisation. 
 
The improvisor does not look for the ideal organizational structure, Hatch (1999) argues. 
Instead, structure is thought of as a process, as a verb; or if seen as a noun, it comprises a tool, 
a point of departure (Weick 2001). As follows, the improvisor asks herself how she can use 
the structure at hand to solve problems and create novelty. As such the improvisor is taken up 
with finding out what she can get away with or how structure can aid a problematic situation, 
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more than with how structure limits and controls action. Structure is not sacred in any way, it 
is not some taken for granted power that should be obeyed, but an instrument to play with in 
continuously evolving context, something which indicates that no universally right or ideal 
structure can be singled out. The only conceivable Right structure is the one that is chosen 
continuously, which cannot be technically identical from situation to situation.  
 
If structure is thought of as either process (verb) or entity (noun) it cannot be taken out of 
context and studied objectively. Hence, from a practical philosophical point of view structure 
cannot be proven to possess immanent or ontological characteristics. Rather, as suggested by 
Hatch (1999), it is an ambiguous and temporal phenomenon which through interaction can 
both enable and limit further action. Consider a metaphorical example from jazz music: 
Weick (2001) states that some melodies are more open to interpretation and elaboration than 
others, as if there were certain features intrinsic to some melodies that objectively define them 
as more or less open to embellishment. Applied to organizations, this could imply that some 
structures, for example flat or organic structures, per se are more flexible than others. 
Similarly, as argued by Thompson (2005), some structures can be thought of as seeding while 
others as controlling. I trace, however, in both Weick and Thompson a sense of determinism, 
as a possibility of structures having objective characteristics seems to be taken for granted. 
Needless to say, this collides with the improvisational theoretical frame, as structure cannot be 
singled out as more or less anything per se. It only comes to life in a dyadic and reflexive 
relationship: not as an autonomous entity, but as a constructed and temporary object. The 
extent to which structure nurtures knowledge creation; to which it provides a seeding 
mechanism; to which it opens up frozen dialogue, is decided and negotiated on an ongoing 
basis between an agent and her fore-knowledge on the one hand, and the structure as it 
appears in her mind in a situated here-and-now on the other. Whether a structure allows for 
more elaborate creativity than others depends on the context at hand. A seemingly fertile 
structure may prove to be controlling in practice if it is perceived a certain way. Hence, the 
clue in improvisation is how structure is looked upon, how it is perceived.  
 
As an opponent to the ontology game (see p. 52) I suggest talking about epistemological 
rather than ontological structural characteristics. This way the perceived difference between 
different things in real life is taken seriously, but with less danger of reification. This may, of 
course, be the point Weick (2001) makes – that some melodies are so rigidly culturally 
defined that it seems impossible to alter them. Expanding further on the jazz metaphor, there 
 117
might be certain cultural traits deeply engrained in the way music is commonly perceived, in 
the sense that Wittgensteinian (1992, 1994) language game rules bind the number of feasible 
ways of interpretation. Having become used to a certain system of musical rules and 
structures, of musical scales, harmonies and even rhythmical patterns, the perimeters of what 
is considered suitable and appropriate are to a large extent predetermined. For example, I 
would argue that some harmonies and rhythms seem more natural to the Western ear than 
others. An explanation for this could be that certain musical underpinnings work as somewhat 
invisible parameters controlling musical composing, execution and listening. It could be that 
in parts of our culture there is an emphasis on the 1st and 3rd in a 4/4 beat, whereas in other 
cultures the emphasis is on the 2nd and the 4th beat. Such differences may not seem all that 
important, but then again, one might argue that they comprise quite a significant difference 
between two cultures. Such musical structures do not even have to be recognized wittingly by 
cultural members, but might emerge largely unconsciously as bodily engraved patterns 
guiding musical perception. Given this, perhaps it is not so strange that some melodies seem 
more open to interpretation than others. The tools for deciding what are viable perceptions are 
already deeply imprinted in the individual body (Dewey 1929). Thus, possible ways of 
interpretation are both limited and enabled by structural tools.   
 
Imagine taking a picture of a family holiday moment. By taking the picture you try to freeze 
the situation, but as soon as you do, the moment is gone. It can be re-experienced, however, 
through looking at the picture, but the genuine moment is forever lost only to be continually 
replaced by new ones (Bergson 1944). Likewise, formal structures as they appear on charts 
and diagrams are like pictures of an ideal reality: One can wish for them to be similar to the 
“actual” structure of some organization at a given time, but as the actual structure only exists 
in the becoming (Bergson 1944, Hatch 1999) the chance is less than minimal. The real 
structure of an organization fades away immediately just like the holiday moment. Structure 
can to some extent be captured through thorough mapping, but as soon as this is done, the 
organization has already moved on. Consequently, one might ask how such mapping can be 
of any value. Firstly, mapping and pinning down structures can be valuable as they provide 
some intersubjective image of organizational reality, thus forming a basis for creating a sense 
of mutual identity (Weick 2001). Secondly, mapping structures can be seen as a way of 
striving for contextual understanding: Looking for structure is a way to be improspective and 
context-sensitive, thus creating tools for the further process of making sense of the 
organization. Some organizational characteristics can be recognizable from one situation to 
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another, and knowing about these can be crucial. Once structure is constructed it can provide 
guidance in the further process of improvisation. However, there is a long way from providing 
guidance to becoming objectively stable or even untouchable and sacred. Structure (as a noun) 
is something to take seriously in organizing, but not for granted. There is no such thing as the 
right structure, just as there is no such thing as The Context. Structures are more or less useful; 
they are tools of improvised organizing (Ciborra 1999). 
(Un)predictability and plans 
As it is a key factor in theories of organizing (for example predictions, plans and analyses), I 
want to give the issue of time special concern. More specifically “The improvising man” 
implies seeing unpredictability as a natural and inevitable aspect of everyday organizing. 
Whereas momentarily experienced complexity indicates the limits of control and structure in 
the present, unpredictability indicates the limits of planning and future analyses (Weick 1995). 
Nobody knows what the future holds: the future is unpredictable. The keyword is 
“knowledge”, as not knowing is equivalent to complexity. Not to know what will happen is 
closely related to not knowing what is happening, however, since I view sensemaking as 
essentially improspective. Hence, unpredictability can be thought of as a form of complexity 
(the less predictable the more complex). It is important to realize that as a phenomenon 
unpredictability creates real time complexity, but it is just as important to see how real time 
complexity produces unpredictability. This is non-dualism in a new wrapping; since 
meaninglessness knows no boundaries in either space or time, complexity and 
unpredictability concern one and the same phenomenon. Actually, space and time can be seen 
as enacted products of meaninglessness, so to speak. In Purser and Petranker’s (2005) words, 
“Organizing does not occur in time but is time” (p. 195). In that sense, time and space are 
labels employed for the purpose of making the unpredictable predictable. They are constructs 
that align with our experience of reality, but this does not mean that they should be perceived 
as constants (Ciborra 1999). In practical philosophy space and time are root concepts, not 
ontological reflections.  
 
I see unpredictability and the unexpected as closely related phenomena. Unpredictability is 
about standing in the here-and-now thinking about the future and realizing the limitations to 
foretelling. It is a philosophical expression used for labelling unique characteristics of life and 
the way it typically unfolds. In a practitioner’s context foretelling could be anything from 
plain everyday anticipation via planning to market analyses. But what about the unexpected, 
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then, what does it stand for? The approach followed here is that the unexpected depicts 
something that actually happens in the here-and-now that was not (and maybe could not be) 
foreseen or anticipated; much like a surprise (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). Just about anything 
might happen in the future, and there is no way to be 100 % prepared. Thus, the unexpected is 
a logical consequence of unpredictability, but whereas the latter is inevitably a deeply 
complex matter, the former might actually be quite easy to handle. Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) 
do not, however, separate between different shades of complexity in surprises. For example, 
when something unexpected happens (emerges), one might experience being quite well 
prepared. When a friend decides to pay you a visit it may come as a surprise, but at the same 
time it can be a delightful and largely non-complex experience. And if a glass falls down from 
a counter unexpectedly and shatters, it is hardly a very mentally challenging event (unless, of 
course, the glass was a symbol of something meaningful which has now metaphorically fallen 
to pieces). Studying more closely the quality of the unexpected it is my point that only when a 
surprise is concurrently vague or meaningless does it produce complexity. Then again, one 
the basis of practical philosophy every episode of unexpectedness represents an indication of 
fundamental unpredictability and complexity, even if the episode itself turns out to be quite 
familiar and simple (model 5.4).  
 
One cannot prepare specifically for what one does not know will happen, and thus theory 
differs from practice. The practical how to go about a task is always to some extent unknown 
and undefined (Ciborra 1999). There may be a what or a that, stating a theoretical aim or 
ambition (a plan), but these can only become real as an authentic how, which is never 100% 
predictable (Mead 1967).  
Fundamental  
complexity  Complex 
event  
 
Familiar 
event 
(Philosophical) 
unpredictability 
The unexpected 
(in practice) 
Model 5.4 Unpredictability and the unexpected 
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For sure, plans and procedures matter, but they just constitute the tip of the iceberg. Even 
more relevant is the drifting mass at the bottom, which provides the raw materials, the 
leftovers out of which plans are put together, particular problem definitions are selected and 
means-ends chains assembled. The improvised component embedded in structured decision-
making comes from the highly circumstantial fashion in which the bottom of the iceberg is 
brought to bear the situation at hand, the relevant problem formulation, the solution chosen 
and the way [my italics] it gets implemented. (Ciborra 1999, p. 85).   
 
One might project upon the future an image, an intention, a plan or a design stating what to do, 
thereby consolidating that it is actually to be done. Still, from an improvisatory strand, plans 
are merely tools; they must be worked with, adapted, elaborated on, renewed and put into 
contextual action. In this sense, plans are sources of inspirations and not restraint jackets 
(Orlikowski and Hofman 1997; Ciborra 1999; Hatch 1999). 
 
Much like structure, plan is amongst the most prominent of the organizing tools in linear 
theory. Indeed, a plan might be seen as a form of structure, except that it is directed towards 
the future rather than the present. A structure may be, for instance, an organizational skeleton; 
a plan is a projection of future organization. Following Schütz’s (1967) concept of the future 
perfect, a plan is a projection of an activity “. . . as if it were already over and done with and 
lying in the past” (Schütz 1967, p. 61). Making plans is part of the process of creating 
linearity and predictability in everyday organizational life, and as a sensemaking activity it 
contributes to establishing intersubjective coherence and identity. Also inspired by Schütz 
(1967), Weick (1995) sums up beautifully the relations between sensemaking, planning and 
action:  
 
Strategic plans are a lot like maps. They animate and orient people. Once people begin to act 
(enactment), they generate tangible outcomes (cues) in some context (social), and this helps 
them discover (retrospect) what is occurring (ongoing), what needs to be explained 
(plausibility), and what should be done next (identity enhancement). Managers keep forgetting 
that it is what they do, not what they plan, that explains their success. They keep giving credit 
to the wrong thing – namely, the plan – and having made this error, they spend more time 
planning and less time acting. (p. 55).   
 
Being strongly guided by Weick (1995), my improvisational perspective entails regarding 
plans as creative points of departure rather than as control instruments. To have a plan is 
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synonymous to being prepared for the future, but no preparation is final. Rather, to prepare for 
future scenarios solely by making plans is a way of showing up somehow empty-handed. In 
some cases, however, the future might turn out almost exactly as planned, and to the extent 
that this can be accounted for in advance, planning is of utmost importance. Moreover, plans 
comprise a most effective way to signal an intention for the future. There is, however, a 
danger of over-planning for future events. One might, for example, be dazzled by and 
somehow get stuck in the beauty of a detailed plan, and start seeing it as a given. Or one 
might be seduced by the process of planning to such an extent that details are carved out on a 
level that is more abstract than probable. When this happens one is cast into practical 
blindness, in which case there is less chance for the plan to actually work (Kotter 1986): If the 
plan is not adapted to the context at hand, but is sooner implemented and forced onto it, its 
practical workability is threatened. One can never plan for the unexpected, but a good plan is 
an important back-up (tool). 
 
When a plan is produced it becomes a tool of improvisation. A plan can be continually revised. 
It can be edited and re-edited infinitely, without this necessarily influencing practice. Hence it 
would seem that planning as an organizing activity differs strongly from improvisation, which 
is irreversible in character. Planning as a practically detached activity does not change the 
world; improvisation does. A rather intricate theoretical point is indicated here, namely that 
planning as a social undertaking is an act of improvisation (Ciborra 1999), but its 
“irreversible” effects can be reversed. This is not as paradoxical as it sounds, for social 
planning is a way of thinking out loud. It is about improspection, prospection and 
retrospection, but even if it happens in abstract terms, it is rooted in the actions of interacting 
individuals, and thus it comes about as local improvisation. Likewise, thinking must be acted 
out to become real; to become organizing. But planning entails improvisation in somewhat 
artificial circumstances: The process itself is improvisation, but the effects can be revised 
through further improvisation as one is not doomed to act as one thinks. Different scenarios 
can be tested out before they are presented to the outside world, and in organizing terms 
“outside” means the world outside of the planning arena. And with regard to the outside world, 
the more short term the planning, the purer the improvisation. Herein lays another interesting 
aspect: if organizing is genuinely improvised, planning may come about as a result. This is 
merely a restatement of saying that improvisation means to do what the situation demands, 
and if planning is possible and desirable from an improvisational perspective, it should be 
done to the greatest extent possible. According to Shütz (1967), the only future that can be 
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mentally projected is an abstract one, but still, as one possesses functional theories about 
emerging contexts, a lot can be said about what is to happen. The following implications can 
thus close this discussion on planning and improvisation: Firstly, in the process of planning, 
recall that reality is unpredictable, and be observant as to when to draw the line. Secondly, a 
plan is a tool of improvised organizing; philosophically speaking it is a temporary structure 
not a restraint-jacket. 
The system: A metaphor or an analogy for organization?  
As systems thinking has had tremendous influence on organization theory, organizations have 
become associated with various kinds of systems and networks (Andersen 2000; Fauske 2000; 
Stacey 2001, 2003; Griffin 2002; Czarniawska 2005). Although systems can be powerful 
metaphors, can they be said to reflect objective reality? Is it not so that as static expressions 
they run the danger of being outdated? My point is that often when we think of a system, we 
think of it as a given; and when we talk about networks, we might over time begin to see them 
as connected pieces of an objective structure. Using systemic metaphors extensively might 
over time contribute to an overly rigid conception of organizational reality: We might start 
seeing the system as a real thing transcending organizational members. To facilitate further 
expansion of this argument, however, I want to take a small detour and make a brief study of 
the concept of “metaphor”. My reason for this stems from a belief that the great impact from 
systems thinking on organization theory has to do with the way reification can turn metaphors 
into analogies.     
 
I start with Hatch (1999), who, on the basis of Morgan (1986), explains that a metaphor: 
 
. . . engages and involves a broader experience base than do other approaches to theorizing, 
in that metaphor works with the total imagination of the theorist. That is, metaphor does not 
simply operate within the analytical range of imagination (where Giddens and his followers 
focus), but calls on emotional and aesthetic capacities as well. (Hatch 1999, p. 76). 
 
As implied, metaphors might over time change into something more like an analogy, or 
indeed, an ideology (Morgan 1986). For example, one might start out describing 
organizations as systems in order to explain certain aspects of what one perceives as 
“structures-on-the-move”, so to speak. In the beginning, such a comparison between systems 
and organizations may spark many new thoughts, but after a while these thoughts might 
change in character. Initially, there is perhaps a creative and open process of making new 
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models to understand and organize the world, but soon the process may become more like a 
reified technical rational one of taking the metaphor for granted as objective reality. What has 
happened is that the original sense-sparking tool has been turned into an objective parallel to 
nature.  
 
Earlier I talked about the phenomenon of frozen metaphors under the label reification. In 
short, reification means that the objects of sensemaking, the brackets of consciousness, are 
made absolute (Dewey 1929). Berger and Luckmann (1991) argue that this is a tendency 
latent in the process of creating identity and meaning. Practical philosophy, however, induces 
that no significant symbol can ever become more than a tool for communication, but as 
reification draws a veil over our eyes we are apt to believe that objects are mere reflections of 
a given universe. Seen as tools, objects work as metaphors: they potentially open up new 
perspectives and alter perceptions (Czarniawska 2005). But if seen as ontological 
correspondents or reflections they close the universe, making us believe that they are 
analogies to the world as such.  
 
According to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) an analogy is different from a metaphor in that it 
is more structured and emphasizes what is similar between two phenomena, whereas a 
metaphor is used to describe something as different and somewhat new from something else; 
to shed new light on an object (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). In both cases there is an element of 
comparison; but in the first the comparison is closed and technical rational, whereas in the 
latter it is open and mind-sparking. With regard to practical philosophy, we are now implicitly 
addressing the most basic traits of human sensemaking: using something as an instrument to 
create and understand something else. Without metaphors the world would become a 
repetitive and machine-like place, and without analogies it could potentially become chaotic 
and equivocal.  
 
With reference to organization theory, some theorists have according to Griffin (2002), 
Morgan (1986) and Andersen (2000) taken the metaphor of organizations as systems to the 
extreme, not seeing it as a metaphor but as a mere reflection of biological reality. As 
examples of this Griffin (2002) names Wheatley (1999), Lewin and Regine (2000), and 
Pascale et al. (2000). What might happen, then, is a subtle change from using the organic 
systems metaphor as a tool to reifying it and making it a normative standard for organizational 
action: i.e. since the organization is a biological mechanism, we should do this and that for 
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ideological purposes. Behind an ideology can be revealed a rigid belief system. Consequently, 
an ideology is more likely to govern and control thoughts and actions than to open up new 
perspectives. Mead (1967) refers to this phenomenon as “cult values”, arguing that socially 
negotiated values might become reified as unquestioned rules of conduct. Building on Mead, 
Griffin (2002) offers the following explanation: ”. . . when organizations are said to be caring, 
or to have a soul, then the organization is being idealized as a cult.” (p. 117). 
 
If metaphors transform into analogies there is good reason for taking a critical position 
towards them, Czarniawska and Sevón (1996) argue. Conversely, to stop asking questions, to 
take metaphors for granted, is to create fixed and uncritical impressions of the composition of 
the world. In a metaphorically laden conversation fantasy and play define the game, but if the 
opposite is the case, as is the case of cult values, the rules must be obeyed, leaving little room 
for creative elaboration. In that regard it is easy to see how cult values may produce action 
that stands out as appalling in retrospect (Clegg et al. 2006; Griffin 2002). If cult values are 
perceived to transcend the individual, a strong cohesive feeling of belonging can emerge, in 
which case the ideology both justifies and implicitly takes responsibility for action that would 
otherwise be unthinkable. A typical example from history concerns the Nazi dominion (Clegg 
et al. 2006). Other, and more recent, examples are organizations dumping barrels of poison or 
committing fraud (Griffin 2002; Ferrell et al. 2008).  
 
Transcending cult values into an (unquestioned) ideology is similar to reifying the 
organization into an autonomous system or whole, and they both imply moulding metaphor 
into analogy. I identify severe contradictions in this. Take, for instance, the case of autonomy: 
Griffin (2002) points out that an autonomous system cannot be reduced into equally 
autonomous bits and pieces. Recalling the discussion about change earlier in this chapter, 
autonomy in the dualist sense can either exist or not exist. If a system is perceived to have 
autonomy, the parts making up the system, the individuals, must inevitably be un-autonomous 
and in this regard un-free because they are subordinates of the system. In extreme systems 
thinking, Griffin argues, individuals answer to a transcendent system and are subjected to its 
all-encompassing power; and following Griffin’s argument it is now possible to tie the 
discussion on freedom, systems thinking and autonomy together into a synthesis: Reified 
systems thinking implies a logic of superiority that deprives the individual of her autonomy 
and positive freedom. In this sense systems thinking implies an either-or approach to 
organizing, i.e. either autonomy and freedom or not. However, reification of this kind can be 
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balanced from the point of view of “The improvising man”, as this involves taking a 
metaphorical rather than an analogical stance. “The improvising man” indicates that 
autonomy, along with freedom, is merely a metaphorical tool to describe the sensation of free 
will (i.e. Mead’s “I”) and the ability to make a difference. In this light organization portrayed 
as system is brought back to its presumed point of origin – as a metaphor rather than as a facet 
of some objectively given entity. Organizing as improvisation might make use of systems as a 
tool for some purpose, and might take the form of systemizing, but philosphically speaking a 
system is nothing more than a temporal image; a metaphor.  
 
In the closing stages of these reflections on organizing as improvisation I would like to end 
with some reflections in same domain as I started; namely change. There is one point which is 
particularly easy to understand when it is contrasted with systems thinking. It regards so-
called “re-organizing”, a concept that has much in common with a reified systems perspective. 
Consider how something can ever be re-organized if it is not perceived as static or stable to 
begin with. I must be careful not to exaggerate the tendency to understand organizations as 
objective entities in everyday life, but nonetheless, talking about re-organizing on a daily 
basis might catalyze precisely such a tendency. From the stance of practical philosophy 
organizing is a continuous process of improvisation and involves creating and re-creating 
objects, and only to the extent that such objects are clutched on to can there be talk of re-
organizing. Otherwise, re-organizing might contribute to uphold a view on systems as 
something stable and predictable whilst paradoxically encouraging instability and change. 
Organizing as improvisation, however, is not about ontological change; it is about practical 
sensemaking and contextual wisdom in the becoming (Bergson 1944). 
Organizing and management – the impact from systems thinking 
Who can be pointed out as responsible for the ongoing organizing processes in everyday 
organizational life? The answer to this rather broad question is of course everybody; to the 
degree that one takes part in organizational processes, one is responsible for organizing. But if 
the question is slightly rephrased it obtains a somewhat different edge: Who are those put in 
charge of and held responsible for organizing processes and for making them work on a 
generic level? Answering this question touches upon the aspect of authority and leadership. 
Not just any form of leadership, but leadership of the formal and official kind. The role of 
formally being in charge of organizing is traditionally thought of as management, a role that 
entails using and utilizing the instruments of organizing to achieve efficiency and success. In 
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other words, managers can in systemic terms be thought of as a hierarchical and formally 
superior class with special tasks including prediction, planning and strategizing, control and 
evaluation: in short, attending to systemic considerations and roles (Urwick 1934).   
 
The perspective I pursue in this discussion implies seeing the manager as a defined part of a 
formal system or structure. A manager is an abstract conception; a formalized role or 
responsibility. The manager is responsible for making the system work; for reporting and 
fixing aberrations. Note how decisive the systems metaphor is here: this has to do with the 
accentuation of formality which is caused by the objectivation of a system. Picking up the 
discussion from chapter one, systems thinking can be seen as providing a link between 
management and a linear view on organizing: organizations are systems in which 
management is performed through linear actions. From a systems perspective, talking about 
organizing becomes a way of talking about management, because traditionally, the 
instruments of organizing are assigned to managers.  
 
In the early perspectives on management, systems thinking is taken to the extreme. 
Historically, the principles of management emerge from a philosophical tradition favouring 
normative and acontextual approaches. Fredrick W. Taylor’s (1967) The Principles of 
Scientific Management is a vivid example of this, where the references to modern natural 
science are obvious.  
 
The period from 1890 to 1920 has been called the Progressive Era precisely because of the 
belief that progress was itself a natural law. The progress of an individual through the jungles 
of capitalistic competition reflected an underlying biological truth as surely as the progress of 
technology reflected new discoveries in engineering, physics, and chemistry. It was into this 
context, characterized by a new romance with science, a profound belief in progress, an 
urgent demand for coordination and efficiency in increasingly complex and large-scale 
organizations, and a growing professionalization of the managerial class, that Fredrick Taylor’s 
scientific management approach was born. (Zuboff 1988, pp. 229-230). 
 
In the Progressive Era the role of management became one of identifying the hidden truth – 
the one best way to satisfy strict criteria of efficiency (Zuboff 1988). And although Taylor’s 
management principles were somewhat nuanced through Elton Mayo’s (1945) research on 
psychological and social dynamics, managers were still to employ cool, rational thought to 
manipulate workers and obtain efficiency: 
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An understanding of human relations could be transmitted in codified technical language and 
as such should become an important part of business education, along with other technical 
matters like finance and production. (Zuboff 1988, p. 234).  
 
Systems thinking is predominant in the kind of technical rationality employed by Taylor and 
Mayo, and it constitutes the core around which linear organization theory is built. 
Characteristic in early theory is the way technical rationality is elevated as the supreme form 
of knowledge reserved for the few: the managers. From this point of view organizing becomes 
an undertaking of a superior class. Using rational thought managers are supposed to analyse, 
calculate and predict and then decide upon the correct way of action. Systems thinking 
therefore encourages a conception of organizing not as sensemaking, but as decision-making. 
The actual turning of thoughts into action is assigned to subordinates.  
 
Imagine, as was discussed in the previous section, that systems thinking is exaggerated, in 
which case the manager is not only superior with regard to higher rank but also in a 
transcendent manner. The system is no longer just a tool, but an elevated structure. Formality 
is more than the official way of doing things; it is taken for granted. In this ideal systemic 
world complete control and prediction is possible and desirable. In other words, the systems 
metaphor has become an analogy, making organizing synonymous to management. Some 
have described such a conceptual move as Managerialism (Carter and Mueller 2002; Mueller 
and Carter 2005, 2007). In Managerialism there is no room for leaders other than formal 
managers, for they are the only ones capable of uncovering the ontological objective. From a 
managerialist perspective the ideal manager is very similar to the natural scientist who seeks a 
distance from his research subject in order to study and manipulate it objectively. It is in this 
light I see Schön’s (1991) notes on technical rationality and management science and their 
massive dissemination in the modern world: 
 
What was once true only of industrial production has now become true of sales, personnel 
selection and training, budgeting and financial control, marketing, business policy, and 
strategic planning. Technical panaceas have appeared on the scene with clocklike regularity, 
old ones making way for new. Value analysis, management by objectives, planning 
programming and budgeting, and zero-based budgeting are only a few of the better-known 
examples. Even the human relations movement, which had originated as a reaction against 
Taylorism, has tended increasingly to present itself as a body of techniques. Yet in spite of the 
increasingly powerful status of management science and technique, managers have remained 
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persistently aware of important areas of practice which fall outside the bounds of technical 
rationality. (pp. 238-239).  
 
To this day management and systems thinking have clung to each other, and as pointed out 
earlier, theoreticians have projected organizations as systems in a broad set of ways. It seems 
that we are easily seduced by systems images, and we need only point to the best-selling 
success of Peter Senge’s (1990) The fifth discipline to realize this. Quite a few assumptions in 
Senge’s book are worth questioning, for example the presumed ability of leaders to predict 
and control organizational reality. In Senge’s view, the most important quality of management 
is to identify magical leverage points, which makes the manager capable of controlling the 
system (organization), to predict its future movements and steer its direction. I am, however, 
struck by the many contradictions here; for how can one predict a given future whilst still 
having a real option of making future changes? Secondly, how can a manager be (magically) 
capable of taking an objective role and in the way of the natural scientist control what she 
herself is part of? Thirdly, how come only the manager has got such capacities, and not other 
organizational members? And finally, how can a manager presumably have the ability to 
switch between autonomous and unautonomous roles, a gesture that even Parmenides pointed 
out as impossible? 
 
I shall not dwell upon Senge’s magical archetypes, only point out that systems thinking seems 
to encourage myths of prediction and control. Even though there are areas in organizational 
life where control is appreciated, it can be exaggerated, and systems thinking might cause 
such exaggeration when taken from metaphor to analogy. From an improvisatory view a 
system is a predefined pattern of functions that can be appropriate in some regards and less 
appropriate in others. And the danger lies in believing that systemic principles can be applied 
to organizing as such, as if organizing were a management science rather than a creative art 
(Schön 1991; Petranker 2005) – in which case systems thinking would be taken for granted 
and organizing would lapse into Managerialism, leaving little room for improvisation. As a 
normative mindset, then, improvisation and Managerialism are mutually exclusive. 
Organizing practice as improvisation does not categorically exclude the use of, say, 
management models, but rather than being taken for granted, these should be subjected to 
contextual scrutiny.   
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Organizing as improvisation – some implications 
In this chapter I have built my argumentation on the premise that organizing can be seen as a 
process of improvisation conducted in organizational settings (see model 5.5). Improvisation 
is thus inevitably a part of organizing; it is in a sense the process in which organizing comes 
alive; but the degree of improvisational purity will vary between contexts – sometimes it will 
be more explicit, other times less so, and as an example of the latter is the case of (context-
sensitive) technical rational organizing where the degree of spontaneity is high, but the 
genuineness of creativity is low (see model 5.5). In other words organizing has not been 
found to be a question of either improvisation or technical rationality, but a question of how 
different forms of technical rationality are perceived and utilized – as something temporary or 
as something solid. More specifically, from their status as nouns, I have shown how on the 
basis of “The improvising man” routines, structures, plans, and systems in philosophical 
terms have a temporal status and do not exist objectively as givens. As a result of their 
temporal status they can be used as tools of improvisation and brought to life through 
Organizing Intention: 
Improspection and contextual 
sensemaking  
Organizing Activity: 
Improvisation  
Contextual 
choice to use 
administrative 
tool 
(Context-sensitive) 
technical rational 
organizing 
Organizing Intention: 
Blindly following 
administrative tool 
Organizing Activity: 
Managerialism (i.e. taken 
for granted technical 
rationality) 
Organizing as improvisation in line with “The improvising man”
Model 5.5 Organizing as improvisation in practice 
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different forms of organizing processes (e.g. routinizing, structuring, and systemizing). This 
harmonizes with the following observation by Ciborra (1999):  
 
We would suggest, if anything, a “small” Copernican revolution: improvisation is fundamental, 
while structured methods and procedures possess a derived and de-rooted character. A 
formalized procedure embeds a set of explicit in-order-to’s, but the way these are actually 
interpreted and put to work strictly depends upon the actor’s in-order-to’s and because-of 
motives, his/her way of being in the world ‘next’ to the procedure, the rule or the plan . . . . 
Procedure and method are just ‘dead objects’: they get situated in the flow of organizational 
life only thanks to a melange of human motives and actions. (pp. 85-86). 
 
Organizing happens in context, and in epistemological terms, context has always passed 
(Weisbord 1988). It cannot be clutched onto as such. Rather, it is continually redefined 
through the actions of the spontaneous “I” (Mead 1967). No language and no model can cage 
in context, simply because context cannot be grasped in an ontological manner. Context is 
simply what is counted in as context on an ongoing basis – the stuff that makes sense here and 
now and over time. Context is experience-in-the-becoming (Bergson 1944). Thus, in a 
conception of organizing as improvisation context in itself is less important than how context 
is (perpetually) defined: as something closed and objective or as something open and dynamic.  
 
“The improvising man” is built on the premise that reality is profoundly complex and 
unpredictable (i. e. non-dualism). As a consequence valuable knowledge can come from 
keeping an open mind and to make the best of situations as they emerge, and with regard to 
organizing I suggest that this can be taken as an incentive to preserve curiosity and humility 
and to never stop looking for signs, for differences. And if, as pointed out, routines, structures, 
plans and systems are dead objects that must be given life through improvisation, one should 
be careful not to view them as restraint-jackets in practical organizing. This chapter has 
indicated that good (effective) organizing can be found in a form of “deep improvisation” 
(Purser and Petranker 2005), which implies acting according to a situation’s demands as they 
appear to the subjective mind (Ciborra 1999); creating functional solutions and establishing 
identity and coherence. In decision-making terms, James March demonstrates (1994) a similar 
view when he talks about “. . . matching appropriate behaviour to situations” (p. 103). This 
matter of improvisation as acting in context will be further expanded on in chapters eight to 
ten of my empirical analysis. 
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As pointed out “The improvising man” implies that organizing is not a question of either 
improvisation or technical rationality, but of how different forms of technical rationality are 
treated – as temporary tools or as objective entities. Philosophically I argue that technical 
rationality is subordinated improvisation, which, fundamentally, gives the former a temporary 
status. In practice, however, it is up to the practitioner how technical rational models shall be 
perceived and utilized. More specifically it is up to the practitioner if technical rational 
models shall be made absolute or solid, or if they should be subjected to contextual and 
spontaneous organizing (see model 5.5). In the case of the former I have suggested that a form 
of organizing occurs that can be labelled Managerialism, which represents a form of reified 
technical rationality that isolates context through acts of absolutism (see model 5.5). In other 
words Managerialism implies disregarding context, and acting from a blind conviction in 
some administrative model. This is the opposite of making an ongoing effort to deal with 
matters as they appear in the evolving here-and-now, and as such it is a way of not addressing 
complexity-in-the-becoming. Managerialism is thus a matter of blindly following, rather than 
contextually utilizing technical rational models.  
 
I would like to end this chapter with making some general philosophical comments which I 
believe sum up the essence of organizing from the lenses of “The improvising man”, and 
which can give an indication of the normative value in the concept of organizing as 
improvisation. First of all, organizing as improvisation is a meaning-making process. 
Secondly, from a non-dualist perspective “meaning” is the same as “quest for meaning”. 
Consider the alternative: Why would anyone create meaning if not in order to create meaning. 
When we speak of the world, we simultaneously speak of a world we want to or need to see; 
in other words, in reality there is always intention of reality (Heidegger 1996; Skjervheim 
2001). As a result, any description of organizational reality unavoidably becomes normative, 
which in effect collapses any dichotomy between the two. Still, it can be fruitful to maintain a 
dualism between the descriptive, theoretical and philosophical on one hand, and the normative, 
instrumental and value-laden on the other. In the deepest sense, such a dualism is merely an 
epistemological grip, but it can be a fertile one. Thus, there is a concrete and contextual 
intention behind and in every object of the creative mind produced in moments of real life 
experience, which is captured by Mead’s (1967) concept of the spontaneous “I”. I have 
argued that improvisation is an inevitable trait of practical life, but spontaneous intention (i.e. 
“I”) might in-context work against improvisation or it might pursue it. With regard to 
organizing, the point is that the spontaneous “I” might in any given situation strive to suppress 
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the amount of spontaneity in organizing (Managerialism); or it might want to pursue it 
(improvisation); but as argued in the current chapter, it will always be there to some extent 
(The improvising man).   
 
As opposed to Managerialism which is a way of “doing things right”, seeing administration as 
a form or consequence of improvisation implies a maxim of “doing the right thing”. In other 
words, on the basis of “The improvising man”, “the right thing” cannot be captured in a 
model, but must continually be worked out in context. From this perspective there is no such 
thing as the best way, only the temporarily better way, which means that there is always a 
potential for improvement in every administrative routine, rule, structure, plan, and system. 
Different ways to fulfil and improve certain functions can always be found, as well as new 
functions all together. Normatively and personally I therefore suggest along the lines of 
Petranker (2005) and Ciborra (1999) that a normative conception of organizing that does not 
contain an ambition to embrace the contextual is more apt to fail than one that does.  
 
Realizing and “accepting” practical philosophy, and performing organizing accordingly, 
reflects an intention to improvise - in the sense that all imaginable elements in the 
organizational context are seen as temporary objects rather than given entities. One might of 
course work against or deny the importance of improvisation and things can nonetheless work 
out nicely. Another alternative is to acknowledge the importance of improvisation, but to still 
disregard it in everyday practice. A third alternative might be to show no interest for 
philosophical contemplations on improvisation altogether, but yet to value and practice 
improvised organizing in organizational life. This dissertation is an attempt to explicate a 
theory of organizing as improvisation that aligns with authentic work practice, which can, in 
turn, contribute to a deeper understanding of such practice and offer normative implications. 
But I do not seek to provide an a-contextual model for organizing, for it is my view that just 
as the normative can hardly be avoided in-context, it also cannot be properly addressed out of 
context. For this reason I have found it natural to produce a fuller elaboration of the 
potentially normative value in “organizing as improvisation” in my empirical analysis 
(chapters eight to ten). In chapter eight, for instance, I propose that much can be learned 
through separating “pure improvisation” from “good improvisation”, something which also 
has been of great help in finalizing and presenting sound reflections on the relation between 
improvisation and technical rationality in the current chapter as well as in chapter four. 
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Chapter 6. Methodology 
“What is needed . . . are descriptive cases focused on 
improvisation or situations full of opportunities to 
improvise, so that descriptions of the relevant 
processes can be developed and theory grounded in 
empirical data can be built. For my tastes this would 
involve participant observation so that the subjective 
side of this issue can be explored in depth.”  
(Hatch 1997, p. 187).  
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the methodology driving the empirical and theoretical research process 
of this dissertation. Empirically, my study is conducted as a shadowing venture of a selection 
of hospital department managers over five months combined with in-depth interviews with 
each manager. McDonald (2005) argues that shadowing as a management research practice 
can be traced back to Mintzberg’s (1970, 1973) seminal studies of the management role; and 
later in the work of Snyder and Glueck (1980), which is a replica of Mintzberg’s studies; in 
Noël’s (1989) studies on the nature of management work; and in Perlow’s studies of how 
engineers spend their time at work (1999) and how this is controlled by the organization 
(1998). What is lacking in the majority of shadowing studies, McDonald (2005) claims, is a 
discussion of how shadowing can be grounded in the wider literature, as well as an explicit 
account of the epistemological standpoint underpinning the research designs. As my thesis is 
founded upon non-dualist philosophy holding that methodology implies a reflection upon 
methodology, it is merely natural for me to oblige with McDonald’s requests. But in order to 
understand non-dualism, one must understand the framework that it opposes, namely dualism. 
In order to provide a background and a rationale for the chosen methodology I therefore start 
with a historical presentation of some of the most significant subjects in dualistic philosophy 
of science. The discussion ends up in a presentation of the epistemological assumptions in 
non-dualism. Next, as the research design is presented, I show methodologically how 
shadowing is a natural prolongation of non-dualistic philosophy given my research objectives. 
Lastly, I present the different steps of the research process, and accentuate how the empirical 
and theoretical processes have emerged through a hermeneutical spiral, feeding on and 
developing each other.  
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Against dualism  
The ontological objective – a trajectory through western philosophy  
Any canon of research emerges from specific philosophical grounds, or as Svendsen (2003) 
argues: “. . . all professions and sciences have an opening towards philosophy” (Nyeng 2004, 
p. 53). Based on this it is my view that methodological approaches to studies of organizing 
should be founded on a philosophy of science, and in this chapter I will present and discuss 
my anchorage in the non-dualistic paradigm. Philosophy of science is a systematic reflection 
upon scientific methodology (Gilje and Grimen 1993); it is meta-science (Nyeng 2004); and 
from a non-dualistic perspective where complexity and unpredictability rule, methodology 
itself would imply reflection upon the choice of methods so as to keep up with the emergent 
flow of reality. For instance, Blumer (1969) argues that “It is particularly important in 
exploratory research for the scholar to be constantly alert to the need of testing and revising 
his images, beliefs and conceptions of the area of life he is studying.” (p. 41). Or as put by 
Næss (1984): “[the researcher’s] duties concern his way to seek: his openness and 
persistency” [my translation] (p. 186). If methodology, however, is not associated with 
somewhat continual critical refinement it amounts to what Kuhn (1996) refers to as a 
historical tradition of normal science: an activity of reproducing taken for granted technical 
measures; of “. . . forcing nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box that the 
paradigm supplies” (p. 24). Kuhn’s statement is similar to Feyerabend’s (2002) critique of 
justifying quantification of human behaviour on the basis of the success of “science”: 
“Quantification works in some cases, fails in others” (p. 2). With these statements in mind I 
argue that methodology which does not involve reflection on the research objectives, the 
research-context and the method’s philosophical underpinning might become a technical 
exercise of following preset rules and dogmas. This reflects an approach that can be 
associated with philosophical dualism; a dominant trajectory through Western philosophy 
which has been severely questioned by such philosophers as the American pragmatists, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger.  
 
Taking Martin Heidegger as our starting point, he made a radical break with the Western 
tradition of philosophy with his dissertation Being and Time (1996). We are encouraged to 
ask what could possibly be of such great philosophical importance, something that had 
supposedly been neglected throughout some two and a half thousand years of thinking. To get 
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a grasp on Heidegger’s claim, I propose we take a glance at what might be identified as the 
major strands of thought throughout the history of Western philosophy. We might then be 
able to understand in greater depth how these dominant philosophical views have influenced, 
or maybe even shaped, the modern way of thinking about science and research practice, as 
well as work practice and everyday life in general.  
 
In Being and Time (1996) Heidegger stresses the importance of grounding a philosophy in 
human existence as praxis. As a cornerstone of his writings he introduces the term Dasein, 
which stands for a condition of being thrown into existence, into being. Thus, Heidegger 
rewrites the traditional Western view on ontology as representing the object in itself, and 
substitutes it with ontology as a capacity of creating oneself and the world as objects (Dasein). 
Hence, when Heidegger talks about objects in the outside world he views them as extants – 
objects that are constructed by Dasein on a continual level. As a consequence, for Heidegger 
meaning is tied to understanding in specific practical contexts, and cannot exist in itself 
outside of a Dasein. And as indicated, this is a point of departure which to a significant degree 
had been lacking up until then. Mark Okrent (1988) puts it this way: “The analysis of Dasein 
in general and understanding in particular, which starts out as a radical new foundation for 
ontology and metaphysics, ultimately becomes, in Heidegger’s thought, a radical 
undercutting of the entire metaphysical enterprise and suggests a new, nonmetaphysical 
question for thinking.” (p. 155).  
 
Heidegger was not alone in this matter. For almost half – a century other philosophers, such 
as the American pragmatists, had shared his concern, also pointing out the necessity of 
creating an alternative to the orthodox strands of philosophy. What was it, then, that aroused 
such a yearning, almost simultaneously in Europe and in America, for rewriting, or rather 
reintroducing, philosophy as an important domain of humanity? In order to answer this we 
must try to get an overview of some of the most central issues in the history of Western 
philosophy that were of special concern to Heidegger, the pragmatists and others. In short, 
these central issues evolve around so-called “dualist thinking”: a preoccupation with the 
universally true, hereafter labelled “the ontologically objective”1, and in the following referred 
to as orthodox Western philosophy.  
 
                                                 
1 See Robert Audi (1995) The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, where ontology is said to be commonly 
understood as the “logic of existence” (Onto – existence). “Logy” refers to Logos, meaning speech or reason.  
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Although Descartes might be held responsible for moulding dualist thinking into a systematic 
method in the modern age, the split between the ontologically objective and the subjective can 
be traced back to the very origins of Western philosophy. For example, ontology made up the 
frame in which Heraclitus and Parmenides argued over the status of change versus stability  
(Russell 1995). Questions about the ontologically objective, often labelled the transcendent, 
the universal or the absolute, were also of primary concern for the tremendously important 
philosophers of ancient Greece, as reflected in Socrates’ Orphism2. The ontologically 
objective is also visible in Plato’s concept of utopia and ideals, and as an example, Plato 
thought he could prove that his ideal Republic was universally good (Russell 1995). Moreover, 
we find the ontologically objective in Aristotle’s doctrine of universals; quite an intricate 
concept, as indicated by the following quote from Russell (1995): “. . . a universal cannot 
exist by itself, but only in particular things” (p. 176). Despite the intricacies, Aristotle has an 
explicit concern with the ontologically objective, with the universal and eternal as opposed to 
the transient – something which signifies a dualistic approach.  
 
During the dark ages and in the early renaissance, St Aurelius Augustinus (b 354 - d 430) and 
St Thomas Aquinas (b 1225 or 1226 – d 1274), respectively, continued the debate from 
ancient Greece and adapted it to their time (Russell 1995). Thus, when René Descartes (b 
1596 - d 1650) as one of the most influential philosophers of modern times established Pure 
Rationality (divine Being) as something ontologically separated from the subjective (body), 
this must not be conceived of as something brand new, or in any way disconnected from the 
history of philosophy. Descartes (1996) merely defined the ontologically objective as distinct 
from the ontologically subjective in a more explicit manner, as it would seem in retrospect, 
thereby giving rise to what has become widely known as the Cartesian split or dualism. 
Descartes is commonly regarded as the (fore)father of the dualist conception in modern 
philosophy, a view shared both by the pragmatists and by Heidegger (Russell 1995;  Joas 
1996). This is why, before we move on, it would be particularly interesting to dwell upon the 
Cartesian split for a while – to try to establish a deep understanding of its meaning, so that we 
may understand its rigorous impact on modern Western philosophy and science.  
 
How did Descartes arrive at his famous dualist understanding? What is the logic in and 
behind his arguments? Firstly, Descartes was a profoundly religious man, and even the 
                                                 
2 According to Russell (1995), Socrates was not an orthodox Orphic, and he only accepted Orphism’s 
fundamental doctrines. 
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thought of not including God in philosophy would be preposterous to him (Descartes 1996). 
Consequently, before Descartes has even started on his logical journey to absolute truth, he 
has already taken one premise for granted – the existence of a transcendent God, a God who is 
universally good in all that He is and through all that He does. God is a Being that can and 
should be fully trusted in his goodness and truthfulness. Given His existence, the answer to 
the riddle of life is already given, which merely makes the human project one of discovering 
the right method of unveiling Him. After all God exists. We can relax and put our minds at 
ease, because God is an undisputed fact. But if life has meaning (God), what is this right 
method of discovery that can prove such superhuman Divinity? What can humans do to find 
proof for the ontological objectivity of God? 
 
Descartes is initially sceptical towards the practical (and empirical) sphere we inhabit as 
human bodies. The physical world in which we touch and smell, see and listen, is smudged by 
human frailness and is essentially unholy, as he sees it. Given such a less worthy world of 
physical objects, Descartes compels us to consider how we can know that we are not being 
fooled by our senses. How can we establish for certain that our senses do not play tricks on us, 
perhaps out of some evil purpose? Do we really hear what we hear, see what we see? There is 
no way of knowing this for certain, Descartes argues, but if we cannot trust what we 
experience, then what might we trust? Descartes proposes that in order to find universal truth, 
the ontologically objective (God), we should employ what he calls categorical doubt: we 
should doubt everything we see and know in a consequent and strict manner.  
 
Categorical doubt, however, leaves us with no natural starting point, no direction in which to 
move, no certainties to give us comfort. It is at this point that Descartes (turns to God, and) 
arrives at an astonishing argument: We cannot doubt our own doubt. Doubt as a transcendent 
phenomenon is pure. Categorical doubt is clean. Conceptually it is not smudged by the 
impurity of human senses, but divine in its abstract intellectuality. This can be explained in 
the following intricate rhetoric: If you doubt that you doubt, can it concurrently be possible 
that you do not doubt? No, because then you could not have doubted in the first place, thus 
contradicting your original doubt. Three points can be drawn from this: Firstly, Descartes 
understands doubt as a cognitive phenomenon, erecting rationality as an equivalent to doubt; 
or rather, doubt is a type of cognition. Secondly, the lack of logic inherent in denying doubt 
reflects the divine abstractness of God, thus establishing God as a universal objective fact, 
understood by Descartes as Pure Rationality. Logic is impeccable, he claims somewhat 
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tautologically, for in the opposite case it would not be logic. Pure Rationality is what 
constitutes the Soul of human beings, a perfect merger of philosophy and religion. Doubt in 
the shape of an ontological import, as a noun, is thus a key to transcendence. In its divine 
abstractness doubt has an immanent character of universal validity. Categorical doubt is 
beyond doubt. Thirdly, if there is doubt, there must be a doubter. Thus, Descartes has 
revealed “the subjective doubter” also on an ontological level – I doubt (think), therefore I 
exist: “Cogito ergo sum”. The subjective and corporal thinker must consequently exist, but 
not a as a perfect being. Even if doubt in itself is a feature of divinity, the actual realization of 
practical doubt is not perfect; rather, it is imperfect. The fact that one cannot doubt doubt 
proves the existence of divinity, but the superhuman can never be touched through human 
flesh. Man is capable of nothing more than doubting, and thus he is not perfect. Doubt as a 
course of action is merely an instrument to prove that God exists as an objective fact, not 
itself divine. Absoluteness is by Descartes preferred to doubt even if doubt is good. 
 
If doubt is both possible and logical, there must be a being that does not doubt: Pure 
Rationality, a Divine Being transcending the doubter. And hence the Cartesian split is reified, 
on the one side the doubter who doubts, which in itself makes him imperfect; and who on the 
other side uncovers the existence of a divine Being, since he clearly cannot doubt his own 
doubt. It all depends, of course, on the notion that doubt cannot be doubted, which is true 
because otherwise it would annihilate the perceived given meaning of doubt. To prove his 
point, then, Descartes presupposes the goodness of God. Whereas the empirical stuff of nature 
cannot be trusted, the divine element of rational thought (doubt) is self-evident. As the human 
body is equipped with a soul, thought has the capacity to follow a transcendent method: doubt. 
However infused with the stench of flesh and blood, thought through its divine component 
ranks higher than nature, as soul ranks higher than body and object higher than subject. What 
counts is one’s ability to follow logical arguments, because logic reflects a place hardly 
attainable for human beings due to the imperfection of the body. We are, however, capable of 
transcending the body, to discover our own existence, but only to become aware of our own 
inferiority compared to the divine ontological objective.  
 
In its purest form, the logic of Descartes’ argument is generally labelled “naïve rationalism”, 
which simply states that the journey to absolute truth can be discovered through rational 
thought. In the development of modern philosophy the doctrine of naïve rationalism has not 
been left undisputed. On the contrary, it has been amended, reformulated and even refuted 
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many times over. This is, however, not the time and place to introduce and cite every 
significant philosopher in history dealing with the Cartesian split in one way or the other. Still, 
it would be interesting to understand more about the impact of the dualist philosophy, mainly 
for two reasons: firstly, to get a picture of the notable and dominant focus towards ontological 
objectivity among modern scientists, and, secondly, to comprehend the philosophical counter-
reaction to this by Heidegger, the pragmatists and others.  
 
In the school of Positivism, founded by philosopher August Comte (b 1798 - d 1857), 
condemnation of Descartes’ rationalism is central. In sharp opposition to Descartes, Comte 
argued that rationalism (metaphysics) cannot bring us closer to absolute truth. Rather, we 
should try to minimize the use of rational thought, and maximize the method of empirical 
proof (Schön 1991). Consequently, the more rationality and language mirror or correspond to 
empirical findings, the more valid they are. Though this would seem like a rather harsh 
critique of Descartes’ rationalism, at least with regard to methodological demands, the 
similarity in final objective is evident: to discover or prove universal truth, the ontologically 
objective. Comte’s proposition was simply that truth is found in nature, whereas Descartes 
swore to the validity of rational thought. In both cases Reality is out there, independent of 
frail human existence. From both perspectives epistemology is reduced to a question of how 
to establish objectively true knowledge, either from logical thinking, as in the case of Naïve 
Rationalism; or from empirical objectivism, as in the case of Positivism.  
 
Positivism, a theory of correspondence between knowledge and empirical experience/data, 
has become one of the most powerful canons of modern science (Schön 1991; Andersen 2000; 
Fauske 2000). We need only to look to the Vienna Circle during the inter-war period and what 
has been named the project of Logical Empiricism (also called Logical Positivism) to spot its 
influence. Building upon Comte’s original doctrine, the primary objective of the Vienna 
Circle was to eliminate all metaphysical speculation and to create a language corresponding to 
natural phenomena.3 Traces of Logical Empiricism are still visible today; a fact that is often 
attributed to Karl Popper, a philosopher who although somehow emerging from the Vienna 
Circle, found himself deeply critical to the central thesis of Logical Positivism and the 
Principle of Verification.  
 
                                                 
3 See for instance Feyerabend (2000) pp. 118-119 for an overview of Rudolph Carnap’s theory of language. 
 140
Verification may in simplistic terms be explained as a doctrine holding objective proof as the 
final objective for the scientific method. One should as a scientist seek to prove or verify the 
laws of nature by empirical trial and error. True science, from Popper’s perspective, is 
however not to be found in the attempts to prove the existence of the ontologically objective. 
He felt compelled to reformulate the methodology of verification. As a consequence, Popper 
arrived at the Principle of Falsification, which contrary to verification admits that: “Scientific 
knowledge always has a temporary character, has the shape of guessing/hypotheses that can 
never be proved. The objective is therefore to put forward bold hypotheses and expose them to 
scrupulous tests of rejection. [My translation]” (Nyeng 2004, p. 209).  
 
At first glance it might seem that Popper marks out a totally different course from Descartes 
and Comte, as he underlines the impossibility of proving ontologically objective truth. With 
regard to Popper’s ultimate objective, however, it is obvious that he does not deviate from the 
two in any significant way: 
 
. . . it is ironic that the most pervasive adaption of Positivism has been Popper’s own 
reformulation which seems to have only substituted logical positivism’s principle that it was 
possible to verify and prove theories with the principle that it was only possible to falsify them. 
(Johnson and Duberley 2000, p. 11).  
 
As do Descartes and Comte, Popper has but one goal: to find a universal scientific method for 
bringing us closer to the ontologically objective (Popper 1981), thus approving and 
consolidating the dualist position. Epistemology becomes science: a tool for uncovering the 
given. Being grounded in caution, frugality and logical thinking, it is of course quite a humble 
and careful tool, but all the same a perceived pathway to Absolute Truth. As such, Popper’s 
critical rationalism is somehow a merger of Descartes’ naïve rationalism and Comte’s naïve 
empiricism, as it makes use of rational thought in developing theories, and in employing 
empirical testing as objectively as possible to counter-prove the theories. And thus Popper 
provides the grounds for perhaps the most influential scientific method of today: the 
hypothetic-deductive method, from which scientists are supposed to propose bold hypotheses, 
test and revise or reject these through careful empirical research, and thereby create more and 
more robust theories. By gathering information or testing theories in particular situations 
scientists may induce law-like hypotheses (induction), and building on these theories, they are 
able to deduct the outcome in particular circumstances. There are, however, some very 
problematic aspects to such a method, a few of which will be dealt with in closer detail below.    
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Firstly, how does one start out with such a method? Clearly, for every sensual experience, one 
needs a theoretical language to make it explicit, and consequently there is inevitably a theory 
a priori to empirical discovery. Take the classical case of counting swans to prove that they 
are all white: How can you count swans unless you know what a swan is in theory? And vice 
versa, for a hypothesis to be expressed an a priori conception of reality is needed; it cannot 
appear out of thin air. Again with reference to the swans: To talk about swans in theory 
presupposes an empirical experience of something like swans in reality. If not, the conception 
of swans becomes meaningless and speculative. Secondly, there is a problem with how the 
falsification principle applies to itself. Surely, such a harsh principle must satisfy its own 
demands? But it is hard to see how it can. A theory about everything cannot be verified or 
falsified, because it would literary take Forever to counter-prove it; and also, at some point it 
would require definite objective proof, which Popper himself claimed was impossible. The 
principle of falsification is not falsifiable. It is just another theory, stunning as such in its 
beauty and functionality, but still a theory. In the same manner as Descartes’ theory, the 
falsification criterion can never be invalidated transcendent to itself.  
 
From the preceding reflections it is fairly safe to claim that any ontologically based theory 
about Everything cannot be (in)validated once and for all. Does this imply the rejection of 
truth altogether? Indeed, some theorists argue that it does. As they lapse into a dualist 
antagonism to naïve and sophisticated rationalism and empiricism, they take an ontological 
constructivist stand, arguing that nothing exists and that reality is mere fantasy (Dewey 1929; 
Hellesnes 2001). This form of extremist constructivism is, however, sharply at odds with the 
mild (epistemological) constructivism of non-dualism as explicated by Heidegger and the 
American pragmatists, who instead of basing a philosophy in the static conception of 
ontological existence refute Cartesianism from an epistemological position. 
Some shortcomings of dualism in organizational research 
Initially we can ask: What is the alternative to the dualist position, and why should such an 
alternative philosophical position be pursued? One feasible line of argument is that dualist 
philosophy reflects a limited view on existence and thus on organizational research. Take the 
critical rationalist, for example, by Feyerabend (2002) dubbed the “falisificationist”: From his 
perspective organizational thinking is more about finding universal truths than about creating 
workable ideas. Organizational thinking is for him a journey towards unchanging ideas that 
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can be applicable to all organizations; it is a quest for the acontextual and not the emerging 
and often vague details of the contextual. For instance, with regard to organizing the critical 
rationalist would embrace the linear kind of thinking reflected in Weick’s (2001) architectural 
model, amongst which a good example is found in the early ideas of Organizations (March 
and Simon 1993). Instead of exploring human creativity in all its depths and widths, March 
and Simon lapse into a closed technical-logical perspective: The strong focus on logical 
analytical thinking and objective truth displays a technical view on rationality, thus 
overlooking other, and perhaps more profound, aspects of human creativity and corporality. In 
Organizations the somewhat impure human condition is made synonymous to bounded 
rationality, which is only natural, considering that critical rationalism places its faith in a 
technical rational ideal, in the rigid methodology of induction and deduction, implicitly 
ranking logical calculation and rigorous action above the impulsivity and contextuality of 
emotional and spontaneous behaviour. Actually, spontaneity and emotionality would become 
potential threats from the point of view of someone who seeks the ontologically objective, as 
they are examples of irrational behaviour capable of producing dangerous ambiguity and 
complexity (Simon 1968). Rather, the ability to perform technical analytical thinking is 
preferred, as this is assumed to be the human reflection of the ontologically transcendent, the 
pre-given and pre-ordered reality (Schön 1991).  
 
This displays another interesting characteristic of technical rationality, namely that it 
presupposes only one correct answer to any given question, as it involves uncovering what is 
already hidden or encrypted. In technical-rational problem-solving the answer is found 
implicitly in the question, as the question allows only one answer. For example: 2 + 2 must be 
4. Metaphorically, then, if “4” reflects reality, the human task is to uncover 2 + 2 and its 
bounded relation to 4. Clearly, if reality already exists as law-like structures, the technical-
rational capability to analyze and act according to the lines of such structures is preferred. 
Note how the seeker of ontologically objective truth takes for granted technical intellectual 
activity as an imperative value, implicitly stressing that knowledge should be made equivalent 
to technical scientific research. In short, as the ultimate objective is true knowledge, 
knowledge in general is mainly interesting as a pathway to truth. Thus, organizational 
research becomes more a matter of following rules than genuine creativity: It is the method 
for unveiling non-shifting truths about organizations which is at the centre of scientific 
attention.  
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But how does, say, the critical rationalist, explain where ideas and knowledge come from to 
begin with? Where does abduction (Peirce 1966a, 1966b, 1974a, 1974b), the capability to 
conceive new meaning, appear in his vocabulary? Following Feyerabend’s (2002) lines of 
reasoning, it might be argued that science which follows a fixed idea of method or rationality 
rests on too naïve a view of man and thus says little about how ideas come about in practice in 
favour of emphasizing methodological rigor and technical thinking. For example, in the case 
of the critical rationalist, induction and deduction take the place of abduction, but in an 
organizational research context these say little about the complexity of everyday 
organizational life, the emergent qualities of human interaction and the emotional aspects 
involved in this – aspects that can be of great scientific interest in the pursuit of understanding 
how organizing works in different contexts. This is why I hold that technical rationality 
reflects a limited view on organizational reality.  
 
There is no doubt in my mind that technical rationality plays a very important role in a variety 
of research practices just as it does in many everyday situations. But by reifying logic into a 
Divine Rational Being transcending humanity, one risks creating an unrealistic image of 
reality, as is the case of the dualist philosophy. It is at this point imperative to remember that 
it is the scientific conviction of higher powers, either in the shape of natural laws or given 
structures, perhaps even in the shape of a God, or a combinations of these, which carries the 
burden of proof. In essence, these ideals reflect the possibility of ontological objectivity – a 
concept which if left unproven remains merely a belief. And, of course, as a belief it earns the 
greatest respect. If, however, the belief becomes reified, a shift occurs from saying that 
something might be, into saying that something Is, which is a far less humble approach. At 
this point, therefore, we might start to question the position of technical rational thinking as 
an ideal for all science in general, and for organizational science in particular.  
Non-dualism: a practical philosophy 
In the following only the aspects of non-dualism that affect philosophy of science and 
methodology are discussed. Other central elements of non-dualism have already been dealt 
with in chapter three, and as they will not be repeated here it is imperative that they be kept in 
mind in order to get a fuller picture.  
 
Non-dualism is a form of practical philosophy and is typically associated with American 
pragmatism, but also with Heidegger’s (1996) existential philosophy and Wittgenstein’s 
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(1992, 1994) analytical philosophy. Traces of a philosophy of praxis can be found, however, 
all the way back to ancient Greece, as represented by Protagoras and his doctrine of “homos 
mensura”. Protagoras held that man should be “. . . the measure of all things, of things that 
are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not” (Russell 1995, p. 94), thus 
expressing a dismissal of objective truth. F. C. S Schiller, a philosopher associated by Russell 
with pragmatism, was actually “. . . in the habit of calling himself a disciple of Protagoras” (p. 
94). There is little doubt, however, that Protagoras’ doctrine has ended up in the shadow of 
philosophers such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. In fact, Russell argues, Protagoras was 
somewhat ridiculed and his discussions twisted by Plato, evidently because of Plato’s hostility 
to the Sophists, a group of professional rhetoricians Protagoras participated in.  
 
Some two thousand years later non-dualism was explicated as a response to Descartes’ naïve 
rationalism by the American pragmatists, who as a core thesis held that rationality cannot 
reach beyond its own constituting powers. There might be laws governing the becoming of 
things or there might not. But as long as thinking is facilitated and restricted by the human 
body, philosophies of universalism and ontological objectivism can only amount to mere 
speculation. Soul and flesh, subject and object are constructs of an exploring mind in the 
attempt at creating identity and coherence, the non-dualist argues. The more workable a 
construct is in practice – which is determined by trial and error – the more it can be relied on.  
 
Inspired by Mead (1967), (rational) thinking can be described as being performed by a self in 
the process of substituting chaos with predictability. Thinking is an act of sensemaking and is 
performed by a spontaneous “I” in dialogue with an objectified “me”. Human existence and 
sensemaking is a dialogue in which the self acts towards things from the basis of the specific 
meaning those things give (Blumer 1969). It follows that from a non-dualistic perspective 
science cannot have an ultimate goal of disclosing the ontologically objective. As science is a 
human project it cannot violate the principles of existence that non-dualism erects. Thus, there 
is no singular and defined scientific method that transcends all others, there is no common 
structure; rather, as history demonstrates, science shows signs of multiplicity. There are many 
approaches to science (Feyerabend 2002). The overarching goal is for the non-dualistic 
science to perform rigorous and systematic exploration of the resistance and obduracy of 
physical and social nature (Blumer 1969). Contrary to normal science, where “. . . those 
[phenomena] that will not fit the box are often not seen at all” (Kuhn 1996, p. 24), the non-
dualist holds that no scientific rule, method or idea can be clutched onto for its own sake, but 
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must be subjected to contextual evaluation and validation. Methodology implies reflection on 
methodology. From a non-dualistic perspective, scientific progress comes from developing 
epistemological apparatuses out of earlier versions, and as will be explained in detail later in 
this chapter, I have followed this approach of expanding on and forming an epistemological 
apparatus. More concretely, I have tested the fruitfulness of “The improvising man” as a 
framework for understanding an empirical case of organizing. In the process I came up with 
new ideas and was compelled to elaborate on some of the philosophical premises in “The 
improvising man”, and expand some aspects that were initially of a more implicit nature. The 
role of emotions is a good example. On a more practical level, I conceived new sub-concepts 
to make “The improvising man” work as a lens through which to understand organizing as 
improvisation (see chapter eight).  
 
Theories become sharper from practical testing and revising in the sense that they acquire 
higher degrees of practical predictability and robustness, and thus from a non-dualistic 
perspective, scientific rules and methods are tools, temporary objects, to be employed with 
caution and practical wisdom and to be put to continual scrutiny and (potentially) continuous 
improvement. This implies that science is about language construction, and that the more 
persistent language grows from a practical workability point of view, the more scientifically 
grounded it becomes.  
 
. . . scientific successes cannot be explained in a simple way . . . . the success of ‘science’ 
cannot be used as an argument for treating as yet unsolved problems in a standardized way. 
(Feyerabend 2002, pp. 1-2). 
 
Again I emphasize the importance of “practical”, as the non-dualist will not look for 
objectivity but for practical functionality: A theory is not a tool for uncovering the given, but 
a more or less functional instrument to understand and learn about the complexities of nature 
and sociality. The non-dualist does not categorically oppose, say, critical rationalism in its 
pursuit of testing dogmas and axioms, but embraces it to the extent that the process of testing 
gives practical value. In Dewey’s (1929) words: “If we could free ourselves from a somewhat 
abject emotion, it would be clear enough that what makes any proposition scientific is its 
power to yield understanding, insight, intellectual at-homeness, in connection with any 
existential state of affairs, by filling events with coherent and tested meanings.” (p. 163). 
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The non-dualist is indeed absorbed by truth and realism, but in the form of practical rigor and 
not in the form of the ontologically objective. Non-dualism is epistemologically relative, but 
by no means ontologically relative. Wittgenstein (2001), for instance, warns us not to speak of 
what cannot be spoken of, but he does not categorically reject truth; only the scientific 
possibility to disclose it independently.  
 
From a non-dualistic perspective there can be no ontology outside of epistemology: “There is, 
I think, no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like ‘really there’”. (Kuhn 1996, p. 
206). Even if science in the social domain is different from natural science, as the latter is 
more observational and the former more participatory (Skjervheim 1996), the principles of 
non-dualism apply to both. Whereas participation is fairly clearly biased, even observation 
cannot be objectively clean. No science can avoid being smudged by the flesh and blood of 
the scientist(s). In the social sciences, and more specifically in the organizational domain, this 
has clear implications, and one might ask if objectivity should be the ideal, or perhaps the 
ideal should be participation? In an attempt to answer I refer to what Feyerabend (2002) says 
about the multiplicity of methodology and Blumer (1969) about the obduracy of nature. From 
those standpoints the answer is none of the two; neither participation nor objectivity are ideals 
for non-dualistic social research. Objectivity simply cannot be an ideal because of the non-
dualistic premise, and the degree of participation should be evaluated in light of the research 
context. The “scientific boxes” of methodology should not be defined ahead of research but in 
light of research ambitions, and even then only as temporary theories and not as objective 
measures.  
 
Closing in on the social sciences which this dissertation is part of, the non-dualist would argue 
that observation involves participation. As will be explained later, this is particularly evident 
in the method of “shadowing” (McDonald 2005), which I have used in my study. And like 
epistemology outranks ontology, participation outranks observation: Observation can only 
come about via participation. Moreover, given that participation involves efforts of 
sensemaking – that it is more than the non-significant exchange of symbols – participation 
and observation are inseparable. In practical science, however, the (perceived) extent to which 
they work as methodological ideals depends on the research context. Thus the ideal of non-
dualist research is intersubjective rather than objective substantiation (Winch 1959). 
Furthermore, the social researcher should not try to achieve objectivity by escaping his 
forehaving, as this cannot be done (Schwandt 2000). Rather, he should engage those aspects 
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of forehaving that significantly influence the process of scientific investigation, and 
communicate them to the reader for the sake of facilitating alternative theories.  
Non-dualism and choice of design 
Thomas Schwandt (2000) makes an important observation in his reflections on interpretivism, 
hermeneutics and social constructionism when he claims that these perspectives differ more 
with regard to questions of knowing and being than methodology. Implicitly, this can be 
understood as methodology itself being less important than the way in which it is used and 
interpreted. In a wider sense, if Schwandt’s argument were to apply to all existing domains of 
science, all scientific perspectives differ more with regard to epistemological and ontological 
foundations than in terms of sheer methodology. Thus, methodology as such is somehow 
outweighed by the way in which methods are utilized in practice, and no specific method 
contains any particular epistemological or ontological presuppositions. A structured interview, 
for instance, does not in itself have a specific anchorage in terms of the philosophy of science, 
but the way it is used and the way findings are interpreted, inextricably tie the method to 
particular epistemological and ontological assumptions. Two points can be taken from 
Schwandt’s (1996) non-dualistic reasoning: Firstly, no single method carries certain 
epistemological or ontological assumptions, even if they originate from particular 
philosophical strands in history. Secondly, as method is merely an instrument to be employed 
in research practice, no method can be used in science without particular epistemological and 
ontological perspectives being attached to it by the scientist. Methodological design, then, is 
just as much a matter of how to approach a particular method as it is of choosing which 
method to use. This insight is at the core of my study, as it is epistemologically anchored in 
philosophical non-dualism; a perspective which builds on the premise that method is nothing 
in itself, but a contextual device of sensemaking. Given the assumption that there is no text 
without context, method must be seen in light of its pragmatic purpose. Thus, from non-
dualism, method is inevitably biased by the foreknowledge and research ambition of the 
scientist.  
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Research objectives and research question 
Research objectives 
A general ambition with this dissertation is to contribute to an understanding of improvisation 
in organizing practice. In the spirit of non-dualism, I seek to contribute to a research in 
progress and try not to freeze metaphors, so that even if the reader disagrees with the analyses 
and theories presented, the analysis as such could still be of value to the extent that it sparks 
fresh thinking. I do not claim that improvisation is the only way to understand organizing 
practice, that it covers all aspect of that practice, or that it applies equally to all contexts. My 
objective, rather, is to investigate some vital aspects of how improvisation relates to 
organizing practice, and to contribute to constructing a language that is suitable for making 
sense of improvisation in an everyday setting. I have assembled these aspirations in the 
following two research objectives:  
 
1. To achieve and verbalize an understanding of the nature of improvisation in everyday 
organizing practice and of how this relates to complexity and context.  
2. To achieve and verbalize an understanding of the nature of technical rationality in 
everyday organizing practice and of how this relates to improvisation. 
 
In order to accomplish these goals I made a preliminary literature study and later conducted 
an empirical study of managers at a major Norwegian hospital called InSitu. The literature 
study was necessary as a basis for the empirical study, and involves a treatise on the domain 
of practical philosophy as well as influential theories of sensemaking, improvisation, and 
organizing. It was from these bases that ideas emerged, allowing for a fresh take on 
organizing as improvisation which I have gathered under the concept of “The improvising 
man”. Although in a preliminary manner, these ideas provided a fundament for a unique and 
innovative empirical study of improvisation in authentic organizing practice, where I follow 
Argyris and Schön (1974, 1996) in making a comparison between “theory-in-use” and 
“espoused theory”. This means that I juxtapose observations of authentic practice with how 
managers theorize about the role of improvisation in their everyday work life.  
 
I want to accentuate that the research process has emerged hermeneutically: The empirical 
study could not have been accomplished without an initial philosophical and theoretical study 
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of improvisation. In other words, I needed a solid theoretical platform in order to know how 
to conduct my empirical study and to know what to look for in the analysis. Vice versa, in the 
process of accomplishing the empirical study, important insights emerged which contributed 
to a deeper understanding of practical philosophy and the sensemaking perspective. As a 
consequence, “The improvising man” was embellished through the conception of new ideas 
which made the framework more practical.    
Research question 
From an initial thesis that everyday organizing is improvisation, I have formulated the 
following research question:  
 
Empirical design  
A qualitative study of organizing as improvisation amongst hospital managers 
Similar to the way Latour (1987) is interested in what researchers really do, I am from a 
general point of view interested in authentic organizing practice. In order to feed this interest I 
chose to make an empirical study of hospital department managers, and in this section I will 
explain why. It started with a desire to investigate the relationship between administration and 
improvisation, and to investigate the nature of improvisation in organizing as a sensemaking 
process (Weick 1989; Weick et al. 2005). As a consequence, I had to find an empirical 
context that would allow such investigations, and it had to fulfil two needs: Firstly, it had to 
involve administrative work practice where plans, routines, structures and systems were of 
great concern; and secondly, it should be the kind of workplace where radical transformation 
and/or innovation were not the primary objectives. As a consequence my study would differ 
substantially from earlier empirical research on improvisation, and be more focused on 
everyday life than on exceptional instances of improvisation. 
 
My scholarship stipulated that I had to relate my research to management in the health sector, 
and through my research network I was allowed admittance to a large Norwegian hospital. 
Instead of choosing only one particular department or sub-department, I soon realized the 
advantage of spreading my studies so as to ensure variety as well as similarity. This is why I 
What is the nature of improvisation in everyday organizing practice and how does 
improvisation relate to technical rationality? 
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primarily ended up studying several top-level hospital managers/administrators (department 
managers). I also chose to include one section manager. As my focus is on processes of 
gesture and response (Mead 1967) rather than entity, it is difficult to pin down something like 
a “unit” of analysis. Improvisation is a social process, just as the self is dialogical (see chapter 
three and four). The closest I can define my unit of analysis is thus that it consists of the 
individual manager and the dialogical process of organizing that he/she performs in everyday 
practice, and in that sense the unit of analysis varies between individual, group and individual 
in group, dependent on whether the manager is alone or participates in social interaction. In 
short, I have observed both individual managers and the groups they interacted with, and 
studied how improvisation evolves in these settings.  
 
I also spent a few days observing individual practitioners in two medical practices for the sake 
of getting a feel of the hospital context. Another reason for doing this was that at the time of 
study I had not yet decided on the scope of the study, or whether or not studying department 
managers would provide sufficient data. As the study evolved, however, I realized that a study 
of a group of eight department managers (DMs) and one section manager (SM) from the same 
hospital would be sufficient. As these have similar formal responsibilities and role structures, 
they would give rich, varied and comparable data on the relation between administration and 
improvisation in everyday work practice. Variety would flow from the fact that different DMs 
would have different professional focuses related to the medical area of their respective 
departments. An equally important concern, however, was to ensure sufficient similarity 
between the informants with regard to administrative responsibility and role structures. All of 
them being part of the hospital director’s joint management group, I suspected that the DMs 
would share important general administrative concerns with regard to the hospital as a whole 
as well as their respective departments. Studying a selection of DMs would therefore provide 
important contextual correspondence, and in that regard strengthen the validity of my findings 
about the managers as a “group”. 
 
From an initial three-hour long conversation with the hospital director, I had high 
expectations that technical rational aspects of organization theory, such as the use of 
structures, plans, routines and systems played a significant role in the work of DMs. I would 
therefore have the chance to challenge the commonly held perception that improvisation and 
administration are separate traits, and more generally, I would have an exceptional 
opportunity to study improvisation in authentic organizing practice. Initially, I expected that 
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the further up in the organization I looked, the purer administration would stand out as an 
autonomous profession and the more the perception of administration and improvisation as 
opposites would be put to the test. This was another reason why I considered the highest level 
of management possible, the department level, a fruitful point of departure for studying 
improvisation in administrative practice. 
 
A reason for not choosing other professional groups such as nurses or doctors on lower levels 
of hierarchy was to avoid to the largest extent possible the intricacies of and problems related 
to patient anonymity. In addition I saw initially a significant risk in not being allowed to be 
present during patient treatments to observe. For that reason, studying DMs appeared to be a 
more logical and cost-efficient approach with lesser risk of being denied access. I also wanted 
to exploit the fact that I had considerable personal experience with administrative practice and 
theory, and suspected that I had valuable foreknowledge about the administrative language in 
use amongst DMs. Having to learn in detail a range of unfamiliar contexts of medical practice 
seemed unnecessarily difficult and incommodious considering that I had the opportunity to 
follow DMs, who to a great extent have administration as a central part of their jobs. Even at 
the department level, however, I soon discovered that operational medicine comprised a major 
part of everyday life, as many of the DMs to some extent continued to work as clinical 
physicians. 
 
I ended up with the nine particular managers for the following reasons:  
1. Looking at the massive bulk of organizing literature there are very few empirical 
studies of improvisation (Kamoche et al. 2002) and little has been written on 
improvisation in everyday organizing practice. Amongst the literature that does exist, 
much is of an indirect and skewed nature, as it is mostly focused on certain aspects of 
improvisation rather than on how it typically intervenes with actual organizing 
practice; that is, with the concurrently dull and exciting stuff of everyday life. 
2. Contractual inscriptions in my Ph.D. scholarship stated that my research somehow had 
to be related to management in the health sector.    
3. Through a study of a selection of InSitu Hospital department managers I believed I 
would get a rich and diverse image of organizing as improvisation. The manner in 
which the nine particular managers were chosen happened as a “snowball-effect” 
starting with two in-depth interviews. The first of these was with a member of the 
director’s staff, and the second with a representative from the personnel section of the 
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administrative staff. In these interviews I was advised to contact four particular DMs, 
and via these four DMs I was led to a further three DMs. For example, one of the 
original DMs (A) would compare himself and his department to another department 
(B), and use B as an example of what he (A) was not like. Thus I decided to try to get 
admittance to B so as to ensure a richer foundation of data.  
4. The last of the department managers was chosen because I had met her early on in the 
process, and was interested in the stories she told me about her everyday life. In this 
case I simply followed up on an invitation.  
5. The section manager was chosen because during a visit to his medical clinic, I 
stumbled across quite a chaotic OD-project in which he played a central role. 
 
To sum up, the rationale for choosing the nine managers included in my study is a mixture of 
pursuing my curiosity about a possible contrast between administration and management on 
the one side and improvisation on the other; of contractual inscriptions in my scholarship; of 
using available social resources; of taking external advice; and finally, some degree of 
coincidence and chance was also involved. In that regard, the process of finding informants 
has emerged as a continual evaluation of contextual factors from an initial ambition to study 
improvisation in organizing practice. And following Denzin and Lincoln (2000) I could not 
have determined a sample in advance. Only in retrospect could I decide that my sample of 
managers was sufficient in the interest of providing “. . . an analysis uniquely adequate for 
that particular phenomenon” (Psathas 1995 in Denzin and Lincoln 2000, p. 371); the 
“particular phenomenon” in my case being, of course, improvisation in everyday organizing.    
The empirical research context and the participants  
The empirical study was conducted at a major Norwegian hospital which for purposes of 
confidentiality I have chosen to call “InSitu”, and it addresses a selection of those managers 
that are formally appointed to run hospital departments, of which there were 17 in the somatic 
division at the time of study. The department manager (DM) is hierarchically situated directly 
below the hospital director. As part of a temporary organization, there was only one 
departmental manager – called division manager – in the psychiatric branch at the time of 
study. Below the division manager there were a range of sub-departments that equalled the 
somatic departments with regard to autonomy in professional services, budgets and number of 
employees. My study covers a total number of eight DMs and one section manager (SM) 
taken from both the somatic and the psychiatric division. A detailed presentation of the 
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managers can be found on pages 177 to 185, but as said by Christians (2000): “Confidentiality 
must be assured as the primary safeguard against unwanted exposure. All personal data 
ought to be secured or concealed and made public only behind a shield of anonymity.” (p. 
139). In my case this ethical aspect was particularly important as I had to promise the 
participants full anonymity in order to gain admittance. I have therefore changed the 
managers’ names and held the name of their specific departments confidential. To be able to 
present important details without violating ethical boundaries have produced many dilemmas 
and challenges, and I hope I have managed to find a functional balance between context and 
confidentiality.  
 
It is impossible to pinpoint one single image that is characteristic of and representative for all 
of the hospital’s departments as they vary vastly in important regards such as professional 
area, the work methods and technology related to this, budget size and number of employees. 
At the time of study some of the sub-departments were in many ways larger than some of the 
departments; some departments were located far away from the central building, others within; 
some dealt with a significant amount of acute cases, and others not. Still, a lot can be said 
about the typical role of a departmental manager. First of all, he is typically medicinally 
responsible for those services covered by the department. Secondly, he has financial and 
budget responsibility for major parts of the department, even though much of the 
departmental activity is typically governed by external factors. The number of patients, the 
price of external services such as laboratory analyses and x-ray photos, the price of medicine 
and operational gear, political directives and patient rights movements, labour unions, 
implementation of expensive computer systems, and of course established cross-departmental 
routines, are viable examples.  
Choosing design: Narrative ethnography 
My research objectives imply studying improvisation as a qualitative phenomenon, which 
speaks in favour of a qualitative study. Quantification is not categorically precluded in non-
dualistic science (Schwandt 2000), but in this particular research context it seemed to be of 
little use. Mere counting and quantification would not enable me to grasp the meaning of 
emerging situations. Bringing together my non-dualistic philosophical underpinning and 
research objectives, the design of my study would naturally emerge from what Vidich and 
Lyman (2000) label qualitative ethnographic social research. This is a research strategy, they 
argue, that “. . . permits the sociologist to observe the conduct of self and others, to 
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understand the mechanisms of social processes, and to comprehend and explain why both 
actors and processes are as they are” (p. 38). More specifically, I have conducted my study 
within the genre of “narrative ethnography” (Tedlock 2000), which implies making notes both 
of dialogues between others as well as including personal experiences and evaluations of 
emerging episodes. As part of this genre I have produced lengthy narratives, including 
observations, dialogues and personal reflections, from which quotes are selected and 
presented in the empirical analysis. I have done this for two reasons: firstly, in order to allow 
the reader to make up his/her own opinions about the narratives; and secondly, to be as clear 
as possible about what my interpretations are: 
 
Researchers cannot hide behind a bureaucratic methodological procedure and dominant 
conventions for writing, but must take responsibility for their texts and also make it obvious in 
the texts that they have done so . . . . The researcher may also encourage a dialogue with the 
reader, by indicating pertinent problems and imperfections in the text . . . . The author is made 
visible and the reader is compelled to become involved. (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2008, p. 
192). 
 
Another way of looking at my research strategy is to see it as a case study, where 
improvisation is the “general phenomenon” under study (Stake 2000). Following Stake, my 
case would somehow fall between what he labels intrinsic and instrumental, as I am primarily 
interested in organizing as improvisation as a general phenomenon, thus giving the InSitu 
managers an instrumental character, and have a secondary interest in the particular case of 
InSitu managers (intrinsic).  
Choosing a method: Qualitative shadowing 
The way my case study has evolved is in line with qualitative ethnography as described by 
Vidich and Lyman (2000). And concerning the choice of method, some kind of practice 
observation stood out as logical and suitable as it would allow insight into work practice. As 
my objective was to compare authentic practice with practitioners’ reflections on that practice, 
the method of in-depth interviews was an equally logical choice.  
 
I landed on a sort of practice observation called qualitative shadowing, defined by McDonald 
(2005) as “. . . a research technique which involves a researcher closely following a member 
of an organization over an extended period of time” (p. 456). Thus, to the extent that research 
is focused on observation of organizational practice in the becoming (Bergson 1944), 
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qualitative shadowing as a means of understanding roles or perspectives (McDonald 2005) is 
a rational and pragmatic methodological alternative. This view is supported by Fineman 
(2000), who argues in favour of an “. . . ‘engaged’, critical, style of ethnographic 
organizational research” (p. 14) in the pursuit of learning about the phenomenology of 
emotions, which is part of my study. Qualitative shadowing therefore falls within the kind of 
research described by Fineman, who concludes that “. . . contextually rich, ‘real time’ emotion 
studies of organizational life are still relatively rare. . .” (p. 14).  
 
In many ways qualitative shadowing is similar to participant observation (Spradley 1980). 
Still, as McDonald (2005) argues:  
 
The itinerant nature of the shadowing method lies at the heart of a more subtle difference 
between shadowing and participant observation. By following one person through the 
organization, the shadower obtains insight into a focused and specific experience which is 
relevant to a particular expert role. The commentary provided is the opinion and perspective of 
an expert rather than a novice. In other words, a shadower can follow where it would be 
impossible for a participant observer to go themselves. (p. 457).    
 
This does not make shadowing a better technique than participant observation, McDonald 
quickly asseverates; it only provides different insights. In my case I did not want to risk not 
taking good notes as a result of having to concentrate on participating in and learning the 
nature of everyday organizing as performed by the DMs. Rather, as McDonald indicates, I 
wanted to exploit the expertise already incorporated by the practitioner (i.e. the DM) and 
focus all my energy into observation and writing. As a consequence, I expected shadowing to 
provide me with insights concurrent with my research objectives and thus saw it as a natural 
choice of method.  
 
McDonald (2005) argues that there is great lack of shadowing research that is both grounded 
in the wider literature and which explicitly accounts for its epistemological standpoint. 
Moreover, she argues that the majority of the current shadowing research is eclectic:  
 
Sometimes the qualitative data is a backdrop to the quantitative results (e.g. Mintzberg, 1970, 
1973) and sometimes it is the other way around (e.g. Fenton et al., 1997). As a result, a great 
deal of what is termed shadowing is neither truly qualitative (why questions coded into time 
logs [Snyder and Glueck, 1980]) nor truly quantitative (inductive approaches to surfacing 
activity categories [Mintzberg, 1970, 1973]). This wide and unexamined use of mixed methods 
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in shadowing studies makes explicit and critical debate about the methodological and 
epistemological implications or research design even more vital. (p. 468).   
 
As I have elucidated in this chapter my methodological and epistemological basis is in 
philosophical non-dualism. Inspired by Weick (1995), I brought with me a paradigm of 
sensemaking into the study, and it was those characteristics related to improvisation that 
initially interested me. As I had taken interest in improvisation and its relation to organizing 
practice, I anticipated (potentially) being able to bring in something new and useful to the 
field. But I knew little about how or to which extent, which are the factors that ultimately 
determined the fruitfulness of the concept. How improvisation applied to the research context, 
the quality of spontaneity and creativity in action, the typical traits of specific practices, the 
temporality and quality of action – these were all secrets to me before the empirical study. I 
did not make quantifiable representations of improvisation beforehand, as this would be 
outside my goal of authentic qualitative insight. Unlike authors of managerial behaviour (for 
example Carlson 1951; Stewart 1967, Mintzberg 1973; Kotter 1986; Tengblad 2006) I had no 
ambition of counting decisions or phone-calls, or of measuring the length of meetings or the 
like, but rather, of studying the quality of organizing practice and its relation to improvisation. 
Related to this I want to see the extent to which improvisation provides a higher level of 
abstraction of the quality of everyday organizing, thus permitting a practice-close 
communication about it. 
 
Following the premise of non-dualism in science as discussed earlier in this chapter, I believe 
that scientific findings should be subjected to continual scrutiny and embellishment; that they 
are mere tools in an ongoing sensemaking process. The rationale for my investigations has 
therefore been one of opening up horizons of understanding before proposing perspectives 
and theories. In short, I have tried to avoid forcing closed perspectives upon the reader. In the 
language of Kuhn (1996) I did not seal my boxes before I made my study. My theoretical 
elaborations in “The improvising man” are in themselves attempts to present practical and 
useful hypotheses in the interest of opening up a field of research. From a basis of non-
dualism it has been my purpose to present fruitful interpretations, useful theories and concepts 
of improvisation resulting from empirical analyses based on an initial improvisatory 
framework. Developing a framework that aids communication about organizing as 
improvisation was a crucial part of the process, and the framework emerged in a 
hermeneutical manner. As the research process evolved, some aspects were toned down, 
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others up, and there was a continual and genuine explorative undertaking of empirical and 
theoretical analyses for the sake of developing a practice-close language of organizing as 
improvisation. In short, “The improvising man” is not a sealed framework inserted 
beforehand, but a “product” in progress which evolved gradually.  
 
I will in the following describe the process of my shadowing venture – how it emerged in 
practice as a hermeneutical and qualitative empirical study – and how the framework of 
improvisation as presented in chapter four and chapters seven to ten is the result of emergent 
reflections from the basis of empirical data and theory.  
About the shadowing venture 
During the period of empirical research I was permitted to spend at least two days with each 
manager and join him/her in as many of the daily activities as possible and ethically 
responsible. Except for the occasional visit to the bathroom, a few confidential meetings and 
one particular surgical operation I was admitted into all situations as they evolved. I thus 
observed negotiation meetings, administrative meetings, informal meetings, paperwork, 
phone calls, surgery, fights and conflicts, patient tragedies and psychiatric treatment - to name 
a few. My laptop was with me in most of these scenarios but in some instances I exchanged it 
with a hardback notebook. As pointed out by McDonald (2005) tape recorders are not 
practical for shadowing, which also applied to my situation: Being on the run for much of the 
day, and meeting a lot of people who were not immediately aware of my role as a researcher 
made it both impractical and unethical to use a recorder. In large groups and with many 
unknown participants, getting permission to use a recorder was difficult, and would in any 
case introduced the additional complication of having to transcribe the recordings as well. 
Most important, however, was the explicit dismay the managers articulated at my suggestion 
of using a recorder. Although not generally using a tape-recorder, however, I was able to note 
down conversations in great detail by means of abbreviations and key-words, and whenever I 
had the chance I “wrote out” my observations as complete texts with the episodes fresh in 
mind. Likewise, after each day of observation, I spent the night making my field notes 
complete and coherent in terms of dialogue and other contextual details. (The notes were 
continually translated from Norwegian to English.) In that sense my work bears close 
resemblance to the methodological approach of William Foote Whyte who in 1943 published 
the study “Street corner society”, which later has become a sociological branch standard. 
Without the use of tape-recorder Whyte sometimes made notes in short breaks between 
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observations, but ended up with a method of writing narratives and dialogues at night whilst 
the experience of previous encounters were still fresh in mind. 
 
How accurate are my observations and especially the dialogues? As I seldom used a recording 
device I have had to rely on my notes, keywords, abbreviations and recollection of the 
observed occurrences when “completing” the field notes. The notes were expanded shortly 
after the actual occurrences, but I have no illusions about their accuracy or objectiveness. First 
of all, even if I had used a tape-recorder, I would still have had to rely on my instincts as to 
what was going on, what the emotional atmosphere was like etc., and some degree of 
inaccuracy would have been unavoidable. From a sensemaking perspective I believe that my 
ability as a researcher to read social situations and their meaning is the most important factor. 
Words in themselves give little meaning outside of the social and emotional context (Dewey 
1929). Secondly, some detail and accuracy would inevitably have been lost when translating 
the dialogues from Norwegian to English. This is no excuse for the apparent flaws of my 
note-making method, of which I am aware, but I believe that the dialogues are sufficiently 
authentic even if they are not accurately cited word by word. When presenting data in 
chapters seven, nine and ten I find the dialogue-form important in order to show authentic 
emergence of social processes, and in that sense it is a weakness that the dialogues are not 
quoted accurately. But I still believe that my recreation of the episodes on the basis of detailed 
notes holds sufficient quality to counter much of this weakness. The trustworthiness of my 
method is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.     
 
Even if many harmless jokes were made at my and the managers’ expense in the beginning, I 
soon became a natural element of the context. I was accepted and blended in. The irony of 
things is that amongst those occurrences that made the strongest impression on me 
emotionally were two particular experiences that I have not been able to fit into the final draft 
of my dissertation. These experiences include confrontations and conversations I had whilst 
shadowing a variety of nurses and doctors in a psychiatric ward and some rather intimidating 
episodes that occurred while I was shadowing doctors and nurses in a surgical ward. But even 
if these are not explicitly utilized in the thesis I still see these experiences as central to my 
understanding of InSitu Hospital as a sensemaking arena and the way it affects those 
participating in it.  
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In line with the way Angrosino and Mays de Pérez (2000) describe observation research, my 
personal experience of the research process is a tale of emotionality. There were many 
moments where I wished myself out of the situation, mostly because I felt that my presence 
bordered on the inappropriate, or I was frightened by the patient treatment taking place, or 
because at times, those around me at times suspected me of being a spy from central 
management (which was of course cleared up the next minute). Indeed, simply to contact the 
managers in the first place trying to make an appointment was exciting and a bit intimidating. 
Getting their attention and convincing them that my work could be valuable was quite a 
delicate and somewhat awkward matter. Generally, I would say that much of the empirical 
phase of my dissertation was centred around legitimating, building trust and gaining 
admittance. It takes quite a lot of convincing and arguing to be let onto someone’s private turf 
as a stranger, but in the end it worked out as intended. 
 
In the beginning, shadowing the managers took some getting used to, both for me and for the 
individual manager. But in none of the cases did it take long before it felt like the most natural 
thing in the world. Indeed, some of the managers were right out flattered by all the attention 
and the fact that I was interested in them. It is my impression that it helped matters that I 
explained that my mission was not to evaluate the quality of their work, but simply to study 
how everyday life went along.   
Interviews 
According to McDonald (2005) and Fontana and Frey (2000) it is a common approach to 
combine ethnographic studies with in-depth interviews as well as a form of informal and 
continual interviews to sort out the researcher’s observations and clear up misunderstandings. 
In my study I made both kinds of interviews. I conducted a total of nine in-depth interviews: 
one with each participant. The goal of these was to get to know how the managers reflected 
upon their everyday life so as to gain insight into their espoused theory (Argyris and Schön 
1974, 1996). The interviews lasted between one and two hours and on the whole, the 
exchange concerned practically relevant issues, but as I was pursuing their typical 
understanding of improvisation in everyday organizing, issues of specific theoretical interest 
were addressed as well. I had prepared an interview guide covering these theoretical issues in 
advance, and as a consequence the interviews are a mixture of what Fontana and Frey (2000) 
call structured and unstructured. The interview guide was divided into two parts concurrent 
with my research goals. Around these generic topics conversations emerged in an open-ended 
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manner, and the informants were allowed to elaborate freely on those topics (King 1994). 
Concretely, using the interview guide, I asked the managers the following questions:  
 
Concerning research goal 1  
1. How does your everyday work life play out in terms of 
 the nature of problems you encounter – vague and diffuse or clear and technical? 
 unpredictability? 
 
The analysis of the responses I received to these questions is found in chapters seven and nine.  
 
2. What is the significance of being able to 
 be empathetic with the social context, and sensitive to the physical context, you act 
in? 
 act spontaneously and rapidly?  
 
The analysis of the responses I received to these questions is found in chapter nine.  
 
Concerning research goal 2  
1. What is the role of rules, routines, structures, systems and plans in everyday 
organizing? 
2. How do you think about and deal with these issues in practice?  
 
The analysis of the responses I received to these questions is found in chapter ten.  
 
As indicated earlier, a different kind of interview was also conducted on a more or less 
continual basis. Through the shadowing experiences I often posed questions in order to 
validate my interpretations and to get a sense of how the informants saw the situations 
(McDonald 2005). From this I hope to have achieved a greater understanding of contextuality 
and of the manner in which the manager categorizes his experiences of that contextuality.  
 
I used a recording device only in a few of the interviews, as I soon discovered that in many 
cases the tape recorder made the manager sceptical with regard to anonymity, and thus that it 
inhibited the natural flow of conversation. In addition, several managers expressed a general 
distaste for mechanical monitoring of any kind, and made it clear that they would prefer my 
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not using such a device. To compensate for the lack of recording equipment I repeatedly 
informed the managers about my notes and interpretations and asked them to confirm my 
understanding of them.  
The analysis 
During the data-gathering phase I tried to avoid thinking about theory, prioritizing instead the 
endeavour to capture the richness of contextuality in my notes. In the succeeding phase of 
analysis I was guided by an ethnographic aim “. . . to place specific encounters, events, and 
understandings into a fuller and more meaningful context” (Tedlock 2000). Thus, after the 
data recording phase I drew on theory as a sensemaking tool for analysis, a process that was 
initiated by an iterative exercise of qualitative data analysis, QDA software coding, and 
categorization (Weitzman 2000). Importing the narratives into N-VIVO I worked hard to 
structure and categorize my findings with relevance to the initial framework of improvisation, 
but also with regard to any upcoming topic that seemed interesting. As a result, I came out 
with some 200 categories and subcategories, many of which overlapped and covered the same 
occurrences: Just as no context was easily captured in a single category, the categories 
naturally fitted several contexts as they were of a higher level of abstraction than the text.   
 
After the process of initial structuration I started looking for similarities and dissimilarities in 
the stories. Having the initial rudimentary framework of improvisation in mind, I tried to sort 
out characteristics in the narratives that could be of special interest – because they surprised 
me and/or because they highlighted traits of special relevance to the understanding of 
organizing as improvisation. Of special interest were topics such as complexity in different 
shapes, unpredictability and interruption, use of language, planning, and systems thinking.  
 
Much can be said about the initial analysis phase of using N-VIVO. First of all, this was a 
very thorough and scrupulous process compelling me to re-experience the incidents in detail 
and to see them as a whole. For this alone the N-VIVO process was worthwhile undertaking, 
as I paradoxically obtained both greater proximity and greater distance to the data. This might 
represent an interesting angle in relation to the current debate on how QDA-software 
influences closeness to data (Weitzman 2000). Secondly, using N-VIVO has left me with 
several ideas for new papers that could not be integrated in the thesis. Thirdly, and less 
pleasantly, after having spent a considerable amount of time using N-VIVO I almost began 
seeing words instead of contexts; an emerging tendency which took a lot of effort to avert. I 
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do not, however, suspect this to be a feature of the QDA-tool, but rather a necessary part of 
the qualitative analysis as such. And fourthly, having some 200 categories at my disposal 
created something of a luxury problem in choosing, not to say not choosing, amongst them. 
Indeed, writing the analysis was as much a matter of choosing the appropriate codes and 
citations (invisible work) as of structuring the draft. In that sense the continual and exhausting 
sensemaking efforts in many ways overshadow the final text. On the basis of the 200 
categories there was no one apparent history to be told, and no given order of sequence in 
which to tell it. Finding (creating) the right story was indeed a great challenge, and looking 
back I would have tried to minimize the number of initial categories and put somewhat less 
emphasis on letting the text speak for itself in all its diversity. In other words, when writing 
my first drafts it was hard to exclude any of the categories, as I wanted a dense and interesting 
basis for further analysis and embellishment, but in retrospect I realize that some effort could 
have been saved by limiting the amount of data to be analyzed (Silverman 2000).  
 
The next phase was to choose the most interesting of the N-VIVO categories, those which 
seemed especially illustrative in light of the generic concept of improvisation, and use them in 
the moulding of another draft. But as this draft, too, was found to be too wide and unfocussed, 
I soon started working on yet another. And then another – and so forth. In the end, I ended up 
abandoning most of the 200 categories in favour of new, more relevant and specific headings. 
In that sense the original categories worked together with the initial (and evolving) concept of 
improvisation as dynamic forehaving, as sensemaking tools, guiding an increasingly specific 
and contextual analysis. And as indicated, the ideal behind this process was to find a workable 
balance between theoretical abstraction and contextual relevance.  
 
To sum up, my goal was to study how improvisation evolves in everyday organizing practice 
amongst managers at InSitu Hospital, which implies moulding analytical categories from the 
contextual data. These categories must necessarily be of a higher level of abstraction than the 
data and within the practical philosophical framework of improvisation but still contextually 
relevant. The path towards the final draft can be outlined as illustrated in model 6.0:  
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The proposed analytical categories reflect attempts to gather some of the observed regularities 
in improvisational behaviour as indicated by the data, and by describing these regularities I 
aim to contribute to a language that is more empirically specific and in that sense contextual 
than the generic and initial hypotheses of organizing as improvisation from the theory 
chapters. Whereas the data themselves present a rich portrait of everyday contextuality and 
improvisation, the analytical categories reflect typicalities in those data concurrent with the 
improvisational frame: the particular meets the general (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). In other 
words, I have tried to point out some distinctive traits of everyday organizing practice that 
seem to be of special importance for the quality of improvisation. Thus, I could not have 
determined beforehand which contextual factors to focus on in the analytical phase; rather, I 
have had to see if in retrospect I could find viable categories of practical context and 
improvisation that covered recurrences in my findings. The main reasons for this approach 
have been the following: 
 
1. The aim of having as much as possible an open and curious mind as to what may 
emerge as significant findings, concurrent with using and building theory rather than 
following it. And as a consequence: 
2. Possibly to open some new and practically relevant perspectives on everyday 
improvisation in organizing based on the empirical material. This point is in line with 
the hermeneutical message that theories and hypotheses function as forehaving, thus 
guiding further analysis, from which new theory emerges.  
3. To increase the transferability of my findings from the InSitu Hospital context to other 
relevant organizational contexts from an aspiration to reach high levels of abstraction.  
Analysis: 
Abstracting data 
into theoretical 
categories 
concurrent with 
the framework of 
improvisation 
Gathering data 
and turning rich 
contextual 
descriptions into 
narratives  
Developing a 
rudimentary 
framework of 
improvisation 
Discussion of 
improvisation 
versus technical 
rationality 
 
Model 6.0 The analytical process 
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Inspired by Argyris and Schön (1992) a final step of the analysis was to juxtapose my 
findings on organizing practice with the way managers talked: both as reflected in the 
interviews and in the everyday conversations that were logged during the shadowing. This 
analysis leads up to a final discussion which is linked to dominant strands in organization 
theory so as to point out the relevance and need for the line of research implied by the 
improvisation framework (see chapter ten).  
Trustworthiness & credibility 
There have inevitably been some instances of the Hawthorne effect due to my mere presence 
in the manager’s context. After all, a central point in philosophical non-dualism is that I am as 
a researcher part of the context I am studying. In Weick’s (1995) words, through enactment I 
partly create the context in which I act. There were, especially in the very beginning of my 
observation periods, instances where I felt that my presence influenced the manager’s choice 
of words and actions. In my view, however, as I started to blend in as a natural element of the 
context the Hawthorne effect seemed to gradually wear off.  
 
To secure a high level of credibility in my analysis I have drawn heavily on member-check 
and participant validation (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Angrosino and Mays de Perez 2000). As 
an explicit attempt to counter research bias I have regularly asked for the informants’ view on 
whether the particular situation at hand and the general flow of that day were normal 
compared to everyday life:  
 
. . . the constant shuttling between hard data gathering and interaction with the subjects was 
essential in order to go beyond the level of observing mere behaviour and grasp the meaning 
the observed actions had. (Bonazzi 1998, p. 223). 
 
Furthermore, I have continually strived for rich description in my research notes so as to 
facilitate rich interpretation (Denzin 1989), and the goal has been to ensure that analysis and 
interpretation balance description (Janesick 2000). As far as practically possible I have tried 
to log occurrences-in-the-becoming (Bergson 1944), as well as the informants’ views on what 
was going on. Writing from the genre of “narrative ethnography” (Tedlock 2000), I have tried 
to keep a time-log of events as they occurred as well, but often, when situations emerged with 
great intensity or density I chose to focus more on qualitative aspects. Having “a passion for 
detail” (McDonald 2005), I have noted down odours, colours, shapes, moods, emotional 
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atmospheres, gesticulations and conversations as I have observed them. Even if (or precisely 
because) I realize there is no one truth to be uncovered, it is my hope that the narratives 
presented are consistent and credible (Janesick 2000). To my knowledge my field notes hold 
high quality in that they reflect episodes and dialogues in sufficient and authentic detail; and 
in addition the notes contain personal experiences which, again, is part of the narrative 
ethnographic genre to which I subscribe (Tedlock 2000). More about the field notes and their 
utilization in data presentation is found in the introductory section of chapter seven.  
 
As described in an earlier section of this chapter I mostly did not use a tape recorder, but 
through continual note writing, making use of key words and abbreviations I was able to 
follow the episodes as they evolved. Earlier I argued that the ultimate measure of 
trustworthiness from a sensemaking perspective is the ability to observe and understand the 
meaning of social situations. Weick et al. (2005) state the following: 
 
Sensemaking is not about truth and getting it right. Instead, it is about continued redrafting of 
an emerging story so that it becomes more comprehensive, incorporates more of the observed 
data, and is more resilient in the face of criticism . . . . People may get better stories, but they 
will never get the story . . . . A focus on perceptual accuracy is grounded in models of rational 
decision making. (p. 415).  
 
Interpreted into a research context this is the ideal I have followed, as following a 
sensemaking perspective I have tried to log on to emerging stories, grasp their meaning and 
write them down as plausible narratives. Recreating these stories in retrospect has therefore 
been dependent on my initial interpretation of what was going on, and my field notes have 
greatly aided this process of reconstruction. As explained earlier in this chapter my objective 
has not been objectivity, but intersubjectivity (Mead 1967). As I did not use a recording 
device dialogues included in the narratives are not accurate word by word; a point which is 
reinforced by the fact that the original field notes have been translated into English. I still 
hope that the final result as presented in the succeeding chapters is sufficiently detailed, and 
that the narratives are presented in such a manner that I might gain trust as an observer, 
researcher and writer.  
 
Schwandt (2000) argues that in any social sensemaking activity intersubjectivity is at stake – 
some form of bias is inevitable because interpretative research assumes an understanding of 
understanding. From the non-dualist position it is impossible to make sure that you grasp 
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exactly what is on another person’s mind. Throughout the research process I have followed 
authenticity and contextuality as measures of validity (Lincoln & Guba 2000) and practical 
wisdom has been my guiding rule (Schwandt 1996). But even if I have validated my 
interpretations with participants, I cannot know whether I covered all aspects of importance. I 
did, however, address those aspects that I saw as important features of authenticity, and in the 
end I hope that I have created sufficient understanding of those social meetings which most 
participants can agree with. An interesting and potential next step in this process may be to 
bring the dissertation back to the participants and discuss its usefulness in terms of achieving 
better organizing practice.  
 
As encouraged by McDonald (2005), I have tried as best as I could to be prepared for the 
events to come and to know something about the participants in advance. Actually, this is a 
matter that came along quite naturally as the managers usually prepared me in advance by 
volunteering information about themselves and their work. Furthermore, as a rule the 
managers introduced me to important others when it was natural to do so, and they gave me 
instructive information about the meetings we attended. For instance, they would typically 
show me meeting agendas, inform me about the purpose of the meeting and about other 
participants, and in some instances give accounts of the preceding history leading up to the 
meeting.  
 
In addition to writing notes continuously and meticulously, I have kept a private log 
throughout the entire research process. This has enabled me to go back and see which 
thoughts emerged when, and to consider my expectations, worries and general reflections. 
Confronting what I wrote down and anticipated before events took place has proved to be 
quite fruitful with regard to validation and enlightenment and to avoid the pitfalls of “going 
native” (McDonald 2005; Nielsen 1996).  
 
With regard to the observations and the interviews I cannot be certain that I have understood 
the informants correctly in all aspects, even though I double-checked my interpretations. But 
it is my opinion that throughout the data gathering, a genuine intersubjective sphere emerged, 
and that empathic understanding was achieved. Needless to say, difficult words and 
expressions, both medical and administrative, were thoroughly discussed as they occurred.    
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As a measure of validity Lincoln & Guba (2000) ask: “Can our cocreated constructions be 
trusted to provide some purchase on some important human phenomenon?” (p. 179). The 
“human phenomenon” in my case is improvisation in everyday organizing, and in order to 
provide a trustworthy construction of this phenomenon I have strived for fruitful dialogues 
with myself as well as with others. An important point has been to be critical towards my 
preliminary expectations. My log contains some of my essential expectations, and I have tried 
to surface these as best I can wherever it has seemed important. An essential part of this, as 
earlier explained, has been to test out my interpretations continuously with the participants in 
order to eradicate potential misunderstandings, exaggerations or the like. Likewise, I have 
used colleagues and advisors as a source of validation by having them comment on my beliefs 
and anticipations. The point has not been to achieve a condition of “tabula rasa”, but to bring 
to the surface important factors that might influence my analysis. Four phases can be singled 
out in which social validation has been especially important:  
 
1. Theory development. Discussing with colleagues, family and friends.  
2. Data collection. Conferring with the participants about by interpretations. 
3. Data transcription. Conferring with my logbook and advisor about the style of writing. 
4. Data analysis. Conferring with all sources available to maintain an open but concrete 
view.    
 
As a last comment on credibility I refer to the advantages pointed out by McDonald (2005) 
regarding shadowing as a method: Being more like an observer than a participant might 
reduce the chances of “going native”. Thus, even if as a researcher I have been part of the 
social processes, I have focused on seeing them from the outside.  
The hermeneutics of the research process  
This thesis has come about through a challenging hermeneutical process of sensemaking. 
Starting with an initial interest in improvisation as a concept for organizing, the succeeding 
process has been a continuous effort to confront deeply held personal mindsets and develop 
new insights.  
 
This forehaving might in the dialogue with the text transcend and lead up to new 
understanding. The concept of understanding is to be seen as a radical act - it is about 
renewal, transformation and new insights for the researcher rather than reproductions of old 
conceptions [my translation]. (Ödman 1979 in Norén 1995, p. 34). 
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In that sense, putting together this dissertation has implied “science around the clock”, with 
seemingly non-stopping reflection, frustration and evolving enlightenment. Working with 
non-dualist theory has in itself been a challenge to such an extent that some of my most 
profound private identity-structures and expectations have been put to the test. As my ideal 
has been grounded in the practical and contextual, the process has been genuine in the sense 
of opposing reification and taken for granted beliefs. It has been lonely, uncertain and 
exhausting. I have taken on the most complex philosophical questions of existence and 
attempted to mould these into workable concepts for organizing praxis. As a result, I have 
been working on my research during weekends, at night, at concerts, while driving to work 
and while reading books or magazines. Whenever a theoretical problem has surfaced in my 
head, I have attempted to solve it and place it within a larger philosophical frame, from a 
desire to develop workable and internally consistent hypotheses of improvisation.   
 
Equal to philosophical non-dualism such as mine, Schwandt (2000) argues that theory-free 
research is an impossible ideal in hermeneutical epistemology. Indeed, as Schwandt points out, 
to strive for a “tabula rasa” approach to empirical studies is not even desirable, as “. . . 
tradition is ‘a living force that enters into all understanding’”(Gallagher 1992 in Schwandt 
2000, p. 194). In the spirit of ethnography and qualitative shadowing I have tried, rather, to 
engage my biases (Schwandt 2000), to note down events in the becoming and to provide rich 
descriptions that could later be interpreted somewhat independently by others.  
 
Ethnography presumes that the researcher should have an open mind vis-à-vis the object of 
study. Naturally some theory or frame of reference must direct the work, but the purpose of 
this is to give some direction and system to the task, rather than get in the way of crucial 
observation and analysis. (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2008, p. 46).   
 
During the data gathering process, and especially in the interviews, I tried to be as explicit as 
possible about my theoretical suspicions, expectations and interpretations, in order to avoid 
and challenge possible bias and prejudice. Not to mention the number of times I was surprised 
by what I found. For instance, I often had thoughts in the mornings before meeting the 
manager about what to expect during the day, and when I did, I wrote them down. It could be 
that I feared that the day would be wasted on observing paperwork or, as in the case of the 
clinical observations, that the odours, sounds and images would be so horrific that they would 
prohibit effective note writing. In some instances, I even dreaded meeting the manager in 
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question, as the preceding phone conversation had not been too promising with regard to 
obtaining good communication. In most of these cases, however, my apprehensions were 
proven to be unfounded. Particularly what I feared would be uninteresting and unusable for 
my thesis proved to be quite the opposite. Indeed, as a general comment, the richness of 
evolving contexts always surpassed the simplicity of my prospections.  
 
As to the findings a lot of occurrences surprised me, for instance the extent to which 
interruption enters the organizing context. Of course I had my suspicions, but the variety, 
multitude and complexity brought about by interruptions in typical everyday life took me 
somewhat by surprise. Likewise, the essential role of emotion, through implicit and explicit 
moods and affections, and the ways these tune and colour everyday life were quite a 
revelation. Again, I suspected that emotion plays an important role, but precisely how and to 
which extent, I had to experience in order to realize. Being a shadow rather than a participant 
let me see social processes from a perspective not commonly reachable. After all, monitoring 
conversations as a civilian is seldom considered acceptable, nor is it very respectful or indeed 
interesting. But shadowing implies admittance into the complexity of real time interaction, 
thus facilitating in varying degrees a range of perspectives not usually accessible.  
Non-dualism and transferability 
As argued by Janesick (2000), traditional ways of thinking about generalizations are 
inadequate in interpretative, non-dualistic research such as mine. Implicit in the non-dualist 
approach to shadowing is an appetite for details, but as they are not seen as objective features, 
details can never provide grounds for quantitative generalizations: An inductive approach to 
shadowing can from a non-dualist point of view never lead to hypotheses from which future 
events can be deducted. Rather, as a non-dualist I have pursued a methodology of 
hermeneutical abduction: of authentic sensemaking in evolving context.  
 
Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical operation 
which introduces any new idea; for induction does nothing but determine a value, and 
deduction merely evolves the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis. (Peirce 1974a, p. 
106).  
 
Instead of generalization transferability might be a better term. And indeed, I would argue that 
this dissertation might have value outside of the specific case of InSitu Hospital; that my 
findings might be translated and in that sense transferred to other contexts (Czarniawska and 
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Sevón 1996). My empirical findings and analysis cannot be applied analogically to other 
contexts, but to the extent that they seem plausible and illustrative, they provide grounds for 
future understanding of similar situations elsewhere. Thus, my aim is to provide a 
sensemaking instrument; to give rich illustrations and narratives (Geertz 1973) and a 
theoretical apparatus of improvisation that lends itself to the possibility of being translated 
metaphorically into new situations.  
 
From a non-dualistic point of view, improvisation, communication and sensemaking are 
intertwined and general phenomena found anywhere where people meet, although to varying 
degrees. They are traits of what Blumer (1969) labels “the common”. This is in accordance 
with Denzin and Lincoln (2000), who argue that “. . . after Sartre (1981, p.ix) . . . no 
individual case is ever just an individual or a case . . . . Thus to study the particular is to 
study the general” (p. 370). Furthermore, the narratives from the InSitu context might in 
themselves be of a familiar kind that allows for understanding and learning: It is likely that 
other managers in different organizations would recognize many of the typical situations 
described in the analysis. As beautifully summed up by Denzin and Lincoln (2000), I take the 
role of the researcher who “. . . assumes that the readers will be able . . . to generalize 
subjectively from the case in question to their own personal experiences” (p. 370).   
 
The theoretical framework of improvisation as it is developed in this dissertation is not meant 
to be a conclusive contribution to the field. Many other concepts, such as learning, group 
dynamics and complexity theory overlap and provide interesting views, and even 
improvisation itself can be portrayed in other ways than has been done in this thesis. Still, I 
hope the empirical and theoretical insights can provide some openings into improvisation in 
organizing practice as it evolves on an everyday level. And even if future contexts should 
differ considerably from the conditions at InSitu Hospital, this dissertation can at least provide 
some points of departure for creative discussions. At the very least I hope that it can be a 
contribution to a way of talking about organizing that is practically realistic.  
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Concluding remarks 
This dissertation is a study of improvisation in organizing processes, and I go about this study 
by means of a two-step strategy: the first strategy is a theoretical elaboration of organizing as 
improvisation, and the second an empirical study of improvisation in everyday organizing 
practice amongst nine managers in a large Norwegian hospital called InSitu. From a 
hermeneutical, practical philosophical point of view I have derived the following research 
question for this study: “What is the nature of improvisation in everyday organizing practice 
and how does improvisation relate to technical rationality?”  
 
My choice of empirical research design is a logical consequence of the non-dualistic 
philosophy that underpins both the theoretical and empirical study, and I have found 
“qualitative ethnographic social research” (Vidich and Lyman 2000) to be an appropriate 
research strategy. From this strategy I use a method of qualitative shadowing (McDonald 
2005), and in accordance with this my field notes are written within a genre of “narrative 
ethnography” (Tedlock 2000). In order to obtain a good grasp on the managers’ organizing 
reality in terms of both “theory-in-use” and “espoused theory” (Argyris and Schön 1974, 
1996), I compare my observations with in-depth interviews. Using an interview-guide, the 
interviews are a mixture of what Fontana and Frey (2000) call structured and unstructured, in 
which each of the managers engages in exchanges about their typical everyday practice. 
Following McDonald’s (2005) and Fontana and Frey’s (2000) notes on ethnographic research, 
I also conduct frequent informal interviews so as to obtain continual intersubjectivity between 
myself and the managers. Hopefully, the results are exciting reading.  
 
Penetrating, preceding and succeeding the empirical study is a process of hermeneutics from 
which a challenging and rewarding knowledge growth has emerged. The empirical analysis 
would have been of little worth without the preceding and rudimentary theoretical framework, 
but at the same time this framework has been significantly improved by the empirical study. 
Moreover, “hermeneutics” describes the crucial way in which theoretical forehaving has 
guided my perception in the research context and how empirical reflections have refined 
forehaving. For instance, I do not have any illusions that my empirical notes have been, or 
could have been, made in complete isolation. On the contrary, I see the value in having a 
sophisticated forehaving if possible, as long as it is used in an open and explicit manner, 
 172
which involves continuously striving for scrutiny and seeing it in a critical light (Schwandt 
2000).  
 
The most challenging part of the empirical analysis process has been to determine a functional 
level of abstraction: to balance the right amount of abstraction with contextual validation. 
More specifically, as I see the two as inseparable, the challenge has been to find workable 
categories that display epistemological features of improvisation as a general phenomenon 
and at the same time the way improvisation emerges in practice amongst InSitu managers. 
Not only do I recognize that a sharper linguistic apparatus has come out of this; the focus on 
which dimensions of improvisation constitute the most crucial ones has also been provoked 
and renovated as a result. For example, seeing in practice the importance of everyday emotion 
has inspired me to place a much stronger emphasis on corporality and emotion in “The 
improvising man” than originally intended. Likewise, the significance of everyday 
unpredictability has come out as a more important feature, and in a different shape, than I 
expected beforehand: Whereas before the empirical study I regarded unpredictability as a 
somewhat abstract topic, I have now become far more attentive to the smaller facets of 
unpredictability in everyday life, such as a sudden phone call, a hasty movement or a knock 
on the door. As a last example, the theoretical categories of “positive improvisation” and 
“negative improvisation”, the separation between “pure improvisation” and “sufficiently pure 
improvisation”, and the separation between “pure” and “good improvisation” came about as a 
direct result of the empirical analysis (see chapter eight). Hence, “The improvising man” has 
never been a ready-made concept that has merely been put to use in an empirical setting. 
Rather, “The improvising man” has been, and still is, a concept under development, and 
hopefully it can be further embellished through further empirical and theoretical studies. To 
sum up, I think it is safe to say that in my research process theory and empirical data have 
mutually shaped each other. 
 
Working with this thesis has indeed brought afflictions. Mostly because of the solitude 
associated with being very specialized in a deeply complex matter. Along the way I 
sometimes lost faith in whether my work would be of any interest or use, or whether it would 
offer something new to the field. After all, I could not possibly know the result until the work 
was completed. Furthermore, the risk involved in setting out to create an original but still 
coherent and understandable framework of organizing as improvisation has indeed caused 
some sleepless nights and offered many obstacles. These obstacles can be difficult to see 
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when reading the final draft, but the pile of yellow tags, notes on envelopes, in books, on the 
computer, on concert tickets, on the back of supermarket receipts etc. are living proof. 
Dealing with these obstacles has at times made me lose my conception; the meaning of words 
has evaporated and created confusion. And to my astonishment I realize that it is often the 
same sort of problems that recur over and over again: the basic philosophical issues of 
dualism and technical rationality that originally spurred this dissertation.  
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Chapter 7. Introduction to the InSitu manager’s context  
Introduction 
As the first of the empirical chapters, the current chapter gives an introduction to the 
managers included in the study and to the context in which they perform organizing. More 
specifically the study concerns an observation of eight department managers and one section 
manager in everyday practice at a large Norwegian hospital, which I, for purposes of 
anonymity, have called “InSitu”. Before introducing the managers in the next section, 
however, I would like to start off with some theoretical comments which provide grounds for 
the structure I have chosen for the empirical analysis. 
 
Every so often we have the need to make simple models of organizations in order to facilitate 
communication and coordination. For example, we might talk about organizations as if they 
were actual entities without necessarily believing that they are so in the literal sense. To some 
extent we might even become accustomed to over-simplified contemplations on a taken-for-
granted level so that we come to think of organizations as autonomous wholes. Authors like 
Chia (1996) and Weick (2001), however, remind us that organizations are better explained 
through verbs than nouns, implicating that neat categories and simple formulas per definition 
cannot keep up with the flow of everyday organizational events.  
 
Following in Weick’s footsteps, I do not see InSitu Hospital as one organization and I do not 
intend to treat it as one. Neither is it many organizations in one. InSitu can only superficially 
be spoken of in terms of nouns, structures or any other form of entity. It is a living process 
upheld by interacting individuals, each with different needs and wants; individuals who are 
clustered in groups and united around different functions, routines and services, and who 
every day make an effort to make them work. It is from these considerations that chapters 
seven to ten look into those organizing processes that concern InSitu Hospital managers, 
study how they typically evolve in real time, and, later, how this can be related to the concept 
of improvisation. As argued in chapter four, however, improvisation happens in context, and 
for that reason the current chapter is devoted to a study of the actual situation that the manager 
experiences and the way it continuously evolves into new situations. Implicitly, this is a way 
of studying how practical problems typically occur and what their typical nature is like. But 
although it is a study of contextuality, it is a study of verbs rather than nouns.  
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Knowing more about the typical nature of everyday situations for managers can be valuable 
per se, and is the topic for this chapter. In the next instance such knowledge is crucial as a 
basis for understanding how managers typically respond to and enact situations via 
improvisation (chapters eight and nine). For the time being, I shall concentrate on the 
uniqueness of practical contextuality – on how contexts typically emerge into new contexts 
and how this is perceived from the point of view of the manager. Ultimately I hope to be able 
to present an image of typical characteristics of the work situation of an InSitu department 
manager and the challenges associated with it. Such an image is important as a backdrop for 
understanding the nature of the improvisatory processes that take place: As improvisation 
always happens in context, it is my opinion that an empirical study of improvisation should 
build on a rich and colourful representation of that context. It is easier to see why InSitu 
Hospital managers improvise when one knows something about the milieu in which they 
operate.  
 
The structure for my empirical analysis was chosen partly as a didactic device, and it is to 
some extent inspired by Mintzberg’s (1973) “basic distinction” between characteristics and 
content in his classic study of the nature of managerial work. My interpretation of Mintzberg 
is along the same lines as Weick’s (1974), where “characteristics” concerns context and 
typical work flow and “content” concerns what managers actually do. Broadly speaking, then, 
chapter seven is primarily devoted to work characteristics and the three succeeding chapters to 
work content. I would like to emphasize, however, that there is an inextricable tie between 
characteristics and content, as I see them as mutually constitutive aspects of a lived organizing 
experience. Indeed, to use Mintzberg’s vocabulary, from a non-dualistic perspective 
characteristics are created and shaped by content and vice versa. It is therefore my opinion 
that the real value of a study such as mine lies in bringing the two together, which is the 
reason why characteristics of context is thoroughly accentuated in the last three chapters on 
content. Finally, I hold that it is via such a non-dualistic epistemological grip that Mintzberg’s 
seminal work can be challenged and carried further, hopefully providing new insights. 
 
As a last point before moving on to empirical observations and analyses, I would like to 
comment on the form of data presentation I have chosen. As explained in the chapter on 
methodology, I want to give the reader a chance to form his/her own opinions about my 
observations in order to open up for alternative conclusions. Therefore I have chosen to 
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include lengthy narratives in the form of block quotes. The narratives are written from my 
point of view as a shadow of the observed occurrences (McDonald 2005), and I have taken 
the following statement by Tedlock (2000) as my guide to the way they are presented as 
quotes: ”. . . an ethnographer can allow both self and other to appear together within a single 
narrative that carries a multiplicity of dialoguing voices.” (p. 471).  
 
In that sense the narratives are in a way pre-analysed, as I could only focus on what I had 
focused on in situ. The details presented are the details I saw as important in my personal 
observations and continual interviews with the participants: From a non-dualistic viewpoint, 
making observations is inevitably a process of analysis, of grasping the meaning of a situation 
(Schwandt 2000), and thus I have included in the narratives both emerging dialogues and 
personal views on the emerging episodes (Tedlock 2000; Alvesson and Sköldberg 2008). The 
difference between the pre-analyses presented in block quotes, which I prefer to call 
observations, and the succeeding theoretical analyses is the time at which they were produced. 
More specifically, almost two years passed between the writing of the data in the block quotes 
and the creation of the succeeding analyses, and by that time I had managed to acquire more 
of an outsider’s perspective. As this time lapse have provided some distance to the data, it has, 
in my view, helped in making me capable of conducting good analyses; a process which was 
further facilitated by an extensive N’VIVO analysis conducted in the period between the 
observation phase and the final analysis.  
 
The block quotes are a result of my trying to write down occurrences as they happened, 
minimizing the use of theoretical abstractions to the greatest extent possible. The succeeding 
(post-)analysis represents a diametrically opposite approach. It is an attempt to find 
recurrences in the data in terms of the emerging framework of improvisation. And through 
analysing the data, of which only a selection ended up in the dissertation as block 
quotes, ”The improvising man” took form in a much deeper and more contextualized way 
than before. So why have I chosen to include those particular block quotes that are found in 
the succeeding chapters? As explained in chapter six on methodology, the empirical analysis 
emerged as an iterative process of identifying topics that seemed to be of interest from an 
improvisatory angle. Keeping complexity and improvisation in mind, I looked for recurrent 
issues that could deepen the framework of “The improvising man” and enlighten me about the 
typical form taken by complexity as improvisation in the practical context of InSitu managers. 
In this process of reflecting on and analysing the data the following phenomena came to the 
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surface: Problem definition, ambiguity, vagueness, clustering of events, unpredictability, 
emotionality and emergence (presented in this chapter). I also arrived at the insight that I 
should separate between positive and negative improvisation, between pure and good 
improvisation, and between pure and sufficiently pure improvisation, so as to facilitate 
communication about the essence of improvisation in the everyday setting of InSitu managers 
(chapters eight and nine). Finally, I gained some intriguing insights about the functionality of 
technical rationality in organizing practice. Above all, I found good examples of how 
technical rationality and improvisation can be woven together and involve each other in 
organizing processes, and of how functionality is a matter of perspective (chapter ten). The 
block quotes presented in the following chapters are included because I see them as central to 
my developing these findings, and because they are representative of these findings.     
 
As explained, many new concepts and insights emerged from the empirical analysis and were 
integrated into the framework of “The improvising man”. Many of these are aspects are 
missing in the original literature on improvisation, as well as in my early reflections upon this 
literature. These new aspects, concepts and insights are therefore of a very different character 
from those in the block quotes, just as the analysis made some two years after the observation 
phase is of a very different character from the pre-analyses included in the block quotes. 
Although developed from empirical analyses, they are consistent with the emerging 
framework of “The improvising man” and have contributed to a deepening and specification 
of this theoretical framework for practical purposes. In that sense they are explicit bonds 
between theory and empirical data: they are categories and phenomena that have 
hermeneutically come out of both theoretical studies and empirical analyses and which tie 
these together (see model 6.0). 
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Getting to know the managers 
Confidentiality 
In order to get admittance to the managers included in the study I have had to promise them 
full confidentiality. In the following presentations the names of the particular departments are 
therefore kept anonymous and the names of the managers are changed. The rest of the details 
listed are correct, including the managers’ gender. In general I have tried to give as much 
detail as possible without violating the important ethical contract that was negotiated between 
myself and the managers. 
Camilla 
Camilla runs a [Confidential] department, and had years of experience from nursing before 
becoming departmental manager. She is a highly alert and attentive woman; one of 
professional commitment and dedication. Her ambition is to develop the ward and improve its 
services on a continual basis. In her own words: 
 
With regard to personnel, we are still growing. But we need to grow even more. Both with 
regard to the number of heads and…yes. We shall grow in every way; specialists, research, 
general competence . . . . Now we have the equivalent of one hundred full time positions, but 
we shall continue to grow until we reach a total number of 120, at which point we are as big as 
Ward 2. But still we will probably be smaller than most departments within the somatic division.  
 
On several occasions during my stay with her, Camilla expressed a genuine will to develop 
her organization and continue to raise the level of professionalism. In general, she displays an 
active and inquisitive behaviour, and seems to be constantly searching for ways to improve 
the way things are done. She expresses a sense of hardly ever being utterly satisfied, and tries 
to change routines and structures whenever she feels that it is necessary to do so. And even if 
such is out of her immediate and formal jurisdiction, she is not afraid to let colleagues and 
superiors know her point of view.  
 
As a general observation, Camilla gives me the impression that she is not very subtle in her 
daily contact with colleagues. She does not keep her frustrations to herself, but addresses 
difficult issues directly and confronts colleagues when she considers it appropriate. Her need 
to change routines has little to do with making changes for the sake of making changes, 
however, but are attempts to improve and secure functionality so as to make things work as 
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they are supposed to or even better. In the process of improving departmental services, 
Camilla feels very isolated from the other department managers, both within the psychiatric 
and the somatic division. This issue is a cause of much frustration for her, and it seems that 
the lack of positive attention from central authorities makes her feel somewhat unimportant. 
She does not feel that she belongs to a functional community of practice, and sees great 
potential in bringing DMs together by integrating the somatic and psychiatric services, thus 
facilitating mutual learning and development.   
George 
George is one of the most experienced department managers at InSitu Hospital. George is 
specialized within [Confidential] and runs the Department of [Confidential], which covers a 
wide range of different services.   
 
I am definitely not an expert in all the different disciplines that I am responsible for as manager, 
but still I have (at least) touched upon all the different areas of expertise. I know very well what 
is going on and where. I have a good general understanding and I am capable at laying hold 
of the right things. 
 
George became a departmental manager four and a half years ago after years of working as a 
clinical physician. While holding down his position as departmental manager, however, he 
also continues to practice medicine. This is important to George, in order not to lose contact 
with his profession and to maintain his medical skills. Being very experienced, he recognizes 
a lot of recurrences in the way the hospital has been and is currently organized, and he is not 
afraid to speak his mind about how things could be handled differently. Amongst his biggest 
worries is the more or less constant overbooking, which results in his department’s corridors 
filling up with patients. He finds this unworthy and disturbing, and sees it as a consequence of 
bad financial prioritizing from the central authorities. 
 
On the whole, many of George’s comments about his work situation are of a political nature, 
and he is often explicit in his criticism of central authorities and the way reforms seem to be 
forced upon the organization. In his criticisms he sometimes seems tired and bitter, as if the 
managerial part of his work is a non-stop process of dealing with stupidities, unrealistic 
pressure from central authorities and financial impossibilities. Behind the critically reflective 
and grave surface, however, I have found a subtle humorous side; a sense of irony that 
somehow sets him apart from the gravity of everyday challenges.  
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John 
John is the manager of InSitu’s [Confidential] Clinic. Having a background in paediatrics, one 
of the first things that stands out about John is his kindness and concern. He seems almost 
completely at ease; there is a certain calmness surrounding his presence. John is the kind of 
person who is both sharing and interested in others. As he is a rather outgoing person, what 
you see is what you get. This makes it easy to relax around him. He often speaks about not 
letting the demands of everyday work get to him, as if he is continually walking around 
telling himself: Do not worry; it is only work, why become agitated?  
 
Why do I come to work in the morning? Because I'd like to contribute to giving patients the 
best possible treatment in the country within our budgets. In addition research is important, of 
course, given the money we have at our disposal. My staff come in as a second priority. First 
priority is the patient . . . . The staff are merely a tool. But I must treat them well, as badly oiled 
equipment tends not to work too well. 
 
John does not seem particularly stressed, but he sometimes complains about lacking time to 
do what is on his agenda. He speaks vividly of his pragmatist heart and the importance of not 
letting systemic reality get to you. Judging by the relaxed and positive atmosphere in his 
department, as well as his distinctive way of behaving, this pragmatist idea amounts to more 
than words. It seems to be the way John is. He finds loopholes and solves problems, and 
stretches far to get want he wants. Although being very determined in his quest to build his 
organization, he does not seem ruthless or insensitive to others. His concern for his colleagues, 
however, has a ring of professionalism, and it is hard to determine how deep it goes. 
Howard 
Howard is the manager of InSitu’s Department of [Confidential]. Like Camilla, George and 
John, Howard is a deeply devoted manager professionally. His everyday style is, however, 
slightly more authoritative without being insensitive. He, too, is pragmatic and creative in 
solving problems.  
 
I am not a very bureaucratic person. Rather, I am motivated by achieving results, which is not 
always an easy undertaking. I am not concerned with which rule or method I am going to 
follow in order to get things done. But it all depends on what kind of boss I have got, and our 
present director is certainly not very preoccupied with bureaucratic thinking. Before last 
summer I just got the key to the office and the words: “The job is yours”. No job description or 
anything. In that way it was all very informal. Either you manage or you don’t. And if you don’t 
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you should find something else to do. I certainly did not take this job because I so wanted to 
become a manager, to put it that way. The most important thing is to get the best possible 
result from the financial means we have got for patient treatment - the best possible treatment. 
And to make this predictable in terms of finances. But also to create as good a working 
environment as possible in order to make people want to stay here. 
 
According to his own account, Howard is concerned about the wellbeing of his employees, 
but is not afraid of taking a strict line if he deems it necessary. Likewise, he is not afraid to 
confront central management or whoever threatens his department’s interests. Howard strikes 
me as a bold and open-minded man. He is willing to try things out before he makes a decision. 
And he is a man of professional pride. During my stay, the professional pride was particularly 
evident, and I had the impression that it sometimes gets in the way of caring and empathy. 
There were a few running conflicts at the time of study, related to an ongoing restructuring of 
his department, and some employees had quite explicit emotional reactions to this process and 
to Howard’s somewhat strict management style. These reactions, however, seemed to matter 
less to Howard than his professional focus on organizing.  
Chris 
Before I came to visit Chris, the manager of the Department of [Confidential], the signals 
from central authorities were that he runs one of the best organized departments. The word 
was that Chris was on of the most successful department managers in terms of planning and 
efficiency, as if his department was a well-oiled machinery with highly predictable patterns. 
To see Chris in action, then, as a brilliant on-the-spot improvisor, as someone who puts action 
before plan, initially came as a surprise. I expected someone calmer, perhaps a bit slower, 
someone who emphasises thinking before acting, but what I saw was a manager who acted on 
the spot, and made plans work in context. According to central management the result is a 
well-run department, but the way this comes about seems to me to be different from the 
signals I was given initially. 
 
Chris gives the impression that he is a highly structured, reserved and down-to-earth type of 
person, with a high level of commitment to his work. But his speed is tremendous. His way of 
talking is efficient, swift and to the point. No time for beating around the bush. Chris’ 
movements are rapid and goal-directed, and quite often he saves time by talking while doing 
something else. Things that can be done today are not postponed until tomorrow. Time should 
be used wisely, not wasted. Every second is exploited for something productive. Every action 
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has a thought-through purpose, or at least so it may seem. To an outsider this gives the 
impression that Chris is stressed and chaotic, but Chris seems to worship the high speed and 
variation:  
 
I am truly a skilled juggler, and this is exactly what makes this job interesting. The variation is 
tremendous between intense drama in one moment and hectic meeting in the next. 
 
Chris is indeed a busy guy. He is constantly “switched on” so to speak, and together with his 
concentration on whatever object craves his attention, this might create a somewhat humorous 
image. For example, at one point during my visit Chris’ swift movements and shifting focus, 
combined with a high-pitched voice, invoked laughter from one of his secretaries observing 
him from a distance.  
 
According to him, Chris is dedicated to the moment – to making the best of it, to exploiting it 
in terms of higher achievements and improved quality. He rarely seems to miss an 
opportunity to make things better, to increase understanding or to simply get in touch with 
reality and provide care for his employees. Although he is not the kind of person who wastes 
his words, he does not use them so scarcely that he fails to be understood either. All that 
needs to be said is said, and sometimes even more. In addition, he has a strong loyalty to his 
department and his employees. Chris and his head nurse make a good team, and they put a lot 
of effort into making the department autonomous and self-reliant. During my stay, 
interference from central authorities was met with scepticism, and it was clear that Chris does 
not want to be disturbed by unnecessary bureaucracy or by central attempts at control.    
Elisabeth 
Elisabeth is the head of a [Confidential] department. She lacks, however, [Confidential] 
medical training as she is a qualified radiologist. Her job as a department manager is 
temporary and related to a major departmental restructuring-process: it is her responsibility to 
survey and facilitate this process. Therefore, Elisabeth does not think that her medical 
background is of significance to the same extent as her personal capacities and general 
leadership qualities. Elisabeth immediately strikes me as a strong and ambitious woman. She 
is dedicated to her work and genuinely interested in finding ways to improve herself. 
Moreover, she is a highly outgoing person. What you see is what you get, and she takes pride 
in calling herself an extrovert. She holds that the ability to communicate with other people is 
at the very heart of being a leader. Indeed, the split between extrovert and introvert is one she 
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uses extensively herself to make sense of social relations: of why they work and why they do 
not always work.  
 
My knowledge about people is based on the way they handle practical cases, on the way they 
behave. I read a lot from what other people do. I form an impression of people from spending 
time with them. 
 
The first time you meet Elisabeth chances are high that you will be met with a firm handshake 
and a large genuine smile. You can tell that she loves working with people, and that she 
strives for the down-to-earth genuine in her inter-human relations. In addition, she is quite a 
supporter of structure, and she does not tolerate much disarray in her administration. 
Structures are supposed to be simple and predictable, so as to make systems work. This is 
reflected in the way she talks and in her choice of language. She seems to spend a lot of 
energy on making herself understood in simple ways. There is certainly no attempt at 
snobbery or pretentiousness in Elisabeth’s dealing with the surrounding world. On the flip 
side, however, Elisabeth can at times appear quite blunt, and her strong extroversion 
sometimes leaves me with a sense that she feels insecure. As a consequence, it seems to me 
that her desire to be understood is at times outweighed by somewhat insensitive gestures 
seeking to confirm her capability as a leader; insensitive in the sense that her actions are 
sometimes more about proving her own competence than connecting to others. As a last 
observation it also seems to me that her obsession with extroversion and its social significance 
is partly a way of affirming her own personality and partly her leadership qualities – both in 
relation to me as a researcher and in relation to her employees. I do not know to what degree 
this is a consequence of her temporary role as a “restructurer”, or of a more permanent 
character trait.  
 
During my stay I sensed a lot of conflict between Elisabeth and her closest subordinates, and 
she revealed early on that she did not know how to connect with her introvert office manager. 
What made her job especially difficult was the fact that she was only temporarily hired to fill 
the position of DM for two years, until the restructuring was finished. She expressed a fear 
that this temporary role made her unpopular from the start, but she was determined to do her 
job and in her own mind she was a perfect candidate for it.     
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Karina 
Karina manages the Department of [Confidential]. Like Chris, Karina seems to be constantly 
“switched on”. She says that she is dependent upon this; on maintaining a “hands on 
approach” and on understanding what is going on in her organization.  
 
. . . it is very useful to get down there and see where the shoe pinches. Then I am able to see 
in practice how things relate to each other. I see it as free contact with the staff. I am very 
much the visible manager, and I like to be so. This is important to me, because it enables me 
to hear what people would not tell me otherwise . . . . In general, though, I haven’t got enough 
time . . . . But I want to be present, want to be where it happens.  
 
It is important for Karina to maintain and improve her medical skills, and she has not given up 
working as a physician even if she has become department manager. Seeing that she can make 
a difference for patients seems to be a significant motivator to her, and she is determined not 
to let her managerial position weaken her medical skills. From her reflections on her own 
work situation I am left with an impression that Karina sees herself in an impossible situation 
of being both a good doctor and a good leader, and that she does not have the conscience to 
perform either role half-heartedly. In addition it seems to be important to her to get 
recognition and respect from others as to her medical and managerial capabilities.    
 
On some occasions Karina seems to speak more than she listens, but her deeply felt 
devotedness to the wellbeing of her employees is evident. Karina’s movements are on the 
whole swift and sometimes even a bit clumsy. On several occasions during my visit she 
dropped things on the floor, spilled coffee and the like. She does not seem to be nervous, 
though, but quite stressed and tense. Instead of walking leisurely, she has a style of half-
running, which sometimes strikes me as involuntarily comical. My impression is that her 
intention of logging on to social situations, of being improspective and empathetic, is 
somewhat contradicted by her impatient body language. It is as if she constantly wants to do 
more than is practically possible, and be in many places at once. 
Peter 
Peter runs the Department of [Confidential]. He seems to be very close to a real life 
counterpart of Donald Schön’s (1991) notion of “reflective practitioner”. Through the way he 
talks about his work it is obvious that he has put down a lot of energy in finding out what 
works and what does not.  
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I have been here since 198x, and when I took this position I knew the organization well. I knew 
a lot about where the shoe was pinching, and it soon became clear to me how this could be 
organized differently. Then I decided on a solution. And as I have little formal education within 
management, I based it on things I have learned and observed along the way. 
 
Peter has clear opinions which he communicates out to colleagues, and with a calm and 
pragmatic attitude he puts his opinions into practice. In his own words he regards structures as 
tools more than as control mechanisms. Peter is a man of vision, and is regarded as being 
ahead of many of the challenges that InSitu is facing. Another feature that strikes me about 
Peter is a certain “coolness” in his attitude towards work. It is as if he makes it a point to 
enjoy work, and to not let harsh realities get close enough to become emotionally intolerable. 
 
Peter is explicit in his worries that he may not be very popular amongst his subordinates. For 
example, he has stopped having lunch with his colleagues, as he clearly remembers what used 
to be the topic around the lunch-table before he became head of [Confidential]: the DM. This 
does not seem to bother him much, however, as he realizes that an important part of his job is 
to make decisions that are not always popular. He has an ongoing project of making his 
section managers more financially responsible, and as in some ways this contradicts medical 
concerns, the process has not been a smooth or easy one so far. Still, he is determined to 
succeed, and willing to meet the resistance that comes with it.   
Thomas  
As the manager of a [Confidential] section, Thomas is the only section level manager 
included in the study. (The section level is positioned beneath the department level.) As is true 
for most of the managers in the study, Thomas is a pragmatist. Furthermore, he is not afraid to 
admit any faults that he makes, and he is deeply caring and devoted to the task of creating a 
well-functioning as well as content organization. In addition to learning from others, Thomas 
has a predilection for making the organization learn from itself.  
 
It isn’t possible to think through in advance every single detail of how something will work in an 
organization. Things will always appear that expand our experience, after which we can make 
an assessment. Continual assessment provides a potential for improvement.  
 
Even in chaotic times Thomas manages to keep a cool head and to focus on the goal, but not 
without consideration for the wellbeing of his employees. The way he sees his role as a 
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section manager, however, is not as a clear-cut matter, but rather as a continual negotiation 
between contradicting demands. Working in a psychiatric milieu, surrounded by nurses and 
doctors who are all professionally concerned with psychiatric issues, is something Thomas 
sees as a great challenge. Amongst his colleagues there is much focus on emotions and caring, 
and in that regard he sometimes feels that it is difficult to operate as a manager. This is why 
he is determined not to pursue a career of hierarchical climbing: 
 
I could not imagine being higher up in the hierarchy than this.  But, of course, to be here is 
very much a conflict in itself: I am dependent on information from my staff, but simultaneously I 
take orders from above. 
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Characteristics of the InSitu Hospital management context 
Stories of complexity - an introduction 
In the following we will become acquainted with a number of characteristic traits of everyday 
contextuality for InSitu managers. The identification of these traits is the result of an 
extensive analysis of my empirical data, and what they all have in common is that they 
highlight everyday features through the lenses of improvisational organizing theory as I have 
presented it in chapters four and five. The traits are not meant as an attempt to provide an 
exhaustive list, but are chosen on the basis of the relatively large space they occupy in 
everyday practice. As such they stand out as especially important features of a complex 
everyday tale of InSitu managers that it is impossible to relate in full detail. At the end of each 
section follows a short analysis discussing major features of each trait. Towards the end of the 
chapter the traits are summarized, analysed and discussed on a higher level of abstraction, and 
here the phenomenon of “emergence” provides an essential analytical instrument. In the 
following, my point is to do the opposite of whatever managers do when they struggle to 
eliminate everyday complexity; namely to illuminate the complexity of everyday practice. 
Trait # 1: Open-ended problems 
This opening section is meant as an introduction to the different forms of complexity which I 
have found in the InSitu context. This section deals with a phenomenon that characterizes 
most of my observations of InSitu managers – that on a deep level, organizing is about 
identifying and making sense of problems with no given solution. It is more about defining 
problems than solving technical problems (Schön 1991; Weick et al. 2005; Purser and 
Petranker 2005). I start with the question: What is a typical workday like for a department 
manager at InSitu Hospital? Is it largely predictable and ordered or quite the opposite, or 
perhaps somewhere in between? Can one in simplified terms sort out categories that still 
match the myriad of evolving events and the details of practical contextuality? In an attempt 
to give an answer, the following extract from my observations of George provides an 
appropriate introduction. As a background for this story, George is talking on the phone when 
I knock on his office-door at 0935 in the morning. Still he welcomes me in, and ends his 
conversation as I hang up my jacket and take out my laptop. I overhear, however, that George 
has just had to let one of his section nurses go; something that was discussed in a closed 
meeting the day before to which George denied me access for the sake of confidentiality. 
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Unfortunately, I do not have many details about this particular case, only what George tells 
me in the following quote.  
 
[The remaining part of the day, George is scheduled for operation duty. He calls the ward to 
find out if they are ready, which they are. As George is putting on his coat, I ask him if he sees 
any similarities between the two jobs or roles that he occupies; the medical and the 
managerial.]  
- There are no objective answers in the managerial area, George says.  
[He is interrupted by someone knocking on his door. A physician enters.] 
- Can you participate in a meeting later this afternoon? the physician asks.  
- Yes, I can, says George.  
[They go through some of the urgent matters that are up for discussion: how the laboratory 
should be organized.]  
- We need to reconsider how to do this. But I guess this is a lost case. The director said it 
would be reconsidered as soon as the laboratory centre is ready, George explains to him.  
[The two of them continue discussing this issue for a little while, and soon they agree on a 
status for the matter. And being as it is, they decide to postpone the meeting that was 
supposed to take place later this afternoon. They agree that there is no purpose in having a 
planning session as long as the matter to be planned for is not yet settled. Then the physician 
leaves and George picks up where he left off earlier.]  
- There are objective criteria, international guidelines, for what is wrong and right within 
medicine. You always risk making the wrong diagnosis. This is certainly not the case in 
leadership. When, for instance, I had to let one of my employees go earlier today, I wonder: 
did I do the right thing? I certainly created problems for myself. I could easily have let the issue 
flow, but then the ward would slowly have degraded out of discontent, lack of professional 
development etc. And it is up to history alone to decide if I have done the right thing or made 
the right decision. 
[George takes a deep breath and continues.] 
- The similarity is that I often have to make up my mind on impulse. And I always have people 
I can ask for input. I never make decisions from a basis solely of my own making. So, I guess 
both of them are somewhat improvisatory. I can’t walk around thinking about things for weeks. 
Then I risk going nuts myself as well as making the social environment surrounding me go 
nuts. The problem occurs when an illness is diagnosed, but the patient is still in pain. One 
does not always find a workable diagnosis, for example when there are mental issues involved. 
[George is interrupted by his pager going off. It is a signal saying his patient is ready.] 
 
The episode starts off with George sharing with us some reflections based on his own 
experience. Notice that he is talking about the lack of objectivity in leadership as he is 
suddenly interrupted by a colleague who comes by to ask if George will attend a meeting later, 
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which he confirms that he will. After a short conversation, however, they decide to postpone 
the meeting altogether. In this relatively short amount of time, then, a great many possible 
futures have been singled out, only to be discarded the next moment. How much of this could 
have been predicted? How much could have been disclosed by objective analysis?  
“There are no objective answers in the managerial area . . . it is up to history alone to decide if 
I have done the right thing or made the right decision”, George says, indicating the 
fundamental complexity he experiences as a manager. George’s arguments are strongly 
supported by practical philosophy. According to “The improvising man” there are no 
objective answers in organizing, and organizational contexts always differ from each other in 
some respect. There are no objectively clear paths to walk down, and no certainty as such 
guiding management practice. Even in George’s medical practice, though being strongly 
guided by tools of diagnosis, it happens every so often that a patient is still in pain after 
having been diagnosed. The key word here is certainty; there is none. Or is there?  
 
From a non-dualist standpoint this dissertation argues that there is a difference between 
objective certainty and practical certainty. Whereas the former might be a somewhat mythical 
and non-realistic concept, we shall in the following devote our attention to the latter. More 
specifically, we shall see how practical certainty comes about as a continual achievement, and 
that getting there is sometimes more and sometimes less troublesome. It all depends on the 
degree of complexity in the situation at hand, and the manner in which this appears is the 
topic for this chapter. In the following, special attention should therefore be paid to the 
genuine open-endedness of the problems that occur: Rather than choosing between 
alternatives, picking from given solutions and making decisions, it seems that everyday 
complexity manifests itself in terms of the many different occasions of defining problems – of 
establishing sense and predictability (Weick 1995).     
Trait # 2: Ambiguity and vagueness  
Department managers at InSitu Hospital spend most of their working hours interacting with 
other people. The process of social interaction implies a pursuit of mutual understanding and 
is permeated by obstacles and difficulties, ambiguity and vagueness. My analysis of 
ambiguity borrows from Weick’s (1995) elaborate account, where he defines ambiguity as 
“. . . an ongoing stream that supports several different interpretations at the same time” (pp. 
91-92). “Vagueness” is understood along the lines of uncertainty, of confusion and ignorance 
as to what a situation means (Weick 1995). In the following, however, ambiguity and 
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vagueness will be seen as mutually complementary and at times united terms under the 
heading: “what does this situation mean?”  
 
Miscommunication happens and it happens a lot more than is generally appreciated. And as to 
an increasing degree InSitu is for example becoming multicultural, effort must be invested in 
securing intersubjectivity. The challenges of making oneself understood are illustrated by the 
following episode where we meet department manager Peter in a conversation with Yin, a 
visiting professor and colleague from China. Leading up to the meeting are recent 
circumstances that have forced both Yin and his wife, who works together with him, to give 
up their research positions in Howard’s department. As a consequence, Yin and his wife are 
now looking for new solutions to how they might continue with their research at InSitu 
Hospital, and in particular, they are looking for a new laboratory. It is a priority for Yin and 
his wife to stay close to clinical practice and to contribute to that practice if possible, and they 
are eager to find a way to continue their work at InSitu Hospital. Peter thinks he might be able 
to work something out that will enable them to do so, and has invited Yin over for a meeting 
to see if they might come to an agreement about joining Peter’s department, and thus turn this 
into a situation that can be solved to the advantage of both parties. From the very beginning of 
the meeting, however, Yin and Peter seem to be pursuing different conversational topics. For 
example, Yin is eager to explain his ambitions and to justify the practical value of his research, 
whereas Peter is equally eager to get right down to business and find a practical way to 
organize for future collaboration. The result is a somewhat incoherent and strange 
conversation in which miscommunication seems to play a central role, although it is not 
always easy to see exactly why they misunderstand each other. One reason may be that they 
have different native languages, Yin being a native Chinese speaker and Peter Norwegian. 
The conversation is conducted in English, however, a language both seem to master very well.   
 
[Yin and Peter sit down around the coffee table and Yin starts to explain the background for 
today’s situation with him and his wife having to leave Howard’s department. Yin emphasizes 
how his work makes a positive contribution to the hospital’s clinical operation and that his 
primary goal is precisely to make such a contribution. Having explained this, Yin seems to 
notice that Peter does not quite catch his point: He simply stares at Yin with wondering eyes, 
as if he does not understand where Yin is going with this. But instead of moving on to more 
practical details, Yin repeats more or less the same message all over again; and then again, 
only to be followed by a moment of silence where none of the two says anything. They merely 
stare at each other, seemingly anticipating what the other will say or do.]  
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[As the conversation moves on there seems to be quite a communicational barrier between 
the two, and the conversation is repeatedly interrupted by misunderstandings.]  
- I think one should make a distinction here, between geographical laboratory for research and 
a position for you and your wife, Peter says. - I think the university should find a laboratory for 
you, and that it is actually their responsibility to do so.  
- Yes, I agree, Yin says.  
- I, however, do not have the funding to pay for your research.  
[Yin seems again to be misunderstanding Peter’s message, and appears to become a bit 
impatient.]  
- What do you mean? Yin asks bluntly. 
- I do not have available space, Peter explains.  
- OK, but the crucial point here is to maintain close contact with the hospital. Money and space 
can always be arranged externally. What is important to me is to maintain close contact with 
clinicians. My ambition is to contribute to the hospital’s positive development, Yin explains for 
the fourth time.  
- Yes, and I totally agree with your philosophy on upholding cooperation between researchers 
and clinicians. So how can we assist your research group until the new hospital is ready? 
Peter asks, but continues without waiting for an answer: - I could offer you a position as a part 
time physicist at the department? 
- I am grateful for that, but there is also my wife to consider, you know.  
[Without going into the details of the possibility of a position in Peter’s department, Yin repeats 
for the fifth time that his goal is to contribute to the hospital’s progress.]  
- I want to give something back to the hospital, he explains. 
[. . . Peter turns to Yin again] 
- But if we do this I expect you to help us bringing forward Ph.D. students. 
- Oh, but this merely makes me feel at home here, Yin says, obviously relieved. 
- Excellent, but don’t forget what I said about the importance of learning how to speak 
Norwegian in everyday conversations. Yin nods his head to signal his approval. Then they 
repeat the details of their settlement once more. And as soon as they have arrived at a 
solution they are both happy with, they repeat how they agree with each other with regard to 
the philosophy of keeping research and praxis close to each other.  
-  But I fear that the hospital’s central management is not at all interested in my research group, 
Yin utters.  
- No, you have got it all the wrong way, Peter explains. – This is more like a principle ruling 
stating that the hospital cannot hire full time researchers. And concerning your wife, you 
should try to find a position at the university, and to pay her salary via the university. 
- The university college has also shown interest, Yin informs. 
-  Yes, but the university is better!  
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This episode indicates that misunderstanding can be a vibrant indicator of the ambiguity and 
vagueness accompanying some sensemaking processes. Peter and Yin brought with them 
different perspectives into the conversation and as a consequence they saw different problems. 
The one could not understand where the other was going, and this seemed to cause a spiral of 
miscommunication. Firstly, as Yin felt that his work was not appreciated by the hospital’s 
management, he repeatedly justified the importance of his work to Peter; but as it were, Peter 
was already convinced. Instead of getting right down to practicalities, which seemed to be 
what Peter wanted, then, much time was spent at finding out what they were in fact discussing. 
Likewise, when Peter told Yin that he had neither the space nor the funding to support his 
research, Yin had a problem seeing what Peter really wanted. Still, after quite a bit of 
negotiation over meaning, they understood each other sufficiently so as to come up with a 
solution that both of them could live with and hopefully thrive on. In this case, then, the 
degree of miscommunication seemed to accompany the problem’s degree of complexity: 
Since a shared definition of a problem had to be defined, and this problem had to be identified 
outside of predefined parameters, neither of the two had a clear vision of what it was going to 
be. Both Peter and Yin had their own perspectives, needs and resources, and until they were 
able to find some common ground they were less able to communicate well.   
 
One way to see misunderstanding is that it amounts to missing the intention of another human 
being, either directly in a social situation or through the (mis)interpretation of linguistic 
artefacts (Strauss 1993). As a consequence, meaning is lost. Directly or indirectly to 
misunderstand implies being unable to comprehend another person’s actions, and it often 
brings about a process of recreating intersubjective sense. When misunderstanding occurs it 
becomes difficult to build up a sphere of intersubjectivity in which to make sense of each 
other’s gestures. And as meaning is lost, complexity takes its place. The following episode 
involving Thomas (section manager) is quite instructive in that regard. As it happens, an OD 
process his section is currently undergoing has just been brought to a halt, and as a 
consequence a general meeting is summoned. Lack of information and vague communication 
has been hampering the OD process for a long time, and as a triggering incident leading up to 
the general meeting Thomas recently made a clumsy remark which was taken up the wrong 
way by his section. Thomas had thought that his role was to come up with ideas for the future 
and suggest new organizational structures, but he did not realize that his suggestions could be 
understood literally – as if his ideas were orders to be followed rather than creative points of 
departure for further discussions. When presenting his ideas to his section, however, the 
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section believed that a decision had been made to close down for good the outdoors group, a 
central part of the section. What the section saw as an insensitive top-down order with major 
consequences for the organization resulted in much commotion which ultimately reached 
Thomas and his fellow members of the management group. Consequently, they decided to 
hold a general meeting a few days later. In the extract below, Thomas reflects on the latest 
occurrences in an interview conducted three days after the general meeting.  
 
Thomas, SM: - In the beginning it is hard to grasp that you are misunderstood. Then it is hard 
to grasp that what I said could actually be misunderstood. I am sorry if something is perceived 
incorrectly, but for me it is important to move on with things. There is always something to be 
learned, especially here where we work with reactions and emotions. 
 
The consequences of this specific misunderstanding were quite serious. The whole section 
was more or less in chaos after Thomas’s inept utterance. And Thomas was taken by surprise 
by the gravity of it all: how could a few innocent words have such large and devastating 
implications? However self-critical Thomas appears to be, though, he is not the only manager 
to be guilty of having produced ambiguous signals at some time or other. In fact, it might be 
an advantage for Thomas that he gained the knowledge that he can in fact be vague on 
occasions.  
 
As explained, the misunderstanding Thomas caused occurred in the middle of a hectic OD 
process. And perhaps due to the fact that the process produced exceptional circumstances with 
a relative lack of structure, issues of profound vagueness and ambiguity became more visible 
than they might have been under normal circumstances. In a situation where people sought 
predictability they got the opposite, and it was not all because of Thomas. Rather, the staff 
complained about the process having been somewhat secretive and vague all along, upon 
which Thomas’s misunderstood statement came as a triggering factor. As a consequence, the 
general meeting was summoned in order to re-create trust and order, and for the management 
group Thomas was part of, a major point was to give an account of their original intentions. 
The multiple misunderstandings and bad communication had to be corrected. The report 
below is from the general meeting. Sharon, a psychiatrist and a management group member, 
is trying her best to sort things out but is met with severe criticism. 
 
Sharon: - Our intention is crystal clear: The outdoors group is to remain. But I am afraid this 
will sound like some conspiracy theory, because some things have to be put on ice.  
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Thomas: - I didn’t have the outdoors group in mind at all. I certainly did not close down the 
outdoors group or anything. This is clearly a misunderstanding of what I said. My aim was 
merely to inform about the new groups.  
Woman A: - We didn’t understand whether it was put on ice or not. It was very vague and 
incredibly difficult. And the answers were many and disperse. We did not know where to refer 
patients. An immense ambiguity! 
Woman D: - I think this is a highly radical re-organizing process. Surely we need to use a lot of 
time to digest this and do things right. I don’t think the staff have suspicions of some 
conspiracy or anything, but we do miss good leadership. We miss a place to consult about our 
issues, someone to talk to. And we would like a clear plan with concrete measures and a time-
schedule to go with it.  
 
The point here is not to focus on the chaos or the apparent lack of structure that seem to have 
characterized this OD process in particular; rather, it is to notice how Sharon’s and the 
management group’s intention, which according to her are “crystal clear”, still ended up being 
perceived differently in practice. A lot may have to do with the words used at the time, and 
indeed, the episode indicates that words in themselves are not enough to communicate 
meaning, but the interpretations that manifested themselves in the organization were probably 
a function of expectations, fear, body language and other situational factors. From the 
perspective of “The improvising man” these factors are not mere variables in a given equation, 
but probable aspects of social interaction emerging on both conscious and subliminal levels. It 
is interesting, however, to see how decisive Sharon is in claiming to have had a clear intention, 
and how this intention still was received differently. We cannot hope to be able to disclose 
exactly why this happened, and neither is this the point. We can, however, view this episode 
as an example of the ambiguity that dwells in verbal interaction. 
 
The following is an excerpt from a staff meeting in Camilla’s department, in which confusion 
soon arises concerning the meaning of government terminology used in a newly arrived 
directive.  
 
[Two minutes later Camilla formally opens the meeting. She raises her voice and takes a 
somewhat authoritative role. Everybody listens as Camilla goes through the agenda. As 
anticipated, today’s main topic concerns the very same document the attendants have already 
spent some 20 minutes discussing. The document is a decree from the Department of Health, 
and instructs Camilla’s organization to change some of their routines. And for today’s meeting 
amongst the most important posts on the agenda (to be discussed) is precisely how to define 
and understand the decree. The orders that are given by the Department do not seem to be 
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self-evident with regard to their meaning and intention, since Camilla has decided that they 
must sit down and discuss what the decree means to them in their situation; how they should 
interpret its different parts; and how it should affect their everyday routines.   
 
As the meeting proceeds, people alternate between negotiating, proposing, bickering with and 
informing each other. Whereas some emphasize points of vagueness in the decree, others, 
trying to make sense of those ambiguities, propose viable interpretations. In this process, 
there is one way of beginning sentences that stands out as frequently used: “I think”.]  
 
This meeting is representative of all of the managers and the multiplicity of meetings that took 
place during the research period in that it signifies the typical unpredictability and ambiguity 
of unfolding social interaction. Furthermore, this episode shows how lack of textual clarity 
can cause quite intense processes of interpretation and clarification. Most of everyday practice 
depends on the use of language signs, and this episode indicates the vagueness in which 
language is embedded and the danger of treating language as self-explanatory. There is 
always some degree of ambiguity underpinning linguistic systems, and typically, much effort 
goes into interpreting and making sense of these ambiguities.  
 
The managers at InSitu are not constantly involved in real time interactive processes.  
Administration and paperwork comprise a significant part of everyday work. However simple 
and routine-like this kind of work may sound, it may not always be without its problems or 
challenges of some kind. Theory does not always follow practice and thus perhaps 
administration is not all that straightforward after all? In the next episode we find Karina in 
her office working on a report to the Research Council. As there is some ambiguity in a form 
that is to be included in the report, Karina is having a hard time interpreting it and deciding 
what to do.  
 
[After 15 minutes’ intensive work, Leslie, Karina’s secretary, walks out to do the last finish. As 
Leslie leaves, Karina has to make a phone call to sort out some vagueness in one of the forms 
she has received, which is supposed to be included in the final report to the Research Council. 
But before she comes as far as to actually making the call, someone knocks on the door. It 
turns out to be one of the head nurses (HN), who frowns and looks a bit frustrated.]  
- Did you know that not a single physician has registered for the “the news group day”? HN 
asks.  
- No, I did not, but I anticipate that some two thirds will come anyway. They always do. They’re 
just a bit slow, and until now it has been difficult for them to register due to the rosters and so 
forth.  
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[The HN seems content with the answer. She nods and turns around to leave as an “OK” slips 
through her lips. Then Karina picks up the phone again and calls a fellow physician to clear up 
some ambiguities in the research report form he has handed in. They talk for a couple of 
minutes, trying to sort out what should and what should not be included in the form. As soon 
as they agree on an interpretation, Karina hangs up and walks into Leslie’s office and informs 
her on their decision in a very instructive and direct way. Karina returns to her office with a 
question about who is regarded as responsible for the project in a Ph.D. context: the student 
or the supervisor? She needs to know, because she is required to enter it into the Research 
council report. She decides to call Berit, the hospital research coordinator. She finds her 
number from her organizer and dials the number. But Berit does not answer, so she leaves a 
message.]  
 
[Berit calls back only minutes later, and after a short informal chat they agree that the 
supervisor is regarded as responsible. But there is another issue that is supposed to be 
included in the report which not even Berit knows how to go about. Berit needs some time to 
sort it out and they agree that Karina should call back later. Karina hangs up and explains that 
she has to go find a guy who does not answer his pager. She knows where he is, she says. 
Karina leaves and returns 3 minutes later, and makes a comment about the beautiful 
Christmas carols sung by the children outside. Then she sits down and complains about the 
lack of knowledge about what is supposed to be reported and not in the research report.]  
- Not even the local research coordinator knows. You go figure it out! So now I have to call 
Berit again, she says with a raised voice as she picks up the phone.  
[The details seem to be more complicated than can be sorted out there and then, and soon 
they agree that Berit should come to Karina’s department and hold an information meeting on 
the Research Council report. That being settled, Karina hangs up and steps outside her office 
to tick off the meeting on a calendar hanging on the corridor wall. Then she returns and writes 
a notice about the meeting on her computer to  send out to her physicians. When she has e-
mailed the physicians Karina turns her chair away from the computer and thinks out loud.]  
- Just now on the phone Berit asked which efforts can be made in order to increase the 
attraction of applying for research positions. Personally, I propose increasing the wages, 
because today’s researchers are paid up to two thirds less than clinicians. This is why I have 
supported research in my department. But I need more support to finance much needed 
research apparatus. I do not want to farm out research, because the goal is to integrate it into 
everyday practice. And support personnel surrounding the researchers are also important, 
even though I am aware that there is a demand to make cuts in non-clinical positions. 
 
What I want to call attention to in this episode is how a seemingly straightforward case of 
administration can in effect be quite challenging. Karina has sent out forms to be filled out by 
the physicians in her department in order to be included in a report to the Research Council, 
but as one of them is returned to her she discovers that it is filled out incorrectly. Thus Karina 
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calls up the responsible physician to clarify and put things right, and they agree on an 
interpretation. Consider what would be the consequence if Karina had not recognized the 
ambiguity? What would be the consequence if a misunderstanding had occurred but never 
surfaced? Would the ambiguity and thus the misunderstanding still be there?  
 
Yes, from a practical point of view I think it would. We cannot possibly hope to know of 
every time we misunderstand others or are misunderstood ourselves. We cannot know if we 
have read something or heard something whether we have understood it according to its 
intention (Strauss 1993). Thus, as Karina’s final report to the Research Council is produced 
by the aggregation of many partial reports, its functional value is dependent on the extent to 
which each of those preliminary reports has succeeded in creating intersubjectivity. If they 
have not succeeded in creating intersubjectivity, and the respondents as well as the recipients 
(in this case the Research Council) are unaware of the problem, the report would be deprived 
of its practical value, and the consequences could be quite unpleasant. The report would 
project the wrong image, without anybody knowing about it. Thus, it was of the essence that 
the ambiguities were disclosed and resolved.   
 
The previous selection of episodes suggests that everyday challenges for managers are more 
about creating sense and understanding in an evolving and complex milieu than about making 
technical rational decisions and choices (Weick 1995; Weick et al. 2005). Situations of choice 
(and their outcomes) have not presented themselves in a technical manner that would have 
enabled the manager to merely calculate the right direction ahead. From my view “decision 
making” does not catch the essence of these everyday incidents, and neither does “rational 
choice” or “control”. The recurrent question for the manager throughout these excerpts has 
not been: “Which solution should I pick?” or “What weight should be put on each 
alternative?” Rather, situations have been enacted and reacted to through efforts of reducing 
ambiguity and vagueness (Weick 1995). Typically, the questions that have been posed are: 
“What does this mean?” “What is going on?” and “What should I do?”  
 
To focus on sensemaking is to portray organizing as the experience of being thrown into an 
ongoing unknowable, unpredictable streaming of experience in search of answers to the 
question, “what’s the story?” Plausible stories animate and gain their validity from subsequent 
activity. The language of sensemaking captures the realities of agency, flow, equivocality, 
transience, reaccomplishment, unfolding, and emergence, realities that are often obscured by 
the language of variables, nouns, quantities, and structures. (Weick et al. 2005, p. 410). 
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In the situations described above problems have been defined to a greater extent than they 
have been solved (Schön 1991), and as a general feature of contextuality there has been a 
sense of continual novelty – a novelty that is genuine in that it keeps evolving into new and 
ambiguous scenarios (Petranker 2005; Purser and Petranker 2005). Still, not all situations 
have been equally vague and ambiguous. The everyday contextuality of InSitu Hospital 
managers seems to vary quite intensely with regard to clarity of meaning. But even if 
misunderstandings are not the rule, pursuing understanding is, and in chapter nine I will 
attempt to show how this comes about through improvisation.  
Trait # 3: Clustering of events 
 
John, DM: - . . . in everyday work there is a continual change of problems. I constantly have to 
change my focus. I never have much time to deal with a single problem. It is gone after just 5 
minutes. Then I have to reactivate my brains for the next issue. I guess most people have 
similar experiences.  
 
The tendency for events to crop up in a turbulent and dynamic fashion is a matter that stood 
out clearly in my empirical material. A typical trait of the InSitu managers’ everyday work is 
that it is often quite messy, turbulent and stressful; a point which is manifested through the 
somewhat simultaneous upcoming of different events. Inspired by Berger and Luckmann 
(1991) and Purser and Petranker (2005) this section is built on the premise that attention can 
only be directed to one item at a time, something which would make the speed of focus 
change and the number of issues to which attention is refocused of the essence. Camilla has 
the following comment: 
 
Camilla, DM: - Everyday work life is distinguished by the great number of different cases. A 
great pile of different issues. So I guess this is why I consume such a large number of yellow 
tags.  
 
Camilla’s description is to the point. In a couple of sentences she illustrates the task variety 
and diversity that characterises her work life. Working as a manager involves all kinds of 
problems and activities which often bear little or no resemblance to each other, and which are 
quite often (at least initially) unstructured and even chaotic. Camilla’s statement is general 
and conclusive; it is her personal report of her own work situation. We could take her word 
for it, but let us rather follow up with an everyday episode from which unfolding task 
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variation and complexity stand out as distinctive traits. As we join in, Camilla has just ended a 
coordination meeting with her local management group, but she has not yet left the 
conference room.  
 
[The meeting is formally over but Camilla, a psychiatrist and one of the section managers, 
remains in the conference room to discuss another issue: A new therapist is to be hired, and 
they need to find a way to utilize the new form of treatment that he offers. After quite a bit of 
hefty discussion and bickering they finally agree on offering the therapist a 50% position. And 
finally, at 1115 hrs, after more than two hours of continuous discussion, brainstorming and 
negotiation, Camilla can return to her office. On her way back she talks about the meeting.] 
- Truly a turbulent and action-packed meeting, she says with an incipient smile. 
[She walks into her office and takes a seat.] 
- Generally agitated and impatient people, I think, Camilla continues.  
[She is interrupted by someone knocking on the door. It is her financial advisor. He needs to 
clarify a few matters in the budget. No sooner has he left than one of the women from the 
administrative staff comes by to inform Camilla about some patients ready for discharge in one 
of the wards out in the district. The information is quickly handed over, and Camilla makes a 
phone call to check up on some details concerning a meeting she is scheduled to attend after 
lunch. The meeting is on “quality” and is scheduled to last the rest of the day, she explains. As 
Camilla is closing down the computer and getting ready to leave, another woman from her 
administrative staff comes by to ask questions about some office routine. She has been told 
that new directions have been issued, and now she does not know what she is supposed to 
do.] 
 
As Camilla moves from one meeting to another the topic of discussion changes. From what 
she says about the previous meeting it seems to have been somewhat turbulent and exhausting. 
Hence, not only has she just come out of a challenging process of finding practical solutions 
to open ended problems and arrived in yet another challenge of the same kind, but along the 
way she has dealt with agitated and emotional people – indeed a complex matter in itself. And 
no sooner has she returned to her office than another task is handed to her, this time a 
financial matter; then yet another one immediately after, concerning some patient’s discharge. 
Next, her mind is set on a meeting on quality which she is supposed to attend right after lunch, 
and minutes later another unexpected issue is thrown into her lap. Listing the events like this, 
it is almost as if the invisible becomes visible: The small details of some 10 minutes of 
everyday organizing indicate clearly the more or less continuous change of focus that is 
needed in order to cope.  
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On any given day a large variety of occurrences typically appear to emerge somewhat 
surprisingly and require a refocusing (and reaction) on the part of the InSitu Hospital manager. 
In the next extract, where Chris has the leading role, the aspect of refocusing the mind is 
conspicuous.  
 
[After a highly concentrated and factual meeting with Brit, Chris has planned to go somewhere, 
but he has to postpone it, whatever it is, as he is called upon to attend another organizing 
meeting taking place in one of the wards upstairs. He runs towards the lift, pushes the button, 
and seconds later the door opens and a guy from the transport section walks out. Chris gives 
him a hand with some stuff he his carrying and takes the time for a small chat. In the lift on his 
way up, Chris confirms that his days are normally very hectic.]  
- They are diverse and turbulent; a lot of different topics demand my attention, he says.  
[The lift door opens, and Chris walks just a short distance before arriving at the meeting, which 
is taking place in the hallway. Quite a large number of people (physicians and nurses) are 
stowed together in an untidy manner, engaged in going through a range of specific patient 
details. Chris only stays for about five minutes before moving on to a new meeting.] 
 
[. . . Chris is more or less running up the hallway stairs.]  
- Do you think of me as a busy man? he exclaims, short on breath. 
- Yes, I answer almost too quickly.  
- Do you think I am juggling a lot of issues simultaneously?  
- Yes! I confirm, trying to keep up as he spurts upwards; - It seems to me that you are indeed 
a skilled juggler.  
- Yes, I think so too, I must say. I am truly a skilled juggler, and this is exactly what makes this 
job interesting. The variation is tremendous between intense drama in one moment and hectic 
meeting in the next. But there is little doubt as to what is my second priority: management.  
- So, do you strictly separate the two roles from each other? I ask, using what little oxygen is 
left in my lungs. I am not sure if he heard me as he continues explaining: 
– The core enterprise is my main priority. Therefore it happens every now and then that I don’t 
attend all management meetings and so forth. We are only 4 physicians responsible for 800 
operations a year. I guess that would amount to almost an operation a day for each of us, he 
says gravely as he enters through a massive door into an operation theatre.  
[A patient undergoing a general anaesthetic is situated on a table with a variety of tubes 
connected to him. The tubes are transparent and from the shocking red colour I can tell that 
they are transporting blood. A small group of people in white coats are gathered close to the 
patient talking to each other. Some are attending to the patient, others are engaged in general 
everyday conversation. They look up as they see Chris coming. He walks up to the gathering 
and has a small chat about the patient before he suddenly remembers that he has a meeting 
downstairs. Chris excuses himself as he leaves the room even quicker than he entered, and 
runs down the stairs into his office where he picks up a recording device. Evidently in a hurry, 
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he dictates some patient details into it, and puts it down again. Then he grabs his notebook 
and heads for the meeting room a few metres down the hall.] 
 
In Chris’s case many different tasks are succeeding each other, but somehow the incidents 
that occur do not seem excessively repetitive or automatic. The contexts that emerge seem to 
be more than, and indeed different from, strict routines. In the course of a relatively short 
amount of time Chris interacts with a lot of people, all of whom claim to be heard and 
understood, a process which even in isolation can be seen as an achievement.  
 
There is no way of knowing whether changing focus in itself categorically produces 
complexity. The different themes demanding attention might after all be quite structured and 
straightforward. Variation is not in itself enough to comprise a complex reality, as intricacy is 
different from complexity (see chapter three). For example, alternating between performing 
routine surgery, reading patient journals and preparing for routine meetings does not 
necessarily produce complexity. As long as variation is expected, and to a significant degree 
pre-determinable, it merely produces an exercise of focus change on the manager’s behalf – as 
to some extent seems to be the case for Chris. Still, whenever everyday challenges are 
inherently unpredictable and complex as is often the case in everyday interaction, variation 
adds to the convolution. Moreover, as demonstrated by both Camilla’s and Chris’ case it is a 
great effort simply to change the focus of the mind, and doing so may frequently arouse 
confusion and bewilderment. Thus, given a sufficient number of different events, this might in 
itself produce stress. However prosaic and redundant it might sound, I believe that the 
simplest things might become difficult if the mind is exhausted, which may result both from 
changing focus and from concentrating hard within each area of focus. 
Trait # 4: The emotional challenge 
Department managers at InSitu spend time alone for only minor parts of a typical workday, 
typically doing administrative office work, reading up on medical issues or preparing for the 
future. None of these are non-emotional activities, however; no more than they are non-bodily 
experiences (see chapter four). Thus, emotional complexity constantly impinges on the 
manager’s context through moods and emotional states. Emotional complexity is especially 
visible and explicit in processes of social interaction. Social emotionality concerns an aspect 
of everyday reality-in-the-becoming which is prone to affect managers on a daily basis as they 
interact with people made of flesh and blood. 
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Emotionality is an issue that has been a factor in all of the episodes presented, most often 
implicitly but at times even explicitly. In the following reports emotionality stands out.   
 
[It is quiet in Camilla’s office and the atmosphere is relaxed. Only the monotone whistling of 
the air-conditioner can be heard as a backdrop to  the sound of papers being flipped softly. 
Camilla is sitting down, bent over her desk in deep concentration. Reading. Every now and 
then she stops and looks up, apparently reflecting over the contents. After a while she turns on 
her PC, but as she is about to log on she discovers that she is denied access to her account. 
“My god”, she utters in despair and immediately gets up to leave her office. Before reaching 
the door, however, the phone rings, and in a flash she has returned to her desk and answered 
it.   
 
The conversation soon becomes tensed up, and the pitch of Camilla’s voice rises. There has 
been a mishap in a routine case involving four patients. Camilla responds to something the 
other person just said and asks, “What does this mean?” Having got the contents of the other 
person’s message, Camilla hangs up and immediately leaves her office. She explains that she 
is heading towards one of her sections (S) because of what was said in the telephone 
conversation. Camilla tells me that the phone call was rather disturbing, and as a 
consequence she is immediately forced to confront some of her employees at S. She says 
that the problem at hand is related to a long history of conflict and disagreement between S, 
herself and some person in the central administration (CA).  
 
On our way down Camilla explains that she is very upset, and in a raised voice she 
immediately on arrival tells a group of employees gathered in the lunchroom that she is tired of 
this kind of calls from central management. She moves on to explain how the CA has grown 
tired of complaining to the hospital director about so called conscription meetings not being 
held, and Camilla wants to know why on earth this has once again been neglected? The 
responsibility clearly lies within S, doesn’t it? Camilla looks around as she apparently awaits 
an answer.  
 
With a remorseful look on her face, a woman from the group immediately responds and starts 
explaining: they didn’t know, they thought otherwise and so forth. Camilla repeats how the 
process is formally supposed to work, only to be met with more of the same kind of 
explanations from another staff member. The conversation continues like this for quite a while, 
as a somewhat redundant continuance of arguments, until most of them have said something, 
or more accurately, they have all repeated more or less the same thing. After a while everyone 
goes quiet. They all seem to have got a say and to be happy with that. Camilla closes the 
conversation by explaining once more that it is precisely this section, not the CA, that is 
supposed to initiate conscription meetings. And if they did not know this before, they (certainly) 
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know it now, Camilla concludes firmly before she turns around and rapidly walks out of the 
lunchroom.]   
 
In this everyday episode does Camilla seem at all emotionally distant? Might she possibly be 
overreacting? Who is to say? Is she not allowed to be upset when things do not work? Is she 
displaying bad leadership, and if so, from whose perspective? All of these questions might be 
asked, but what I would like to direct attention to is how deeply emotionally involved Camilla 
is, and the fact that her feelings seem to be a major driver of the way she acts. Notice how 
Camilla’s explicitly emotional behaviour triggers spontaneous responses from her employees. 
Is it not precisely Camilla’s frustration that provokes the elaborate and superfluous 
explanations? Is it not of key importance for the employees’ correct interpretation of Camilla 
in order to catch her point; to realize that Camilla has had enough of that type of complaint? Is 
it even possible for the group not to notice Camilla’s frustration (and the way it produces a 
tension that can hardly be understood without empathy)? As this is an emotional context, it is 
complex and non-technical by nature. One thing is the words that Camilla uses; a completely 
different thing is the emotional gestures, the facial expressions, her tone of voice: all of those 
are matters not easily caught on paper, but, as I see it, which make up the emotional 
framework within which Camilla’s words are understood and responded to.  
 
In the next episode Howard receives an unexpected visit from the department head nurse 
(HN). Howard is currently restructuring a part of his organization, and this seems to have 
stirred up some of his employees. HN comes to him with some reflections about one of them, 
Heidi, who does not seem to be coping too well at the time. The following discussion is a 
direct consequence of an earlier meeting between Howard and Heidi in which emotionality 
was displayed to such an extent that Howard simply did not know what to do or how to deal 
with Heidi.  
 
[HN closes the door and starts talking about a woman called Heidi.]  
- She has a problem, she says.  
- Yes, I do not seem to be able to figure her out, Howard says. - She is not a very 
communicative person. She uses a lot of time and energy asking about small and insignificant 
matters. And she seems to tense up a lot when I see her. Can I make use of her, you think, or 
do I have to do without her? The last time she was here she actually burst into tears for no 
apparent reason. She strictly and somewhat unnaturally kept to her agenda, and then she left 
just like that. Can you explain to me why?  
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– Because there is a lot of tension and uncertainty related to EKF. They know nothing about 
what is happening in relation to the downsizing.  
[Howard makes it clear that he does not intend to destroy what has been built up among the 
nurses, but that one must be able to make revisions to organizations on occasions.]  
- OK, of course, HN comments, but what about my position, then?  
– I cannot answer that until I know whether Hilde (another department employee) is resigning.  
– Yes, I can see that, HN states brusquely.   
– Anyway, I have to leave now for another meeting, Howard says as he gets up from his office 
chair.  
– OK, talk to you later, HN says.  
[She produces what seems like a formal smile and walks out.]    
 
This episode ends quite explicitly in an emotional manner as HN shows discontent with 
Howard’s unwillingness to disclose anything about her future in the department. But even as 
this particular episode of emotionality ends quite easily and orderly as far as Howard is 
concerned, the problem concerning what to do with Heidi seems to have provoked more 
trouble for him. Howard does not know how to interpret Heidi, he explains to HN. She acts in 
ways that are a mystery to him. And he has actually reached the point where he does not know 
whether or not he can make use of her. Emotional reactions such as tensing up and crying 
make it difficult for Howard to make sense of what is happening to her and between the two 
of them. He does not know how to deal with this kind of explicitly emotional behaviour. As a 
consequence, he is left with feelings of doubt, uncertainty and bafflement. Being as it is an 
intense case of emotionality, the situation with Heidi might not be very representative of the 
usual character of everyday organizing as such. Then again, similar although less explicit 
situations are perhaps not as uncommon as we might think. For what do we really know about 
how often people in a workplace are troubled by difficult feelings or how this affects their 
work? How can we ever dream of revealing the inner sphere of privacy where thoughts and 
feelings towards our nearest colleagues and managers are stored? What about the emotional 
experiences people bring with them from non-work related contexts? How do they influence 
everyday interaction?  
 
Emotion is at the centre of the following episode where Peter meets one of his physicians, 
Julie. The conversation that follows shows aspects of conversation that seem unexplainable 
by means of a technical rational framework: it is lively, tense and in that way representative of 
many of the social meetings I attended during the empirical study. 
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[On Peter’s request Julie takes a seat.] 
- So, Julie utters, who has summoned this meeting, then? 
- You know, that’s a good question, Peter responds and continues: - I wonder why we are here 
at all? Don’t you know? I was hoping you would.  
[It turns out that none of them knows the circumstances for the meeting, but Julie decides to 
make the most of the fact that she is actually there, and says that she wants to discuss some 
issues concerning the construction of the new hospital. In particular, a hearing is being held 
that she wants to know more about.]  
 
[Julie sounds a bit snarly as she explains her worries about the new hospital to Peter, and her 
negative tone of voice appears to make Peter lose some of his normal tranquillity. Soon they 
both seem a bit resigned and tired, even though it is not evident exactly what has triggered 
this. Their voices have changed character since the beginning of the meeting, and it sounds 
as if they are now dragging their words along more than uttering them spontaneously. Then 
Peter changes the topic.]  
- So, how is the yearly agenda working out for you and the ward? Peter asks.  
- But we have been over this so many times before, Julie responds, still in the same negative 
tone of voice. - But of course I can explain it again, she says and is interrupted by Peter’s 
phone ringing. 
[He answers it and speaks English to the guy at the other end, who turns out to be Yin, a 
Chinese colleague currently working at InSitu hospital. Yin is calling to make an appointment 
with Peter later this afternoon. Having arranged a meeting they hang up and Peter once again 
turns his attention to Julie, who resumes her explanation. Peter is evidently impressed with 
what she is saying, and there is a modest smile on his face.] 
- In that case you are really very close to an actual yearly plan of action, aren’t you? 
- But I have nothing to gain from designing a yearly plan of action. It is not like there is money 
to save or anything. 
- No, but what you can do is to obtain a little more predictability, right? 
- Yes, maybe, but the sick leaves… 
- … come anyway, yes I know, Peter says resignedly. 
 
The manner in which this conversation emerges is difficult to comprehend (and analyse) 
without taking emotion into account. Whether Julie intends to sound negative, whether she is 
nervous or maybe just trying to be formal and professional is hard to say. No matter what the 
reason may be, however, Peter seems to be a bit annoyed, and the situation appears to send 
him into a somewhat impatient and irritated mood. From that moment onwards, emotional 
gestures and responses showing annoyance and frustration follow upon each other and the 
situation emerges as complex and emotionally draining.  
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In the next quotation we shall revisit Thomas’s psychiatric section and the general meeting 
held as a consequence of the turbulent restructuring process. As we join in, the meeting has 
just been dissolved and the staff are going home for the day. The last topic before the meeting 
ended concerned whether they should go ahead as anticipated or slow down the process, and 
the general attitude amongst the staff seems to be that they want to continue, as they have 
come quite far in finding new ways of organizing the section. The staff leaving, Brit, Maddy, 
Sharon and Thomas from the management group remain in the room to continue their 
discussions.  
 
[Sharon restates that it is her firm belief that the process of reorganizing should be postponed 
until they are sure they have the support of all the employees involved in the process, but 
Thomas fears that this will destroy the motivation that most of the staff have worked up. 
Thomas’s view seems to upset Sharon considerably and her voice has become louder than 
the others’. At the same time Brit is becoming impatient, looking frequently at her wristwatch.]  
Brit: - We should also think about how to make this work with regard to the rotation etc. OK, I 
have to leave.  
[She gets up in a hurry, says goodbye and walks out. The remaining three continue the 
discussion, and Maddy speaks next.] 
- Many of the staff members are not participating in any group.  
[Thomas does not seem to notice what Maddy just said. He turns to Sharon.] 
Thomas: - This is the way we need to think: I can work every other week. I’m not worried 
about the eventuality that something bad might happen. What I do worry about is how this 
process is managed on our part.  
Sharon: - I understand the way you are thinking, but you are wrong!  
[Sharon punches the table with clenched fists, and receives odd, almost detached looks from 
Maddy and Thomas.]: 
Sharon continues, still in a loud voice:  - It is wrong that the good things that have been 
accomplished so far should be used as an argument for not taking more time. I do not think 
this is just a piece of cake.  
Thomas: - Me neither. He is interrupted by Sharon, who is now repeatedly hitting the table in 
front of her, as well as hitting herself in the chest like a gorilla. With a thunderous voice she 
continues: 
- I have no confidence that this will all work out before the end of Easter. No confidence at all!  
[Thomas and Maddy are still sitting calmly in their chairs hearing Sharon out. It is hard to say 
whether they are agitated or not, as they are both keeping a straight face and a calm, steady 
posture. A moment of silence follows, and Sharon finally calms down. Thomas speaks.] 
- The fact that this process ended up as it has, is not something I can take much responsibility 
for. That it happened rapidly is something I was caught up in, but now, when it actually has 
happened, it is vital that we don’t slam the door in their faces again. 
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Sharon: - What is the difference? (She is still calm and her voice normal). 
Thomas: - This time we have actually asked them about their opinion, and they have given us 
an answer. This is their opinion, not something we have forced down their necks. There are 
some leadership aspects in this process which are not good, and we have to work on them. 
This implicates myself and my position, and I have to deal with that. There is something about 
human relations in all of this that does not work. But what is happening is something that is 
happening here and now in this particular staff, and we should bring that energy with us. I 
have no difficulty seeing the problems here. I am not certain I actually want to see them, 
however. But I do.  
Sharon: - OK, then we agree on that. We have to let the dialogue continue, but we need 
someone to take charge of the process.  
 
Sharon’s behaviour made me very uncomfortable at the time of observation. Her extreme 
emotional reactions seemed somehow detached from the context, and exaggerated in an 
unpleasant way. Seeing an adult pounding on her own chest was new to me, and I could not 
understand how Sharon could get so agitated so fast. Sharon’s reaction was, however, very 
much at odds with the calmness displayed by Thomas and Maddy. It did not seem to affect 
them much. Thomas had earlier spoken to me about being used to dealing with explicit 
emotionality at work, so it is likely that his experience from similar situations helped him deal 
with this case too.  
 
According to Thomas, working in a psychiatric milieu involves dealing with reactions and 
emotions, but what about the somatic branch? I would argue that InSitu hospital as a whole is 
a special arena in terms of emotionality. Illnesses, injuries and matters of life and death are 
natural parts of everyday life, and for departmental managers these issues very often make up 
the framework within which they conduct their organizing. Emotional aspects are often 
distant from the matters at hand, such as in financial and structural concerns, but the following 
report from a routine meeting to exchange updates on patients’ progress in John’s department 
gives an illustration of the opposite: 
 
[The atmosphere is calm and informal, and the conversation is very relaxed and open. As the 
meeting progresses it is remarkable how it seems to organize itself. John’s voice is seldom 
heard, and the participants are simply talking, taking the lead so to speak, in turns in a natural 
way. No hands are raised, and there is no authoritative direction, merely a conversation 
between professionals about matters of unquestioned importance and relevance. The 
physicians coming off night shift are presenting updated patient records, and those who have 
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something to contribute to the case histories currently discussed volunteer their input. The rest 
observe and listen.]  
 
[John is sitting back in his chair listening to the different cases, when a special case becomes 
the focus of attention.]  
- How did things go with patient X? Did he get to go home or what? John suddenly bursts out. 
[A sudden silence follows. It is broken after a while by a female physician from the night shift. 
She hesitates. Then, in a calm but somewhat uneasy tone she explains that the patient never 
made it that far. Unfortunately, he died during the night. His family seemingly took it well 
enough, she continues, but she herself was devastated. She did not know what to say, and 
she broke down and cried in front of them, she explains, staring at the desk in front of her.]  
 
[Her words resonate between the walls for a while, giving room for reflection. Nobody attempts 
to comment on her nightly experiences; they just sit and wait. After a while, she receives looks 
of understanding from all directions, especially from John. Moments later John asks the 
doctors to continue the update on other patient cases, which they do. But the atmosphere has 
changed, and the conversation is even calmer than before and somewhat hesitant . . . . When 
they have gone through the whole list of patients half an hour later the meeting ends.] 
 
The death of a patient is sometimes inevitable, and doctors and nurses simply have to find a 
way to deal with it. There is little doubt that working in certain parts of a hospital may involve 
more of this kind of complexity than most other jobs. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily 
make death an easy affair. The physician on duty in the passage quoted above, for instance, 
seemed to be quite involved in the patient, and to be having difficulties detaching herself from 
the incident. The silence in the conference room that followed her report was a social 
indicator of the gravity of the situation, and was followed by emotional gestures of concern 
and sympathy. As John had taken a special interest in this particular patient’s case, learning 
about its outcome seemed to affect him even though this was communicated in a subtle way. 
Still, he had to ensure that the meeting continued so that the last cases could be addressed, 
irrespective of his personal feelings.  
 
Portrayed as bodily processes, emotion brings complexity into everyday interaction, and it is 
often a form of complexity that is not explicitly addressed. The less explicit the exchange of 
emotional signals that occurs when people make sense together, the less it is noticed. From 
the extracts that are presented in this section it seems that coping with emotionality is a 
significant part of a DM’s job. With regard to social interaction it is perhaps one of the most 
important parts? After all, a DM is not responsible for system, structure or technology alone. 
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From a sensemaking perspective, a hospital manager’s organizing is above all a social 
enterprise. Technology must be fitted into this social enterprise; not the other way around. My 
argument here is simply that emotions assert a major influence on management practice on 
many levels, and that dealing with emotions is a normal feature of everyday challenges. 
Emotion colours reality, sometimes explicitly and at other times not, but emotion is always 
there. Moreover, it affects the flow of everyday events and spurs organizing, which then often 
takes unexpected and complex directions. The challenging part of this is that somehow, 
emotions must be met by the manager in order for sensemaking to continue (Weick 1995; 
Weick et al. 2005). In chapter nine I attempt to show how this can be accomplished through 
improvisation.   
Trait # 5: Unpredictability: complexity-in-the-becoming 
 
How can you know what you think  
before you hear what I say? 
 
Analysing the preceding empirical reports it seems that however simple or straightforward 
some situations might appear, their meaning is never static or given. Verbal statements, for 
instance, are contextually bound to evolving situations − to living bodies of flesh, blood and 
emotion.4 Thus, the contents of conversations are always to some extent unpredictable, and 
when gestures are put into words they inevitably trigger new ideas which are interpreted by 
people with unique backgrounds and perspectives. The processes of gestures and responses 
that we have witnessed indicate that one can never tell what the future will look like, what it 
will feel like, how it will change and be changed by perceptions. In that sense, the stories we 
have been presented with − which reflect authentic instances of real-life situations for InSitu 
managers − represent a long chain of events that are to some extent unforeseen and complex.   
 
The aim of this section is to provide a few examples as well as an analysis of the role of the 
unforeseeable in organizing practice for the purpose of relating it to the role of improvisation 
in the succeeding chapters. Consider first an episode featuring Howard dropping in on one of 
his departmental staff meetings. The meeting is nearly over, and the second last topic of 
discussion is the process of constructing and moving into new premises. Howard is far from 
                                                 
4 See for instance Latour (1986), and Czarniawska and Sevón (1996) on “the translation of ideas”.  
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content with the way they have cooperated with the architects, and he has made plans to 
notify the director of what he thinks are intolerable conditions.  
 
[Howard continues stressing that the process has been very messy, unpredictable, over-
complex and stressful.] 
- Do you all agree with me in using such heavy artillery, he asks the attendants.  
- Yes, they all confirm.  
[They assure Howard that he has their full support. Some of the crucial arguments from the 
discussion are then repeated, before the meeting is formally concluded. But as they are about 
to leave the room, yet another problem is raised by one of the staff members. An important 
external collaborating partner has just resigned his position, Howard is told. It is unexpected 
news that the contact has resigned, and Howard says that this is not good news. Not good at 
all. He frowns and looks worried.]  
- Now we have to start from scratch teaching a new person about the specific conditions of our 
department, he says. 
 
Initially, Howard gives explicit expression to his discontent with the process of relocating. 
And no sooner has he commented upon what he claims has been an unpredictable and 
complex process, and received the support from his staff, than is he surprised by even more 
bad news. In one instant, then, Howard is talking about the unpredictable, and in the next he is 
put out by the unexpected news that their point of contact has quit.5 I will stay with Howard 
and present another episode where interruption is central. Here we find Howard in his office 
just as he has brought a meeting to a close. As his guests are leaving the departmental head 
nurse (HN) enters: 
 
[HN spontaneously asks about the meeting with the director yesterday. Howard says it went 
fine, but that everything seems to be a bit ambiguous for the time being. He gives her a 
summary of what he knows so far. HN asks him what he wants for the future. Howard says he 
wants everything gathered in the same building – Building X – but unfortunately, he fears, this 
is a utopia. Howard asks HN which issues she wants to discuss with him. She says she has 
some concerns about the management structure, an issue that was initially raised with her by 
two of the nurses.] 
- Exactly what do you have in mind? Howard asks. 
- The wage structure amongst the nurses in the department no longer adds up, HN argues. 
[Howard says he understands her point of view, but at the same time he emphasizes that he is 
not interested in yielding too easily when it comes to increasing wages.]  
                                                 
5 See chapter 5 for more about unpredictability and the unexpected.  
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- Rather, we are talking about symbolic effects, he says. Round about 1000-3000 NOK in 
annual difference. I encourage you to find a functional solution that you believe in, but within 
reasonable financial limits. But obviously, this is a matter for negotiation. 
 
[. . . Howard is interrupted as HN’s phone rings. Seconds later, the mediator from yesterday’s 
construction meeting appears in the door, asking for an update from Howard’s meeting with 
the director. No sooner has Howard told her they must talk later, than his pager goes off. He 
does not return the call. In the meantime the mediator has left, and Howard can once again 
return to HN and their conversation about wages. Howard is quick to emphasize that he 
definitely will listen to the nurses.]  
- That’s the least I can do, he says.  
[HN then says she wants to be part of the operations meetings every now and then].  
- But I need to feel that I have got a reason to be there. And it is important that I feel I have a 
direct and open line to you, Howard, HN says.  
- But clearly, you do not need to go through me unless it concerns money, Howard argues. 
- Yes, this is my understanding, too, but then again, a lot of things are indeed about money.  
[Her argument remains uncommented upon by Howard, who suddenly leaves his office 
carrying some letters. Returning a few minutes later he explains that he had to run to get the 
mail out on time. He apologizes to HN for the interruption. HN says it really does not matter, 
and once again starts explaining her case. But only a few words into her explanation, 
Howard’s phone rings. He picks it up and answers. A quiet sigh passes through HN’s lips as 
she frowns at Howard. And the atmosphere suddenly tenses up a little. They are both 
interrupted by a woman  popping her head in Howard’s door.]  
- When can I come in? the person asks.  
- Sorry? Do we have a meeting? Howard asks, lowering the phone from his ear.  
- No, I just thought I could do the cleaning, says the woman cheerfully: she turns out to be the 
cleaning woman!  
[All three laugh.] 
 
To close this section on unpredictability I have chosen an episode from my observations of 
George. The background for this episode is that George has scheduled a meeting with his 
section managers (chief physicians) for 1230, and is now waiting for them to arrive.   
 
[The time is 1230 and the meeting is about to commence. Not too many have shown up for the 
start of the meeting, but people keep arriving as the meeting progresses. George starts out by 
informing about the new personnel administration system, which will be launched in two 
months’ time. It will require the weekly filling-in and submission of paper forms, so that “Mary” 
can put the data into the system. (By the time he has said this, two pagers have already gone 
off with loud disruptive alarms. Three minutes later two doctors have left the meeting, and one 
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of them has returned. Another two minutes pass, and the second one returns. Then the first 
pager goes off again. The face of its owner takes on an annoyed and impatient look.)] 
 
Although there was a set time for the meeting, few people arrived on time, and some left 
during the meeting as well. This behaviour may be attributed primarily to the unexpectedness 
and urgency accompanying hospital work. It is a trivial remark to say that pagers going off is 
a recurrent affair in a hospital setting. As such, the frequent beeping of pagers are reminders 
of the great extent to which the unpredictable defines the hospital management context. And 
as witnessed in the previous episode, this can produce an atmosphere of annoyance and unrest. 
The point is that small and continual interruptions in everyday work life might make a work 
environment seem disordered, which again can spur sensemaking and organizing efforts 
(Weick et al. 2005). In that sense, the lack of predictability and the unexpected pose 
something of a challenge for the practitioner to work out and resolve – a challenge which 
often causes irritation and general unpleasantness (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). I am not trying 
to argue, however, that hospital managers are constantly interrupted or that all they ever do is 
deal with unexpected events. Interruption is not a universal rule, but neither is predictability. 
Based on what we have seen of the managers’ work situation, setting up a fixed dichotomy 
between plan on one hand and action on the other would be to commit a grave mistake. Even 
though everyday practice is utterly unpredictable, in practice, predictability is achieved to a 
sufficient degree most of the time. So there is indeed plan and action, interruption and 
continuity, side by side. And conceptually, the one is as important as the other. Such a 
dichotomy can indeed be useful, but only if used as an instrument for categorizing practice 
and not as a measure of the ontologically objective. From the point of view of practical 
philosophy, predictability is an achievement, as is practical certainty. Interruption, or 
unexpectedness of any kind, is a (philosophical and practical) reminder of that.  
An analysis of everyday contextuality amongst InSitu managers 
Everyday contextuality as emergence 
The concept of emergence can serve as a fruitful tool for analysing the occurrences presented 
in this chapter. As a lens of investigation and understanding emergence speaks about that 
which is in between and behind situations – the process from which situations are shaped. For 
example, Stacey et al. (2000) build on Mead (1967) and elements of complexity theory, and 
speak about emergence as transformative teleology, meaning that processes of reality “. . . 
arise in patterns that display both continuity and potential transformation” (p. 174). Similar 
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to Stacey’s approach, I suggest merging Mead’s (1967) notion of emergence as novelty-in-
the-becoming through continual reorganization with Wittgenstein’s (1994) concept of “family 
resemblance”. In this light, emergence can be understood as a continual accomplishment of 
using the past to understand the present. Thus, emergence is the process in which the present 
is continually created as context. Emergence is context-in-the-becoming (Bergson 1944), as it 
represents a developing chain of events following each other in a profoundly unpredictable 
way (Stacey et al. 2000; Stacey 2001, 2003). Emergence depicts how something grows out of 
the past and into the future; metaphorically speaking, it glues situations together. A way to see 
emergence, then, is as the hermeneutical movement accompanying gesture and response, both 
in the internal (bodily) and the external (social) sense. From this point of view, emergence is 
inextricably tied to improvisation − a central topic of discussion in chapter nine.  
 
As emergence grows from a familiar past, it might often be quite predictable in practice, but 
this is only to a limited extent the case for the InSitu Hospital managers. Even if emergence 
varies between unfolding situations of lesser and greater clarity, a general impression of 
contextuality amongst the InSitu managers is that it is complex and unstructured; not only in 
the sense of a profound philosophical complexity, but also in the sense that typically, many of 
the situations these managers experience are rather vague and ambiguous. On a deep level, 
problems seem to be open-ended, not technical and closed. Even when there are agendas, 
plans and structures, these do not provide 100 per cent clarity, but often require considerable 
interpretative efforts. In addition, there are usually a lot of concurrent issues, clusters of 
events, all of which demand the manager’s attention; some of them more structured and 
technical than others, but on the whole the amount of complexity overshadows the degree of 
familiarity. Furthermore, as bundles of familiar issues are mixed with complex experiences, 
situations often become messy and difficult to follow. As a consequence, high tempo and 
turbulence typically underpin real time experience − a trait of the job described by the 
managers as a source of both tension and excitement. And as I will be arguing in the 
succeeding chapters, all of these factors are important triggers of improvisation.  
 
Emotions and feelings play a decisive role in complexifying both private and social situations 
for the InSitu managers. In essence, they prohibit everyday organizing from ever becoming 
completely technical and analytical. Perhaps more interestingly, though, emotions often play 
an explicit role, creating spirals of complex emotional emergence, where emotional gestures 
create emotional responses in a perpetual manner. A remarkable trait, however, is that 
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whenever emotions define the frame of reference, they are seldom addressed verbally by the 
participants. The manager seldom speaks explicitly about emotional agitation, for instance, 
even if this is an essential driving force of ongoing interaction. During the period of the 
research there was very little explicit communication about emotion, even in situations where 
people were sobbing or showing aggression and frustration. Instead emotion was mostly 
ignored as a topic of verbal communication. There are many possible explanations for this. 
Often, it seemed, emotions remained unaddressed for the sake of calming down the situation. 
More interestingly, however, people’s emotions were in some instances not taken into 
considerations at all in situations where the opposite could have led to greater understanding 
and goal-accomplishment. Especially in matters of great uncertainty, such as in Howard’s re-
organization process and Thomas’ OD-process, emotional lenses could have uncovered a 
reality that might possibly have challenged and even shifted the managers’ view. It is also my 
view that the impact of rumours and misunderstandings could have been lessened if emotional 
factors had been taken seriously and addressed explicitly by the manager.  
Unpredictability produces complexity 
My study strongly suggests that as an InSitu Hospital manager, one should expect the 
occasional surprise or interruption; sometimes caused by familiar events, sometimes by more 
complex ones. Nevertheless, I have an impression that managers are not sufficiently 
conscious about the fundamental position occupied by the unexpected in their everyday life. 
They lack a sharp linguistic apparatus to explain and make sense of the somewhat 
unpredictable way events usually emerge. Rather they tend to use imprecise expressions like 
“ad hoc” and “on-the-heals” as if an ideal world exists of stable equilibrium where 
unpredictability could in fact be avoided: 
 
[Before leaving, Chris complains to Brit about being “on-the-heals” in relation to a range of 
issues. And as he walks out he says with a light, almost humorous, voice, that last Friday was 
so busy that they just barely managed to work it out.]    
 
Having spent some time with Chris, and seen him move swiftly between everyday situations, 
it is actually hard to see that he is usually anything other than “on-the-heals”. Being 
somewhat behind schedule seems for him to be normal practice rather than the exception. 
Quite literally, the Norwegian expression “being on-the-heals”, can be translated as being out 
of balance, possibly implying that balance is the desired state (much like the concept of 
punctuated equilibrium). Simultaneously, however, Chris has in other instances emphasized 
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that this kind of turbulent work situation is what makes everyday life exciting. Actually, it is 
possible to sense that “being behind” is somewhat romanticised by Chris and that having the 
capability to get things done effectively and efficiently despite high turbulence gives some 
kind of status. What follows is a selection of quotes which all illustrate a similar kind of 
vocabulary to the one used by Chris.  
 
Elisabeth, DM: - Predictability? Around 50 %, I would think. There is, of course, the yearly 
agenda and the continual following up, and a lot is already decided for the spring. I would say 
those things fill up half of my time. And then there are all the affairs that make everyday life 
work. And in addition to that there is a great deal of ad hoc business, personnel issues, 
irritating cases and new stuff.”  
 
Camilla, DM: - There are always a lot of ad hoc occurrences, and I always have to stay longer 
than regular working hours. The important thing is that I am visible during the day, and that I 
always have two minutes to spare.  
 
Howard, DM: - Half my day is process work; the other half is ad hoc.  
 
Karina, DM: - Today, as always, the morning meeting resulted in a somewhat spontaneous 
discussion on practical issues and general clarifications and principles. After that I spent some 
15 minutes taking x-ray photos. Next I had to attend an ad hoc crisis meeting with the 
operational nurses. You see, there is some kind of a crisis going on here at the moment.  
 
George, DM: - Often I must make sense of things in a hurry – in seconds or minutes. I have to 
decide there and then, on the right method to stop bleeding and so forth. So I am pretty used 
to doing things ad hoc. Every now and then this gets wrong with regard to leadership, so that I 
have to reverse decisions. But on the other hand, having to do that is hardly much of a 
catastrophe anyway.  
 
“Ad hoc” is typically used as a common label for the unexpected (Mintzberg 1973; Crossan 
and Sorrenti 1997), and to put trust in the previous statements means to realize the large space 
occupied by unexpectedness in everyday practice. It means to take seriously all of those 
things that “just happen” and with which little can be done by means of prevention. Some 
worship these moments and see them as exciting events, while others detest them and would 
like to see them eliminated once and for all. In the literature “ad hoc” is typically defined in 
two ways: either as a tailor-made and non-generalizable solution to a specific problem 
(Webster 1994), or as an impromptu measure (Sinclair 1987). The DM’s seem to use the word 
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in the latter sense, but in a limited version; as if they are pointing to something that is not 
supposed to happen; as if the unexpected occurrence could, and maybe should, be avoided.  
 
My observation is that there is an awareness of the unexpected amongst InSitu managers, and 
that it is a matter of the highest concern. Still, as implied, it seems that the unexpected is seen 
as something outside of the frame; as something threatening the normal (ideal) condition of 
equilibrium. For example, the managers use the expressions “on-the-heals” and “ad hoc” 
about crises, personnel issues, irritating stuff and non-process work. Alternatively, as this 
study shows, the unexpected could be seen as something connected to the unavoidable 
complexity of everyday emergence. It would merely be a rhetorical grip potentially 
facilitating a richer understanding of typical contextuality, but it could contribute to changing 
the agenda somehow with regard to the image of organizational ideals. Perhaps then stability 
would not be perceived as the fundamental condition of organizational reality, which would 
be seen, rather, as a continual application of context in more or less complex surroundings; as 
a process of improvisation. From this perspective the true creative endeavours of managers 
can be appreciated and not only, say, their decision making capacities. Weick et al. (2005) 
draw a similar conclusion: 
 
Students of sensemaking  understand that the order in organizational life comes just as much 
from the subtle, the small, the relational, the oral, the particular, and the momentary as it does 
from the conspicuous, the large, the substantive, the written, the general and the sustained. 
To work with the idea of sensemaking is to appreciate that smallness does not equate with 
insignificance. (p. 410).   
Emergence and some outlines of improvisation 
Throughout most of the excerpts presented in this chapter there is a red line of responses 
succeeding gestures in spontaneous and genuine ways, thus creating unpredictable emergence. 
I have presented portraits of typical everyday contextuality and pointed out how ambiguity 
and unexpectedness prevail, but we have also seen skilled and experienced managers going 
into complex situations with great inspiration and wisdom and finding viable solutions. And 
therein lies the nexus that ties this introductory empirical chapter on contextuality to the 
succeeding chapters, which explicitly address improvisation and its relation to emergence. As 
a key line of argument I suggest that organizing practice is unavoidably connected to the 
context from which it emerges, and as we have seen great amounts of complexity at play, 
improvisation might be a key element in this practice.  
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Judging by the descriptions provided in this chapter the unexpected is not necessarily 
equivalent to chaos or crisis, and the reasons for this have to do with the improvisational 
sensemaking efforts produced by managers as a counter-measure to complexity. We have 
seen some of the typical challenges encountered by the InSitu Hospital managers, and become 
quite familiar with their everyday context; and in the following we shall study how this 
challenge is countered. Complexity can be translated as “not-knowing” and since in general 
terms improvisation can be seen as an act of changing “not-knowing” into “knowing”, there is 
an apparent connection between complexity and improvisation. The following chapters will 
therefore provide a thorough theoretical and empirical analysis of how InSitu managers 
typically respond to, deal with and act in complex environments and turn not-knowing into 
knowing. From the need to tie empirical data and theoretical conceptualizations of 
improvisation together, and to facilitate a conversation on improvisation as everyday 
organizing, some new dimensions of improvisation will be introduced in the next chapter. 
These new dimensions are a result of aligning theoretical reflections with empirical findings; 
they represent an attempt to expand on and build theory from both philosophy (The 
improvising man) and practice (InSitu managers). In the end we will hopefully gain an 
elaborate overview of important facets of improvisation as an everyday phenomenon (chapter 
eight) and a grounded understanding of how InSitu managers improvise (chapters nine and 
ten).  
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Chapter 8. A call for new concepts of improvisation in 
everyday organizing 
Introduction 
The previous chapter provides an impression of the complexity faced by InSitu managers in 
their everyday settings. In that regard, the previous chapter aims to answer in concrete terms 
the following question: “What does complexity mean in the context of InSitu managers?” In 
other words, I have attempted to translate the abstract concept of complexity from chapter 
three into concrete and authentic categories applicable to InSitu managers; and in order to 
accomplish this I have in chapter seven undertaken an iterative process of analysis, 
connecting literature with empirical data. A more difficult and intricate task has been to do the 
same with improvisation, which until now has been quite an abstract theoretical concept. 
Firstly, “The improvising man” represents a set of philosophical assumptions which position 
improvisation as an inevitable trait of practical life. “The improvising man” does not say 
much about how improvisation emerges qualitatively in different contexts; it only asserts that 
it plays a role. For example, it does not suggest how theory relates to empirical data: How the 
theoretical aspects of improvising man relate to authentic organizing practice, or more 
specifically, how the role of improvisation unfolds qualitatively with regard to spontaneity, 
creativity, emotionality and sociality are intricate questions that should be addressed in 
context in order to flesh out the concept. Stating theoretically that improvisation is a fruitful 
conceptualisation of certain aspects of practice merely amounts to providing a framework 
from which empirically based theorizing may flow. Such analytic theorizing is the aim of this 
chapter; and on a more detailed level; of chapters nine and ten.  
 
Secondly, the authors on improvisation referred to in chapter two are for the most part 
occupied with certain contexts in which improvisation stands out as exceptionally pure (i.e. 
jazz improvisation, radical change and innovation). And as I found that the data from the 
InSitu context differs significantly from those contexts of pure improvisation in the previous 
literature, I soon saw the need for other and more practical ways to conceptualize 
improvisation. In other words, seeking to conceptualize improvisation amongst InSitu 
managers has given me two fundamental reasons for honing the improvisatory vocabulary 
within the parameters of “The improvising man”. The first was the need to contextualize “The 
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improvising man”, the second was the need of different concepts than the ones provided by 
previous theoretical and empirical studies. 
 
After having worked intensely with and reflected over the empirical observations, I finally 
came up with some new ways to categorize improvisation in everyday organizing practice. 
First of all, the data inspired the idea that improvisation does not have to be remarkably pure 
to be perceived as improvisation. It must be sufficiently pure to be recognized, but not 
exceptional or radical in terms of creativity and/or spontaneity. Secondly, I realized that the 
previous literature meshes together practical forms of improvisation that I have found in my 
study to be qualitatively different. For instance, I found artistic and innovative improvisation 
as in the case of idea storming processes and humour to be epistemically different from 
emergency action or any form of immediate improvisatory reaction. Thus the idea emerged to 
establish different categories for positive and negative improvisation, and to show that 
improvisation varies between the more voluntarily chosen action (positive) and the more 
forced upon reaction (negative).  
 
Thirdly, the data analysis consolidated an idea I have been working on for quite some time: 
that one should separate between pure and good improvisation. For instance, it might be good 
improvisation to employ impure improvisation, if this is what the practitioner perceives to be 
right and wise, contextual factors taken into consideration. This insight was not only of great 
inspiration for the understanding of organizing as improvisation amongst InSitu managers, but 
for the discussion in chapter five as well. To conclude: By establishing the three new 
dimensions of sufficiently pure versus exceptionally pure; positive versus negative; and  pure 
versus good improvisation, I should have some fruitful theoretical tools to make sense of 
(analyse) the role of improvisation in everyday organizing amongst InSitu managers. In that 
sense they make a bridge from the abstract concepts of “The improvising man” to my 
empirical data, and they were conceived via a hermeneutical process where the one inspired 
the other. This chapter will deal with all of these three aspects theoretically, and the next 
chapter will show how they apply to the InSitu managers.  
Introducing negative and positive improvisation  
Whereas “The improvising man” indicates improvisation as an inevitable trait of practice, 
improvisation is not always easily spotted as a practical phenomenon. I suggest that for it to 
be natural to label something as improvisation rather than, say, planning or routine, action 
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must be sufficiently spontaneous and creative. Situations may, however, be overseen and 
disregarded, as is the case when traditions are (desperately) held on to even if they do not 
work, or for instance when defensive routines are triggered (Moorman and Miner 1995). But 
if situations are addressed in the becoming, spontaneity and authenticity become dominant 
traits of practice, in which case improvisation is no longer only a theoretical concept, but a 
practical fact. In cases of improvisation in practice, high levels of context-sensitivity imply a 
state of being submerged in the here-and-now of the present. Improvisation in practice implies 
that using contextual and practically functional theories by far surpasses blind reconstruction 
or abstract reflection, and questions that might be asked are the likes of: What is going on 
here, what does it mean, what can I do, how can I make this work, how can I make success 
(Weick et al. 2005)?  
 
We see, then, that as we take the perspective of the practitioner rather than the philosopher, 
improvisation can be thought of as an attitude or as a method of practical thinking, which in a 
given instance considers spontaneity and context superior to tradition and system. 
Furthermore, a guiding message is that explicit improvisation, in the sense of it being 
sufficiently pure, can be found in a variety of practical situations containing adequate amounts 
of spontaneity and creativity so as to be recognized (by an observer) as explicit. And I 
propose two rough categories of ideal instances of such practically explicit improvisation: 
negative/reactive and positive/proactive improvisation. In other words, the general thesis is 
that improvisation – negative and positive – occurs explicitly at a stage where the degree of 
spontaneity and creativity is amply distinct and recognizable.  
The improvising man 
 
 
 
 
 
Negative 
(reactive) 
improvisation 
 
 
 
 
 Positive 
(proactive) 
improvisation 
 
Sufficient level of spontaneity 
and creativity 
Model 8.0 Improvisation in practice 
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Secondly, as argued in chapter four, purity in both negative and positive improvisation 
depends on the degree of spontaneity as well as the degree of genuine creativity involved: The 
more spontaneous and genuinely creative the action becomes, the purer the improvisation, and 
the purest of all improvisational forms can be called flow. I emphasize, however, the 
difference between “pure” and “sufficiently pure”, a distinction that is easily missed if for 
example free improvisation as seen in theatre and jazz serves as the model (for example Zack 
2000). Although pure improvisation is useful in a metaphorical sense, its form may be too 
exaggerated to serve as a model for organizing, since many instances of everyday 
improvisation are unlikely to meet the same criteria.  
 
Another important distinction which is introduced in this chapter is the one between pure 
(flow) and good improvisation, and as a general thesis, the latter does not presume the former. 
Good improvisation has to do with practical wisdom, and much like the Aristotelian concept 
of phronesis (Vetlesen 2007; Wyller 1996), it entails pursuing spontaneity and context-
sensitive action for the sake of practical workability, in which case the purity of 
improvisation varies infinitely between non-recognizable improvisation on one hand and flow 
on the other. And somewhere between those two extremes, improvisation becomes 
sufficiently pure so as to be depicted as either positive or negative improvisation. As this is a 
different and more nuanced approach to improvisation than any that I have found in the 
existing literature, which often seems to mix good and pure improvisation, I hope that my 
contribution will help open up new horizons in terms of knowledge about organizing.  
Negative (reactive) improvisation 
Taylor (1985) describes negative freedom as a way of being free from external obstacles, 
barriers or constraints. The key is in the combination of the words “free from”, as negative 
freedom entails escaping something larger, maybe even something suppressive, threatening or 
controlling. An example is a government; one is free to the extent that one manages to escape 
the established and dominant structures of society. Inspired by Taylor’s concept of negative 
freedom, improvisation can be said to be negative when it involves reaction to external 
pressure: action that is initiated to free oneself from outer elements. Thus, negative 
improvisation is more of a reaction to upcoming events than something that is initially chosen. 
It depicts the kind of situations where acute complexity is thrown at you, sparking a felt and 
recognized desire to resolve this complexity and avoid chaos. This is the case for example 
 222
when unexpected occurrences interrupt a current activity, producing stress, anxiety or simply 
a need to overcome disruption for practical reasons (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). Improvisation 
due to unexpected occurrences involves using whatever is at hand as tools to construct 
meaning where it has apparently been lost. This latter point should be emphasized, as an 
experience of meaninglessness, a sense of uneasiness, must combine with the urge to put 
oneself and the situation together again in order for negative improvisation to occur. One way 
of dealing with such an urge, however, is to attempt to contain anxiety by denying the 
complexity at hand. With regard to authenticity, this is a way of not recognizing practical 
knowledge as vital, as the intention to create new sense is absent − it may thus effectively 
hinder improvisation (Petranker 2005).  
 
It may be, of course, that rules, manuals or drills exist for dealing with unexpected problems, 
but access to such means that the situation is not primarily complex, but rather to some extent 
complicated (see chapter three). The difference is that complicated problems require 
technical-rational problem solving: the employment of defined rules to solve problems within 
a given system. In order to call a situation complex, however, no manual awaits readily at 
hand and no clear route can be chosen instrumentally. Unexpected events often require rapid 
action, but this does not necessarily make them complex. Complexity calls for new meaning, 
not the technical (re)employment of old knowledge. Philosophical non-dualism shows us that 
we are inevitably surrounded by complexity to some extent, but by the description reactive 
improvisation is indicated a connotation of “complex” as it is used in everyday lingo, pointing 
to circumstances that are more than usually uncertain, vague, ambiguous or even meaningless 
(Weick 1995). Unexpectedness in itself does not fulfil all these criteria, but comes in addition 
to them. What is important to understand in the forthcoming passages is that the more 
complex a situation − given that this complexity is perceived and experienced as unintended 
and somehow negative, and given that there is a need or a desire to act and not just think − the 
greater the need for context-sensitive, negative improvisational action. At this point it is 
natural to repeat the insight from chapter three that in non-dualism there is no such thing as 
complexity as such: complexity exists in the dynamic relation between the human body and 
its perceived surroundings. 
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Positive (proactive) improvisation 
The other ideal instance of improvisation I propose concerns creativity and knowledge “for its 
own sake”. Translating Charles Taylor (1985) into a pragmatist frame, the ambition to 
voluntarily express creativity can be labelled positive. In Taylor’s view positive freedom, as 
opposed to negative freedom, entails taking control of one’s own life: utilizing one’s capacity 
to translate intention into action. One is positively free to the extent that sensemaking 
capacities are used as instruments for personal growth, development or simply self-reflection. 
In the positive sense, there is less focus on external pressures and the manner in which they 
compel the individual to employ creative powers. There is less focus on being free from 
external forces than on being free to create meaning for private and voluntary reasons. 
Consequently, positive improvisation implies twisting and turning rules, systems or ideas, 
viewing them as temporary constructs that can be used as tools to craft something new. In this 
sense structures are not perceived as given, but as instruments to be used creatively in context. 
Why? Because the ambition is to create new meaning and achieve practical workability, not to 
preserve the old. 
 
Whereas negative improvisation is triggered by unexpected complexity, positive 
improvisation implies actively making sense of and acting in your present situation out of an 
ambition to create knowledge. Thus, knowledge is sought voluntarily as a sovereign value, 
but always within context. There may be an element of external instrumentality governing the 
process, such as a desire to make money, to assure future growth or receive social status and 
applause; nonetheless, however, creativity is viewed as a quality in itself, as a capacity 
providing value; not merely as a reactive competence due to sudden complex circumstances, 
but as something to make the present or the future a better place in which to live. In other 
words, creativity-in-context becomes the explicit theme or concern of the present.  
 
If you have an intention of improvising proactively, the question you ask yourself is: What 
does novelty mean to me in my situation? Even when there is a profound wish to create the 
new, this also has to be based in reality, in your social and physical here-and-now. In that 
sense, positive improvisation is closely related to “innovation”, although not in the orthodox 
or commonplace version, as Fonseca (2002) labels it:  
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It has become commonplace to talk about innovation in terms of rational decision making 
based on foresight, where the main focus is the system for decision making and the outcome 
of those decisions, that is, on an innovation (p. 28). 
 
Unlike authors such as Zirger and Maidique (1990), Johne and Snelson (1990), Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt (1991), Gupta and Wilemon (1990) and Crawford (1991), who according to 
Fonseca (2002) represent a technical-rational perspective on innovation, I see positive 
improvisation as related more to an emergent form of innovation-in-context (e.g. Bastien and 
Hostager 1988). And I propose that it is in this light that Weick’s (2001) perspective on 
improvisation can be understood. Note, however, that Weick (and Bastien and Hostager) 
seems to be concerned with only one specific occasion of positive improvisation, and less 
with the phenomenon as it changes between and within contexts (and certainly not with 
improvisation as a philosophical doctrine; i.e. “The improvising man”). As indicated in the 
following excerpt, Weick seems to be primarily concerned with the form of positive 
improvisation that sets out to reach the highest possible purity and genuineness.  
 
. . . there are good reasons why the idea of improvisation may have limited relevance for 
organizations. If organizations change incrementally – punctuations of an equilibrium seldom 
materialize out of thin air without prior anticipations – then those incremental changes are 
more like interpretation and embellishment than variation or improvisation. Thus even if 
organizations wanted to improvise, they would find it hard to do so, and probably unnecessary. 
(Weick 2001, p. 300). 
 
As opposed to this view of improvisation as a process of radical innovation, my concept of 
positive improvisation, which emerges from the framework of “The improvising man”, 
suggests that creating novelty is not categorically limited to causing something to become 
structurally different, unknown or unfamiliar; to innovating and fabricating something you or 
others have not experienced before (an unfamiliar product, service or experience). Positive 
improvisation may simply entail acting wisely based on contextual considerations and a desire 
for positive knowledge. And contexts vary. Positive improvisation means something else in a 
hospital setting than on a theatre podium or a jazz stage. When pure improvisation is the 
explicit aim, however, there is an implicit intention to create the genuinely new and 
unfamiliar, which is a far more specific aspiration. Zack (2000) goes so far as to label the 
purest forms of positive improvisation meta-improvisation, implying that not only is structure 
altered, but even the very understanding of structure. From a non-dualistic perspective, 
however, Dehlin (2003) argues that meta-improvisation is not in essence different from 
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improvisation. Only if structure is viewed from a dualistic perspective can there be a 
difference between structure (ontology) and understanding of structure (epistemology). 
Structure never is; it only exists in the becoming as evolving understanding. Thus, any 
understanding of structure is always somewhat different from before; it is transitory and on 
the move, as argued in “The improvising man”. In free jazz, then, which Zack uses as an 
example of meta-improvisation, the setting is simply that more is allowed than in other forms 
of jazz. It may seem that Zack underrates that even in free jazz one cannot escape musical 
forehaving, the physical setting at hand, and so forth. There may be less rules in free jazz, but 
it is not rule-less. 
 
To sum up, I propose a separation between two categories of positive improvisation (see 
model 8.1), both of which have in common some kind of deeply held mind-set devoted to 
creating “the new”. Even if the one grows out of the other, the difference between the two 
categories is that they operate with different meanings of novelty. Whereas both categories 
are built upon a quest for meaning and workability, one of them considers the purity of 
improvisation superior to mere contextual workability. Thus in the pure and more narrow 
sense, improvisation is not only about continually finding functional theories and modes of 
action that fit with the novelty of the moment; it is about developing theories that are new in 
the sense that they are not found in established fore-having (individually or socially). This is 
improvisation in a more constricted and rare form, which is typically associated with 
Positive improvisation: Taken for 
granted ambition of creating the 
contextually new; recognizing 
inevitable variation between 
emerging contexts. 
 
Taken for granted ambition of 
creating the genuinely new: a 
unique context of innovation. 
 
Model 8.1 Positive improvisation 
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innovation and musical and artistic creativity. Both categories of positive improvisation may, 
however, reach very pure stages of improvisation, in which case improvisation as such is 
more explicitly recognized. Again, the only difference lies in the perception of novelty: In the 
general sense, positive improvisation applies to the ongoing struggle to make things work in 
the becoming, and can thus involve highly familiar and recognizable solutions. In the 
specialist sense, this is not enough, for as much as meaning must be contextually based it 
must in addition bring with it some sense of extraordinary freshness; of genuine innovation.  
 
Because every situation is somewhat new and temporary (Bergson 1944), a characteristic 
feature of positive improvisation in both forms is that it involves an attitude of context-
sensitivity, of being constantly alert (Petranker 2005; Purser and Petranker 2005). Positive 
improvisation involves a voluntary intention of “acting in a timely fashion” (Purser and 
Petranker 2005), which is similar to what Schön (1987) calls “knowing-in-action”, and also to 
March’s (1994) concept of “matching appropriate behaviour to situations”. Reversed, if a 
context is perceived as given, it would imply less need for continual sensitivity to emergence 
in favour of objective analysis and technical rationality. Context-sensitivity, however, 
involves judging, testing and determining what is needed here and now, a pursuit for 
spontaneity and perhaps even the genuinely new. Recall Schön’s (1987) definition of 
improvisation as “. . . on-the-spot surfacing, criticizing, restructuring and testing of intuitive 
understandings of experienced phenomena” (pp. 26-27). Socially, this can be aligned with 
pursuing empathy and improspection, the capability to understand others, what they mean, 
how they feel, what they need. And as you too are part of the context, improvisation involves 
bringing attention to your own feelings and needs and the way these shape reality. In the 
social regard, rules, norms, expectations, systems, routines, structures, laws, ethics and 
cultural elements may be of key importance, and they are consequently contextual factors that 
must considered if present. Of course, the physical context, too, plays a decisive role; one can, 
for instance, hardly “think away” the forces of gravity.  
 
Positive improvisation is not an easy undertaking and it does not always succeed. The mere 
ambition to create novelty, in either sense of the term, is not enough to comprise 
improvisation, but it is a precondition. Attempting to get as close to the organizational context 
as possible is not the same as positive improvisation, because such an attempt might fail: this 
merely signifies a proactive improvisatory attitude. Nervousness, lack of concentration, or the 
need to impose control ahead of time might prevent the mind from seizing the moment so that 
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pure spontaneity fails to appear. One might have a desire to be caught up in the moment and 
to become intimate with occurrences-in-their-making, and perhaps one has an attitude of 
seeing the world and everything in it as temporary, but unless this is translated into action, 
improvisation will remain somewhat unrealized. Many things cast the mind out of context and 
onto, say, linear paths, and it is difficult to perpetually keep an open eye towards one’s 
physical and social surroundings (Petranker 2005).  
Risk-in-context: Positive improvisation and provocative competence 
What if you have a profound intention to make the most of every lived moment (positive 
improvisation), how do you go about this in practice? Maybe it is a somewhat unrealistic ideal, 
but still an ambition you hold high and strive for; an ambition of improvising new meaning, 
creative development and authenticity. So, how would you go about fulfilling this ideal? The 
first message from a philosophy of praxis is to always remain sensitive to the context in which 
you are situated (Petranker 2005). This means that every development, every innovation, is 
based in the stuff of everyday life. Next, as this everyday stuff has a quality of temporality, 
positive improvisation implies continuously striving for new meaning. Of course, such an 
attitude involves huge amounts of risk-taking, and it does not combine with being too 
preoccupied with past experience (Weick 1989). Everyday routines and rules must not govern 
your life or control your movements like restraint jackets. Rather, to some extent these must 
be left behind, in the sense that they should not be taken for granted, but merely provide a 
starting point, a tool for breaking new ground. The very ability to take risks, then, may be 
perceived as an improvisatory tool (Barrett 1998). In a non-dualist language one has to 
construct the object of risk-taking as something meaningful and significant in order to become 
a real life improviser. Risk-taking will, to the extent that you succeed, work as a temporary 
construct enabling you to reach new goals. In chapter nine I will present some illustrative 
cases of positive improvisation in practice, and we shall see how hospital managers confirm in 
their own words the importance of proactive and creative action when it comes to succeeding 
in their work. 
 
If rather than something you fear, risk is something you embrace, this opens up a variety of 
options. Given, of course, that you have an initial intention to move on and be innovative. 
Being willing to take risks implicates that you might provoke your own assumptions. 
Accordingly, you would not be a stranger to impressions from unfamiliar sources, or to 
breaking up everyday patterns. Actually, as an improvisor you would seek such provocation, 
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with the result of finding yourself thrown into the unknown. Possessing the ability to bring the 
unknown onto oneself is what Barrett (1998) calls having provocative competence, a 
competence to invoke chaos and disorder. This is a way of invoking complexity for the 
purpose of reducing it and hopefully ending up as a more experienced and robust person 
equipped with new ideas. Such a risk-taking attitude may be traced all the way back to ancient 
Christianity, where it represented a moral ideal (Nicolaisen 2003). Furthermore, Heidegger 
(1996) ties risk-taking, spontaneity and enquiring behaviour to authenticity [Dasein], as does 
Taylor (1998). True living, they claim, lies in the capacity to spontaneously explore life in-
the-becoming. As a critical remark, however, one might ask whether such risk-taking and 
knowledge-seeking should not be a matter of individual consideration rather than a 
philosophical pursuit of universal ideals.  
 
Provocative competence implies invoking some degree of complexity in everyday situations. 
It is about not taking everyday structures, rules and routines for granted, but continually 
looking for ways to improve them. Provocative competence involves acting first and making 
sense later, and is in that sense a highly retrospective form of improvisation (Weick 1989, 
1995). It involves taking a risk and gambling on the result. It involves trial and error. Of 
course, the aim is not to fail, but to succeed in the long run; in order to accomplish success, 
the context at hand must be experienced in a practical manner through the moulding and 
grounding of new ideas. One way of practicing provocative competence is to act in seemingly 
meaningless ways. Acting somewhat unwittingly can be useful just to get an idea, to find 
inspiration. As the patterns of everyday life tend to be internalized to the extent that they 
almost disappear, one way of making them visible can be to break them on purpose, even if 
there is no clear route or intention ahead.  
 
In technical rationality there is only one right way ahead (Schön 1991). Deviations are 
undesired and errors can be fatal. In provocative improvisation, however, one can deliberately 
claim something out of context, play the wrong note, or make errors on purpose and then see 
where this leads (Barrett 1998; Weick 2001). Play and humour can be useful instruments for 
creating unexpected complexity. In short, anything that can more or less radically change the 
context, making it somewhat chaotic and vague, can serve as tools of provocative competence. 
Note, however, that this is not an invitation to act sloppily or carelessly. Errors, for example, 
should from an improvisatory perspective always be viewed in context, with due 
consideration to issues such as safety, ethics etc. (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). Provocative 
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competence means creating openings in space and time especially designed for creative 
activities where the direct consequences of actions are relatively harmless.  
Improvisation in practice 
From the perspective of “The improvising man” it is imperative to understand that everyday 
practical life to a varying degree is packed with more or less unexpected and complex events. 
Some of these we feel compelled to address in order to secure the continuance of everyday 
life, which signifies a basically reactive pattern. The process of negative improvising, though, 
is not different in essence from the positive type. Both types involve improspection and 
context sensitivity. The only difference can be traced in the sense of negative urgency in 
reactive improvisation versus the positive knowledge-attitude and relatively urgency-free 
atmosphere in the positive (proactive) version. In practice, the difference between positive 
and negative improvisation is often vague, and the two should therefore only be perceived as 
ideal constructs. On a philosophical level, this can be explained through Mead’s (1967) idea 
that every reaction is simultaneously action, and vice versa, meaning that an agent responds to 
his own and others’ gestures, which in turn produce further gestures to be responded to. As an 
example, even in the most extreme form of positive improvisation, such as in the arts of free 
jazz and free theatre, one reacts to the gestures of others. Nevertheless, I think negative and 
positive improvisation form a dichotomy that can be useful by facilitating empirical 
categorization of everyday events: In some situations it makes sense to say that we actively 
and voluntarily sense the context and look for improvements; in others we feel that we have to 
create meaning reactively.  
 
Creative action is essential as a tool in both positive and negative improvisation. Both 
typically concern situations where there is an explicit side to improvisation. Either there is a 
conscious positive knowledge-attitude guiding spontaneous action or there is an externally 
induced urge to make new sense. Thus, as we are apt to find these situations more than 
usually pure to the extent that creative desires and urges are realized, we would in everyday 
speech refer to them as improvisation and not as, say, planning, routine work, habit or 
technical action. Hypothetically, one could disregard the often urgent complexity of real life 
and care little about creating new knowledge (Petranker 2005); although doing so would make 
it hard to talk about improvisation as a tool, since there is no active or conscious intention to 
improvise. However, as argued in “The improvising man”, some degree of (everyday) 
improvisation is inevitable. From this perspective improspection and improvisation cannot be 
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turned on and off, as they are profound aspects of sensemaking. Rather, improvisation 
emerges as a fluid and ongoing qualitative gradation, but only when it reaches a certain level 
of purity is it typically recognized as improvisation in practice: be it positive or negative. 
Improvisation in practice is thus sufficiently pure, not just radically pure, and it is within this 
perspective that the empirical analysis of everyday organizing amongst InSitu managers can 
make sense (chapters nine and ten).  
Good improvisation is not necessarily pure 
In an attempt to mould a concept of organizing as improvisation that stretches further 
than ”The improvising man”, but which flows from the insights from it and uses its root 
concepts (i.e. spontaneity, creativity, emotionality and sociality), I hope to be able to specify 
the role of improvisation in everyday organizing practice amongst InSitu managers (next 
chapter). I suggest that a pathway to this can go through an understanding of practical wisdom, 
and that good improvisatory practice presumes (contextual) improspection rather than a 
categorical pursuit of radical innovation. I therefore end this chapter with a theoretical 
discussion of the difference between pure and good improvisation, and my thesis is that the 
latter does not have to involve the former.  
 
I have two reasons for introducing the concept of “good improvisation”. The first concerns 
giving explicit focus to the normative dimension of improvisation in practice (positive and 
negative), which is treated empirically in chapter nine. The second also concerns normative 
aspects of improvisation, but on a more subtle level, as I want to address a type of 
improvisatory processes that involve technical rationality. Here I argue that the term “good 
improvisation” facilitates the theorizing of improvisation as practical wisdom, as it concerns 
the challenge of how to make organizing effective: or in other words, how to make technical 
models − such as rules, routines, structures, plans and systems − work.  
 
Improvising, be it positive or negative, implies evaluating the context at hand, to determine 
what is going on and then acting accordingly. In that sense improvisation is about creating 
and applying theories that work in context, which is a fundamentally open process of 
abducting sense. Whereas induction and deduction entail working systematically, abduction 
concerns the birth of meaning (Dewey 1929; Peirce 1966a, 1966b, 1974a, 1974b) within a 
dialogical self (Mead 1967). Abduction entails using tools pragmatically, not following a 
programme blindly: 
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The process (of abduction) itself is not guided by a well defined programme, and cannot be 
guided by such a programme, for it contains the conditions for the realization of all possible 
programs. It is guided rather by a vague urge, by a passion (Kierkegaard). The passion gives 
rise to specific behaviour which in turn creates the circumstances and the ideas necessary for 
analysing and explaining the process, for making it rational. (Feyerabend 2002, p. 17). 
 
Expanding on Feyerabend, this is the way the mind works, as an open process of defining, of 
making theories and beliefs, rather than as a closed process of calculation guided by some 
programme. Technical rationality may, however, result from abduction and may at times be 
very useful. The point is that technical rationality is just one of the many possible ways in 
which one may use one’s creative capacities, not the one. In some practical situations strict 
rules work and in others they do not, and the process of determining this is contextual and 
improvisatory. Thus, as suggested in chapter five, improvisation could in some instances 
involve employing technical-rational, rule-based action, simply because this is what the 
situation requires. And to the extent that this is actually done, technical-rational action comes 
about as an effect. In other words, as soon as it is established that a system could be 
implemented with luck and this is actually done, the subsequent actions will be technical-
rational. In chapter, ten illustrative examples of such behaviour amongst InSitu Hospital 
managers are shown and discussed, and special attention is given to the way improvisation 
and technical rationality tend to amalgamate in organizing practice. 
 
An implication from “The improvising man” is that as improvisation is unavoidable in 
practice there is no natural or categorical separation between improvisation and technical 
rationality in practice. In a given instance, the former might in fact entail the latter: it may be 
good improvisation to employ impure improvisation. Consequently, as argued in the 
beginning of this chapter, in instances of impure improvisation it is difficult to identify it as 
positive or negative because the spontaneity and creativity involved is of an implicit and 
subtle character. Then again, spontaneity and genuine creativity might be sufficiently present 
over time – one may decide to change systems and replace functions on the basis of 
spontaneous considerations, in which case the boundary between technical rationality and 
improvisation is blurred. In evolving practice, sensemaking processes may vary between 
being more or less improvisatory and, consequently, more or less technical-rational, 
something which is supported by my empirical study (see chapter 10). For instance, actions 
may start out as proactive improvisation, continue as technical-rational action, and perhaps 
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end up as reactive improvisation. Either way, the true improvisor acknowledges the 
temporality of systems, and keeps asking (in a proactive manner) whether it should persist. If, 
however, rule-based technical-rational action is regarded as primary and somehow taken for 
granted as a script for action, as a paradigm or as an ideology, irrespective of the actual 
context at hand, this reflects an act of reification. (See for example Berger and Luckmann 
(1991) for an elaborate explanation of “reification”, and Goffman (1969) for a similar 
discussion of “idealization” and “maintenance of expressive control”.)  
 
Reifying technical rationality is a way of following a rule for its own sake and taking it for 
granted, rather than employing it on the basis of improvisatory (contextual) considerations 
(for example “standardization” (Weick 2001)). In this case, not only is the rule not treated as a 
creative point of departure or as a governing tool; it is made absolute or solid. This kind of 
reified Technical Rationality mirrors the dualistic philosophical position, such as in the case 
of Positivism (Schön 1991), and stands in opposition to an improvisational framework. From 
the practical perspective of an improvisor, however, technical-rational action can be chosen 
over and over again if considered contextually wise, but it is never taken for granted.  
 
Good improvisation entails to minimize the delay between thought and action. Good 
improvisation means to improspect and get close to the context at hand, not to abstract from it; 
whereas to calculate means to go the opposite way. Wisdom in the improvisatory sense is 
similar to what Purser and Petranker (2005) call “deep improvisation”, which implies thinking 
and acting in situ as opposed to following some kind of rule or ideal blindly. Good 
improvisation thus implies performing “deep improvisation” in practice, and it implies 
striving for authenticity and spontaneous creativity through improspection. According to this 
view, theories are used as tools to understand the present. Hence, there can be no universal 
incitement to stop, reflect and then act in a linear order. An implication of “The improvising 
man” is that practical wisdom flows from good improvisation, as it is about meeting real-time 
problems with real-time measures, not about abstract reflection or technical calculation for its 
own sake, as in the case of Managerialism (see chapter five). Thus, wisdom often derives 
from trial and error, from prior experience, or from immediate reaction. It is not categorically 
wise to think before acting, however counter-intuitive this might sound. And more 
importantly, with regard to practical wisdom and good improvisation, rules are guiding tools 
and not measures of control.  
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Some concluding comments 
In this chapter I have expanded on the insights from “The improvising man” to facilitate an 
analysis of organizing as improvisation amongst InSitu managers. I have suggested three new 
dimensions that flow from the theoretical conceptualizations in chapter four as well as from 
the concrete findings in my empirical study that will be presented in the forthcoming chapters. 
More specifically, I have tried to provide “The improvising man” with more practical 
substance, and argued that even if improvisation is an inextricable feature of practical being, it 
is not always explicit as such. Rather, it takes on a sufficient degree of purity, of spontaneity 
and of genuine creativity to allow the empirical observation of improvisation. Sufficient does 
not necessarily imply flow, however. It points to circumstances where the degree of 
spontaneity and genuine creativity overshadows more technical and routine-like behaviour. In 
particular, I have suggested two typical instances of such improvisation in practice: negative 
and positive improvisation. By treating these as sensemaking apparatuses to be used in the 
categorization of emergent and fluent everyday experiences, I have encouraged the reflexive 
and mutually constitutive relationship they form. Thus I hope to have contributed towards 
overcoming a conception of improvisation as an either-or concept, as I focus on real-time 
flowing qualitative evaluation of improvisation rather than quantitative depiction. In the same 
manner, I have tried to soften the separation between technical-rational action and 
improvisation, arguing that in practice, the latter may include the former. Finally, as a non-
dualistic counter-move against improvisation as either present or not, I have argued that good 
improvisation is not necessarily pure, and that emergent details of practical life, of 
contextuality in the becoming, can best be handled through improspection and context 
sensitivity. This entails a view on practical wisdom as an improvisational assessment of the 
present, and implies a fundamental attitude of using physical and mental objects as creative 
tools rather than as restraint-jackets or givens to be followed without question. These 
reflections can be summed up as in table 8.0: 
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Table 8.0 Good improvisation, authenticity and purity 
 
A subtle message indicated in table 8.0 is that improvisation in practice is always intended as 
good improvisation; as a way of acting spontaneously and creatively that may ensure practical 
workability and effectivity. As we have seen with reference to Feyerabend (2002) earlier in 
this chapter, the normative and the descriptive amalgamate in abductive processes, implying 
that action always presumes the intention of action (Skjervheim 2001). In other words, 
thought is inevitably guided by a desire, an urge (Dewey 1929; Feyerabend 2002), in which 
case improvisation in practice results from intentions of good improvisation. A second 
reflection from table 8.0 is that good improvisation, and thus any form of improvisation, is not 
always sufficiently pure to be empirically recognized as improvisation in practice 
(positive/negative). For contextual reasons good improvisation can take the form of technical 
rationality, and when it does, it can be hard to identify it as improvisation even if it is in fact 
context-sensitive. This is why I have chosen to categorize only two forms of improvisation in 
practice, negative and positive, and to separate these from technical-rational action. Finally, in 
table 8.0 “good” and “taken for granted” are emphasized, and the point is to show that I see 
them as antagonists (i.e. Schön 1991). Good improvisation implies not taking something for 
granted. I have therefore separated three forms of authentic and improvisatory action from 
blind, inauthentic action which flows from taken for granted beliefs. 
 
In the next chapter I will be using the new concepts presented to make sense of my empirical 
observations of InSitu managers.  
Proactive/reactive 
intention 
Authenticity Form of action Improvisational 
purity 
Authentic Negative improvisation  Sufficiently pure 
Authentic Positive improvisation  Sufficiently pure 
Context-sensitivity & 
improspection, i.e. good 
improvisation Authentic Technical-rational action  Impure 
Taken for granted 
structure of action  
Inauthentic Reified technical-
rational action  
Impure 
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Chapter 9. Improvisation amongst InSitu managers 
“. . . people organize to make sense of equivocal 
inputs and enact this sense back into the world to 
make that world more orderly.”  
(Weick et al. 2005, p. 414). 
Introduction 
The ambition behind this chapter is to study in detail how improvisation evolves in everyday 
organizing amongst InSitu Hospital department managers: how they organize their worlds, 
deal with upcoming issues and how they create meaning and find solutions under emergent 
and complex conditions such as described in chapter seven. It is also an ambition to show 
how the managers reflect upon their work in terms of improvisation, and how they act in 
terms of positive creativity and knowledge growth. Building on “The improvising man”, key 
words for the succeeding empirical analysis are spontaneity, creativity, emotionality and 
sociality, and as argued in the previous chapter these are addressed to the extent that they are 
found in a sufficiently pure form. Furthermore, also based on the previous chapter, they are 
addressed from two angles, one negative and the other positive. Finally, throughout the 
succeeding analysis there is a focus on good improvisation and practical wisdom; on how to 
make things work in context. This is expanded upon in the next chapter, which deals 
explicitly with the role of technical rationality in everyday organizing.  
 
Two elements of “The improvising man” can serve as an introduction to this chapter. Firstly, 
to act spontaneously implies acting according to what is happening here and now: acting in-
context rather than on the basis of some abstract model. Secondly, whereas context may be 
purely mental, for example in theoretical contemplation (abstraction), in improvisation there 
must be an external and irreversible component as well. In this sense improvisation means to 
create context spontaneously through external action. Thus, organizing as improvisation is 
about making a difference in the physical and social sense. And above all it is about making a 
difference in the here-and-now, which presumes improspection of either the positive or the 
negative kind (see chapter eight).  
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Negative improvisation 
Emergence, context-sensitivity and improvisation 
In chapter seven I argued that an inevitable complexity underpins organizational reality at 
InSitu, and that it can be explained as emergence (Mead 1967). In this section I will try to 
show that the quality of organizing is closely related to the quality of emergence, and that 
organizing in an emergent environment takes the form of negative improvisation. In other 
words, negative improvisation occurs as emergent complexity is dealt with by means of 
practical and context-sensitive action. Context-sensitivity may, however, be a misleading 
expression, as it seems to indicate that there is a given context for the improviser to act upon. 
This is not my point. Rather, I take the view of Bergson (1944), Dewey (1929) and Joas (1996) 
who see context as a (shared) temporal image of social and physical reality at a certain point 
in time. So there is no One Context to relate to, no given Reality, but a continual and 
improspective projection based on practical measures of workability. Inspired by Mead (1967) 
I understand context-sensitivity as continual openness to emergence, and improvisation 
means to deal with and act upon this openness.  
 
Improvisation is not just looking into the present (i.e. improspection), but acting creatively in 
the present. In that sense improvisation is constituted by actions taken in situ; actions that in 
themselves co-produce emergence. This means that improvisation simultaneously constitutes 
and has its origins in ongoing processes of gesture/response; i.e. in emergence (Mead 1967). 
Hence I would argue that in those cases where we have earlier seen managers trying to cope 
under vastly emergent circumstances (chapter seven), we may find illustrative examples of 
negative improvisation. And the more complex those situations are, the more illustrative they 
would be, as one would then expect purer instances of improvisation. To grasp the central role 
of improvisation in practical organizing, I therefore suggest drawing on the insights from 
chapter seven by analysing some episodes that are illustrative with regard to emergence. The 
difference is that improvisation, and not complexity, now is the primary lens through which 
these episodes are viewed and analysed. 
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Presenting some stories of negative improvisation 
Following the structure from the previous chapter the first extract to be presented gives an 
image of the way meaning is contextually bound, giving language a temporal, ambiguous and 
vague status. Here I argue for how improvisation is a process in which contextual meaning 
emerges, and how ambiguity and vagueness is organized through improvisation. I then 
present some extracts arguing that there is a relation between improvisation and clustering of 
events, and subsequently between improvisation, unpredictability and the unexpected. Finally, 
I have chosen to analyse the relation between improvisation and emotionality in a section of 
its own. Implicit in all the chosen extracts is a demonstration of how improvisation in a 
fundamental manner involves defining problems.  
 
A written narrative can only hope to give indications of the unfolding of real life events, and 
the shorter and more superficially and generally a story is told, the more difficult it is to 
recognize practice-in-the-becoming: emergence. Hence I want to start by presenting a rather 
comprehensive moment-to-moment report from Elisabeth’s work life. I urge the reader to pay 
attention to how the episode moves onwards; how one trivial thing leads to another, and how 
gestures create responses that themselves work as gestures for yet new responses. 
Furthermore, I want to direct focus to the apparently temporal and ambiguous status of 
language in this emergent process, something which spurs further gestures and responses for 
the sake of interpretation and meaning-making. 
 
[Elisabeth’s assistant manager (AM) enters for the daily morning meeting, and immediately the 
two of them start going through the calendar.]  
-  We have 11 managers coming over from the Netherlands to visit us, Elisabeth begins. - We 
have to make a program ready for them as part of a larger national program issued by the 
former hospital director. Later they will be going to Oslo, she explains, and continues with 
another issue on her agenda. - Unit [Anonymous] has taken direct contact with the Ministry of 
Justice without going through us. They have not gone through the official channels.  
AM: - This is not exactly the first time it happens.  
Elisabeth: - No, but the guy from Unit [Anonymous] has randomly passed on information to 
some case officer. There must be a void of knowledge in their organisation.  
AM: - Perhaps we should take this up in the management team?  
Elisabeth: - I think we should rather take it up with Unit [Anonymous] directly.  
AM: - Yes, I agree. - I choose to believe that Henrik has done this with the best of intentions. 
After all he is new at Unit [Anonymous].   
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[Elisabeth looks down at her calendar.] 
Elisabeth: - Who should attend the [Anonymous] forum this year? Elisabeth suddenly asks. - It 
is being held at the [Anonymous] Hotel.  
AM: – Oh, Helge is the case officer on this one.  
Elisabeth: – Please bring with you this case anyhow, because I need to know who is going.  
[She then gives an account of yesterday’s meeting on cooperation out in the district, and adds 
that while she was there, the other attendants strongly wanted her to speak to them and give 
lectures for the mayors, chief officers and so forth, but that she is afraid this would hurt Lise’s 
feelings, since she is usually the one doing it. The thing is that Lise and one of the attendants, 
Olsen, have a history of getting into arguments with each other.]  
Elisabeth: - I think the two of them get into conflicts with each other because of their 
personalities. Because he is extrovert and Lise is the opposite. When I spoke at the meeting, 
however, Olsen actually said that for the first time he now really understood the problems of 
ZZ-medicine. Could it be that Lise is not explicit enough in her communication? 
 
[Elisabeth expresses satisfaction that she succeeded in getting the attention of the attendants 
at yesterday’s meeting, and continues to tell AM how they had a such fantastic time, and that 
they laughed a lot. It turned out, she says, that they all shared having attended the wrong 
meetings at some time. In one case a guy had even met up to the conference, looked at his 
watch, become impatient after a while, and started giving hints to the person in charge about 
the time – that surely it was his turn to speak now? As it happened, he had actually been 
granted the chance to speak, only to give the wrong speech that had nothing to do with the 
topic at hand.]  
Elisabeth: - He gave the right speech in the wrong context, how about that?  
[Elisabeth laughs at her story, but does not get any response from AM who seems to be 
looking at her in bored anticipation. From the lack of interest it seems that he is eager to move 
on to the next subject, and Elisabeth quickly follows up in a more reserved tone of voice.] 
Elisabeth: - There is an upcoming seminar on how the community and three of our hospital 
units are cooperating on a project. By the way, she interrupts herself, are we talking about 
respect today? Or was it equality?  
[She is referring to the department staff meeting starting in a few minutes, where a regular 
point on the agenda is to discuss the core values that they have received from central 
management.]  
- Respect, is today’s issue, AM says somewhat emotionlessly as he rises from his chair.  
 
[Elisabeth rises too, grabs her notebook, and leaves for the conference room. 12 people from 
her staff are already waiting around a large elliptic table. The time is 0840. Elisabeth starts out 
by debriefing everyone about yesterday’s meeting on cooperation that she attended, and says 
it was a really good and productive one, and that they have already come a long way at ZZ. 
Many of the attendants are nodding their heads approvingly.]  
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- Yes, they are really doing well out there, someone utters.  
[Elisabeth does not pause and continues with the next topic.]  
- What is this so-called big city meeting, she asks the congregation. - Something I am 
supposed to attend?  
A staff member answers:  
- Oh, it is hardly about any big issues, but there are still some things that need to be corrected 
in the report.  
- Ok, so who is attending? Elisabeth asks, apparently looking for volunteers.   
[They go around the table as people put their names on a list. Next, Elisabeth turns her 
attention to another issue about a phone-call from the accountant’s office. Evidently there is 
something about how to deal with invoices that is difficult. After a short explanation of the 
problem, Elisabeth says there is one last point on the agenda: a conversation about the core 
values issued by InSitu’s central management, and today’s topic is “Respect”.]  
 
[Elisabeth calls upon Celia, one of the staff members, to address the meeting.]   
- Our group (Celia names the members) has been working on the core value respect. We 
have asked ourselves: “what does respect really mean”? We have been discussing this, trying 
to gain a deeper understanding of it. For instance, we propose that listening, understanding, 
caring, positive attitudes, human ethics and human worth, room, form and punctuality have to 
do with respect. These are not things you can demand from people, but things you have to 
earn. Likewise, not to interrupt, to understand in the best sense, to have respect for each 
other’s differences and personal feelings are amongst the things we think go into respect.  
[Celia keeps talking to the congregation and uses a written list as her guidance.]  
- And more directly related to our workplace, she continues, we have concluded that it is vital 
that we have respect for each other’s areas of competence, experience and knowledge. 
Moreover, we emphasize the importance of respecting each other’s tasks and areas of 
responsibility.  
[The meeting room phone rings, someone answers, saying that “she” is busy attending a 
meeting. Celia then continues.]  
- Lastly, I briefly want to share with you what we found out about respect in the Latin language. 
Respect is derived from the Latin “re spectare” – to re-view − which indicates keeping an open 
mind and being able to reconsider your opinions.  
 
[As soon as Celia is done presenting the work of her group, a discussion commences based 
on the group’s findings.]  
- Let us not forget about the general respect for human worth, a staff-member (Person A) says. 
- Oh, but we did talk about that, about respect for humanity as such, Celia comments.  
- Personally, I think what you said about punctuality is important, Elisabeth utters. She 
continues.  
- Is there something else you think is worth spending time on?  
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- We certainly talked about all these things, Celia answers and continues, - For example, if 
someone is busy, she must be allowed to be so. (The phone rings again). Ha-ha… speaking 
of interruption…  
[Celia takes short break before she continues.] 
- What we did not do was to suggest concrete measures. This must be improved, of course.  
- Exactly, Elisabeth comments, - because all these were certainly important points that need to 
be reflected upon.  
- Yes, but they should be made more concrete and specific. More action-oriented, a staff 
member (Person B) says.  
 
- What I should have done personally, Elisabeth says, is to show this group more respect from 
the beginning. After all, I was supposed to be part of it, and I do not want to let go of this 
matter. Rather, I’d like it to be addressed every now and then and to be reflected upon.  
- We haven’t really considered in context what needs to be worked on, Celia repeats. - What 
we have done is to make general sense of what respect means. But surely we could put some 
points up on the wall. I have seen it done in other places.  
[AM who has been sitting rather quietly all along saying nothing, is now nodding his head 
slightly. Then he speaks.]  
- What is important here, obviously, is to translate these issues into practical action.  
- What is important is that what is agreed upon is the standpoint of the whole group, person B 
argues, and continues. - We should put together everything that comes from each different 
group, structure it and create a common document. The ambition of this would be to create 
harmony and a common way of thinking.  
- Sure, but I have only got a personal relationship to this exact word, and not to the other three, 
Celia says. - Perhaps everybody should be allowed to discuss all four words? I’d say there is 
no rush to finish this in a week. We have to work on it over time.  
 
[Everybody seems to agree on this, and Elisabeth takes the discussion a bit further.]   
- Has everybody read the report on work environment and mental health care?  
- No, they say, almost in unison.  
- OK. Then I will make sure you get it. We had a very low score on core values. Even on 
bullying. These are definitely issues we will keep in mind and work on with the staff. Anyhow, 
are there any more issues you’d like to address? Elisabeth asks. 
- Yes, Celia says. - I have received a phone call from unit FF. There is this 15 per cent position 
that they are withdrawing.  
- I would definitely like to know more about this, Elisabeth states.  
- Actually, Celia continues, - there are quite a few cases out in the different units that the union 
representative has decided to report .  
-  I do not want any more of this. It has to stop, and they must work on using the official 
channels, says Elisabeth in a raised voice.  
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- There is also another issue about specifying and setting wages using the official regulations, 
Celia breaks in. - It seems that we follow the regulations loyally, whereas a lot of the others do 
not.  
- Hmmmm, this is clearly an issue that must be brought to the management group. OK, 
anything else? No? In that case the meeting is over, Elisabeth concludes. 
 
[It is 0920 hours, and everybody rises. Person B walks straight up to the end of the table 
where Elisabeth is packing her things and preparing to leave. Person B mentions something 
about a conference. The two of them discuss this for a few minutes, before another topic 
emerges. This time it concerns coordination of their meeting schedules. Then another issue 
pops up, then another. For a while they discuss some reports that have recently been 
published, and some official journeys that are to take place in the near future. Soon they 
decide to go into Elisabeth’s office to continue the conversation. Some 15 minutes later they 
are finished, and Elisabeth walks outside for a cigarette.] 
 
Following this story from start to end it is almost as if things just occur by themselves in a 
steady stream of larger and smaller issues, something which corresponds to Mead’s (1967) 
concept of emergence. Taking a closer look, the spontaneity of social interaction stands out: 
Elisabeth’s sudden idea to tell AM about the budget crisis, AM’s telling Elisabeth about a 
successful conversation with a co-worker, Elisabeth’s sudden need to make a phone-call and 
so on. All of these may be ideas and thoughts that appeared because of something that took 
place immediately before, something that perhaps nobody expected, or at least something that 
triggered an unexpected thought. It would appear that the utterances of some provided cues 
(Weick 1995) for improvisatory idea making for others in a manner that was contextual, 
transitory and ambiguous.  
 
On one occasion Elisabeth seems to provide her own cue: In one moment (before the staff 
meeting) she is talking somewhat formally about yesterday’s meeting out in the district, and 
in the next she is caught up in explaining that they had such a fantastic time and laughed a lot. 
Indeed a related and interesting matter for Elisabeth, and only a natural prolongation of the 
narrative from her perspective, but for AM how much fun they had seems to be on the side of 
what should be the focus there and then; which he signals by showing very little interest. 
Elisabeth spontaneously responds to his gesture by immediately changing her course. AM has 
not given her the reaction she was hoping for, but Elisabeth picks up on his signal and tries to 
move on and find a new course of action. After this improvisatory act she suddenly 
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remembers the shortly upcoming meeting with the staff, and as she mentions this AM 
immediately gets up from his chair. As a result they are both out of the door less than a 
minute later.  
 
In the immediately succeeding meeting Elisabeth goes through the agenda for the meeting 
issue by issue. Reading about this might somehow give the appearance that the agenda is 
completely unambiguous and straightforward. But following the logic of Weick (1995, 2001), 
Ciborra (1999), and Hatch (1999) there is no such thing as an objective agenda or plan, only 
the contextual interpretation of it. From an improvisatory angle Elisabeth’s accomplishment is 
that she breathes life into, and adds context to, equivocal signs on a dead piece of paper. In 
Weick’s (1995) language, the brackets of information on Elisabeth’s agenda worked as cues 
for sensemaking; as triggers of emotions and ideas. And looking at the staff meeting in terms 
of gesture-and-response (Mead 1967), it is hard to tell how the different topics were 
interpreted by the attendants. As the agenda came to life through Elisabeth’s voice, it 
triggered improvisation. Thoughts and emotions, arguments and ideas, emerged in ways that 
were probably not completely expected (nor completely random). In that sense the agenda 
was improvised into life and there emerged as many stories as there were attendants, each 
performing his or her private dialogue more or less connected to the public conversation 
(Mead 1967). On occasions, ideas from these private dialogues surfaced explicitly in the 
conference-room, often as responses to something that was said, and as a consequence the 
discussion took on new directions. Most visible, perhaps, were the comments that were 
spontaneously given to Celia on account of her briefing on the core value “respect”: Celia 
thought she had emphasised sufficiently that the respect for human worth and punctuality are 
important, but was still reminded by the attendants that this was a point she had not addressed 
properly.  
 
Perhaps the critical voices did not concentrate enough on Celia’s presentation, or maybe they 
interpreted her differently? Maybe Celia was not clear enough? As we saw in chapter seven, 
however, there is no way to be sure that even the simplest piece of information gets through. 
From a sensemaking perspective, saying that “information gets through” is in fact something 
of an oddity, since it presumes that information can be objective. An essential trait of 
sensemaking processes is that people inevitably have their own unique version of matters, 
including Celia and the rest of the staff. As a consequence, there is no way of controlling or 
guaranteeing that messages are interpreted as intended or that things happen as planned. 
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Words are vague and ambiguous indicators of meaning; they are tools of sensemaking 
(Dewey 1929). And if sense is created socially as a living process of using abstract symbols, 
this might imply that in Celia’s case complexity arose due to communicative equivocalness 
and vagueness, which in turn was cleared up through improvisation.  
 
The previous extract illustrated two things of particular relevance for improvisation: Firstly, it 
indicated a close tie between linguistic vagueness and improvisation. Secondly, it gave an 
example of the emergent and complex quality of everyday life gesture-and response, in which 
negative improvisation forms through spontaneous sensemaking reactions. The negative 
dimension manifested itself as improvisation emerged as reactions to perceived ambiguity, 
rather than as creative play, for the sake of understanding and coping. The next episode, 
featuring Chris, continues along similar lines, and illuminates the negative role of 
improvisation in dealing with the clustering of events.  
 
[. . . After the meeting, Chris leaves the hospital for an hour and a half. When he returns, the 
first thing he does is to more or less throw himself at the phone that is ringing in the office next 
to his. The office belongs to an administrative employee, Hanne, a woman who is sitting at 
another desk further inside the room. In Hanne’s office there are several phone-lines, and the 
phone call Chris answers is forwarded from his own office.]  
- This does come a bit unexpectedly, he says into the phone. - Could we possibly wait a bit 
and I will deal with it in a few hours? Ok, Chris says and hangs up.  
[As he turns around a man is standing by the door lifting his eyebrows and looking at him in 
anticipation. Hanne is now looking up, too.]  
- Do you have time to discuss some administrative matters with me? the man asks.  
[As Chris is about to answer the phone rings again. He picks it up. It is a former colleague of 
his wanting to talk to him about a drug which is somewhat controversial. Now things seem to 
be evolving fast, and without Chris taking any notice of it, Hanne is laughing quietly as if to 
underscore the turbulent situation.] 
 - Do not forget, Chris says into the phone, that in the ward the level of predictability is very low. 
Suddenly it is full, and there is no way of knowing this in advance.  
[The man at the door nods at Chris as if to say goodbye and then leaves. Chris nods back with 
an empathetic smile. And as Chris hangs up, Hanne seizes the opportunity to ask him some 
questions about next week’s program. It is noticeable that she has been waiting for a while, 
and that she is more than eager to get an answer from Chris.]  
- Now, please, can I have my turn? she asks impatiently with half a smile.  
 
[After Chris has discussed some matters related to next week’s program with Hanne, he walks 
into his office, grabs a sandwich, and continues into Brit’s (the department’s head nurse) office. 
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The time is 1145. No sooner has he sat down than a nurse appears in the doorway. She 
wants to let Chris know that they have managed to find a solution for a complicated patient 
case they have discussed earlier. She leaves, and Brit and Chris return to their chatting while 
drinking coffee and eating their lunch. But less than a minute later, just as Brit’s phone rings, a 
physician comes by with a question for Chris concerning the Christmas rota.]   
 
At the same time as Chris is engaged in several telephone conversations, a man in the 
doorway wants his attention. After waiting for a few minutes, however, he ends up leaving. 
Simultaneously, an impatient Hanne wants a word with him. Who should come first in line? 
How important is each request and who can wait? These are a sample of questions that Chris 
may have been dealing with as he is trying to define the situation. He had not been in this 
particular situation before. This was a new situation; it was genuine and special in its own 
terms. It kept evolving in ways not foreseeable or entirely controllable, as it depended on the 
outcome of continual negotiations. The simultaneous handling of phone calls and people 
begging his attention gives the impression that negative improvisation was at play. 
 
“Simultaneous” is an important word for understanding this episode, as Chris seems to be 
handling clusters of events rather than an ordered sequence of happenings. It is almost 
amusing to notice how Chris is interrupted while being interrupted. At least Hanne seems to 
think so as she cannot resist a quiet chortle on Chris’s behalf. As argued in chapters five and 
seven interruptions do this; they compel you to consider new elements, to be sensitive 
towards, or rather, to create new and often unfamiliar contexts. Thus, where there is 
interruption one is apt to find negative improvisation. And in Chris’s case interruptions 
happen on a massive scale, to be followed by improvised measures. All of these incidents are 
not in sum very complex, however. Probably, the amount of complexity is not too 
overwhelming for him, but it nevertheless requires his spontaneous attention to sort out the 
various incidents, and as the situation emerges things happen in a largely unpredictable way. 
Complexity seems to overshadow intricacy and familiarity; there is no model for Chris to 
follow; and his past experience cannot give a full answer as to an appropriate course of action. 
Chris’s experience is more like a tool that facilitates seeing family resemblances 
(Wittgenstein 1994), and through negative improvisation Chris uses that tool to produce 
suitable action.  
 
The cases above, featuring Chris and Elisabeth, provide good illustrations of improvisation as 
an everyday phenomenon. Improvisation as witnessed in these episodes is different from, and 
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in a way more subtle than, the rare sort of ingeniousness that dominates the improvisation 
literature (see chapter two). As they are logged on to the small and emerging details of the 
present, Chris and Elisabeth react intelligently to those details on a continual level. In that 
sense they are engaged in “deep improvisation” (Purser and Petranker 2005). They have not 
been in these exact situations before, and the situations keep evolving into ever new and 
somewhat unfamiliar and unpredictable scenarios. With spontaneous creative actions Chris, 
for example, tries his best to keep up with multiple and simultaneous demands, and even if in 
the previous passage there is no artistic elaboration of structures for the sake of creating 
genuine novelty, or utter complexity in the form of outright chaos, Chris is using skills and 
past experience as tools to enact and respond to the fairly complex everyday emergence 
taking place. The excerpt shows people coming and going, emotional signals being exchanged, 
tired faces and indulgent looks, and all of those things produce an emergent climate that can 
only be understood through improspection and empathy. In this setting improvisation is 
spontaneous intelligent action produced to meet novel conditions, and in Chris’s case novelty 
is embedded both in an emergent present and in the complex quality of it.  
 
The episode featuring Chris indicates a bond between the two phenomena of “clusters of 
events” and “interruptions”. Thus, it is a reminder that none of these forms of complexity are 
discrete categories but related aspects of evolving practice. We shall continue with a more 
explicit focus on unpredictability and the unexpected in the next episode where John is 
virtually beleaguered with interruptions. 
 
[No sooner has John entered his office, than a man comes by asking for his help. As a 
consequence, John quickly follows the man out, only to return a little less than five minutes 
later. He stops for a moment before he suddenly leaves again and goes into his secretary’s 
office to ask whether the 0930 meeting is still on. He returns within seconds, and explains that 
the meeting has been called off. He sits down, pours himself a cup of coffee, and starts talking 
about a subproject which has been established in relation to project  “New Hospital” in order to 
get a financial overview. (Soon after) John is in a hurry because he has just been told that they 
need to have a spontaneous meeting about a refurbishment project they are working on. John 
spurts out the door and down the hall where the meeting is to be held. On his way over he 
explains that late yesterday afternoon he was given authorization to proceed with this project, 
which involves refurbishing an old section of his ward.]  
- Sure, this is good news, but things are really becoming urgent, he says gasping for air. - We 
will start the job at the end of next month.  
 246
[A small group of people await John in the meeting room. He sits down and they get right 
down to business. They need to find a solution to the problems that are caused by the 
refurbishment project. Some people will have to be relocated, but where to? They cannot sit 
just anywhere, because of limitations connected to building technology constructional 
technical limitations. More restrictions and constraints are brought up, such as a shortage of 
personnel to handle the relocation, lack of time to finish the project and lack of funding to get 
things the way they want them. Having reeled off all kinds of possibilities and limitations about 
the project, they round off the meeting by distributing tasks. John decides to take on a lot of 
these himself, including the task of giving notice to the implicated personnel, and of writing to 
the people who need to be informed.]  
 
[At 0947 hours John is back in his office. He needs to make an important phone call, he says 
as he dials a number.]  
- Hi, are you busy? Can you come down here for a minute? Good, see you then, he says.  
[He hangs up and explains that they are currently working on a project of relocating people.] 
- And we are conducting conversations designed to identify needs and problems because of 
project “New Hospital”. I was originally meant to have one such conversation with a woman 
later this afternoon; a department nurse. But as she has been working all night, against her will 
in a sense, we need to have the meeting right away.  
 
[A minute later the nurse and two other women from the administrative staff arrive at John’s 
door. They all sit down, and John informs them about the forthcoming process.]  
- Some will have to be relocated, he says, but personnel with legal rights will receive an offer.  
[There is not much discussion, and soon the meeting is over. The women leave, and as soon 
as they are all out the door John informs me that he intends to read a science paper and to do 
some tidying up of his mail. Usually this is the kind of stuff that is postponed to late afternoons, 
but since a meeting has just been cancelled he can do it right away, he explains. John thinks it 
is a good idea that I wait in the office next door while he does his reading, so that he might 
work in peace. . .] 
 
[The time is 1130 and John knocks on the door to the office he has let me borrow.] 
- As usual the stuff I was supposed to do didn’t happen, John utters resignedly. - As you know, 
I had planned to read a research paper and tidy up my mail, but instead several spontaneous 
meetings occurred. Most of them were requests regarding that special patient, you know, the 
one who requires such expensive medication. The patient is not from around here, you see, 
he’s from another part of the country and the question is whether his local authorities might 
contribute towards covering some of the expenses. The other issue concerned the rebuilding 
of the hospital and consequences this has for us. Anyway, we should leave now to arrive in 
time for the scheduled lunch meeting.  
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In this account John seems to walk into one unexpected happening after another: someone 
knocking on the door needing his immediate attention and help, several spontaneous meetings 
due to unexpected occurrences, cancellations, and changes of plans, to point out a few. These 
are occurrences that indicate a high degree of unpredictability. But they do not seem 
extraordinary; rather, they seem to naturally belong to normal organizing practice, to 
everyday life. As a colleague once said: How can a telephone ring in any other way than 
unexpectedly?  
 
“As usual the things I was supposed to do didn’t happen”, John says. And the report certainly 
shows how he keeps on being interrupted from his planned agenda. Instead of John’s 
anticipations for the immediate future coming through, something else happens that 
constitutes a new reality all together; one that is not asked for. Unexpected occurrences follow 
each other and set John off in another direction than planned. As he has new contexts forced 
upon him, he is encouraged to perform a different kind of action than anticipated. In terms of 
sensemaking, interruption persuades John to redefine what is important and meaningful, and it 
is not always a pleasant experience. Observing him, I rather got a sense that he considered it 
troublesome and stressful to keep getting thrown out of context and into new ones. 
 
Even if new contexts are constantly thrown at John, as argued by Weick (1995) these are 
contexts that John himself participates in shaping. He enacts and recognizes them through 
processes of improvisation in which he performs as best as he can. In some of the cases 
described in the excerpt, for instance the spontaneous meeting on refurbishment, there is even 
a significant degree of surprise and creativity, so there is not only task variation but 
complexity as well: The refurbishment meeting comes unexpectedly, requiring a change of 
focus and contextual, sensible action. Moreover, as the meeting evolves, there is a lot of 
playfulness and creative idea storming, which indicates positive improvisation. Seen from a 
different angle, however, the meeting displays negative improvisation, as the participants are 
responding (reacting) to each other’s emergent gestures. Still, as idea storming was not only 
anticipated but the very agenda itself, the reactive aspects might be toned down in this 
instance. After all, the refurbishment meeting was more about producing some good ideas for 
the future than about reacting to emergent problems.  
 
I suggest that by using two different ways to approach improvisation (as elaborated in the 
previous chapter), one negative and the other positive, one may shed light on important 
 248
aspects of social interaction that might otherwise be left in the dark. From a negative angle, 
the reactive aspects of the situation stand out, such as responding to arising complexity in the 
form of other people’s gestures. From a positive angle, the more playful and proactive aspects 
stand out, such as in the process of producing new ideas for future organizing. In addition, 
John’s story indicates support for a theoretical observation made in chapter eight, namely that 
I do not think about positive and negative improvisation as discrete phenomena, but as 
different frameworks for understanding the same lived experience. In the latter sense, positive 
and negative improvisation evolves simultaneously and reflexively, as mutually constitutive 
phenomena feeding off each other.   
 
I want to include one last episode to illustrate unpredictability and improvisation in practice. 
As was the case in the previous episodes featuring Elisabeth, Chris and John, this is a portrait 
of the way improvisation typically emerges in everyday social interaction: rather than take the 
shape of a grand event of peak performance, it tends to emerge as a natural form of 
spontaneous and contextually intelligent presence. The episode starts with Howard receiving 
a surprise visit by Ole, a department physician and colleague.  
 
[It is 1235 hours and Howard is back at the office. He invites me to have a chat about his 
normal workday as it usually unfolds.] 
Researcher: - It seems to me that there is a lot of administration that needs to be done in your 
work, but still, in general, you appear to be acting spontaneously. For instance, in most of the 
meetings you attend conversational themes seem to emerge without being on the agenda, 
and things tend to happen that were not neatly planned. How do you relate to this 
interpretation? 
Howard: - Yes, definitely! A lot of my time is indeed spent in meetings; everything from the 
detailed management of planning rosters and work schedules to more spontaneous tasks. I 
have spent a lot of time delegating detailed tasks. I have created report systems, and I have 
monthly meetings with every section in my department. Except from this, I encourage that the 
sections be given the liberty to manage themselves responsibly as they best see fit. It is 
impossible to plan everyday work life in detail. In other words: I really do recognize my 
everyday work life in your description. By the way, there is another meeting today at 1300 
hours. With food!  
 
[Just as Howard finishes his sentence, a physician comes by and asks for his signature on 
some documents. He also says that the meeting scheduled for 1300 hrs (with food) is 
cancelled. One thing leads to another, and soon they are discussing the effects of treatment 
and medications. The physician, Ole, tries to prioritize, he says, but it is extremely difficult. 
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Actually, he feels that he is rather restrictive, probably more so than others, but still it is difficult. 
And with regard to the new drugs that have been developed, they are not a real break-through. 
They merely indicate an effect, he says.]  
- Regarding “fourth time treatment”, Ole continues, - I am afraid to make political and financial 
decisions on my level of command. 
[Ole and Howard continue discussing this topic for a while, before Ole brings up some 
personal problems related to his academic career. Ole proposes a solution for how he might 
be able to combine his medical practice with academic interests. Howard agrees. He says he 
shares Ole’s point of view, and approves of his proposal. Next, Ole shares with Howard some 
personal concerns about the future. Howard mostly listens though he occasionally backs him 
verbally. Shortly after, Ole leaves and Howard turns to his mail.] 
 
The way this episode develops, the aspect of small-scale unpredictability is conspicuous. 
Throughout the episode, the context keeps evolving somewhat unexpectedly, and it even 
starts with an interruption, as Ole comes by unannounced. Intuitively I have the understanding 
that there could be no practical way for Howard to foresee his receiving a visit from a 
subordinate, nor could he know in advance the topics that would come up. Furthermore, in 
one moment Howard is looking forward to a meeting with a nice lunch, and in the next he is 
told that it is cancelled. Instead he finds himself engaged in a conversation, a meeting if you 
will, which he had not planned for. And in this conversation there is a process of continuous 
gesturing and responding that seems to follow no rule or system. The spontaneous choice of 
words, tone of voice, use of hand signals and facial expressions are just a few examples not 
easily caught on paper. Again we are reminded of the quality of emergence as we realize that 
we never know how a situation will be played out, and we seldom know precisely when 
something will happen (Petranker 2005; Purser and Petranker 2005). 
 
As soon as Ole enters the room Howard is ensnared into social and emotional interaction, and 
he acts in an authentic and genuine manner. Soon Ole is sharing some personal reflections 
about the future, and some of his deepest concerns about the workplace. In a sense he is 
laying his problems upon Howard’s shoulders, expecting him to listen and give advice. And 
Howard follows up. He listens patiently to Ole and backs him. Context-sensitivity in this 
situation can best be explained as empathy. Moreover, Howard does not merely understand 
Ole by taking his perspective and being passively empathetic; he is also showing empathy 
through explicit verbal and non-verbal actions. Thus he is actively taking part in the situation 
and producing the kind of actions that the situation demands. He is showing understanding 
and proposing solutions. He is improvising.  
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In order to see improvisation as an everyday phenomenon we must look for novelty on a 
detailed and practically realistic scale (i.e. Mead’s (1967) notion of emergence). In this sense 
novelty is not only to be found in outright chaotic grand scenarios, but in sufficiently complex 
situations – more complex than familiar, more vague and uncertain than given, more 
unpredictable than predictable. In a variety of examples we have observed precisely such 
emergent everyday complexity, ranging from ambiguity and vagueness, via clustering of 
events, to everyday unpredictable scenarios. One aspect from chapter seven remains to be 
addressed, however: emotionality. On the basis of my findings I regard emotionality as a 
particularly central topic that in many ways binds the different aspects of complexity together. 
I have therefore chosen to discuss the role of emotionality in improvisation in a section of its 
own. Seeing how the implicit and subtle complexity introduced by emotions is dealt with by 
managers may contribute towards expanding the limits of what is traditionally considered to 
be improvisation.  
Emotion and improvisation 
Emotion is unavoidable in a social everyday setting such as a workplace (Dewey 1929), but as 
implied in chapter four it is seldom talked about as a trigger or as a signifier of genuine 
improvisation. Rather, we are not strangers to associating improvisation with a technical 
family of concepts such as problem solving, innovation and (positive) creativity, almost as if 
they were emotionless subjects (for example Moorman and Miner 1995, 1998a, 1998b; 
Brown and Eisenhardt 1997; Ciborra 1996; Orlikowski 1996; Orlikowski and Hofman 1997; 
Zack 2000; Leybourne 2006). Whereas chapter four argued for the essential role of emotion in 
“The improvising man”, this section goes one step further and attempts to provide empirical 
support for the role of emotion in organizing as improvisation.  
 
We saw in chapter seven that emotional complexity is a matter to be considered in everyday 
contextuality amongst the InSitu managers. We witnessed many examples of managers facing 
situations of emotional complexity, and saw how the managers countered those situations not 
by using technical rational measures, but with empathy and through reactive improvisation. 
Call to mind, for instance, Camilla’s reaction to the unpleasant news about routine failure (pp. 
202-203); Howard’s having trouble with interpreting and responding to an employee crying 
(pp. 203-204); the manner in which the conversation between Peter and Julie emerged as 
emotionally complex, urging real time (reactive) improvisation from both parties (p. 205); 
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Thomas’s dealing with the very agitated Sharon (pp. 206-207); and John’s dealing with the 
tragic death of a patient (pp. 207-208). In all those instances we saw people making sense 
with people in an emotionally authentic manner.  
 
I suggest that dealing with emotion at work can involve improvisation in a quite pure form. 
Wherever there are people of flesh and blood there is emotion and vice versa. Above all, 
social processes require empathy and the capacity to act in what can sometimes amount to 
immense complexity. Following Mead (1967) and Dewey (1929) one may ask how emotion 
might be made cognizant if not through the emotional register of another human being? 
Instrumentality of any business or work process is inevitable in some sense even in a hospital 
context, but in none of the previous instances were people treated purely as means, resources 
or machines. The point argued here is that whenever someone is addressing and treating 
people as they appear in a lived present, that person is improvising. To authentically read and 
interact with people requires certain corporal and improspective capacities of social sensitivity 
and empathy.  
 
In the opening passages of this section I mentioned some instances of emotional complexity 
from chapter seven, and I encouraged the reader to see the improvisation involved in them. 
Keeping in mind the possibility of a connection between emotionality and improvisation I 
shall in the following present a longer and quite remarkable episode of social and emotional 
emergence. The situation features Howard in a negotiation meeting with two union 
representatives and a lady from the personnel division of the central administration about 
some department personnel cut backs. We join in as Howard is preparing to leave for the 
meeting.  
 
[Howard runs by his office to pick up a few things – a notebook and some files – and quickly 
heads off to the meeting room. Two female representatives from the labour union and a 
woman from the personnel division of the central administration (CPA) are waiting for him. The 
meeting is about downsizing, and particularly about two people whose temporary employment 
has exceeded the 6 months limit for such positions. . .] 
 
[At 0835 hours the meeting commences. Howard starts out by saying that he has great 
sympathy for the union representatives’ (UR) position, as he has himself a history of working 
for the union. Nonetheless, there is an explicit demand from central management that they cut 
three positions. As a consequence, two research positions will be made redundant. One of the 
union representatives (UR 1) responds with a question.]  
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UR 1: - How is the rest of the department notified about the cut? And by the way, is there 
really no other way to make cuts in the department’s budget?  
Howard: - I would have to remove other positions if these two were to be left untouched. I do 
not want to do that, however, since these two positions are not really part of the department’s 
operations. On the contrary, they are research positions. And I am reluctant to remove 
resources I feel are crucial to our core operations. 
UR 2: - What implications might this have for patient treatment?  
Howard: - To some extent all research has implications for patients. But research is not 
supposed to be part of the department’s ordinary operational budget.  
UR 2: - But is research not part of the core activity at the hospital?  
Howard: - Maybe, but I do not have any funding for direct research.  
UR 2: - Are you sure about this?  
Howard: - Yes, unless you are pointing at education. This is, of course, a matter of definition. 
 
[The atmosphere in the room is growing tenser by the minute. Voices are raised slightly and 
facial expressions becoming a bit tighter. Howard keeps repeating his message over and over, 
only to get similar questions back, compelling him to once again go through his arguments and 
check whether they do in fact hold water. CPA’s phone rings. She picks it up from the table, 
but does not answer and puts it down again.]  
UR 1: - Surely you must agree that research is a primary objective of the hospital. No doubt 
you have the power to reverse this process, to find the positive aspects of keeping the 
positions? You might, for instance, turn this into a case of future succession.  
Howard: - Yes, but the money simply does not exist! And funding for research is not supposed 
to come via the operational budget. And if money should rush in to publications, this certainly 
does not come via operations. 
UR 1: - From where does it come, then? 
Howard: - I don’t know. 
 
[Similar questions are once again repeated and answered in the same manner. Then again. 
And again.]  
Howard: - I realize under the circumstances that I should stress the rules even stronger. 
[Howard says this in a firm tone of voice. His body language signals irritation.]  
Howard: - What I am referring to is the director’s unambiguous view on the situation, and what 
he spells out to me I have to take into consideration!  
UR 1: - So where can we find these regulations in writing?  
Howard: - You have to make direct contact with the director. I cannot sit here and point out 
sources in detail. In that case we will get nowhere.  There is an explicit demand for me to 
downsize. And this being the case, there is no way around these two positions not being 
carried on into next year’s budget. As it is now that I’m having to turn down requests for 
treatment because of the two research positions. This is why I cannot take responsibility for 
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these positions on next year’s budget. Researchers have their very own moneybag for 
everyday operations. Personally I have no influence on this as it concerns external funding.  
UR 2: - So there is no other way to solve this? 
[UR 2 sighs loudly and frowns].  
Howard: - No, because then I would have to play the role of a research manager, which is not 
part of my job description. I do not want to enter into such a discussion. You must raise the 
matter with the director. If I had the responsibility for research in addition to everything else, I 
would have drowned!  
UR 2: - How is this initially intended to work, then?  
Howard: - Again, we are approaching a discussion we cannot have here, one that must be had 
with the director in person. The issue here is that there is no money for these positions on next 
year’s budget!  
[Howard sounds even more determined and his voice is very firm, almost cold. The discussion 
seems to be having a draining and wearying effect on him.]  
UR 2: - But surely this is just a form of reorganizing; of cutting costs? And the point of 
reorganizing is not merely downsizing? Surely other solutions must be found first? 
[UR 2 seems impatient and irritated and her voice is raised, too. She is interrupted as CPA’s 
phone goes off again, but CPA ignores it. Howard hesitates and does not seem too eager to 
give UR 2 an answer. He then calls upon CPA to speak.] 
CPA: - Of course we will look for other solutions. But in this case we must be aware that there 
is no guarantee that they will comply with our offers of relocation. We cannot even guarantee 
that we will actually manage to find realistic possibilities of relocation. And should we not 
succeed in doing so, they will be offered severance pay of five months’ salary. Or they may be 
transferred to the “Personalhuset”, which is an external collaboration partner who then takes 
over the employer’s responsibilities. In that case they may receive 5 + 8 months’ salary. But in 
that case the ”Personalhuset” may employ them in their own organisation, and they may insist 
on as much as one hour of commuting, one way, every day.  
UR 2: - Two hours in total, then?  
CPA: - Yes, but this is no different from what we have today. 
 
UR 1: - It seems a bit strange that the people are already picked before the process has even 
started. How have you informed your department? In a case like this is merely natural that the 
department is notified about it?  
Howard: - My department has been notified on a general level, but in this case it is not even 
certain that anybody in the department actually knows the people concerned, as they are not 
physically present on our local premises. Anyhow, I have authority over some 260 employees, 
and it is not an easy undertaking to notify them all.  
UR 1: - So it is not possible to remove some here and there when there are as many as 260 in 
the department?  
[The CPA breaks in.] 
 254
CPA: - One must be able to show concretely where the cut has been made.  
UR 1: - I wish a decision had not been made before the matter was cleared on a level of 
principle, though. Research is very useful in this department!! 
[UR 1 seems eager and determined, her upper body pointing forward towards Howard, who 
repeats his message a last time.]  
Howard: - This is a case that should be taken to the director in person. The hospital’s strategy 
on research is certainly not a part of this meeting!  
UR 1: - But we should have received earlier warning. In writing. And this has not happened.  
Howard: - I can put down the arguments on paper today.  
[The CPA’s phone goes off again. She ignores it for the third time.]  
 
UR 1: - This is a new situation for us. A difficult case. Actually, this is my very first formal 
discussion with fellow union representatives.  
[Then UR 1 repeats her arguments one more time, only to get the same message from 
Howard as before, and again he emphasizes that this is not the place to discuss the hospital’s 
research strategy. And that this is not the forum to discuss which position Howard’s 
department should have in relation to medical research.]  
UR 2: - Have you considered that what you are doing amounts to cutting off the very branch 
you are sitting on? 
[Howard frowns, takes a deep breath as if to demonstrate irritation, and responds.]  
Howard: - I have estimated the departmental costs of doing this, both in the long and the short 
term, but within the present budget. And it is not my responsibility as head of department to 
facilitate research. There are other guidelines for this. You have to confer with the director in 
person.  
[For the fourth time CPA’s phone goes off, and she still ignores it.] 
 
[UR 1 asks whether plausible possibilities for relocation exist.]  
Howard: - Almost impossible to find an identical position. But this is a matter of what they are 
willing to do themselves, and which priorities they have. The reason we are gathered here 
today is that there are a bunch of rules, regulations and considerations that must be taken into 
account when cuts are being made in the staff. Other issues should not be addressed. But 
surely it is easier to build up than to tear down. How the process of funding research is to be 
managed is an issue to be addressed to the director in person. Clearly, there are a lot of 
things that might have been addressed here, but sadly they are outside of my jurisdiction. The 
limitation that I have to consider is to avoid making cuts in direct positions. And I have already 
made a cut of 1,2 positions in the administrative staff.  
 
[It seems that both parties are realizing that they are not making any progress, and they agree 
to continue the meeting as soon as the written material has been handed out. The problem, 
however, is that Howard and the others all have a packed calendar. Hence, they agree to 
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meet up later the same day at 1600 hours. (An important point is that the written material is 
supposed to be handed out in advance.) Soon the two URs leave, and only Howard, the CPA 
and myself are left in the meeting room.] 
 
In order to see emotion, emergence and improvisation in action, more than just a few lines of 
writing are required. In many ways a movie or sound clip might give a better view into real 
life improvisation in terms of spontaneity and emerging details, but from my perspective 
nothing measures up to real life experience. In written text one must as a reader try to 
visualize parts of the setting to make it come real. In the previous passage the length of the 
conversation in combination with contextual details of how it emerged hopefully goes a long 
way towards indicating the richness of emotionality and impulsiveness involved. Even though 
this episode involved the repetition of similar rhetoric and arguments by the participants over 
and over again, thus creating some sort of cognitive redundancy, I hope I have communicated 
sufficiently the emotional presence, the tension, and the spontaneity of real time gesturing and 
responding.  
 
Immediately after the meeting Howard commented that he had to invest a lot of energy to 
remain empathetic and to stick to the situation at hand, and that he did not have a clear image 
beforehand of what the meeting was going to like. In an attempt to further illuminate the 
improvisatory aspects of the meeting from Howard’s point of view, I have enclosed one last 
quotation which expands on Howard’s remark. As we enter the situation Howard, CPA and I 
are slowly walking back to Howard’s office, and I take this opportunity to ask Howard some 
questions about what just happened.   
  
Researcher:  - The arguments that you used in the discussion, had you prepared them 
beforehand?  
Howard:  - No, I had not prepared my arguments in detail. Actually I did not have a clear 
image of the meeting at all before it actually took place. My strength, however, is that I was a 
UR myself for three years. So you might say that I am used to this kind of situation, as I have 
experienced similar contexts earlier. That being said, however, this was quite a new 
experience for me. I really had to invest a lot of energy to stick to the case at hand, and avoid 
being tricked into a far more elaborate discussion that did not really belong there.  
CPA:  - You had to watch yourself to avoid being caught in the trap?  
Howard: - Ha-ha… Yes, I guess you might call it that – a trap.  
Researcher: - Would you say that you are gifted in the sense that you are capable of 
understanding their position? 
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Howard: - Yes, absolutely. I think I understand them very well. And I understand very well how 
they might feel. 
 
How could Howard possibly be prepared for the practical details that emerged during the 
meeting? Although Howard has gathered much experience over many years of working under 
similar conditions, this exact meeting was unique. It was genuine and demanding − to such 
extent that Howard speaks of it as quite a new experience. Consequently, Howard was very 
well prepared for things that could happen, and he had the right tools to deal with the situation; 
he was prepared for those things that in this case one could be prepared for. But he was not 
prepared for the practical how. For this he relied on his capacity for spontaneous attentiveness 
and reaction, and his ability to utilize his knowledge contextually. As the meeting progressed 
there was a lot of tension that had to be addressed on impulse in some way or another. Thus, 
Howard had to match the emotional seriousness of the situation by creating genuine responses 
to the gestures of the others as they were trying to come up with a sensible solution.  
 
In my view the previous meeting shows Howard as a skilled improvisor; a man who knows 
how to react spontaneously (negative improvisation) and to make genuine conversation. On a 
larger scale it also indicates how emotions “entrap” people into authentic real time interaction 
and improvisation. In this sense it shows that sociality involves emotionality and that handling 
these matters authentically on a conscious level involves “deep improvisation” (Purser and 
Petranker 2005). There were no extreme acute incidents, no deaths and no emergencies in this 
episode. But nonetheless there was a chain of somewhat small and emerging events that to a 
large extent could not be anticipated, and although the events might not immediately seem 
constantly complex, the meeting was open ended, and as it proceeded it varied between the 
more and the less familiar. (It is my interpretation that the participants joined the meeting in 
search of a solution, not with the purpose of following some routine). Nobody could tell in 
advance what would happen, or which conclusions would be drawn, or which emotional 
patterns would form. Alternatively this could have been a routine matter with a rigidly 
performed agenda, with less of a need to pay attention to the actual circumstances. Instead it 
became an emotionally complex process; a genuine conversation between passionate and 
deeply involved individuals. Emergence was less predictable in this case than in processes of 
strict routine. As a consequence, even if the conversational themes might not seem severely 
complex, the practical process of conversing was, and thus the situation became complex, too.  
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It is my impression from observing InSitu managers that emotions vary with regard to their 
degree of explicitness. As a third person it is sometimes easy to spot the emotional component 
in a gesture, while at other times it is more difficult. Furthermore, there is always a chance 
that as an observer I misinterpret emotionality and the role it plays in a situation. This 
indicates that emotional interaction is a process of sophisticated improvisation; of playing 
roles, responding to equivocal gestures, of understanding one’s own emotional vocabulary as 
well as that of others, and of participating in constructing trajectories of shared meaning into 
the future. Through the examples presented here and in chapter seven I have tried to give rich 
illustrations of emotion at play in everyday situations. The narratives I have presented, 
however, vary with regard to emotional intensity and explicitness. As it represents a 
phenomenon of more explicit emotionality, humour and the way it is manifested in action as 
pure improvisation provides the topic for the next section.  
Humour at work – some cases of pure improvisation 
In this section I suggest humour as a specific facet of emotional sensemaking which may 
provide valuable insight into what can get blended together into a grey mass of everydayness. 
My impression is that humour is a recurrent and typical trait of everyday life amongst InSitu 
managers, and as such it might contribute towards consolidating improvisation as an 
important feature of organizing practice. Much like the metaphor of jazz music, through its 
emotional explicitness humour can help display sides of improvisation which might otherwise 
be hard to trace.  
 
Whatever the purpose of humour – the act of making jokes, of having fun − in a given 
situation, I have found in my observations of InSitu managers that humour shows aspects of 
genuine improvisation. On many occasions humour was a very distinctive trait in social 
processes. In this regard my study suggests that humour is a natural part of everyday 
organizing, and that it is “used” as an instrument of improvisation and therefore deserves a 
place of its own. The following example is taken from a group discussion where John and his 
chief physicians are gathered to go through the different patients’ cases.  
 
[The discussion moves on by itself between the physicians without John’s interference. Soon a 
remarkable case comes up. One of the doctors reports on a patient with rare and abnormally 
stout and massive defecation. He explains that the faeces tend to come in lengths of up to half 
a meter, and that the quality is  so firm and robust  that they refuse to break off as faeces 
normally do. Consequently, once every month when the patient uses the restroom, the toilet 
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usually gets jammed, as a half a metre piece of faeces sticking up from the bowl is plugging it. 
Not only do the faeces not break off by themselves, the doctor goes on explaining, but they 
are almost impossible to break at all – even by force. No less than three toilet-brushes have 
broken off during attempts to crush the faeces, he explains with astonishment. He looks 
around only to meet silence from the other doctors. It is almost as if they are awaiting the next 
detail, but there is none. Then, in what seems like an awkward stillness of anticipation, a quiet 
chuckle can be heard; it is way too discrete to be called laughter. Next, someone makes a 
funny comment; something about how “hard” it is to believe what the physician is saying, upon 
which the whole gathering breaks out in laughter. Someone is holding out his hands so as to 
gesticulate the size of the faeces, which is followed by more laughter. “Incredible”, a male 
physician states in amazement.  
 
With a smile the physician adds that the story was in fact so incredible that doctors initially had 
problems believing it. Consequently the patient had to bring photos from home to prove his 
story. More laughter follows, now much louder than before. And soon the whole meeting is 
making comments, visualizing with their hands and laughing.  
 
Turn-taking seems to be essential to the meeting’s organization, and as the laughter calms 
down the turn is passed on to another physician coming off night shift, who starts out 
elaborating on the record of one of his patients in a far more grave tone of voice. Others are 
pulling out their notebooks, asking questions and making comments about the information 
presented, which regards an instance of leukaemia. It appears to be a tragic case.  
 
The meeting is rounded off by John as he reports about a male patient who arrived from a 
different department last night with a large swelling on his neck.  
- They did not have enough room, he says.  
- Was it that big? one of the physicians asks as he half-heartedly tries to suppress his 
amusement, and once again the gathering breaks out in laughter.] 
 
This episode shows that laughter may come even if unintended. Whether the physician who 
reported the faeces incident expected the situation to become comical or not is hard to tell, but 
it was hardly his intention to joke about his patient. After all, this was a serious meeting in 
which humour occurred unexpectedly and spontaneously. And as it evolved, people seemed to 
gradually let out emotional tension, rather than instantly explode in laughter. They seemed to 
be feeling their ground, so to speak, to be considering the emerging context. The 
intersubjective comprehension of what was acceptable changed dynamically, inevitably 
leading up to a situation of spontaneous and genuinely creative comedy.  
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The comment on John’s report of a huge swelling was harmless and witty. It appeared to be 
made as a deliberate misunderstanding of John’s report, so as to produce an image of such an 
enormous swelling that it needed more room, and under the circumstances this was seen as 
funny. In this sense the absurd image of a gigantic swelling can be seen as an improvisatory 
play with meaning, provoking fantasy and imagination and liberating positive emotions.   
 
In the previous quotation humour was sharply contrasted by the graveness of the leukaemia 
case, a contrast which stands out when emotion is the frame of reference. A similar contrast 
between graveness and humour can also be identified in the next episode, featuring Chris.  
 
[Chris looks at his watch. He tells Brit that he has a lot of things on the agenda and that he has 
to flee. Next thing Chris dashes out to take the elevator. Up on the third floor he meets up with 
an American product salesman who is promoting some new state of the art product line which 
can improve operation procedures in Chris’ department. The two of them go into an office and 
meet up with a physician and a machine specialist. Soon they start discussing the product, 
which seems like a radical improvement on what exists in the hospital today. Chris sounds 
excited, and has many questions. He says his department could be the first in Norway to 
possess and exploit this new technology. And not a second too early, as there are a lot of 
problems with the current technology − something which urges an update. The American 
salesman continues his briefing for another half an hour, and explains that the product has 
been successfully implemented in Germany. Maybe Chris should go there and have a look?  
 
Having discussed the matter for a while they get up to leave. On their way out they stop by a 
piece of old and outdated machinery which is stored in the office. The machine specialist 
explains that it was earlier used for operation purposes.]  
- It is quite a paradox, the machine specialist (MS) comments as he puts a hand on the old 
machine, - that in this matter the central authorities demand that we elucidate the possibilities 
to buy old and second-hand technology.  
[The MS smiles and looks at Chris as if to invite a comment. Chris looks as if he just 
swallowed a frog. He laughs half-heartedly and this seems to loosen up the group. Soon 
everybody is laughing and making jokes about the lack of competence within the central 
authorities and their unhealthy preoccupation with cutting costs.]  
- Perhaps, Chris suggests trying to avoid laughing, - perhaps old mixers could be made into 
the machines we need? Talk about saving money!  
[As a response everybody laughs, louder now than before, as they slowly start moving 
towards the door. And as the MS is going through the doorway he stops and turns to face the 
others.] 
- I say, this bureaucracy thing is something we simply have to do – like you know, on the side; 
in addition to what we really want and need to do, MS says.  
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[His tone of voice has turned more serious. Chris, not smiling anymore either, nods his head 
as if to show sympathy whilst resting his eyes on what appears to be some non-existent point 
in front of him.] 
 
It seems that in this instance humour was used as an instrument to make a serious statement. 
In times of strict budgets and downsizing, getting one’s hands on updated and expensive 
operation equipment may prove difficult. Thus the departments are encouraged to save money 
and keep a low financial profile, which can of course seem quite incompatible with 
maintaining a professional medicinal edge. How humour was used, however, for which 
purpose it was utilized, is of secondary interest for now. Rather, my point is to show the 
spontaneity and context-specificity involved in this instance of authentic humour. More 
generally, my aim is to provide support for the argument that humour is a way of 
sensemaking which is highly emotional and thus improvisational. To the extent that humour 
presumes a particular feeling-state, humour without emotion would be an odd concept, and to 
the extent that humour emerges socially, it is a way of creating meaning in the here and now 
through physical gestures. Humour is improvisation. 
 
I urge the reader to see in the previous extracts how improvised humour makes use of the stuff 
that dwells in the here and now, and that both physical and mental entities can be used as 
instruments. As a process of improvisation humour is contextual and impulsive as well as 
creative. Take the old piece of machinery in Chris’s department for example, which through 
MS’s joke becomes the centre of attention for him, Chris and the others. Throwing sarcasms 
at the “old piece of junk” can be seen as a way of using it as an instrument to make people 
laugh, and in this case the purpose appears to be that of creating a joint identity of ridiculing 
bureaucracy. Running the danger of exaggeration, one might even see this specific joke as a 
means to deal with technical-rational imprisonment: as an improvisatory act to deal with 
systemic shortcomings.  
 
As indicated, I see humour as a social and improvisatory process making use of certain tools 
or instruments. In the previous example the tool was quite noticeable: The old machine. But 
as indicated, the object of conversation, the tool, may be far less tangible than this; it may be 
purely abstract or at least not physically present there and then, as in the cases of the 
extraordinary faeces and the enormous swelling. As an example of even more abstract 
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improvised humour, consider the next episode where John is in a meeting with the director 
and two of his assistants (DA). 
 
[Next the discussion turns towards departmental downsizing. John has promised the director 
to cut down on his number of staff, but currently he has only two options available. John 
explains that these are two vacancies that in fact do not require funding. These are leaves of 
absence, and amongst them one maternity leave.] 
DA 1: -  What happens when the leave expires? 
[John’s answer comes spontaneously.] 
John: - I had, of course, hoped for another pregnancy!  
[The meeting bursts out in laughter, which is followed by some comments on “sexual 
harassment”, and yet more laughter. Moments later, as the mirth calms down, the director 
calls for another round of downsizing. John says he realizes that this was destined to happen, 
and admits that he has had no expectations that it would simply go away by itself. The group 
seems to take John’s utterance as an understatement, and everyone bursts out in laughter. 
John joins in, too.] 
 
Are there any physical symbols in this extract? In a sense they are there, but not for the eyes 
to see. Rather, they are present as mental representations of experience; as language. As John 
makes his understatements, for instance, he merely indicates situations – things that might 
happen – but which for all practical purposes are not seriously considered. And this makes it 
funny: the fact that speculating in pregnancies is a highly dubious affair, one that is quite 
incomprehensible for responsible managers, not to mention doctors. Performing such 
speculation, as John so subtly invites everyone to do, can be seen as a way of proposing 
alternative realities. From a sensemaking point of view John, creates images of reality that are 
somehow not meaningful. John deliberately says unacceptable things and by doing this he 
creates a comical situation. There is no actual pregnancy in this case. Rather, there is John 
playing with the social context at hand, saying something which contradicts his formal and 
responsible position. In this case it seems that understating something works because John’s 
position is somewhat overstated, thus making his statements harmless. John takes a risk, but 
the group picks up on his joke immediately, even though it is an ambiguous statement. For 
what if John is making fun of them, too, as well as of the whole process of cutting 
expenditures, however implicitly and gently it is done? The deliberate play on ambiguity 
therefore seems to be a key aspect in this situation, indicating the fundamental role played by 
improvisation here.  
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In John’s case the large degree of ambiguity implies that it is hard to identify objective 
reasons for why humour appears. Only John knows his intentions, to the extent that he has 
any. It seems that the context and the novelty involved provide unique circumstances, and 
John’s humour works because of these circumstances. In this situation John does not have any 
over-sized faeces to joke about, or some piece of old machinery to mock; instead he has the 
imaginary incident of a pregnancy. More importantly, he is involved in an authentic 
conversation with living and attentive human beings, and in this sense I regard John as 
context sensitive and improvisational. He is playing with forbidden and unthinkable ideas, 
and he is doing it together with, or rather to, someone else in a real-life situation (and in a 
convincing manner). The joke would be senseless otherwise. It is only funny because it 
belongs and makes sense in the context. And in this case it is a context of certain people 
discussing certain issues in a manager’s office, in some Norwegian hospital building under 
particular political circumstances at a specific point in history and so forth. Forced 
pregnancies and “sexual harassment” are not funny topics per se. And this brings me to the 
last incident of improvised humour that I have chosen to include, one that perhaps did not 
work as well as the previous examples.  
 
[The director comments that he has noticed that some of the wards are advertising services to 
the private market.]  
Director: - But no-one is doing any haggling!  
Head nurse: - Can we really do that? Offer bargains, I mean?  
Director: - Yes, certainly!  
Head nurse: - There may be something in our culture that prevents us from it. We are not used 
to negotiating prices. 
Director: - On one hand we are old Stalinists, as we focus on retaining costs. And we are 
obliged to tell you that. For example, “reduce your costs by 10 per cent”. But please come up 
with your own ideas for how to do it! We want you to be pro-active. Currently we are accepting 
a bit too much.  
George: - Yes, but we are very content that we hired an African as a hospital orderly at low 
wages. But then again he was really on some kind of a slave contract. 
[George probably intends to imply that the orderly’s wages were very low. It is hard to tell, 
however, whether or not George is aware that his utterance, which includes both “African” and 
“slave” in the same sentence, might be seen as having racist connotations. His statement 
seems more as if it is  “hanging in the air” as looks are exchanged between the participants. It 
being an essentially ambiguous statement, nobody seems to spontaneously pick up on it 
before Richard, from the director’s staff, responds in a joking tone of voice.]  
Richard: - A black contract, perhaps? 
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[There is no laugh and only reserved smiles. Richard gets little response and the director 
breaks the silence.] 
Director: - Anyway, we cannot see where you have cut costs. The work you have done on the 
budget, however, is very good, apart from the operation services.  
[George is eager to comment and explains.] 
George: - Yes, but there is a continual increase in hospital admittances. This year there is a 3 
per cent increase, precisely the same as last year. Actually, Christmas Eve is the only time 
there are no patients in the corridors. And this is the way it has been for the last two years.  
Director: - Yes, anyway, I think we are done here already. A highly unusual budget meeting as 
it was so short and efficient, I think.  
 
What is funny and what is not? What is good humour? When does humour work? I think 
these questions are similar to for instance “what is good music”? Concerts are often quite 
social in form as they are performed in real time by groups with large audiences. In social 
terms, then, listening to and sharing the experience of a concert resembles telling and hearing 
a joke. There might be a shared context to joke in and with, just as there might be a shared 
cultural conception of good music, and both happen as spontaneous events emerging in the 
here and now. As a result they may both work and they may not, no matter how carefully 
planned their contents. And a failure to recognize the actual circumstances, the audience, the 
physical and social setting, the culture, in short: the situation, may result in bad music. And 
bad jokes.  
 
As pointed out in the reflections I made during my observation it is hard to tell whether or not 
George was aware of the potential of racist connotations in his statement. Richard, however, 
seemed to be quite conscious about his statement, but did he think about the implications? Did 
he intend it to be a racist statement? To answer these questions you would have to be Richard. 
Judging by the text there seems to be a considerable potential for interpreting Richard in a 
racist manner − something which is supported by the reactions of the group. But it might have 
been a slip of the tongue, or a play with prejudice and conflicts from a “safe” distance. Second 
best to actually being Richard is being present and reading the atmosphere, as I was, and from 
that stance this is what happened: Richard did not reflect sufficiently before telling what he 
probably saw as a harmless joke. The thing is, however, that no-one in his audience thought, 
or at least expressed, that it was funny. Thus the joke failed; it did not work under the 
circumstances, which made it an example of bad improvisation. However spontaneous, it 
lacked social sensitivity and intersubjective anchorage. One might say that it was good 
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improvisation from Richard’s perspective, at least before he saw the (absent) reaction, but it 
was bad improvisation socially speaking. I see this as an indication that context is 
epistemologically relative; it is a matter of emergent and shifting perspective (se chapters 
three and four).   
 
The quotations on humour in this section support Weick’s (1995) and Weick et al.’s (2005) 
premise that sensemaking is an ambiguous affair and thus a matter of dealing with problem 
definition (for example “what does it mean”, “what is the story?”). Consequently, this section 
ties a bond between the former sections of this chapter, which dealt with open-ended 
problems, equivocal situations, emotionality, unpredictability and the way sensemaking under 
such circumstances can take the form of negative improvisation. A red line through all of 
these sections is therefore the manner in which complexity has many dimensions, and how 
complexity can arrive uninvited, urging negative improvisation. As pointed out, however, 
there have been occasions where the negative is difficult to separate from the positive. In the 
following I will take a closer look at the latter, and study how positive improvisation 
manifests itself in everyday organizing.   
Positive improvisation 
Some opening statements 
In chapter eight I argued that the quality of positive improvisation is context dependent and 
that it may be divided into two categories, one pure and one general. In the pure and specialist 
sense of positive improvisation, the goal is the highest possible degree of improvisational 
purity, and it is typically found in creative art forms such as free jazz and free theatre and in 
genuine innovative processes (Bastien and Hostager 1992; Crossan and Sorrenti 1997; Hatch 
1997; Zack 2000; Weick 2001). In the general sense, positive improvisation involves a 
proactive desire to create contextual, and not merely genuine, novelty (Purser and Petranker 
2005; Petranker 2005). There can be various reasons for such a desire, but in a management 
context one would expect it to be a matter of improving or facilitating work practice for the 
sake of achieving some kind of present and future success. In both categories, positive 
improvisation comes about not because of something you are compelled to, but because you 
want to do it – there must be an initial ambition for creative development based in sensitivity 
to emerging contexts.  
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I want to emphasize that I do not intend to propose any natural or categorical border between 
positive and negative improvisation, as it is difficult to say in a given situation what comes 
first of want and need, or indeed, if the one can at all be separated from the other. And as the 
previous sections have already implied, negative and positive kinds of improvisation seem to 
emerge from and blend into each other over time. What is voluntary in one moment might 
lead to a surprise in the next, which again might arouse more voluntary efforts of 
improvisation. Positive and negative improvisation is therefore a matter of less and more, not 
of either-or. As a result, I associate certain situations more with the one than the other, but 
even though this section is devoted to positive improvisation, the mutual connection to 
negative improvisation is maintained and emphasized: Positive improvisation, too, implies 
handling open-ended problems (problem definition), equivocality, clusters of events, 
emotionality and unpredictability. Indeed, positive improvisation might entail voluntarily 
seeking and thriving on these if possible. A philosophical argument guiding the succeeding 
analysis is therefore that positive and negative kinds of improvisation concern the same 
phenomenon, all depending on the perspective taken, and I will be pointing out how in many 
cases the one relates to the other.  
 
As a way into this section on positive improvisation I would like to present some personal 
statements from the managers. They have in common the fact that they signify the managers’ 
attitudes towards context-sensitivity, thus giving an indication of the role positive 
improvisation plays in actual practice: 
 
Howard: - I try to plan ahead as much as possible, but still I end up doing a great deal of 
spontaneous problem-solving . . . . The most dangerous thing in a job like this is to become 
blinded by rules. One needs a large degree of freedom to find local solutions, even if the rules 
are there as a fundament . . . . Is not [the ability to read, understand and act in unique contexts 
and situations] what it is all about, really? For example, the meeting with the union 
representatives was a whole new situation to me. Had never done this before. Still I have 
experience from other situations earlier in my career, but this unique situation was totally 
different. 
 
Karina: - I evaluate the context at hand, and act accordingly.  
 
Peter: - [Context-sensitive] is something I have to be. I have to be able to sense the attitudes 
wherever I go. And there are huge differences internally within the department. Some things I 
know because I have seen them so many times . . . . Nurses have totally retreated when it 
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comes to the issue of professionalism versus management, and they have exaggerated the 
focus on management as something in and by itself. Nurses would love to have a total 
overview, even if they are responsible for as much as 50 employees . . . . To sum up, nurses 
regard management as a profession in itself, disengaged from the lived context. This way they 
risk getting professionally outdated. They are not up-to-date on what is going on, because they 
are so preoccupied with “management”.  
 
In these statements I see a shared positive attitude towards context-sensitivity and the crucial 
role it plays in everyday organizing. Howard and John even indicate that it can be the most 
important factor. But it is one thing to claim to be constantly alert and context-sensitive; and 
another thing to actually practice it: to improvise. I shall in the following move from words to 
action and explore how context-sensitivity can be a driving force in everyday action, thus 
enabling positive improvisation. 
Some illustrative cases 
The first example of positive improvisation concerns Camilla, who has gathered her medical 
staff to discuss structural challenges that her department will be facing in the near future. For 
the last half hour they have been discussing a range of topics when they are suddenly 
interrupted:   
 
[At 0931 hours a man, one of the section managers, suddenly enters. He apologizes for his 
tardiness, takes a seat and joins the discussion which now concerns the problem of breaking 
deadlines. Camilla says there are routines that regulate such occurrences, but she cannot 
remember the details. Neither can anyone else. At 0935 hours a female psychiatrist, who was 
also late for the meeting, rises. As she is more running than walking out of the meeting room 
she explains that she has to return to an acute incident, but that she will try to be back as soon 
as possible.  
 
Later, as they are discussing the general role of the Ministry of Health, one of the male 
psychiatrists (MP) says that he is a bit upset with the politicians, who, he argues, speak with 
two tongues] 
MP: - The politicians give the patients increased rights, but they do not simultaneously 
increase the budget so as to handle these rights. In other words, the more patients that are 
treated, the more the hospital is penalized! 
Camilla: - Well, the Ministry wants increased control over the enterprise. Anyway, there seems 
to be an extensive use of double diagnoses that we need to sort out how to deal with.  
[A female psychiatrist (FP 1) takes the word.] 
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FP 1: - Yes it is a paradoxical task to define whether a patient is mentally ill or ill from 
intoxication. How should we make our diagnoses? We often end up with double-diagnoses. 
And, of course, there is a great difference between the patients as well. 
 
[The discussion is interrupted at 0948 hours as the female psychiatrist returns once again. 
Another female psychiatrist (FP 2) speaks up.] 
FP 2: - Often problems with intoxication are caused by mental illness. And definitions are 
beating each other to death. One thing is no more correct than the other. It is merely a matter 
of different ways to perceive a case, she claims.  
[The medical issues and dilemmas of double-diagnoses are discussed for quite a while, before 
a new topic is introduced by FP 2 at approximately 1030 hours.]  
FP 2: - There are a great many vague points with regard to receiving patients. For example, it 
is often hard to say which patient belongs where. And it is difficult to know where to send the 
patient.  
FP 1: - We are currently working on a system for differentiating between different categories of 
patients with psychosis.  
[FP 1 asks Camilla if she can borrow the blackboard to sketch out a few possible solutions 
they have been working on. Camilla welcomes her to come up and do so, and as the 
psychiatrist makes her sketches and symbols all the participants start engaging in a 
brainstorming process. Nobody asks for permission to speak, they just speak as they 
themselves see fit. Nobody is controlling the process, except to some extent the psychiatrist 
who is putting the suggestions on the blackboard as they crop up. Camilla does not seem to 
attempt to control the process either, but sits back and contributes where she can, like the 
other participants. Ideas are put forward and discussed, and facts are brought in along the 
way to provide practical guidance and make the suggestions realistic. There are quite a few 
interruptions during the process, such as people coming and going, but nobody seems to pay 
them much notice. It turns out that finding a practical structure for performing diagnoses is a 
highly intricate matter as there are many pieces that have to fit together: The different sections 
work different hours, the wards have different kinds of patients, and they have different ways 
of thinking in terms of diagnoses, and different values that they hold high. Not until 1102 hours 
does Camilla formally close the meeting, some 30 minutes after the brainstorming began.] 
 
The first thing to happen is that one of the participants comes in late. Then suddenly another 
participant has to leave. However clear these incidents are as indicators of unpredictability, 
they are just part of the real-time emergence going on; for whilst all of these things are 
happening, a creative conversation is taking place on how to improve hospital practice. There 
is quite a bit of tension and inspiration amongst the participants, which seems to stem from 
the open-ended problems they are facing. In the middle of the process Camilla is trying to 
drive the process forward, however implicitly, towards a solution. In order to succeed, she has 
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to consider not only the ideas that are put forward, but the emotional state of the others, her 
own feelings and opinions towards them and the issue at hand, the great amount of 
professionalism and skill amongst those participating, and of course all of the unexpected 
incidents along the way. In this sense there is genuine complexity behind every corner and 
there is genuine reactive improvisation at play. And there is positive improvisation as well, as 
the participants are engaged in a genuine creative process, airing their thoughts and ideas 
spontaneously. Especially towards the end of the meeting it amounts to such genuineness that 
the improvisation taking place approaches flow.  
 
To sum up, the previous excerpt indicates that Camilla is organizing through (positive and 
negative) improvisation. She deals with matters as they appear, and does her best to (co)create 
meaning and structure. She could easily have taken an authoritative stand and simply directed 
the process as she saw fit without considering the needs and wants of the others. She could 
have neglected suggestions, ideas and emotional aspects, or simply drifted away from the 
situation, but she did not appear to do so. There was little attempt on her behalf to force 
structure on to the meeting; rather, she took part in spontaneous structuring efforts, using her 
expert knowledge as a source of inspiration and direction. This way of behaving is in line 
with her general perspective on leadership: 
 
Camilla: - I would say I mostly act in the moment. They say I am not afraid of making decisions. 
My response is that it is better that I make them, than that I do not! I try to make things 
predictable for people, and when decisions are not being made, things soon become 
wearisome for others to relate to. 
 
From an improvisatory perspective, making a decision based on group conversation and 
involvement is different from making decisions on behalf of a group (acontextually). The fact 
that Camilla strives for predictability and order indicates that she has a thought-through 
intention. In her opinion, there should not be chaos for the sake of chaos; neither should there 
be rigid structure for the sake of rigid structure. She considers the problem at hand and the 
context surrounding it and does her best to move on. I would argue that this makes Camilla 
context-sensitive and creative, as she allows new elements to spark and guide her 
sensemaking and actions. By doing so she lays down the foundation for creative organizing 
through improvisation. Her way of organizing shows that creativity does not have to be in the 
shape of some innovation model, but can be seen as an ongoing social accomplishment 
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(Weick 1995, 2001). And as Camilla allows for sociality and emotion to influence her, she 
comes forward as an improvisor in both the positive and the negative sense.  
 
In the last episode we saw Camilla and her management group deeply involved in a game of 
quite genuine positive improvisation. They were using blackboards to front ideas which were 
then discussed, expanded upon, rejected or kept. Positive improvisation also stands out in the 
next episode, where Peter is unexpectedly required to deal with some problems in an ongoing 
OD-process in one of his sections. What starts out as essentially reactive improvisation (an 
interruption) soon turns into a process of playing with ideas and sketching out solutions.  
 
[At 1005 hours Peter is interrupted as one of the head nurses, Fay, enters. She explains that 
she is struggling with the project “reorganizing the operating theatre”. They start discussing 
different solutions, and Fay tells Peter that he is needed at a section meeting in order to get 
the process moving. Peter appears to be very understanding and positive. He is goal oriented, 
but not domineering, and seems eager to give Fay the necessary support.  
Fay: - There is quite a bit of frustration in the project. 
[Peter is quick to reply.] 
Peter: - The only thing I demand is that the project comes up with some propositions, although 
I wouldn’t mind getting the alternatives graded and prioritized.  
[To illustrate his points, Peter draws figures and models on a piece of paper which he shows 
to Fay. And it seems that this gives a boost to the communication, making it more effective, 
because soon Fay is starting to nod her head understandingly. They sit like this for a while, 
making proposals and refuting them: Can we move him, can we do that with her, how do you 
think she would react to this, can we arrange the beds in a different manner, or maybe move 
the chairs? Equipped with quite a few new ideas, Fay leaves almost half an hour later. Then 
Peter turns to me and explains.] 
Peter: - What happened here was definitely improvisation, but it was only so in a context of 
goal management. There were no wild ideas, but creative thinking within parameters in which 
we can picture the consequences. And quite a few good ideas came out of it, such as for 
instance changing the day of operations for [a particular kind of] surgery.  
 
Peter’s own comment towards the end of the episode supports the claim that this episode was 
positively improvisatory. The use of illustrations and models to create new understanding, the 
playfulness of the idea making and the genuine openness that accompanied it were good 
indicators. It all took place there and then, and things that were said could not be taken back. 
Even if the consequences were not too serious − after all, this was merely a planning session − 
the produced gestures and responses were irreversible in local terms (see chapter five). In this 
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instance, however, positive improvisation was not so pure as to challenge radically contextual 
features. Rather than it being a matter of a “completely” open process of allowing for just 
anything, quite robust frames and rules were guiding its direction. Some new solutions were 
proposed and elaborated on, but very much in line with preset and quite rigid parameters. 
Nevertheless, the improvisation was genuine in pointing out new and in some sense 
unfamiliar directions, and the context created by Peter and Fay allowed for hermeneutically 
free play and elaborate experimentation with possible scenarios. They spontaneously tested 
out ideas through conversation and imagined practice. Some ideas were dismissed while 
others provided the basis for further improvisation. In this sense it was a highly spontaneous 
situation of quite pure positive improvisation.    
Good improvisation: a bridge between attitude and practice  
Positive improvisation is guided by a desire to be creative (see chapter eight). The way 
managers put their intentions into words can therefore teach us a lot about the phenomenon; 
the declared attitude of a manager says a lot about how he goes about the usual trot or at least 
how he intends to go about it. This section started with some statements from the InSitu 
Hospital managers on how they think in relation to the significance of context sensitivity in 
organizing. In general they all signalled, at least implicitly, a positive improvisatory attitude. 
How so? Context sensitivity is important, the managers say, because they want to achieve 
effective organizing; they want to take the contextually and practically best possible actions. 
In Purser and Petranker’s (2005) words the managers pursued a desire for “deep 
improvisation”. None of them is questioning the desire for development and efficiency, which 
seems to be somehow taken for granted. The managers jump right to explaining how they 
achieve effective organizing in practice, and “practical how” is explained by the managers as 
context sensitivity, not as, say, technical administration. Underpinning their role as managers, 
then, there seems to be a powerful canon of positive improvisation, and this canon seems in 
many ways to be the reason they keep looking for improvements, playing with ideas and 
forming the present into a desirable future. In short, they seek effectivity through good 
improvisation.  
 
Chris: - Being able to read and understand different contexts means perhaps more than 
anything. In my work there are new scenarios all the time. In this work you will not get far with 
ready-made recipes. The question, however, is how one is supposed to educate oneself for 
this. As a hospital manager I am in a kind of special situation, as I have so much clinical work. 
Nobody else has that. It is as if I am a “playing coach”, and it is a real advantage. I work at 
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night and so forth to keep up, because this is of vital importance to me. And it is unique to this 
department, too, because, after all, it is so small. 
 
A man like Chris, always tied up in something, always on the move looking for structure and 
order, informs me that his approach is context sensitivity. Chris’s department is known to be 
amongst the most structured in the entire hospital. He says so himself, and his claim is largely 
supported by people in central management. His department is, however, anything but a 
Kafkaesque universe in miniature, and Chris himself does not appear to be some single-
minded authority taking and giving orders without critical reflection. My impression of Chris 
is that he creates order in the here and now, from which structure can be traced retrospectively. 
And as he often works nights to keep, up I make notice of the amount of energy he invests in 
his practice. His success in creating order is in this sense not accidental. A lot of effort is laid 
down in continuously producing the best possible result; be it in the operational theatre, in the 
office or in the meeting room. By no means do I have the impression that order comes easily, 
or that it is pre-made in the shape of some inflexible plan or routine. As Chris argues: “. . . 
you will not get far with ready-made recipes”. Having seen him at work I take his word for it. 
Elisabeth shares this attitude: 
 
Elisabeth: - I am a good observer. I don’t intend to brag, but I generally make good 
observations. I am capable of seeing the diversity of things. . . . There are large cultural 
differences and different problems to be addressed in different places. Things that were easy 
in [the part of Norway where I worked earlier] are difficult at InSitu and vice versa . . . . The 
only recipe is to take the context at hand seriously. I would not fit as a manager in some of the 
departments at InSitu. I am best off when I can make use of my direct appearance, humour, 
temper etc. I must be allowed to build upon who I am; on my personality . . . . It is vital that I 
realize that I am part of the context, too. My personality also plays a part in determining the 
relation, the process. I cannot see the context as something different from me, and that is why 
some places suit me better than others.  
 
Elisabeth’s message is not that efficiency is found in planning alone or in management 
models. As she says: “The only recipe is to take the context at hand seriously . . . . I am a 
great opponent of plans that just stay in the drawer. And words without action are not 
significant.” Elisabeth is not saying that she does not plan for the future, only that she tries not 
to overdo or exaggerate her planning. Her intention is to consider the context at hand and 
adapt plans to the present, instead of planning acontextually: “There must be no plan for the 
plan’s own sake”, she says later in the interview. Even if empirical accounts suggest that 
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Elisabeth does a lot of improvising, and that she is in fact a skilled improviser, she might not 
always succeed in this, but at least she intends to. In general, Elisabeth tries to improve the 
conditions in the workplace; she tries to improve the quality of services through 
improspection and contextual sensitive action, rather than through thoughtless directions and 
insensitive orders. This makes her a proactive improviser in theory, but as I have seen 
glimpses of her in practice, I am of the impression that she is a proactive improviser in 
practise as well. Much the same can be said about Camilla. In her own words:  
 
Camilla: - Some things can be planned for, but far from all. I continually experience issues that 
occur in the here and now. Not necessarily putting out fires, but severely time-limited 
processes of decision-making. Sometimes the problems at hand are very complex, at other 
times they are fairly simple. I would say I mostly act in the moment, though . . . . I often work 
late after hours. The most important thing is that I am visible during the workday. I always 
have two minutes to spare for my employees. This is important because people must flourish 
here. It is imperative that they are seen . . . . Some kind of recipe for me, this is; to create a 
healthy environment. There is not much progress in creating conflicts. One should, however, 
not always agree with each other, which would be boring. There have to be tensions, but not 
rigidly locked tensions. The goal is to create a dynamic that creates movement/motion. 
 
Camilla displays an active and investigative behaviour, not only in this statement, but also in 
practice, and in general she seems to be searching for ways to improve the way things are 
done. I get the impression that she is seldom completely satisfied. Rather, she tries to change 
routines and structures whenever felt necessary. And when such is out of her immediate and 
formal jurisdiction, she says she is not afraid to let colleagues and superiors know her point of 
view. Her need to change routines seems to have little to do with making changes for the sake 
of making changes, however, but rather with improving and securing functionality so as to 
make things work as they are supposed to or even better. This is a genuine desire that she 
possesses, and not necessarily something that is thrown at her unexpectedly. From this I 
would like to make a general statement about the InSitu managers as a whole: that negative 
improvisation can be thought of as something which occurs in addition to, and even because 
of, positive improvisation.   
 
Standing alone statements like these from Chris, Elisabeth and Camilla are only a partly 
trustworthy source of knowledge into how people organize in everyday life. They give an 
indication. It would be interesting to see the personal statements from the managers 
contradicted by the way they actually behaved. But from my viewpoint the case is rather the 
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opposite: the statements support the image that has been created from observing the InSitu 
Hospital managers in practice. As a rule, the InSitu managers can be seen pursuing a doctrine 
of good improvisation as they typically act on the basis of contextual considerations and find 
ways to improve practice (i.e. theory-in-use); a point which is consistent with their verbalized 
intentions (i.e. espoused theory) (Argyris and Schön 1974, 1996). So with regard to positive 
improvisation there is coherence between word and action, and this indicates that 
improvisation is the rule and not the exception; not only in theory (i.e. chapter four and five), 
but also in practice amongst the managers; positive in the sense that their behaviour emerges 
from a taken-for-granted positive intention to create context-sensitive practical sense and 
organizational development, and negative as in many cases complexity comes unexpectedly 
and is dealt with reactively. Good improvisation can be a valuable term here, as the purity of 
spontaneity and creativity is not always high, but sufficiently high, so as to be recognized as 
improvisation in practice. Based on this study, then, I have found that effectivity of 
organizing is looked for and found in the becoming, from which good improvisation flows 
(Ciborra 1999; Purser and Petranker 2005). 
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Discussing and concluding  
A preliminary conclusion 
If context comes first, and if context is emergence, organizing is never exactly the same 
(Weick 1995; Hatch 1999; Weick et al. 2005; Purser and Petranker 2005; Petranker 2005). 
Throughout a variety of episodes taken from typical everyday practice amongst InSitu 
Hospital department managers I trace a red line of complexity and novelty in organizing 
processes. In short, the typical organizing process amongst the InSitu managers is more 
unpredictable, complex and improvisatory than foreseeable and machinelike. As a preliminary 
conclusion of the findings in this study the following can thus be singled out:  
 
Firstly, as a broad observation organizing has generally been found to emerge as 
improvisation: Everyday organizing amongst the InSitu managers is found in the spontaneous 
employment of practical skills that shapes and defines contexts and makes everyday business 
work on a continual level. This concerns improvisation in the form of real-time presence 
through (corporal) action, which is the prerequisite for all forms of organizing from the 
perspective of “The improvising man”. Being positively and negatively logged on to the 
present, everyday organizing emerges as a spontaneous and creative and relatively pure form 
of improvisation that goes far deeper into practice-in-the-becoming than mere technical 
manoeuvring. Thus I have not only found organizing to emerge as improvisation along the 
epistemic lines of “The improvising man”, but also in a sufficiently pure form so as to 
radically distinguish it from the more technical-rational (managerialist) forms of organizing 
typically found in strict administrative models, plans and structures. This is in line with 
Brown and Duguid (1991), who from the basis of the ethnographic studies of workplace 
practices by Orr (1990a, 1990b, 1987a, 1987b) claim that “. . . the ways people actually work 
usually differs fundamentally from the ways organizations describe their work in manuals, 
training programs, organizational charts, and job descriptions” (p. 40). 
 
Secondly, following the vocabulary of Argyris and Schön (1974, 1996) the dominant 
espoused theory amongst the managers displays an attitude of context-sensitivity to novelty-
in-the-becoming (Bergson, 1944) and creative development through genuine novelty and 
innovation, which both speak in favour of positive improvisation. It is also my observation 
that the espoused theory of positive improvisation is generally realized in practice.  
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Thirdly, in accordance with Weick (1989, 1993, 1995, 1999, 2001), Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2001) and Weick et al. (2005) I have found that unpredictability permeates organizing 
practice, and that unexpected, emotional and complex events often trigger a negative form of 
improvisation. In some instances, however, it is difficult to tell the two forms apart, and it 
often seems as if positive and negative forms of improvisation melt into each other. I would 
argue, however, that the particular form of improvisation taking place in a certain context 
(positive or negative) is less important than my finding that improvisation seems to be the 
kind of organizing that is naturally dominant in practice, as the InSitu Hospital managers tend 
to submerge themselves in everyday contextual emergence.  
 
These findings have implications beyond most of the existing literature on organizational 
improvisation. Not only philosophically, but now also based on an analysis of my empirical 
data, I suggest that improvisation plays a far more comprehensive role than as a method of 
radical innovation (Bastien and Hostager 1992; Cunha and Kamoche 2001); as a particularly 
creative and spontaneous form of art, such as in free theatre and free jazz (Crossan and 
Sorrenti 1997; Hatch 1997; Weick 1989, 1998, 2001; Zack 2000; Alterhaug 2004); as radical 
change processes in organizations (Orlikowski 1996; Orlikowski and Hofman 1997); as a 
characteristic trait of temporary projects (Leybourne 2006); or as a last minute, second hand 
solution when planning has failed (Ciborra 1996; Miner et al. 1997; Kamoche et al. 2002). 
Above all my study indicates that there is much value in the “The improvising man” as a 
general theoretical framework for understanding everyday organizing, even if, or rather just 
because, in practice improvisation does not always reach the highest peaks of negative or 
positive purity.  
 
Fourthly, and related to the previous reflections, I have found that over-focussing on flow and 
purity of improvisation might entail losing sight of good improvisation, and by that I mean 
that good improvisation in organizing practice only rarely seems to imply breaking contextual 
parameters and pursuing the unfamiliar and genuine as seen in, say, free jazz (Zack 2000). My 
conclusion is therefore similar to the views of Crossan and Sorrenti (1997), Ciborra (1999), 
Petranker (2005) and Purser and Petranker (2005) who regard good (effective) improvisation 
as a process of considering the emerging context at hand and acting accordingly. As implied, 
this involves less focus on improvisation and genuine novelty, and more focus on the quality 
of improvisation as an everyday organizing process. As a fifth finding, however, I have 
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identified quite a few cases in my study where good and pure improvisation are found to be 
woven together in extraordinary organizing practice, in exceptional instances of deeply felt 
creativity; in flow (Csikszentmihalyi 1990).  
 
Lastly, I would like to expand on an important issue that was indicated in the first paragraph 
of this concluding section, and which regards the relation between improvisation as 
sensemaking on one side, and decision making on the other. In short, in accordance with 
Weick et al. (2005), following Ciborra (1999) I hold that the secret to understanding the 
everyday trot amongst InSitu DMs lies not in treating everyday practice merely as a matter of 
analytical choice and technical-rational decision making. My observation of the InSitu DM is 
that only rarely does he/she have clear alternatives to choose from, and on the few occasions 
that he/she does, the DM knows that there can be no guarantees about future outcomes. The 
DM does not tend to harbour any naïve hope that systems and regulations will provide all the 
answers for the future. Typically he/she does not think first and act later, but as along the lines 
suggested by Schön (1987) the DM thinks-in-action and defines problems spontaneously. A 
reason for emphasizing this is that my findings contrast in a fundamental way the works of 
Simon (1968) on administrative behaviour; and Carlson (1951), Stewart (1967), Mintzberg 
(1973, 1994), Kurke and Aldrich (1983), Kotter (1986), and Tengblad (2006) on managerial 
behaviour. I will not make a detailed analysis of all these contributions, but use a few 
examples to point out some fundamental differences from my study which are crucial to 
acknowledging the value of my findings. 
 
First of all the findings and reflections in my study belong to a sensemaking tradition, and my 
theoretical focus is on organizing as improvisation, not only amongst managers, but in all 
forms and varieties (see chapters one and four). In contrast, studies of managerial behaviour 
are explicitly directed at the manager and his job, but more importantly they are 
methodologically very different from my approach, as they share a theoretical anchorage in 
decision-making as opposed to sensemaking. Even if we may share certain observations of the 
nature of everyday life, due to a difference in methodology we attribute our findings to 
different phenomena and as a result we come up with qualitatively different conclusions. 
 
Take for example Mintzberg (1973), who states explicitly that his view on managerial 
behaviour stems from contingency theory. Furthermore, according to Mintzberg (1973, 1994) 
managers are imperfect gatherers and traders of information; not spontaneous sense-makers.  
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The job breeds adaptive information-manipulators that prefer the live, concrete situation. The 
manager works in an environment of stimulus-response, and he develops in his work a clear 
preference for live action. (Mintzberg 1973, p. 38).  
 
The philosophical starting point for Mintzberg is not the profound complexity of everyday 
social and emotional life, but a contingency view where variables in the environment create 
stimuli to which the manager responds. Thus, even if Mintzberg (1973) recognizes that “. . . 
the classic view of the manager as planner is not in accord with reality” (p. 37), he argues this 
from a dualistic rhetoric where there is little room for “The improvising man”. The lenses 
employed by Mintzberg to investigate the nature of managerial life are not sensemaking, 
enactment or improvisation but, as Weick (1974) points out in a review of Mintzberg’s (1973) 
study, a Stimulus-Response language (S-R) which underpins the decision making paradigm. 
So even if Mintzberg as a pioneer addresses, say, “interruption”, he addresses it from an S-R 
perspective and naturally fails to see important aspects of how interruption affects 
sensemaking processes. For example, as much as interruption in itself can be a very 
interesting feature of practical organizing, as a practical fact so to speak, my study connects 
this finding to a larger theoretical framework and proposes that if it is seen in connection with 
complexity and improvisation, it can spur quite radically new thoughts. Carlson (1951) states 
explicitly, however, that he has no vision of a larger theory. My ambition is quite the opposite, 
as I have a vision of connecting my study to the larger framework of sensemaking. For me 
sensemaking is the lens through which empirical observations are made, and the point is to 
build upon this perspective to contribute to both a logical and practically anchored theory of 
organizing as improvisation.   
 
As the language of S-R operates within the same epistemological rhetoric as Simon’s (1968) 
administrative man, I identify a trajectory of dualism from the basic presumptions in “homo 
economicus” to Mintzberg’s (1973) seminal study. Even if Simon (1968) recognizes that “. . . 
concentration on the rational aspects of human behavior should not be construed as an 
assertion that human beings are always or generally rational”, he claims that “. . . choice, in 
so far that it is rational and cognizant of its objective conditions, involves a selection of one 
alternative from among several” (p. 61). As in “homo economicus”, then, information 
processing seems to be the ideal for both Simon’s work and for studies of managerial 
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behaviour, and in both cases sense is not made; it is deducted. In a similar vein Ciborra (1999) 
argues that:  
 
. . . this picture of organizational decision making, which seems to rule out improvisation 
completely, is due to a bundle of assumptions embedded in a particular perspective of 
analyzing and designing organizations, the information-processing perspective. (p. 81). 
 
I will not go as far as Ciborra who argues that the information-processing perspective 
potentially rules out improvisation completely; I propose, rather, that it frames it in quite a 
different way – as a matter of decision making instead of sensemaking. My argument is that 
from an information processing perspective, decision outranks emotion and improvisation, 
whereas from a sensemaking perspective it is the other way around. As a consequence, 
“improvisation” means different things in the two camps.   
 
My observations of the InSitu managers imply that they do make decisions and they do solve 
problems in everyday practice, but from a sensemaking viewpoint each decision is merely a 
fraction of the far more fundamental process of improvisation and problem-definition leading 
up to it (Ciborra 1999; Weick et al. 2005). Improvisation is more profound than decision 
making and satisficing (i.e. Simon 1968). Underpinning and preceding situations of choice are 
always comprehensive processes of spontaneous sensemaking in which some issues have 
been favoured over others due to, say, emotional factors, their practical worth, political 
negotiations and power-plays or even by coincidence. Similarly, in a critique of the 
contingency view, Joas (1996) argues that human action is not merely contingent on the 
situation, but constitutive of action: 
 
In order to be able to act, the actor must pass judgement on the nature of the situation. Every 
habit of action and every rule of action contains assumptions about the type of situations in 
which it is appropriate to proceed according to the particular habit or rule. In general, our 
perception of situations already incorporates a judgement on the appropriateness of certain 
kinds of action. This explains why situations are not merely a neutral field of activity for 
intentions which were conceived outside of that situation, but appear to call forth, to provoke 
certain actions already in our perception. (Joas 1996, p. 160). 
 
Put differently, choice is hermeneutical, not technical (Husserl 1962; Shütz 1967). According 
to the framework of “The improvising man” the DM is creative not because he is capable of 
searching for and generating alternative solutions, but because he is capable of “abducting” 
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those solutions to begin with. It is because he feels and communicates, interprets, creates, 
defines, embellishes and adapts systems and structures contextually that the manager moves 
forward. This study suggests that managers do not primarily exchange information; they (co-
)create sense through improvisation. As an implication, my study suggests that understanding 
authentic organizing practice presumes a rich, qualitative study of unique contexts, and − as 
pointed out by Purser and Petranker (2005), Petranker (2005) and Ciborra (1999) − that 
effective organizing can be found in the improvising based on the emergent details of that 
context. 
An everyday story of the InSitu Hospital manager  
To round off this chapter I have chosen to include an analytic and general narrative of how the 
InSitu department manager organizes his world through improvisation. This way I hope that 
my observations may facilitate an understanding of the typical way everyday organizing 
occurs. 
 
The InSitu department manager creates context in the present and prepares for a future that 
does not exist except from in abstractum. Improvisation can be found in the smallest details 
of coping with emotionality; both his own and others’. The emergent nature of reality 
encourages and compels the manager to enact an organization in the becoming, and through 
his actions he contributes to this joint orchestration of organizing. Even when spending time 
in his own company he cannot escape the impreciseness of language embedded in written 
communication. And the (re)constructed images of potential realities that his mind produces 
are never certain or final. Rather, they are temporal objects based on ambiguous experiences 
that validate their existence through practical rigor. The InSitu manager is dependent on these 
images of organizational reality, but typically, he is prone to refine them as he enters the 
social arena. He knows that a significant portion of his day will be taken up by the unexpected, 
and that he should not take things for granted. Thus he holds context-sensitivity as superior to 
system, and he typically expresses an attitude of positive improvisation.   
 
The manager’s own corporality forces him to consider sympathies and antipathies towards 
people as well as everyday problems and dilemmas. He is expected to have an opinion on 
organizational issues and to be of assistance in intricate and complex affairs, and as he 
engages in these matters out in the open, he cannot later withdraw his hand gestures, facial 
expressions or words. As the manager has improvised sense his actions are irreversible, as 
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they belong to a previous and explicated unique present. Thus, as he logs on to the present he 
must not only deal with the actions of others, but also with the consequences of his own 
actions, as they become constituents of, or at least influence, succeeding social processes. 
Alternatively, the manager could have drifted away from the moment, and at times he 
probably does, in which case his mind will lose the focus on present contextuality. Thus there 
is no method to ensure good improvisation in social processes. The natural rhythm and flow 
of good conversation is not subject to control. An attitude of context sensitivity may go a long 
way, but the practical realization of organizing is inevitably emergent and unpredictable. And 
as commented explicitly by one of the managers: remaining context sensitive − improvising 
on the context at hand − takes a lot of effort. 
 
As implied earlier, my study suggests a nuanced approach to understanding the role of 
technical rationality in everyday organizing practice. In the next chapter I attempt to elaborate 
further on some crucial findings on the dynamics between system and context; between 
technical abstraction and concrete experience. A lot can be learned through studying how 
formal and systemic ways of administration interfere with everyday practice. In particular, I 
direct the focus at the tension between ideal administration as it is constituted by 
organizational routines, systems, directives, bureaucracy and plans on the one hand; and the 
practical application of these by improvising managers on the other. I have argued through 
empirical examples that complexity is the rule and not the exception, and this point will once 
again be put to the test as I juxtapose improvisation with technical rationality.  
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Chapter 10. Technical rationality in everyday organizing 
amongst InSitu managers 
Introduction 
“To follow a structure or some demands blindly is 
impossible as there are always counter-demands and 
changes that make a streamlined structure 
impossible.”  
Central staff member at InSitu Hospital.   
 
This chapter builds directly on chapter five, “Organizing as improvisation”, and deals with the 
phenomenon of technical or systemic rationality in everyday practice amongst InSitu 
managers. Here the insights from chapter five are used as a framework to understand how 
technical rationality and the use of administrative models relate to improvisation in practice. 
(Some of the findings have also inspired many of the arguments presented in chapter five, and 
in that sense the process has been hermeneutical). Chapter five contained a purely theoretical 
study of the implications of the conceptual framework of “The improvising man” on 
organization theory, and more specifically it addressed the role of the administrative elements 
routines, structures, plans and systems in organizing. A key argument was taken from chapter 
one; that a change of sociology from nouns to verbs (Chia 1996) implies a change of focus 
from organization (noun) to organizing (verb), and that this change facilitates a perspective on 
organizing as a process of improvisation (Ciborra 1999). In this respect, if formal 
administrative models such as structure, plan and system are seen as nouns, they comprise 
tools of improvisation. This is, however, a philosophical argument about the nature of 
technical rationality in the organizational literature, and it does not say much about how 
formal models are perceived and treated by InSitu managers who perform real-life organizing: 
Are structures, for instance, used as temporary tools in context, or treated as givens that 
should be followed acontextually?  
 
My aim with this chapter resembles that of Kotter (1986), who sets out to study how 
managers perform their work authentically as opposed to the understanding of reality in 
management theory, which he claims focuses on tools, concepts or principles. An important 
difference, however, is that I seek to expand on and test the usability of a theory of 
improvisation, whereas Kotter emphasizes that he has no specific interest in any particular 
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theory. Another difference concerns the fact that Kotter’s explicit interest in theorizing “. . . 
includes variables, concepts, and relationships that deal with both decision making and 
implementation” (p.148), whereas I conduct my study from a sensemaking perspective.  
 
The following discussion expands on Argyris and Schön (1974, 1996) and sets out to 
investigate the triadic relationship between how InSitu managers organize authentically in 
practice (theory-in-use); how they talk about their organizing practice when they are allowed 
to reflect freely in interviews (espoused theory); and the nature of the vocabulary or language 
used by the managers in practice and interviews (language-in-use). I intend to show that 
investigating these three dimensions can teach us much about the nature of improvisation in 
organizing, and contribute to a nuanced perspective on the role of administration and 
technical rationality in improvisatory practice. In addition, mirroring authentic organizing 
practice with the espoused theory of managers as well as their language-in-use can provide us 
with knowledge about possible gaps between thought, action and language. Knowing about 
such gaps is a first step towards filling them, and can hopefully contribute to a more effective 
organizing practice. In that regard I want to contribute to uncovering potential “false-light 
subjective fusion” (Petranker 2005), which can occur:  
 
. . . when espoused theories are not distinguished from theories-in-use (Argyris & Schön, 
1974). Organizations can get caught in false-light subjective fusion, convincing themselves 
through plausible stories invoking a subjective future that they are on the right track, or that 
their problems are about to be resolved, until events make painfully clear that they have been 
living more in dreams than reality. (Petranker 2005, p. 254).  
 
In chapter five the theory on organizing as improvisation seems quite neat and ordered. 
Studying administrative organizational phenomena such as structures, plans and routines in 
authentic practice has been a much more messy process. For example, when studying plans 
and planning, I have had to focus on specific kinds of “plan”, namely agendas in different 
forms (for example meeting agenda and day agenda), the quality of which varies immensely 
in practice with regard to degree of detail, structure and layout. Still I hope I have found 
examples that are rich enough to give workable knowledge about plans in practice and 
improvisation. I also want to mention that the empirical analysis of the InSitu managers has 
provided me with greater insight about the intricacies of functionality, which is a key theme in 
practical philosophy and thus in “The improvising man”. By relating abstract theoretical 
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concepts such as routine, structure and plan to authentic practice I learned to see functionality 
as a fluent phenomenon that depends on personal perspective and interest, and in practice 
these issues seem to be intertwined, and on occasion even contradictive. Which perspective 
comes first? Which interest should be given the highest priority? These represent the kind of 
question that creates challenges, dilemmas and great demands for improvisation, and are 
therefore a central part of the succeeding analysis.    
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Firstly, I will present examples of technical 
rationality and systems thinking at InSitu, and point out how this approach has practical 
advantages, but that if it is taken for granted it can potentially create problems rather than 
solve them. Next, I discuss how technical rationality relates to practical workability and 
improvisation in the InSitu context. I ask in which settings technical-rational action works, 
from which perspective it works and how administrative systems function in practice. Lastly, 
I attempt to provide an analysis of technical rationality amongst the InSitu managers and its 
relation to taken-for-granted systems thinking. A key finding is that managers use 
administrative elements such as routines and plans as tools in improvisation rather than as 
control mechanisms. At the same time, however, the managers seem to be under immense 
systemic pressure, and they are afraid that different forms of Managerialism are about to 
become dominant. The chapter ends with a concluding analysis of the relation between 
improvisation and technical rationality in practice and the way this is expressed in talk, action 
and language.  
Some introductory examples of technical rationality at work  
In spite of, or perhaps because of, a significant amount of complexity within and between 
different hospital practises, there seemed at the time of study to exist an urge to assemble 
InSitu Hospital as a whole under one common structure. For example, in connection with a 
centrally driven project called “New Hospital” there was a process of creating a formal and 
official structure of organizing that could contribute to producing order, coherence and 
predictability in management processes. One of the guiding principles was that everybody 
employed at InSitu should know the identity of their closest superior, which seems a more 
than reasonable expectation in terms of providing a sense of security and order. Another 
example of these efforts concerns the former Unitary Split Management (USM) model, which 
has quite recently been replaced by a unitary management model. A third and quite obvious 
example is that organization charts have been produced, giving names to different 
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departments and sub-departments, so as to provide a holistic view of the hospital’s many 
functions. A fourth example is found in the process of creating a common culture, in which 
central management has worked out a common value base that all employees are required to 
follow. Note, however, that these values are imposed upon the organization, much like new 
computer systems, rather than having emerged from it “naturally”. Such measures seem 
valuable in directing focus towards saving resources and gaining a general overview of the 
hospital, but one might ask how far such measures should be taken. Is there possibly a side-
effect to the effect? Can the process of systemic thinking, planning and subsequent action in 
itself create problems? 
 
According to Schön (1987, 1991), technical rationality as an abstract concept goes far beyond 
mere administration, and it contains more than the technological or computerized systems that 
are implemented by central management at InSitu. ”Systems”, for instance, imply more than 
computer software and hardware. Technical rationality is a way of thinking and 
communicating; indeed, it is a paradigm in that respect (Schön 1987, 1991), and as such it 
occurs regardless of hierarchical level. The following observations are included to give an 
idea of the multiplicity of ways in which technical rationality occurs in the practical life of the 
managers at InSitu Hospital.  
 
In the first excerpt Howard is complaining about what from his perspective amounts to 
insensitive treatment by the central authorities regarding the planned dispositions of his 
department as part of “project New Hospital” − a centrally driven project of renewing both 
hospital structure and premises. As the department has received a visit from one of the local 
project coordinators, Howard has summoned a meeting of his administrative staff to comment 
on the architectural sketches. After having studied the sketches for a while together with his 
staff Howard has worked up quite a high level of frustration: 
 
Howard: – It  probably won’t be many months until we have a “Moelven workman’s hut” placed 
outside. 
[After saying this he sighs heavily as he looks out the window indicating the spot he has in 
mind.] 
Howard: - I do not think the plan of the new department will work. It is not functional! This 
whole thing is just putting me off. There is no way of keeping key personnel with such a 
solution. I simply do not want this “open solution”!  
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[His voice has now turned harsh and firm. The atmosphere in the room seems to have lost the 
initial relaxedness, and the looks on the participants’ faces are now grave and expectant. 
Howard continues.]  
Howard: - They must be able to tell us how we are supposed to move ourselves into the new 
premises, how the area will be modelled, what our parameters are in terms of work methods. 
Indeed, it is hard to point out what this would implicate for work methods. Throughout the 
department there is a strong opposition to open solutions, but the refrain has been: “This is 
just the way it is”. My comment to this, however, is: I do not accept it! I refuse to be held 
responsible for this. I would rather sacrifice my position.   It is unacceptable: Social workers 
are supposed to have offices measuring 10 square metres, whereas chief physicians are not!? 
And by the way, how come social workers are placed in the middle of clinical operations?  
 
Two things may be pinpointed as having upset Howard in the quoted episode: firstly, the fact 
that the plans that are presented to him are not in accordance with his needs or anticipation. 
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, Howard is reacting strongly against what he 
perceives as a centralized process of planning first and asking important questions later. From 
his viewpoint other concerns than the essential ones have come first, such as the positioning 
and wellbeing of social workers at the expense of medical personnel. It must be stressed that 
this is merely how things look from Howard’s perspective, and one should be careful about 
drawing conclusions about the project management and their intentions. And even if to some 
extent the process has been technical and insensitive, there may (or may not) be important 
reasons for this. A context sensitive decision from one perspective might entail disregarding 
certain aspects that are significant to others, and thus end up being interpreted as insensitive − 
a point I will be returning to later.  
 
A typical way in which technical rationality is merged with daily operations at InSitu hospital 
is through the implementation of new systems and technology. Implementing computer 
systems, for example, to achieve greater efficiency, is regarded as a key element by central 
management. And since at InSitu there is a continuous pressure on DMs to achieve increased 
control over economic and material resources, budgeting and purchasing routines, a 
significant number of computer systems are planned and implemented to aid the process. 
Somewhat bluntly put, the slogan is to save money with your left hand and to make money 
with your right, and the systems are meant to secure greater efficiency and to produce as well 
as thrive on similarity between contexts. The goal is to find systematic ways of doing 
administration that work for all departments, and to replace local and potentially less effective 
solutions. Some examples of such systems from InSitu include the Electronic Quality System 
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(EQS), the Personnel and Resource management System (PRS), the Patient Administrative 
System (PAS) and the Electronic Patient Journal system (EPJ). These are all systemic 
measures that are initiated with good intentions, but do they always work as planned? The 
following extract is taken from a general meeting concerning the implementation of the PRS.  
 
[ . . . inside the auditorium a woman (PR) from the project responsible for implementing the 
PRS system is sharing some of her experiences with personnel administration. She says that 
no department has got any extra resources to implement the new system, but that rather, they 
have had to find room for it within the existing budget and with the personnel at hand. PR 
speaks warmly of the system and its capabilities, but says that since there have been quite a 
lot of discrepancies between the actual and the formal rosters, the new system could bring 
with it some challenges.]  
PR: - Besides, physicians are away a lot, not ill, but away without anyone really knowing their 
whereabouts.  
[Then PR discloses the fact that some physicians have not welcomed the system at all. Some 
have even asked her whether the physicians were consulted about whether they actually 
wanted the system to begin with! The audience finds the remark hilarious and breaks out in 
laughter. It seems that a lot of the people in the audience are empathetic to these critical 
remarks, and that they share the impression that people are not really being asked about their 
needs and wants, but rather that the system is just implemented anyway. And after this 
somewhat self-ironic anecdote, the project representative concludes that inevitably, the 
system is in fact being implemented, and that it will be effectuated as soon as possible. And 
since this is the case, it would be nice if people could be generally positive towards it!  
A quiet buzzing sound can be heard now amongst the audience. People are commenting on 
PR’s last words, and are not immediately accepting her invitation to create a positive 
atmosphere. Some are starting to pose critical questions without asking for permission to 
speak, and others are just sitting passively and smiling indulgently about the whole thing.]  
Member of audience: - What about the requirement that all kinds of absence must be 
documented? Where does it come from? Is it self-imposed? Where is the authorization for this 
in the formal regulations? 
[The PR answers that it is indeed self-imposed, which is met with further commotion amongst 
those present.]  
 
I get the impression that the implementation of the PRS system has been a process of putting 
structure before action, and that from the perspective of the users it has failed to address their 
context. This is supported by PR’s statement that the PRS system will be implemented no 
matter what the opinion of the users. So why cannot the audience try to be more appreciative 
and positive, PR wonders, as if she chooses not to recognize the unpleasantness of having 
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systems forced down upon the organization. In this particular case, then, technical rationality 
seems not to be used in an improvisatory manner, but to take the form of an insensitive model 
(Schön 1991). 
 
Next, I want to present a much more local episode where technical rationality appears to be 
playing a crucial role. In the following report, Thomas indicates having found himself 
performing technical-rational style of management, but that it was not his original intention, 
and that as a consequence an ongoing OD-process in his section broke down:   
 
Thomas: - It isn’t possible to think through in advance every detail of how something is 
supposed to function in an organization . . . . there is always some vagueness as to who 
makes which decisions. To a certain extent we have a pseudo-democracy here. But 
codetermination is of the essence . . . . It is a cornerstone of this department that everybody 
must have the opportunity to participate. But I must say “should” have the opportunity, in the 
sense that I am certainly not that attentive all the time. Sometimes context is not in my head at 
all. With regard to [the OD-process], for instance, I was not very context-sensitive.  
 
Thomas’s report supports the theoretical observation that technical rationality is not just a 
property of central management or political authorities. It is a way of thinking that is latent in 
all sensemaking activity, including that of managers, and it may come out even if it is not 
called for. Again this indicates the validity of Schön’s (1991) warning that technical 
rationality can take the form of a model for action that is taken for granted. For example, in 
Thomas’s case he claims that it is his intention to take situations seriously and to be context-
sensitive, but in practice he finds himself having deviated from that intention. Drifting out of 
the moment and wandering into abstract landscapes is something most people do from time to 
time, and this merely points to the challenges of maintaining a context-sensitive gaze and 
improvising (Petranker 2005). However, uncritical technical rationality is a different matter; it 
is forgetting and neglecting context and from that stance to address the situation, or rather; not 
to address the situation. Blind technical rationality implies acting purposely on the basis of 
acontextual considerations, and this is what Thomas reports having done. Recall from chapter 
seven that Thomas has formed a management group together with a doctor and two other 
managers, and that they have created organization models that were originally intended to be 
implemented in his section. Thus Thomas and the management group seem to have fallen into 
a taken-for-granted technical-rational way of organizing (i.e. Managerialism), and as a 
consequence Thomas has failed to fulfil his original plan of involving his staff.  
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As it will be an interesting point regarding the succeeding discussions, pay special attention to 
how Thomas regrets having followed an idea, a system, despite his original intention, and 
thus being in a way seduced into thinking that things were all right when, as it turns out, they 
were not: The next excerpt shows how as a consequence of the technical approach taken by 
Thomas and the management group the OD-process has been brought to a halt. As a result a 
general meeting has been summoned to clear things up. As we revisit this meeting, Sharon, 
who is a doctor and a member of the management group, is trying to explain to the employees 
how despite their good intentions a closed managerialist logic has replaced contextual and 
democratic involvement. 
 
Sharon: - It has actually been a totally open process, only it has happened behind closed 
doors, which is unnecessary. It was not intended like this. It was supposed to be open. We did 
not want to “control” things. And we should have adjusted what was going on in the 
management group. We were working just as much on the one model as on the other. We 
have not been sitting still politely watching the process in a condescending manner. But the 
fact that it might have appeared that way is beyond any doubt.  
 
The contradiction in Sharon’s opening line seems obvious; the OD-process has been open 
behind closed doors. And this suggests an explanation for why the process has stranded. From 
the point of view of the management group there has been structure all along, both with 
regard to the process and to the different models that have been considered. One might even 
say that structure and functionality have constituted the very objective of the OD-process. The 
intention is one thing, though. The actual outcome is another. In this respect the previous two 
extracts provide illustrative examples of technical-rational Managerialism, which tends to 
come up with a solution first and then as a secondary measure implement it in practice 
without listening to or being sensitive to those it concerns (Schön 1991). And again, although 
this was not the original intention, it happened anyway, which implies a taken-for-granted 
form of technical rationality as opposed to one that is chosen as contextually appropriate on 
the basis of improvisatory considerations.  
 
Through these previous examples of massive system implementation, insensitive planning 
and top-down restructuring processes we have seen some indications of how deeply technical 
rationality may penetrate everyday organizing. In the following, more empirical examples will 
be presented, leading into a discussion on how technical workability relates to everyday 
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complexity. The ambition is to try to get closer to technical rationality in practice, and to point 
out possible advantages as well as limitations. 
Technical rationality and workability 
Temporality and subjectivity – structures as tools of improvisation 
Improvisation in practice entails keeping an open mind and looking out for the nuances in 
practical situations (Ciborra 1999; Purser and Petranker 2005; Petranker 2005). Hence one 
should be careful not to condemn technical rationality as something that should be 
categorically avoided, as it might help accomplish many great things in organizations, such as 
justice, efficiency, structure, and predictability, to name but a few. Then again one might ask: 
justice and efficiency for whom? This section deals with questions related to the workability 
and perspectivity of technical-rational models in the InSitu context, and I begin by presenting 
an excerpt where Chris and Brit, his Head Nurse, are having a meeting in Brit’s office with 
two representatives, PR 1 (female) and PR 2, (male), from the PRS project management team 
about the implementation of the new personnel system.   
 
Brit: - Anyway, I don’t understand why it is so important to take away our files! 
[Brit utters this while shaking her head lightly, looking down at the floor.] 
PR 2: - According to the central management this is related to attestations, calculation of 
seniority etc. The consequence might be that different kinds of files are created, much like 
things used to be 
[PR 2’s tone of voice is quiet and apparently relaxed.]  
Chris: - That being as it is, there is an evident conflict of interest here. I sincerely fear over-
centralization, even though I understand the need for attestations in order to calculate the right 
salaries and so forth. Could it be that this whole new system is a result of three employees in 
the central staff retiring?  
PR 1: - No, definitely not. Of course there are other considerations behind this, for instance 
that the cuts in expenditures have not been sufficient!  
Chris: - But why, then, does this system require so much personnel, considering that it is 
supposed to be automatic? 
[PR 1 sighs.] 
PR 1: - Oh, I guess it isn’t as automatic as we initially thought it would be.  
 
[ . . . The discussion does not continue for long, and soon the two PRs leave. After they have 
gone, Chris and Brit remain in Brit’s office, reflecting upon the meeting. Brit says she is deeply 
sceptical towards the female PR, whom she thinks is the worst of them all. She says this 
woman, who by the way has no proper education, was merely guarding her own territory, 
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rather than doing what is best for this department and the hospital as a whole. Chris seems to 
have no comment on this, but they both agree that changing the system is more about power 
struggles between professions than about real needs. After the old system was decentralised, 
and Brit took over the responsibility for handling wages, they have had no problems at all. The 
other departments at InSitu were not allowed to handle their own wages, however, as central 
management argued that they lacked the competence. Chris and Brit are not entirely 
convinced about by this argument. Rather, they maintain that the hospital’s wage 
administrators have produced the need for a new system themselves, being as it is that wages 
is a profession of its own. They have probably exaggerated the need for a new system, and 
downgraded the old out of consideration for their own situation: - “Nobody else than us can 
possibly do this”, Brit says, miming an imagined wages administrator in a ridiculing tone of 
voice. Chris emphasizes that he is a great fan of the director’s and of his strategic thinking, but 
that in this particular case, he is wrong. He suspects that the director might have been fooled 
by some of his co-workers. 
 
In this instance, system functionality was originally defined by those in the central 
administration who wanted a more centralized and efficient system for handling wages. As 
they have proceeded with the implementation, however, the project representatives admit that 
the system has in fact not worked out as smoothly as they expected. The improved efficiency 
and the cost reductions that were hoped for are yet to materialize. It may seem that in this case, 
the PRs may have had quite a naïve expectation of system perfection, as they have had to 
reconsider the degree of automation that was originally hoped for. The system did not work 
by itself as it were, and now further adaptations and adjustments must be made.  
 
As a result of analysing this episode another and related issue strikes me: that workability is a 
matter of perspective. Before the empirical study, practical philosophy had taught me the 
importance of functionality and workability in theories, models and systems, but I did not at 
the time realize sufficiently the importance of asking, if a something works, for whom does it 
work and for which purpose? Analysing my empirical observations, however, I see that as 
long as there is a conflict of interest, the question of workability will always be there. An 
important part of the previous story is that Chris’s department only recently went through a 
similar process, which ended up in decentralized authority; and since that time, Brit argues, 
everything has worked smoothly. As a result, they fear changing into something that 
resembles the old and non-functional solution. Consequently, chances are that Brit and Chris 
would disagree with central authorities no matter how well the new system works out, 
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because of their fear of losing autonomy and flexibility in the handling of local administrative 
matters.  
 
Let us move on to another facet of technical rationality (and workability). Bureaucracy is an 
example of an organizational system and routines that managers at InSitu cannot avoid 
interacting with. Bureaucracy plays a decisive role in determining the way health care 
services are governed politically, and as it is built over strict rules and structures it points to 
the inevitable influence of technical rationality in everyday practice. In the following episode 
we join a coordination meeting of a section in Karina’s department. The meeting has been 
summoned by the chief surgeon to deal with some bureaucratic flaws, and besides the surgeon 
and Karina two nurses, the section accountant and a representative from central health 
authorities (CA) participate.  
 
[The chief surgeon argues that cancer patients should get a certain piece of preventive 
medical equipment covered. They need this equipment, he explains, to maintain different 
kinds of corporal functionality, which are ruined by the radioactive treatment. Without it, they 
might easily end up needing immediate medical attention. He reaches into his briefcase and 
takes out one of the items referred to. As I look at the device I suddenly realize the tragedy 
involved in these patient cases.]  
Chief surgeon: - Preventive treatment using this device is currently not covered by the existing 
regulations, but the reactive treatment needed as a consequence of not using the device 
actually is. In order to receive the treatment, however, you need a certain functionality, and to 
get that you need this device.  
[As he says this he points at the plastic item.] 
Chief surgeon: - But still the item is not covered. The same is the case with [particular piece of 
medical equipment (PME)]. The proactive treatment involving the PME is not covered, but as 
soon as immediate treatment is required, it is covered. It doesn’t make sense, now, does it? 
 
[Around the table the attendants seem very attentive to and affected by the chief surgeon’s 
message. Some are looking down at the table quietly shaking their heads; others are lifting 
their eyebrows looking to CA for a comment.]  
CA: - I can see the paradox in this. It is clearly unreasonable.  
[Judging by her rapid head movements shifting between looking at the chief surgeon and CA, 
and by her wrinkled forehead, Karina seems upset. One of the nurses seems upset, too, as 
she is slightly shaking her head as if in anguish. The surgeon continues in a very calm and 
formal way to explain that they have been thinking about producing some kind of package 
which the patient can bring with him to the National Health Insurance Office.]  
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Chief surgeon: - This way the patient does not have to think about these things at all. And by 
the way, on a national scale this might just be a unique solution, and it would even save us 
some money, I suspect. 
 
In this episode I want to shed light on how one kind of logic explicated by one particular 
bureaucratic structure might create a problem that has to be handled later by another. As such 
this serves as an example of two rules within the same system that do not pull in the same 
direction. One might say that the two logics contradict each other in that sense, but only to the 
extent that patient care is the focus. Honouring the Hippocratic Oath implies seeking to offer 
the best possible patient care, and in that respect it involves taking the patient’s perspective. It 
is from this perspective that the chief surgeon has summoned a meeting. The argument made 
in the previous quotation is that from the patient’s perspective, the bureaucratic system in its 
present state is not effective and cannot be trusted. According to the chief surgeon it does not 
provide the best possible patient care; nor does it pursue the most cost-efficient solutions.  
 
Patients should be given proactively what they will in any case receive reactively, those 
present agree, which in this case implies a need for system improvement. In theoretical terms, 
then, if their suggestion is accepted and regulations successfully changed, order will have 
been restored as they will have made the system work for them; at least temporarily. And as 
they make adjustments to ensure that the system works, the meeting attendants are 
improvising new sense: They realize that the system has only temporal validity and seek to 
create new structure and new routines that will fit the new context. This new structure is itself 
a technical-rational measure, however, but it is one that is contextually chosen. Instead of 
following the system blindly they are trying to keep up with emergent demands, and even if in 
this case the solution might seem obvious, it is not given from following established technical 
procedures; hence the meeting.  
 
Whereas bureaucratic equality and predictability are examples of acontextual ideals, and 
indeed constitute the building blocks of bureaucracy for precisely that reason (Weber 2002), it 
follows that bureaucracy as a technical-rational system can only vouch for those instances 
covered by its systemic nature (Schön 1991). In simple terms, bureaucracy and any system for 
that matter, can only handle what it is defined to handle. It only works within its own limits, 
and in terms of predictability this is functional; it is much like knowing something about the 
future, having something to trust and take for granted. Thus the upside of system is 
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simultaneously the possible downside to the extent that incidents occur that are not anticipated. 
The previous extract gives a clear indication that technical-rational measures are temporary, 
and that acontextual ideas must be adapted to the present context in order to work; they do not 
work as such.  
 
What I suggest is that trust is put in bureaucracy for its capacity to provide future justice, and 
in order to do this it must be perpetually subjected to practical wisdom and scrutiny so as to 
keep up with the unfolding of events. Of course, there is predictability in knowing that 
something will not change, and that bureaucracy will not discriminate between similar future 
incidents, but if this instance of bureaucratic constancy is categorically wrong bureaucracy 
might merely produce continual injustice, thus pleasing nobody. For instance, you may want 
the bureaucratic right to be treated the same as all others, but would you not prefer to be 
treated rightly? And since from a sensemaking perspective the definition of right and wrong is 
a continual negotiation (Griffin 2002), bureaucracy must be made sensitive to context. As a 
general statement I would thus argue along the lines of Hatch (1999) that only in those cases 
where contexts are less emergent and less complex will systems “survive” and work more or 
less autonomously. 
 
As shown in the previous excerpt, the bureaucratic system is sometimes perceived as 
undermining organizing processes rather than facilitating them. When bureaucracy does not 
work, complexity arises which needs to be resolved, and if this happens the manager has no 
other option than to change the setting, and perhaps try to change or find ways around 
established routines and structures, not knowing what the outcome will be. Dealing with 
bureaucracy can on occasions be a demanding and uncertain process, as John indicates in the 
following episode.  
 
[We enter a messy room with lots of equipment scattered around. John says the room is being 
refurbished and transformed in order to fill new medicinal purposes. This, however, requires a 
special kind of power supply.] 
John: - We actually had to fight to have this done, even if it will produce savings of NOK 1.8. 
million! How about that? We actually had to fight the bureaucracy to cut budget expenditures! 
Luckily, after quite a bit of bickering the project came through at a total cost of 200 000 NOK. 
Typical rigid bureaucratic process; formalities and conservative interpretations creating 
problems and increasing costs.  
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In the quotation John refers to “typical rigid bureaucratic process”, but what should we make 
of that? The process of getting permission to refurbish was hardly bureaucratic in the sense 
that John simply followed the rules? He did not merely comply blindly with the system so as 
to come up with a fast solution? I doubt that this is what he means by “bureaucratic”. Weber 
(2002) claims in his seminal treatise that one of the greatest advantages of bureaucracy is its 
speed and swiftness, but John’s experience seemed to be of a different nature. My 
interpretation is that John is indicating that he has had a close encounter with bureaucracy and 
the downside of its rigidity, and that he has taken extraordinary measures to get around it 
somehow. John did the things he saw fit to solve an issue of great concern and importance for 
his department, despite the bureaucratic hindrances along the way. And finally, after much 
fighting and arguing, he managed to get permission to have the office –space refurbished.  
 
Did the system work (swiftly) for John in this situation? From John’s perspective it did not; 
but like Karina and the gathering from the last episode John made the system work for him. 
He realized that new sense had to be made where, from his point of view, nonsense ruled. He 
had to act creatively instead of following some bureaucratic rule to the last detail if he were to 
get things done. Thus it was of no help to John that the bureaucracy as a rule is fair and 
legitimate in many other regards, as long as it could not be trusted in the one regard John 
needed it. This indicates the theoretical observation that bureaucracies are swift and reliable in 
the sense that they can work fast along the lines of their present constitution (e.g. Weber 
2002). In instances where the bureaucracy does not apply to context, however, the result can 
be quite the opposite, in which case genuine improvisation is needed to make order. Once 
again, then, my empirical observations indicate a tight connection between improvisation, 
workability and perspective.  
 
Next we shall witness John admitting that he actually only rarely follows systems and rules; 
that bureaucracy is only the right tool in certain formal instances.  
 
John: - As money is short at the moment, a financial plan must be presented to the board. I 
am currently involved in producing manpower plans. A large number of personnel must be 
relocated, so there are a few formalities to be handled. And I am trying to avoid conditions like 
those at Avinor6 in the process. But I only do things by the book when I really have to. 
Because it takes much longer time. But in this case it is important to do things by the book. I 
                                                 
6 Avinor AS is a state-owned limited company responsible for air traffic control services in Norway, which 
during the course of the study experienced extensive challenges and problems related to personnel administration. 
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am certainly no formalist. I have a staff that is fairly good in guiding me. In this matter, 
however, things are about salaries and workers’ rights, which makes it important to take the 
right formal steps.  
 
The way John sees it the bureaucracy and the political regime are not always sensitive 
towards his needs. As a result he does not see himself as a formalist, but rather as someone 
who lets rules guide him in an open process, and in that process he uses his staff to make sure 
he stays within accepted limits. Nevertheless, he recognizes the need to play by the rules in 
matters of great importance in terms of predictability and structure for the individual 
employee, matters that are at the heart of the raison d’être of bureaucracy: to secure justice 
and equality (Weber 2002). 
 
I have so far in this dissertation argued that technical-rational action is right in some instances 
and wrong in others (and sometimes somewhere in between), and that the evaluation of when 
it is right or wrong is improvisatory. I end this section on technical rationality and workability 
with a short discussion on quantification in organizing and suggest some connections to 
improvisation.  
 
Whatever can possibly be counted should be counted, a central staff member at InSitu 
declares. And in itself I see nothing wrong with this, quite the opposite, as long as there is a 
clear and explicit understanding shared by all parties in terms of what such quantitative 
measurements can produce when it comes to knowledge, as well as of what it does not 
produce. Counting and quantifying might be a rewarding approach if it is done well and the 
results are treated right.  
 
Peter: - Anyway, I am what you could call a numbers fetishist. I have gathered numbers from 
the operations section since 1990. I actually started doing this long before it became my 
formal assignment [he says with a laugh and continues.] 
 - I am quite proud of this. I punch the numbers myself and print out the report. It costs me 
some 1-2 hours of work every month, but in return I get a highly personal relationship to the 
data. You might say it is a kind of combined analysis and punching, which is much more 
effective than having it punched by others and delivered to me. I miss the same kind of 
numbers from the other wards, but I do the same with data from the waiting lists. I know what 
the numbers mean when I do the work myself, which makes them much more valuable for me. 
I prefer to use the deviations from last year’s numbers as a basis for management rather than 
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this year’s budget. But in order to be able to speculate about anything regarding deviations, 
you have got to know their history. 
 
In Peter’s case there seems to be little danger of quantity being made equivalent to quality. 
For Peter, quantification represents a place to start, a tool for further analysis, and not 
something final or conclusive. Peter seems good at contextualizing numbers and translating 
them into practical significance. A way of seeing is a way of not seeing (Poggi 1965), and 
counting something implicates focusing on that something rather than on something else. 
Hence, although it can be a valuable instrument, counting has its limits and its results should 
not be categorically trusted as representing truth (Dewey 1929; Feyerabend 2002). If they are, 
technical rationality is no longer an instrument but a taken-for-granted paradigm (Schön 
1991).  
Some concluding thoughts on technical rationality and workability 
On the basis of a preliminary analysis of the episodes presented in this section, four 
theoretical observations can be singled out in terms of systemic rationality and workability: 
Firstly, as a fundamental theoretical remark, systems cannot reach beyond their predefined 
logic (Schön 1991; Stacey et al. 2000). Secondly, for technical-rational action to work it must 
be contextually validated. In most cases dealt with in this study systems are not followed 
blindly; they are not chosen on the basis of technical analysis and employed without caution 
or consideration for evolving contexts. Rather, they are subjected to scrutiny and adjusted to 
fit contextual demands. Examples of this include the way Karina and John dealt with 
bureaucracy, and how Peter used quantification, counting and measuring as guidance. In these 
cases workability is ensured in the shape of renewed technical measures based on 
improvisatory evaluations; or in simpler terms: Workability is a matter of improvisation. On 
the whole, the InSitu managers seem continually to be keeping an eye on emerging conditions 
and to be evaluating technical-rational measures on that basis. In theoretical terms this implies 
that in improvisatory practice, context comes first and system later: system and structure are 
temporary objects that are used as tools in improvisation. Thirdly, in those cases where 
systemic thinking was taken too far so as to disregard context altogether or to overestimate 
system perfection, it ended in conflict, failure or both. 
 
Fourthly, and lastly, technical rationality and workability was found to be a matter of 
perspective. Taking systemic action might be the contextually right thing to do from one 
perspective, and might indeed prove to work according to these considerations. From another 
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perspective, however, the action taken might be perceived as contextually insensitive. Who is 
right and who is wrong? There is no objective answer to this from a sensemaking point of 
view. Although some degree of budget control and centralization might be right from one 
perspective, it could interfere negatively with everyday operations from another. Thus, in 
practice it appears that in accordance with Ciborra’s (1999) findings, some balance is 
negotiated in situ − not as a static one-time decision, but as a living process of determining 
good and functional organizing. In situations of conflict, context-sensitivity seems to work 
both ways, just as shared understanding is not only a management concern, but a concern of 
all those involved in (joint) organizing.  
 
As a general observation, an approach to organizing which categorically overlooks important 
contextual factors might in the end be seen as strategy of failure (Kotter 1986; Ciborra 1999; 
Purser and Petranker 2005; Petranker 2005). For instance if organizing becomes 
Managerialism through blind employment of control and system, it would imply one 
contextual factor as categorically superior to others, in which case there is little room for 
negotiation and lack of balance. From an improvisatory standpoint, I am inclined to say that 
whenever strict control mechanisms are effectuated it should be from a contextual perspective 
that takes into account the many important aspects that in this particular instance are 
downgraded in favour of control. It might sound banal, but it is easy to take for granted the 
supposedly objective superiority of technical-rational management formulas and to lose sight 
of other perspectives and the fact that workability must be continually revalidated.    
Plans in practice: technical rationality or improvisation? 
Agendas 
This section addresses planning as a particular form of organizing amongst InSitu managers. 
As planning is often held up as a contrast to improvisation (Ciborra 1999; Alterhaug 2004), it 
represents a form of ingrained technical rationality that I have chosen to give special attention. 
At InSitu planning is an important tool for securing order and predictability, not only through 
grand strategic discussions or budget plans, but through the meeting plans or agendas which 
are used in most formal meetings: 
 
John: - I spent last week on preparations, to avoid falling behind. There is generally a lot of ad 
hoc stuff happening; things that fall somewhat in between. And it can get very hectic. The 
meetings, however, are easier, because then at least there is an agenda.  
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At least there is an agenda for meetings making things easier, John says. And indeed this is 
what agendas are for – to make things easier. They give enough room for people to get 
prepared, but do they depict exactly what will happen? As they consist of abstract information 
about a tentative future, one might say that agendas define that something will happen, or 
alternatively, what will happen, but they never say how (Ciborra 1999). Being by nature 
linguistic structures, agendas are also by nature imprecise and vague. As much as meetings 
have their own specific agenda, it is important to understand that each of them, even the most 
structured ones, in practice requires the manager’s constant attention. Seen as an instrument of 
improvisation an agenda does not allow for mindlessness. In Dewey’s (1929) vocabulary it is 
merely a tool to aid a complex process. We shall follow John into what was intended as a 
structured staff meeting for which he had prepared a simple two-point agenda: 1. to provide 
information about a request that had been successfully accepted by central management and 2. 
to provide information about the implementation of the new EQS system.   
 
[The time is 1415 hours, and a local staff meeting concerning both central and local 
administrative matters is about to begin. In addition to John, five members of the departmental 
administrative staff are present, and they are all gathered in John’s office. John opens the 
meeting by repeating something that he has stated earlier: that he strongly wishes to have 
control over the process of appointing his own staff. He continues, with a not-so-modest smile 
on his face, that he has recently been notified that his claim has been accepted by central 
management. Actually, although he had prepared himself particularly well for the meeting with 
central management and assembled some very solid arguments, not to mention his mental 
preparations, John says that his claim was accepted very smoothly and that he did not even 
have to argue much. In a way he had over-prepared, as he was definitely not expecting such 
goodwill. His department got everything they asked for, he says, including the discretion to 
rank job applications. John underscores the importance of this, on account of their 
department’s uniqueness in terms of special needs. The attendants immediately show their 
contentment with this, and having received the news the group spontaneously breaks out in 
joyful small talk, everyone gesticulating and nodding their heads in delight. One after another 
they make comments on the importance of this resolution, and one of them expresses 
particular joy that they will no longer have to deal with unnecessary delays.  
 
The mental and emotional atmosphere in the room seems vibrant. Everyone is making jokes 
and they are all laughing their way through the meeting. In the centre of it all John is making 
spurious comments and he appears to be enjoying himself. A participant reminds him that he 
has a meeting with the nurses tomorrow, which he has totally forgotten. Once again laughter 
breaks lose, as John’s bad memory is for some reason considered hilarious. But the 
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atmosphere soon calms down as those present start discussing, with great inspiration, how 
some administrative routines in the office could be improved – a matter that was not originally 
on the agenda. Time seems to fly by as quite a few potential improvements are identified. 
Possible solutions to difficult problems are brought forward, and having “negotiated” their 
applicability and functionality, the group decide together which improvements should be made 
and not. Much later, after a lot of spontaneous conversation inspired by the decision to 
decentralize the appointing of staff, they return to the meeting agenda and, more specifically, 
to the matter of EQS.  
 
John starts out by stating that EQS does not work as well for physicians as the present system 
does, but then again, he says, the motion of EQS is carried centrally, and there is little they 
can do about it. The meeting is suddenly interrupted by someone knocking on the door. The 
time is 1502, and a delegation from central management − the director and two of his 
assistants − arrive to discuss John’s budget.] 
 
Having an agenda might provide some support and limit the amount of complexity that can 
emerge in a meeting. Still, as the extract implies, meetings can to a large extent take their own 
direction. In the previous example the participants are through a genuine process of positive 
improvisation inventing their own agenda as they go along. One might say that the real 
structure comes alive as process (Hatch 1999; Bosworth and Kreps 1986), as the participants 
express emotions, discuss decisions and make proposals. Creativity in this setting does not 
seem to follow a preset agenda, and thus the meeting sets off in new and to some extent 
unexpected directions. And John follows up, reads the social context as it emerges, plays 
along and improvises. In this process of positive improvisation he cannot possibly know 
exactly what to expect, but being logged on to the present he participates in an ongoing 
process of making order.  
Some reflections by the managers on plan and the unexpected 
This section presents some extracts which show how the InSitu managers reflect upon the 
issue of planning in practice. In the first excerpt Howard is sharing some thoughts about plans 
and technical rationality: 
 
Howard: - I try to plan ahead as much as possible, but I still end up doing a great deal of 
spontaneous problem solving. For instance: Stop, no, go ahead and talk it over once more, 
make compromises, such as the nurse applying for funding to finish her master’s degree. I feel 
that I must create peace and tranquillity; even if the nurse was applying for something that was 
a bit outside of what we should really be doing here in terms of research. The most dangerous 
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thing in a job like this is to become blinded by rules. One needs large degrees of freedom to 
find local solutions, even if the rules are there as a fundament. 
 
According to Howard there is a lot of spontaneous problem solving in his work. Is this a sign 
that he is a bad planner, or perhaps that he chooses to postpone things until there is no way 
around them? I think the answer is neither of the two. The way Howard sees it, things simply 
happen unexpectedly and they must be dealt with spontaneously. This seems to be the true 
nature of organizing as he perceives it. Rules are there as a fundament, Howard says, and one 
should not become blinded by them, and by taking this position he is opposing a reified view 
of technical-rational administration (Managerialism). Plans should not be followed blindly; 
they must be used in-context. 
 
In a similar vein to Howard, Karina presents the following perspective:   
 
Karina: - My work is very predictable in terms of the calendar. But unforeseen events happen 
constantly, and often in the shape of emergencies. One might say that it is very predictable 
that I am interrupted a lot, but the nature and the content of the interruptions are unpredictable. 
There is lot of predictability in terms of meetings, hours at the policlinic etc., but all along there 
are interruptions: things that break down, personnel issues and so forth.   
 
It seems Karina is trying to communicate a similar argument to that of Howard’s; that practice 
is an emergent property and that it is profoundly unpredictable. For example, a calendar is just 
a calendar, a plan just a plan, however intricate and detailed. Plan is theory, interruption is 
practice, Karina indicates. Elisabeth has similar reflections: 
 
Elisabeth: - Future images are exactly that – future images. There must be no plan for the 
plan’s own sake. I am a great opponent of plans that just remain in some drawer. And words 
without action are not significant. You are always measured by your actions, and never 
measured on the basis of the lovely plans that you make. This is the pitfall of working in a staff, 
as you meet those who are less action-oriented and who like planning for its own sake. 
 
Only in rare instances does the context allow for the strict following and execution of plans, 
but it is my general impression that managers put a lot of effort into preparing for the 
unexpected and not only for the familiar and anticipated. Peter has some insightful comments 
on the significance of being prepared for the unexpected. He has just received an e-mail 
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message with some unexpected news concerning the theft of a trailer packed with un-
sterilized medical equipment when he leans forward and explains:  
 
Peter: - They sure are in for a surprise!  
[Peter suppresses a chuckle and stops for a moment of reflection. Then he looks at me and 
continues.] 
- Here, at the hospital, we cannot do as the air traffic controllers and simply stop the 
production at will. Car accidents come unexpectedly whether we want them to or not. So as a 
basis we must have a robust system that is self-upholding. We must be capable of solving the 
problems that occur there and then with the staff we have got. And then it is my responsibility 
to coordinate horizontally, both internally within the hospital and in relation to other institutions. 
 
Peter speaks about having a robust and self-upholding system as a basis, but what does he 
mean? Is he indicating some piece of intelligent machinery that is capable of dealing with all 
kinds of occurrences? Probably this is not a viable interpretation as I suspect that the 
capabilities Peter is calling attention to are not definable in universal terms. He is speaking of 
the staff and the routines they master, not the system in its own terms. Rather, as I argue in 
this dissertation, it is the practical and intelligent utilization of skills and routines that allows 
for contextual and decisive action. For example, as Peter points out, accidents happen 
unexpectedly, of course they do, and no injuries are alike. Pick any two patients and they are 
always dissimilar in some respect. Therefore, practitioners should have a trained eye for 
practical details and should be capable of making sense and acting under unique 
circumstances; they should be the kind of people who can handle the unexpected and the 
complex: people like Silje, Howard’s departmental head nurse. I conclude this section with 
some statements from Silje regarding the significance of being prepared for the unexpected. 
 
Silje: - My job is to facilitate the job of the section head nurses and help them. You see, they 
have really busy days. The head nurses are responsible for 50 employees, for patients whose 
beds are lining the corridors and everything. Their everyday work life is highly dynamic, to say 
the least. I, too, like to juggle many activities simultaneously. This is part of what it means to 
work here. We are spontaneous and solve problems continually. Since I am very experienced, 
I know immediately whom to consult on the different issues etc. We have a saying here that 
you must like the uncertainty which is inevitably part of everyday life in this department. 
Remember, 95 per cent of our activities are acute. You have to like working under such 
conditions. If you don’t, you will not fit in. Because we are used to working like this, we 
become good at finding solutions, too. We learn how to avoid getting frustrated. But often I 
wonder how come things are going as well as they are. But then again, we are trained to 
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master these conditions. And the work environment in this department is fantastic, because 
people are trained to handle the uncertainty.  
 
Unpredictability in organizing indicates that planning has its limits (Crossan and Sorrenti 
1997; Ciborra 1999). In cases of the unexpected there is need of spontaneous and swift action, 
but this does not imply that improvisation is a way of acting without preparation. A meta-
message from Silje seems to be that preparation is more than having a plan. Preparation can 
involve planning (Ciborra 1999), but more importantly it builds on a corporal repertoire of 
skills and routines (Dewey 1929; Schön 1991; Molander 1996). This repertoire enables and 
develops the capacity to see family resemblances in everyday situations (Wittgenstein 1992, 
1994) and is of the essence if the unexpected should occur. The improvisational quality will 
depend on the nature of unexpectedness. More specifically, the degree of genuineness and 
purity of negative improvisation is related to the perceived degree of complexity (see chapter 
four). Much in the same vein as Mintzberg (1973) and Crossan and Sorrenti (1997) I see 
spontaneous action as the rule and not the exception in organizing, which indicates that 
improvisation in practice plays a more important role than mere planning. According to 
Ciborra (1999) improvisation is more profound than planning or any kind of structured 
activities, methods, data and processes, which he sees as “. . . the fragile result of a long chain 
of abstraction and cleansing activitites” (p. 85). The previous statements of InSitu managers 
support this view, from which I deduce that improvisation is at the centre of what these 
managers consider as crucial to effective organizing.    
Some concluding thoughts on plan and improvisation  
Planning entails creating images of a tentative future, and as such it is an acontextual 
technical-rational activity (Schön 1991): It addresses that which is yet to happen so as to 
create a model for action. Three points can sum up this analysis of planning-in-practice 
amongst InSitu managers: Firstly, they often make use of planning in everyday organizing, 
and the degree of tentativeness varies in practice from yearly agendas to short-term planning 
addressing what is likely to happen tomorrow or even as soon as in the next few hours. Due to 
the non-longitudinal nature of my study I have primarily focused on the latter kind of 
planning; as an activity of addressing factors that are likely to occur in the immediate future, 
such as for example in the case of meeting agendas. 
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Secondly, although planning for the future can be an effective weapon against complexity, 
practical events tend to come up unexpectedly − a fact which points to the limitations of 
planning. At the very least the quality of emergence requires the DM to keep alert and to 
direct his/her focus towards real-time occurrences. This suggests a normative improvisatory 
message that planning should not be exaggerated; the DM should plan as far ahead as possible, 
but not too far into ideal futures.  
 
Thirdly, on the whole, as contexts emerge plans seem to be continually fitted and 
contextualized by the InSitu DM. Plans are not used as restraint-jackets but as sources of 
order and inspiration. This theory-in-use is supported by the managers’ espoused theory that 
plans must be continually made relevant to be of use; plans are seen as tools and not givens. 
In a subtle way this contradicts Mintzberg (1973), who appears to say that a plan in itself 
should be adaptive, and that managers should have a collection of alternative plans in 
decision-tree form. This resembles Weick’s (2001) and Thompson’s (2005) view that some 
structures are more open to creative elaboration than others. From my point of view, however, 
flexibility does not come from some autonomously adaptive plan, or from a number of plans, 
but from the very perception of plan. Following Dewey’s (1929) line of reasoning all plans 
are tools; all plans are adaptive. There is from a sensemaking perspective no objective way of 
measuring whether a plan is more or less adaptive; rather, flexibility is found in the way plans 
are translated into action in context. In that sense my view resembles Kotter (1986) and 
Ciborra (1999), who claim that plans should be seen and treated as flexible context-sensitive 
tools in order to become positive contributors to effective organizing. 
 
All structures, including plans, receive some sort of secondary priority when perceived from 
an improvisational perspective; call it instrumental value. In other words, claiming that a 
structure has instrumental value is equivalent to the view that mental objects are temporary 
constructions (Bergson 1944; Berger and Luckmann 1991). They are tools and not ends in 
themselves (Dewey 1929). And from the perspective of a skilled practitioner, a (mental) 
structure is only used and maintained to the extent that it has practical value. A carpenter does 
not bring a hammer to a sawing job. Rather, as a context-sensitive improviser he changes his 
tool to fit the task at hand; he chooses the saw, not the hammer. And in the case of InSitu 
DMs, as tasks keep changing or in fact never stand completely still, the DMs are prone to 
make continual refinement and development; to improvise. In linear organizing theory, 
however, there is great emphasis on plans as a controlling basis for succeeding action: first 
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there is plan and then there is the strict following of plan in practice (Urwick 1934). This point 
can be further consolidated through the way plans are sometimes talked about in everyday 
speech, such as, for instance, in “did you not have a plan to follow?” or “we need to follow a 
plan”. My point is that the term “follow” is essential here as it presumes a preset linearity of 
organizing. But only orders are followed; tools are used (Dewey 1929).  
 
The idealized technical-rational way to approach organizing is through a rigidly planned 
linear sequence of action (Schön 1991). This approach is contradicted by everyday organizing 
practice as it is typically found to evolve in this study. Working as a DM seems to be 
everything but a somewhat mindless activity of following preset agendas or choosing between 
ordered alternatives and making decisions. It typically involves defining problems and making 
spontaneous sense, which implies interpreting, interacting with and utilizing ambiguous 
structures and systems but not following them blindly. This reflects the theoretical 
observation that understanding structure as a noun is more about understanding the intention 
behind it and its instrumentality than about understanding the structure itself (Hatch 1999; 
Purser and Petranker 2005; Petranker 2005). As a practical implication, then, in order to 
obtain effective organizing, one should keep an open eye even when performing the most 
simple and pre-planned organizing activity, and make sure that one is not mislead into taking 
for granted the practical validity of plans in a reality that is emergent and continuously novel. 
Discussing some problems of technical rationality: taking it for 
granted… 
Taking for granted the existence of autonomous systems, the dominance of certain views and 
languages, implies not seeing emergent contextuality on account of a prearranged image of 
reality (Mead 1967; Goffman 1969; Berger and Luckmann 1991). In chapter five I argued that 
this entails seeing language as a system of unambiguous entities in line with an unquestioned 
objectivity of reality. At InSitu hospital there is currently a central undertaking of measuring 
the quality and standard of management within each department, and I see this as an indicator 
of the implicit and taken-for-granted nature that technical rationality might have. My study 
suggests that performance measurement at InSitu is characteristically more prone to be a 
discussion of how rather than whether. Whether one should in fact measure or not is rarely up 
for debate, rather, the discussion concerns how it should be done, almost as if taking for 
granted that it is possible to quantify and measure quality to begin with.  
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George: - To be honest, I don’t feel that I am being measured on the right things. Should have 
been measured on things like production, research, number of scientific articles, number of 
complaints and so forth. The quality indicators handed to us by the Ministry of Health are not 
really that good. Take for instance the case of patients lining the corridors − is it not better to 
treat patients in the corridors than not treating them at all? Actually, I think the Ministry of 
Health is too politically governed; so many laws and rules which are so resource-draining that 
the health worker doesn’t have the time to execute them nor to fulfil all the demands and 
regulations. Bureaucracy and political governance have taken complete control. Quality, 
however, resides with the physicians and the nurses, not with the regulations of the Ministry. 
In short, the entry of the technocrats is not good for the health care service.  
 
Take for example the EPJ-system. Some believe that this system will implicate more health 
care per [monetary unit], but this is an illusion. The time you spend on a computer journal is 
much longer than on a paper journal. The same goes for the EQS-system; I have no time to 
use it. Ergo the system is not really exploited. Being a busy physician there are a lot of other 
things on which to use one’s energy. Amongst the things that bring the most frustration, is the 
imposition from central management to administer a system that does not actually improve the 
quality of the everyday relation between patient and health care worker. The systems, the 
rules, the regulations, are simply forced upon me. I use a lot of resources on implementing 
technocratic systems, although everyday work life is pretty much the same as it was six years 
ago. Without doubt, though, quite a few things have happened that have made everyday life 
easier, but on the whole what I am saying is right. I dread the day I am going back to a full-
time clinical position, because I will have to spend too much time in front of the computer. 
Besides, the costs are not decreasing at all, rather, they are increasing as a consequence of 
expensive computer systems. And I am not sure that these increases in costs occur where 
they are needed the most. For instance, my experience is that we can barely afford using 
resources to buy the equipment we really need. Moreover, I don’t think the Health Reform has 
been a success. Very little of the new technology which is taken for granted in our 
neighbouring countries is available here. We cannot afford it. Soon, Bill Gates will probably be 
the one dictating hospital budgets. 
 
In George’s view there is an exaggerated belief in and execution of technical rational-
measures amongst the political authorities, but instead of commenting on whether such 
performance measurement should be conducted in the first place, he merely expresses 
dissatisfaction with the way it is done. For better or for worse, this can be seen as a way of 
expressing that some sort of technical-rational quantifying is needed so as to improve quality. 
A general and political debate as to the pros and cons of quantifying health care services is 
beyond and outside the realm of this study. The point here is merely to call attention to how 
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ingrained technical-rational thinking might become over time, allowing it to occupy space in 
everyday organizing which goes unquestioned.  
   
Like George, Peter is of the opinion that technical rationality has become too ingrained in 
hospital management and that it has grown to unhealthy proportions. He claims that the 
dominant jargon at the hospital has changed, and that the culture and tradition of patient care 
is threatened: 
 
Peter: - I put a lot of effort into avoiding taking into use expressions from management fads. I 
try to be at the forefront in terms of maintaining our own vocabulary. There is one hell of a 
pressure now on us to use the language of the Norwegian School of Management.7 The term 
“production” is starting to take hold. The core of health services, however, is patient treatment. 
And therefore the ones that are preaching “production” must learn “patient treatment” rather 
than the other way around. But as I said the pressure is immense, and significantly amplified 
through the national hospital reform, by the Ministry of Health and so forth.  
Researcher: Have you given feedback on this?  
Peter: No, not externally. Not to the central management or to [Regional Health Authorities]. 
But internally we do.  
Researcher: Is “productivity” important to you as an everyday term? 
Peter: I restrain myself from using the word in the literal sense. But of course I am constantly 
looking for cuts in cost and increases in income. And the goal is to cure more patients . . . 
Researcher: Why are you saying that too many words from the Norwegian School of 
Management are dangerous?  
Peter: Because the National Health Service contains some values that we should take care 
not to change. It is all about helping sick people. It is not car production that we are engaged 
in, such as for example the Toyota model. No doubt we are infected by this, by quality 
assurance and so forth. BUT DO NOT CALL IT THE TOYOTA MODEL IN THE HEALTH 
SERVICES! Rather, one should call it clinical research and patient follow-up; expressions that 
we have used earlier. I strongly oppose the ISO-marking of our services.  
 
Karina, too, expresses fear of the new terminology, the new language.  
 
Karina: - [With regard to terms like management, control etc.] I get negative associations. 
They are new words to me. I feel insecure about these terms, they are not part of my 
vocabulary . 
 
                                                 
7 The Norwegian School of Management, BI, is one of the most influential business schools in Norway.  
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So what if the hospital lingo changes, how does it matter? It depends on how you see 
language. From a non-dualist perspective, language is a theoretical device that enables and 
constrains everyday operations (Dewey 1929, Schön 1991). In the same vein I see language as 
a constituent of reality, in which case administration is a form of language, and medicine, too. 
Consequently, if a language changes the implications can be massive, as it might imply a 
change in reality and everyday focus. Furthermore, if a language, in this case technical-
rational organizing, is perceived as given and superior, if people stop questioning the validity 
of it, it opens up the theoretical possibility of complete control (Mead 1967; Goffman 1969). 
Instead of administration and medicine emerging together, organizing might become 
Managerialism and thus medicine might have to succumb to its taken-for-granted superiority. 
In other words: as Managerialism substitutes for good improvisation, plan and technology are 
no longer pragmatic instruments. Rather, they claim hold of reality as such (see chapter six), 
in which case the language of medicine, and hence the quality of medicine itself is challenged. 
 
Based on the initial presentation of technical rationality in this chapter, and if we are to 
believe the InSitu managers, there are signs that technical rationality might be about to take 
possession of the throne, rather fit into the existing order as a contextually smart way of 
thinking. In a way, administration might become more than a language; some fear that it will 
become the language, and that technical rationality will become equivalent to rationality as 
such. In some respect administrative systems, reforms and directives may be on the verge of 
being made autonomous, and as a consequence a single, taken-for-granted right way of 
organizing could emerge, much like portrayed in the early formulations of administration 
theory (e.g. Urwick 1934). To the extent that the managers are right in their assessment, this 
could in one sense have catastrophic consequences for the tradition of health care: It might 
mean that in the official and explicated approach to administration, financial aspects would 
categorically come first and patients later; system before context and efficiency before 
effectivity. Instead of seeing system and structure as part of organization, or rather, as tools of 
organizing, they would take on lives of their own. In other words, what the managers seem to 
fear is the creation of a managerialist “Frankenstein” threatening the quality of patient 
treatment. 
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Conclusions and implications 
Everyday organizing practice: Managerialism or improvisation? 
Based on Schön (1991) I have argued that technical rationality involves thinking first and 
acting later, and that this is at the heart of a terminology based on concepts such as system, 
production and control. Through multiple examples I have tried to show that technical 
rationality can be efficient in some regards and less efficient in others, and that workability is 
a matter of perspective. As a general theoretical speculation, systemic behaviour is efficient in 
those contexts where the degree of emergence and complexity is low, whereas in other 
instances context would continually outdate and invalidate it. There is little use in clutching 
on to an extensive and intricate structure that produces a certain output when practical needs 
never stay the same. In accordance with this I have found that managers put a lot of effort into 
contextualizing plans, structures and systems: When systemic invalidation occurs the manager 
sees it as a challenge to revalidate it through intelligent utilization, upon which the flow of 
technical-rational action would resume until once again outdated and eventually renewed. As 
has been thoroughly pointed out, problems of this scale are from a sensemaking perspective 
more or less inevitable, as systems can never keep up with the flow of everyday events. And 
this is perhaps not so much a problem of the system, of technical rationality, as a problem 
with the nature of real-life emergence. If, however, technical rationality is categorically 
clutched on to irrespective of the actual surroundings, serious problems may arise. 
 
In chapter five I portrayed Managerialism as a technical exercise of systems thinking which 
involves seeing organizational members as un-autonomous (and caged in) pieces of an 
autonomous whole (Stacey et al. 2000; Stacey 2001; Griffin 2002). Through the lenses of 
systems thinking all that can be spotted is what fits with defined features of the system. 
Everything else remains unaddressed, much like the way Polaroids close out all sunlight 
except that which follows a certain vector. In “production” the products, and hence the 
problems, are already defined, and in a hospital context this converts patients into customers 
or, more generally, into input and output. In its extreme form this amounts to Managerialism, 
which is a way of systems thinking that turns patients into bits and pieces passing through a 
production line. 
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It could be interesting to juxtapose these observations with the empirical findings of how 
InSitu managers go about their job, and to try to sketch out some implications for practice. On 
the one hand we have seen DMs acting as skilled improvisers in a complex reality, and who in 
interviews explicitly recognize context-sensitivity and improvisation as their most important 
tool (model 10.0, left column). Thus there seems to be harmony between words (espoused 
theory) and action (theory-in-use) as they both amalgamate in a perspective of improvisation. 
On the other hand, I have identified a tendency of systemic thinking which occupies a 
significant amount of space in everyday practice, typically as imposed by formal and official 
channels. This happens both in words and in action (model 10.0, right column): Not only may 
the technical-rational language be in a position where it might assume dominance in health 
care organizing through the excessive use of concepts such as management control, planning, 
system and production; but in practice, too, managers are spending a huge amount of time and 
energy in (centrally issued) planning and strategy meetings, on systematic budget and 
expenditure control and negotiation, on system implementation, and of course, bureaucracy.  
Practice 
Talk
Improvisation Systemic pressure 
Imposed 
system and 
structure 
 
Dominant 
managerialist 
language 
 
Actual 
organizing 
practice 
 
Alternative 
language of 
improvisation 
 
Model 10.0 Management talk and practice 
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Aspects of practice 
I will start off with practice (model 10.0, upper half of the quadrant) and deal with talk later. 
As a first step towards an understanding of what immediately strikes me as a paradox, I 
propose that even if managers are simultaneously improvisers and performers of technical 
rational activities, the one does not preclude the other. First of all, when dealing with systemic 
issues managers typically improvise: they pragmatically contextualize, embellish and adapt. 
They use administrative models as tools of improvisation; in those cases where managers 
make use of administrative models it typically comes about as a result of improspection and 
contextual evaluation. Only on very few occasions throughout the period of my study have I 
witnessed instances of blind following of systems thinking amongst the department managers, 
and those instances were followed by repentance. A more rigid and controlling form of 
systems thinking, however, was found in the directives and impositions from superior and 
official channels. Systems and structures are necessarily part of the context of public hospitals; 
political processes and bureaucratic structuring, for example, are part of a hospital’s raison 
d’être. As long as there is a political system governing both budgets and strategies, technical-
rational elements should be expected. As a critical comment, however, it would seem that 
such elements might be in danger of taking up too much space in everyday practice, thus 
stealing time and attention from upcoming events.  
 
Frequently when DMs are dealing with real-time and often unexpected occurrences, it seems 
somehow that they see themselves more as putting out fires and handling undesirable 
interruptions, rather than as encountering natural and necessary components of practical 
emergence. As a general observation it seems that so much focus is typically devoted to order 
and system that it somehow overshadows a view on complexity and unpredictability as 
something natural. A typical workday for the InSitu manager involves a more or less 
continual stream of formal and official errands, and all other issues have to be fitted in 
between these, or indeed they come up as interruptions. Thus I am tempted to ask if too little 
time and energy is typically put aside for everyday emerging events? Furthermore, I wonder if 
more structure might perhaps flow from focusing less on structure? The general espoused 
theory of InSitu managers is that context-sensitivity and the ability to be spontaneously 
creative is crucial, but to some extent they seem to cut themselves off from utilizing these 
talents, as they allow themselves to be trapped in for instance an endless row of formal 
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meetings. From these observations I would like to pose the question of whether the quality of 
organizing might increase if the systemic pressure was less pronounced.  
 
Judging by my study needs and wants seem to occasionally be transcending (or at least 
significantly influencing) a DM’s situation in a way that may cause him/her to act somewhat 
insensitively given the context. For example there seems to be quite a substantial levels 
systemic pressure which to a large extent comes from external authorities and central 
management. This pressure seems to be imposed on the managers rather than chosen by them. 
Systemic pressure does not only come from formal meetings but also through management 
directives, quantitative measurements, incentives to improve efficiency, from top-down 
control and administrative structures, system-implementations and reforms. In turn these 
matters become constituents of a somewhat systemic contextuality for department managers, 
and as they enact upcoming situations they are in a sense “encouraged” to interpret reality 
through system lenses. Not to take seriously technical-rational demands is not a viable option, 
and as the systemic pressure mounts, the manager’s task of translating systemic demands into 
practical outcomes via improvisation becomes more of a challenge. In that regard “the 
system” weighs heavily on the manager’s shoulders, which increases the pressure of seeing 
system in context and subjecting it to practical validation. From a sensemaking perspective, 
increased systemic pressure does not make the practical how less complex. The case is 
perhaps the opposite, something which indicates a potential increase of the managerial 
challenges associated with performing effective organizing.  
 
Even if systemic pressure to a large extent comes from the outside, and maybe justly so, I 
suggest that the manager can decide the extent to which this pressure is allowed to take hold 
of him/her. The manager has power to report back on system ignorance as it appears from his 
perspective. To some extent this is already happening at InSitu, but is the vertical 
communication sufficiently functional? Another study is required to determine this; here, the 
question is merely raised. As a theoretical observation, however, I’d like to point out that 
increased systemic pressure and control does not categorically lead to increased effectivity 
(Ciborra 1999). Rather, the more one seeks to control the behaviour of others, the more one 
also risks entrapping them in closed rhetoric and systems thinking, in which case less 
effectivity is a possible outcome. Jorid, a member of the central management staff of InSitu 
hospital, made an interesting comment on this in an interview:  
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Jorid: - We are taught structure, control and to focus on details. In a way it is pleasant to keep 
things that way, so naturally I strive for it in every day life; wishing to make things fit into a 
system. Indeed, I feel it in the flesh sometimes. If only we had managed to do so and so… But 
the world isn’t like this. So in everyday life I am torn between lose structures and the desire to 
have full control. And sometimes it becomes quite stressful. There are people who want a 
structured and predictable environment, and people who want the opposite. And here at the 
hospital there is as we speak a confrontation going on between Taylorism and the machine 
bureaucracy on one side, and new things on the other. If improvisation were the language we 
used, everyday life would be so much easier for me. I can feel it physically, in my body so to 
speak, that in that case I would not be imprisoned by anything, like a structure for instance. 
But today other parameters are controlling my behaviour and making me feel like I am stuck in 
some kind of a rigid frame. 
 
Open-ended creativity and practical wisdom may not fare too well under technical-rational 
imprisonment (Pitsis et al. 2007). One might argue that there is a latent paradox in this respect, 
between crucial political, bureaucratic and generally systemic concerns on one hand, and 
room for practical manoeuvring on the other. As a consequence, even if my study suggests 
that practical organizing emerges as improvisation, the conditions for good improvisation can 
be undermined if Managerialism prevails. I shall be careful about my conclusions in this 
regard, and merely suggest that the indications I have found of dominant technical rationality 
can form a valuable topic for further discussions in the search for better organizing. From an 
improvisatory point of view I would argue that new and more effective ways of organizing 
can always be found, but that the creative potential of practical wisdom might be inversely 
proportional to increased control. This is not at all meant as an attempt to romanticise 
complete lack of control, but rather to emphasize the fact that balancing the amount of control 
is something of an art form − the key to which lies in context. 
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Aspects of talk and language 
I shall end this chapter with a discussion on how the InSitu managers talk and the way they 
address the issues of technical rationality and improvisation. First of all, when allowed to 
elaborate freely on systemic issues InSitu managers exhibit improvisatory attitudes, and they 
seem to have clear views on models of technical rationality as temporal and instrumental. As 
an example I have included some comments by Peter:  
 
Peter: - I see the hierarchy as a tool . . . . My task is to deal with matters if there is a great 
incongruity between the hierarchy and actual practice - if there is a discrepancy. I have got a 
fresh example to illustrate this: An office manager has just quit his job here. What I did was to 
split the single position into two group leaders, each counting 20 per cent. That leaves me with 
60 per cent which I intend to use on admission services, because there is such a rat race with 
the new patient rights. Mind you, I haven’t told the director about this, and the process itself 
has possibly been a bit top-down on my behalf, but in a very short period of time this change 
has received broad support. People seem to be pleased with it. 
 
In contrast to such free contemplation (espoused theory) as expressed in interviews, the 
dominant language-in-use amongst top- and middle level managers seems much more 
technical. It is packed with systems and managerialist analogies. This tendency seems to a 
large extent to come from outside of medical practice. As the DMs themselves report, they are 
exposed on a large scale to a way of talking about practice that belongs more to business 
jargon than to traditional medicine. Potentially I might have found that the dominant 
language-in-use at InSitu was one of improvisation, in which case there could be said to be a 
strong emphasis on the instrumental value of systems and structure, but I would say it is the 
other way around. A language that addresses organizing practice as it evolves on an everyday 
basis − a language that fits the empirical findings of this study as well as the way managers 
ideally picture everyday life through espoused theories – seems to be lacking. And lacking a 
language to adequately address their work practice, managers are prone to employ system 
metaphors, which may possibly limit the potential of creative organizing. For example, they 
talk about production rather than health care, control rather than improvisation and problem 
solving rather than problem definition. Similarly in chapter seven we saw how managers 
regularly use expressions such as “ad hoc” and “behind on things ”, as if to signal a deviance 
from some desired ideal state of stability and equilibrium.  
 
Summing up, there seems to be some degree of inconsistency between:  
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1. actual everyday practice versus language-in-use  
2. the way managers reflect on and talk about practice in interviews (espoused theory) versus 
language-in-use  
 
A partial reason why there is such a strong tendency to use managerialist lingo in the worlds 
of InSitu managers might stem from the tough budget process currently taking place at the 
hospital. During my fieldwork I sat in on a multitude of budget meetings, many of them 
involving the director and his staff, and I have no doubt as to the severity of InSitu’s financial 
situation. There is much debate, formal and informal, on how to cut costs, whether costs 
should be cut and the priority of expenditures. My study is not an attempt to make a 
contribution to this debate, but to call attention to the influence evidently asserted by 
managerialist issues on organizing processes and to indicate some theoretical implications of 
exaggerating systems thinking in everyday language-in-use. My proposition is that a language 
of improvisation might provide a tool for better understanding and communication about 
authentic work practice amongst InSitu managers. Such understanding might subsequently 
contribute to the contextualizing of models of technical-rationality and thus facilitate their 
translation into effective organizing action.  
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Chapter 11 Conclusion 
A hermeneutical journey between text and context 
The research question for my study is: “What is the nature of improvisation in everyday 
organizing practice and how does improvisation relate to technical rationality?” In this 
concluding chapter I attempt to provide an elaborate answer as I present a synthesis of the 
preceding analyses and discussions. 
 
The thesis which has inspired this dissertation is that organizing can be understood as a 
process of improvisation (Weick 1979, 1989, 1998, 2001), and in that vein I have conducted 
an empirical study of organizing as improvisation amongst department managers in a large 
Norwegian hospital called InSitu. My project stems from a deep fascination with Weick’s 
work, but throughout the research process I have in many ways departed from his writings on 
improvisation as a retrospective process of sensemaking. However, two very essential (and 
interconnected) premises of Weick’s work have constituted the building blocks of my 
research: Firstly his view of organizing as a general process of making order in a complex 
world (Weick 1989; Weick et al. 2005), and secondly the view that organizing is a social 
process of sense- and identity-making (Weick 1979, 1995, 2001). Based on these assumptions 
I define organizing as “externally oriented acts of sensemaking carried out in the private, 
social and organizational sphere”. In the same vein, based on my study of practical 
philosophy, I propose a framework of improvisation under the label “The improvising man”, 
and suggest that improvisation can be defined as “spontaneous and hermeneutical 
sensemaking via external action”, which leads to a perspective of organizing as a process of 
improvisation.  
 
Unlike Weick (1995) who fundamentally sees sensemaking as a process of retrospection, I 
take a different route and suggest that sensemaking constitutes a process of improspection. 
Furthermore, whereas improspection is merely a way of seeing and thinking in the present, 
improvisation involves something more as it is a way of acting in the physical, external sense. 
From my point of view improvisation is thus a process of thinking-in-and-as-action that 
characterizes the human body. Through my improvising man framework I can therefore be 
positioned alongside authors like Schön (1991), Ciborra (1999) and Purser and Petranker 
(2005) who have in common a focus on improvisation as a philosophical aspect of existence. 
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From this philosophical position I build on authors such as Dewey (1929), Mead (1967), 
Strauss (1993), Heidegger (1996), and Stacey (2000, 2001) and suggest that emotionality 
plays a significant role in improvisation. As I suggest that sensemaking is a process 
constituted by human bodies tuned to emergent feeling states, I arrive at the understanding 
that sense is always induced with feeling, and as a result, that improvisation is emotionally 
conceived and upheld.   
 
My take on improvisation is guided by an interest in everyday organizing, and this 
distinguishes my study from much of the earlier literature in the organizational field, which 
seems to share a focus on improvisation as a rare and exceptional phenomenon. For example, 
theorists have portrayed improvisation as a method of radical innovation (Bastien and 
Hostager 1992; Cunha and Kamoche 2001); as a particularly creative and spontaneous form 
of theatre and jazz which can be used as a metaphor for organizing (Crossan and Sorrenti 
1997; Hatch 1997; Weick 1989, 1998, 2001; Zack 2000; Alterhaug 2004); as radical change 
processes in organizations (Orlikowski 1996; Orlikowski and Hofman 1997); as a 
characteristic trait of temporary projects (Leybourne 2006); or as a last minute, second hand 
solution when planning fails (Ciborra 1996; Miner et al. 1997; Kamoche et al. 2002). 
 
I have found these descriptions to be unsuited to my empirical project of capturing the essence 
of everyday organizing amongst InSitu managers. In addition I found my initial framework of 
“The improvising man” to be too wide to be employed as a tool of empirical analysis. As a 
consequence I realized that I had to hone the concept to make it practically applicable to my 
empirical case. The dual exploration of the empirical case of InSitu managers and the 
theoretical framework of “The improvising man” resulted in a new and deeper understanding 
of improvisation in organizing practice evolving gradually and hermeneutically. At this point 
I want to accentuate that my conception of improvisation has never been, and is still not, final, 
perfect or closed. It is merely an attempt to mould and hone a logical concept that can and 
should be further developed through both empirical research and theoretical reflection. From 
its very start this dissertation has emerged from a devotion to studying the role of 
improvisation in everyday practical life. I am convinced that I could not have reached my 
conclusions about improvisation without trying them out analytically as a framework for 
understanding an empirical case.  
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As explained, when attempting to analyse the empirical data I discovered that my initial 
framework of “The improvising man” was insufficient and overly abstract. The concept 
worked on paper, so to speak, but not well enough as a practical instrument. Thus I had to 
make some theoretical adjustments, and came up with the concept “sufficiently pure”, as 
opposed to “pure” improvisation. As another observation I found improvisation in practice to 
vary between voluntary/proactive and involuntary/reactive forms, which inspired me to use 
Taylor’s (1985) philosophy to separate between “positive” and “negative” improvisation. 
Furthermore, I have on occasions found improvisation to be quite impure, but still practically 
wise, and as a consequence I suggest that the concept “good improvisation” can be a fruitful 
and important alternative to “pure improvisation”. Although different from, and slightly less 
dramatic than improvisation seen as radical altering of structures, I have nonetheless found 
improvisation to be a constructive concept for understanding organizing practice, and found 
that it fills a void in the literature.  
 
The empirical study has helped me to understand improvisation in an everyday practical 
perspective as well as in a philosophical perspective, allowing me to construct even clearer 
connections between the two. As an example, I realized that in order to link complexity in the 
becoming (Bergson 1944) with improvisation, I needed a new tool. As a result I have found 
much value in the term “emergence” (Mead 1967), which I use as a metaphor for 
improvisation being an ongoing process of dealing with complexity through gestures and 
responses. My take on emergence, then, is not like the complexity sciences’ view of it as 
something which grows onwards in an ontologically objective manner (Stacey et al. 2000; 
Stacey 2001); I see it as the very process of creating order from chaos. Emergence is not just 
chaos, and it is not just order. It is an improvisatory process of making sense, in which the 
quality of the sense that is made relates to the quality of complexity. In other words, the 
emergence of sense is inseparable from the emergence of complexity. Based on my analysis, 
then, I arrived at the idea that emergence is simultaneously improvisation and complexity that 
are woven together. This has both deepened my personal insight into philosophical non-
dualism and made it possible to theorize about my empirical data.   
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Main empirical findings 
A general empirical observation is that improvisation occurs as InSitu managers are logged on 
to and act in the emergent present of organizational becoming. More specifically, the nature 
of everyday organizing seems to take two forms: positive and negative improvisation. These 
have in common that they are not necessarily radically pure in terms of spontaneity and 
creativity, but sufficiently pure so as to be recognized as improvisation in practice. I shall deal 
with the former first and then turn to the latter. Lastly I will sum up my findings on how 
improvisation compares to technical rationality, and show how the managers, on the whole, 
use administrative elements as tools rather than as control mechanisms.    
Forms of negative improvisation 
As a general observation, the InSitu department managers seem to be submerged in the 
emerging context they take part in producing, and as a consequence there is a high degree of 
spontaneity in improvised practice. Furthermore, novelty is found in the becoming of 
situations (Bergson 1944; Ciborra 1999; Purser and Petranker 2005; Petranker 2005), which 
encourages the managers to make new sense in a continual manner. Lastly, I have found the 
degree of complexity to regularly overshadow familiarity, thus triggering improvisation in 
quite pure forms.  
 
More specifically I have found that department managers at InSitu improvise negatively as 
they make spontaneous sense of complex situations comprised of: 
 
1. Vagueness and ambiguity both in verbal and written communication. 
2. Clustering of events: there is seldom an ordered sequential manner in which situations 
occur. Rather, the typical work situation emerges through a simultaneous variety of 
issues. Each of these issues is often inherently complex, but complexity is also found 
in the clustering experience itself.  
3. Unpredictability. 
4. Emotional aspects associated with everyday organizing as a corporal exercise of 
socially dealing with living bodies. Situated corporality in the context of InSitu 
managers implies emotionality in varying degrees of explicitness.   
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This list is not meant to be exhaustive. Rather, the points are meant as different and 
intertwined angles on the same phenomena: emergence and improvisation in practice. As a 
red thread through the list, emergence stands out as a complex and dynamic trait of the way 
situations unfold for the InSitu managers. Thus, in all of the issues above understanding and 
sense are at stake, implying a continual effort to improvise. I will deal with each at a time: 
1. Improvising sense from vagueness and equivocality 
The pitfalls of communication are evident in that symbols of language can never encapsulate 
a reality-on-the-move (Bergson 1944). Using symbols of language means to engage in acts of 
gestures and responses (Mead 1967), which can be seen as interpretative efforts of 
improvisation for the sake of establishing sense and coherence (Weick 1995), and the way 
these processes evolve can be described as emergence (Mead 1967). From a sensemaking 
perspective the vagueness and equivocality of language can only be countered by 
improvisation (Weick 1995). For the InSitu manager the emergence of gesture and response 
often takes on a largely complex character; interpretative problems and misunderstandings are 
vivid and recurrent examples. As a consequence, improvisation which is qualitatively rich in 
both spontaneity and creativity is triggered.  
2. Improvising sense from clusters of events 
Everyday events have a tendency to crop up and come in messy clusters rather than in neat 
and ordered sequences. No matter what the extent to which linguistic symbols are involved, 
the managers face occurrences that emerge simultaneously, and which often trigger immense 
efforts of improvisatory sensemaking. Without the manager’s spontaneous and creative 
endeavours the situations could not be handled. Problems are defined in context and are dealt 
with spontaneously by the managers, and as problems tend to come in clusters creating 
turbulence, the manager is compelled to refocus and improvise fast.  
3. Improvising sense from unpredictability 
The way emergence manifests itself in practice for the InSitu managers is largely 
unpredictable. As a result, a profound complexity in the becoming is constituted, which is 
often visible through unexpected events. These are not always very complex, however, but as 
they come up surprisingly they arouse spontaneous acts of improvisation. In short, managers 
sometimes seem to make sense with less genuine creative effort, and sometimes with more. 
Nonetheless, as unpredictability is woven deeply into practice, managers improvise their way 
ahead and in the process they create order and predictable outcomes. 
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4. Improvising sense from emotional complexity 
As everyday emergence is found in the emotionality of situations, it takes on a deeply 
complex character. Improvisation in an emotional context is a matter of empathy and 
interpretation (Dewey 1929; Strauss 1993). As feelings and emotions continuously feed 
situations with complexity, managers are forced to overcome that complexity somehow, and 
the particular way this is done seems to be contextually determined and acted out through 
improvisation. Being logged on to the present, the manager regularly expresses great 
difficulties with interpreting and understanding emotional gestures, and as a result 
improvising in emotional contexts implies high degrees of spontaneity.  
 
Amongst my findings are emotions in an explicit sense, meaning emotions that stand out from 
the point of view of the researcher (i.e. “feelings” (Dewey 1929)). Vivid examples are 
instances I have interpreted as frustration, anger, disappointment, grief and humour. It is 
characteristic how managers seldom address emotion explicitly in situ, irrespective of the 
contextual significance of emotion. Often, feelings and emotions appear to be under-
communicated. Still, as I have found them to be important triggers of improvisation, I suggest 
that much can be learned from putting emotions on the agenda and studying how they 
influence organizing on an everyday basis.   
Negative improvisation versus decision-making  
To sum up, InSitu managers improvise negatively in everyday practice in the sense that they 
react to the emergent, unpredictable and complex flow of everyday events. Complexity 
typically stems from social and emotional factors creating subtleties and ambiguities that are 
dealt with spontaneously. Furthermore, rather than being faced with a series of familiar 
problems or issues, in complex situations managers are cast into unstructured scenarios in 
which genuinely new sense must be made. These are the kind of situations where meaning is 
not pinned down without effort − situations with distinctive uncertainty, in which it is difficult 
to identify or count problems, or to compare them analytically to each other. In organizing 
practice, complexity is typically perceived as one (long) unstructured situation-in-the-
becoming (Bergson 1944); not as many concrete situations succeeding each other. Organizing 
in complex situations is about getting to know what is happening: about defining problems 
more than solving familiar problems (Ciborra 1999). It is about creating context, and as the 
manager succeeds, he makes reality predictable. But the manager can never know when 
something unexpected will interrupt him. 
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The outcome of real-life situations for managers is from a hermeneutical viewpoint dependent 
on past experience (Heidegger 1996). As argued by Purser and Petranker (2005), Petranker 
(2005), and Ciborra (1999), the present cannot be captured by objective analysis. This creates 
unpredictability, but it also generates structure. Hence, even if emergence is profoundly 
unpredictable, it comes to life as structuring efforts and is everything but completely random. 
Emergence is not “either – or”, but “both – and”. If the manager cannot discern objectively 
what is happening now, but is compelled to improvise his own reality in collaboration with 
others, he cannot expect to know what will follow next. The way the manager’s present 
evolves into a future, the way he constitutes reality, depends hermeneutically on his thoughts, 
interpretations and actions − and on those of others. As such, context never is, ontologically 
speaking; it merely exists in and as emergence. Context is not chaos, however. Context is 
stability; it is reality. However dialectical and social in form, however socially conceived and 
upheld, context is a manager’s continual accomplishment, and it generally comes about by 
way of improvisation, negative as well as positive. From this point of view, decision-making 
is subjected to improvisation, not the other way around (Ciborra 1999). In other words, as I 
take a phenomenological approach to choice (Husserl 1962; Shütz 1967), I do not see 
improvisation as a process of decision-making, but as one of sensemaking (Weick et al. 2005). 
Ciborra (1999) puts it this way: 
 
. . . improvisation poses a challenge to our conceptions of decision making, management, 
information and systems: i.e. to abandon the neat, but artificial world of models, structures and 
univocal meanings, enter the world of sense making and experience in the everyday life of 
organizations, and call into the picture a hidden, but powerful presence: our existence, or 
Being-in-the-world. (p. 91).  
Forms of positive improvisation 
According to my findings, positive improvisation is to a large extent taken for granted 
amongst the managers. It is seen as a natural part of the manager’s role, one that ranks higher 
than any other aspect of organizing. This is particularly visible in the managers’ attitude of 
context-sensitivity in the sense that they seem to be continually searching for better ways to 
perform in situ even when there is no uninvited acuteness involved. It is important to note that 
as positive improvisation takes place in the same environment and emerges in the same 
manner as negative improvisation, the four traits presented in the previous section are also 
evident in positive improvisation. Positive improvisation, too, involves dealing with vague 
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and equivocal symbols, dealing with a multiplicity of concurrent issues in unpredictable and 
emotional situations. On occasion it can therefore be difficult to see where positive 
improvisation ends and negative improvisation begins, and the two types are often likely to 
express different facets of the same situations, where the one somehow prompts to the other. 
The theoretical difference is, however, that what I have identified as positive improvisation is 
chosen voluntarily, and concerns those aspects of everyday improvisation where there is a 
conscious intention or attitude to create novelty.  
 
InSitu department managers exhibit positive improvisation in many forms. Firstly, they 
proclaim that they hold context-sensitivity as superior to systems thinking, and in practice, 
they follow up on this view even if spontaneity is sometimes hampered. Secondly, the 
managers are generally playful, innovative and enthusiastic with regard to improving and 
developing organizing processes. They make the most of situations, and regularly encourage 
free creative thinking, innovation and brainstorming in which they too take part. Dedicated to 
the novelty of becoming, they regularly seek new solutions, authentic understanding and new 
meaning. Aspects of positive improvisation are also evident in humour, where creativity is 
found in the very process of having fun, of being sarcastic, ironic or the like, rather serving 
the explicit purpose of improving work practice. Thus, humour has been identified as a very 
explicit process of improvising which uses ideas and physical artefacts as instruments.  
Improvisation as utilizing elements of technical rationality 
Partly from personal reflections that have emerged over a number of years, partly from my 
empirical analysis, and partly from a study of practical philosophy, I have been inspired to 
look deeply into the relationship between technical rationality (Schön 1991) and 
improvisation. This has helped me to understand in greater detail how organizing practice is 
not a matter of either the one or the other, but essentially a grey matter where the one can 
involve the other. Finding that the two constructs, which were antagonisms in theory, were not 
so clearly separated in practice was an essential turning point in this research process. This 
was of particular significance since it inspired me to write more deeply about the 
interconnection, rather than the difference (i.e. Schön 1991), between technical rationality and 
improvisation. Moreover, the theoretical and empirical study of technical rationality taught 
me the significance of perception in determining what is functional and what is not. The 
insight from practical philosophy that a theory’s worth is decided by its practical functionality 
(Dewey 1929; Joas 1996) was for me given a new depth when my analyses showed me the 
 323
importance of taking different perspectives on functionality: When something, say an 
administrative routine or a system, works, for whom does it work and for which purpose; 
from which perspective?  
 
My empirical study suggests that technical rationality occupies a central role in everyday 
organizing amongst InSitu managers. Management reforms, massive system implementation, 
bureaucracy and budget processes are amongst the most important examples. Rather than 
following their prescriptions blindly, however, the InSitu managers use elements of technical 
rationality such as routines, structures, plans and directives as instruments in improvisation. 
Thus, in an improvisatory pursuit of increased workability a lot of effort goes into contextual 
adaptation and embellishment of administrative measures. Rather than linear decision-making 
this implies a process of problem-definition and understanding (Schön 1991; Ciborra 1999). 
Thus I would argue that the everyday trot of InSitu managers is more holistically covered by 
an improvisatory conceptual framework than by a technical-rational doctrine. This is in 
harmony with the observation that situations in which managers make sense and act are fluid 
and emergent and not objects of technical analysis. 
 
Even if this study of organizing practice indicates that improvisation constitutes the dominant 
mode of action, the InSitu Hospital managers seem to lack a linguistic apparatus to help them 
realistically address such practice. Instead I have found a dominance of systems language 
(language-in-use), in which quantitative metaphors substitute for qualitative experiences. 
Moreover, a similar language seems to dominate the official channels, as there is much focus 
on systemizing and structuring for the sake of productivity and predictability. Considering the 
managers’ own statements about their everyday life, which in general seem to favour context-
sensitivity and improvisation, there are, expanding on the vocabulary of Argyris and Schön 
(1974, 1996), traces of paradox between the different ways to talk about practice (espoused 
theory) and in practice (language-in-use), and between actual practice (theory-in-use) and 
language-in-use. I propose that an improvisational vocabulary might contribute to reducing 
this paradox, as I see it as a practically realistic framework. As such the improvisational 
language might contribute to a greater understanding of organizing practice and facilitate the 
communication about such practice.  
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If not improvisation, then what? 
In my studies I might have found a predominance of inauthentic conversations in which the 
level of spontaneous commitment was minimal, and where improvisation would be a less 
functional idiom than, say, technical rationality. I might have found that InSitu managers are 
mainly isolated in private offices with little contact with physical and social surroundings, and 
with little concern for current and evolving organizational matters. Indeed, I might have found 
that managers categorically overlook interruptions, that they are not significantly influenced 
by emotions, and that they shun real-life contextuality. And I might have found an ideal in the 
espoused theory of the managers that systems must be obeyed blindly and routines 
reconstructed for their own sake. But to answer all of these speculations: I did not. Rather, I 
found that at InSitu Hospital everyday organizing is more a matter of finding out what is 
happening, and of making things work, than of solving predictable and familiar problems. In 
essence, everyday decision-making is about (positive and negative) improvisation rather than 
technical-rational linearity (Ciborra 1999). As a result the amount of decisions, the quantity of 
choices, is less interesting from a non-dualistic point of view than the quality of the genuine 
processes of spontaneous creativity leading up to such decisions.   
 
In accordance with Ciborra (1999), Weick et al. (2005), and Purser and Petranker (2005) my 
view is that the objectivist version of technical rationality is not a good tool for understanding 
the emerging details of everyday organizing. From a sensemaking point of view, models of all 
kinds are tools used in improvisation, not frames within which improvisation takes place 
(Hatch 1999). In organizing systemic and structural frames are continually altered through 
reconstruction; in other words they are brought to life through improvisation. With regard to 
InSitu managers, they do not constantly improvise in the same sense as jazz musicians, 
however, as their arena is substantially different with regard to contextuality. Everyday 
organizing does not always reach conditions of pure improvisation and flow, but at times it 
does. Everyday organizing is sufficiently pure; it is sufficiently spontaneous and creative to be 
labelled improvisation (rather than something else). InSitu managers do not perform 
Managerialism; they improvise. 
 
Could it be that another concept than improvisation is more suitable to describe the overall 
perspective on everyday organizing practice found in this study? In an attempt to answer, it is 
not my view that improvisation should be seen as apart from or as a substitute for all other 
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concepts. Rather, improvisation emerges and borrows from other concepts and highlights 
certain aspects more than others. Particularly important amongst those aspects is the 
hermeneutical, emotional, active, and externally oriented sensemaking typical of everyday 
organizing. Thus, rather than it being a question about the term improvisation, my point is 
primarily to focus and expand on the epistemic connotations of improvisation and to propose 
a particular definition. By this I do not attempt to provide some final conclusion to all aspects 
of practice, but to illuminate certain everyday traits that in my view are not sufficiently 
covered by existing literature on organizing. The aim is not to present a concept that covers 
“everything”, but to propose some alternative, fruitful and mind-sparking approaches. And 
with regard to organizing practice it is my conviction that improvisation offers new insights 
above all with respect to the run-of-the-mill details of everyday life, and the distinctive 
spontaneity and creativity that goes into dealing with these for the sake of understanding, of 
forming identity, and of making things work. 
Some practical implications 
The potential of my study in terms of improving practice is indicated by the following 
quotation from Petranker (2005): 
 
With a greater ability to see stories in operation, managers have a wide range of options. At 
the level of the subjective future, they can consciously set about changing stories that are told 
both by others and by themselves, with the aim of changing the stories that organizational 
actors live. If they are willing to go deeper, they can explore changing their own lived story, 
learning to inhabit that story more fully, so that the implied truth of the way things are and 
what’s happening comes more fully into view. Finally, they can let intention infuse their work 
and their perceptions so that it infuses their knowing as well. (Petranker 2005, p. 254).  
 
My methodological approach of narrative ethnography (Tedlock 2000) has allowed me to 
present such rich life-stories from which practitioners can increase their knowing. In 
particular, several practical implications for organizing can be suggested from my study. First 
of all, the findings call for a focus on the complex and evolving present of everyday life. 
Secondly, and as a consequence, good organizing is to be found in improspection, context-
sensitivity and spontaneous action. It is in the emotional, social and linguistic moment of 
becoming that there is a room for practical manoeuvring; in the present that solutions can be 
found and the future shaped. Good organizing is found in empathy, emotional understanding, 
continual openness and spontaneous action. How to go about this in practice is a matter of 
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contextual evaluation and perspective, as I see workability as a matter of subjective 
perception.  
 
Thirdly, as practice only exists in the evolving present, it emerges in a profoundly 
unpredictable way. To match this complexity-in-the-becoming one must rely on 
hermeneutical forehaving, practical and theoretical experience, to provide a tool for 
spontaneous organizing. In order to become a skilled improviser, then, the manager should 
keep an open eye for everyday emergence, look for potentials in the present, and evaluate 
situations with a diagnostic eye facilitated by practical experience (Ciborra 1999; Purser and 
Petranker 2005; Petranker 2005). And as nothing can substitute for experience, one should 
maintain a flexible attitude of curiosity and openness, rather than relying on and following 
fixed models.  
 
Following this line of reason a fourth point can be indicated: There are severe limits to 
organizing as blind technical-rational action (Managerialism). And the limits are set by the 
resistance provided by contextual (social and physical) elements. Not to question a system’s 
validity implies seeing only one perspective, namely the one defined by the system. Thus, 
everyday complexity can seldom be resolved by taking systems for granted. Practical wisdom 
is not about silently accepting structures of reality, but seeing beyond them even if this seems 
unfeasible at the time (Ciborra 1999). Conversely, following the notion of technical 
rationality uncritically implicates playing the role of a cogwheel in a piece of machinery; it 
implies conducting systems thinking to the smallest detail whilst leaving matters of 
contextuality unquestioned. Only when technical rationality is contextually chosen as the right 
way to think and act in a specific situation does it become an attribute of wisdom.  
 
The argument above implicitly implies a fifth point: that administrative objects like structures, 
routines or plans are tools of improvisation; not restraint jackets. They can provide valuable 
points of departure and creative inspiration, but should not be allowed to freeze the contextual 
gaze of improvisation. Being an improviser implies maintaining a humble approach to 
practice, allowing for surprises and “expecting the unexpected” (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001), 
but being prepared as far as possible. Preparation involves building experience and equipping 
the mental (and corporal) toolbox with a variety of structural objects, because from a practical 
philosophical perspective it is those objects that facilitate the mind’s capacity to put together 
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new images; either because one has to (negative improvisation) or because one chooses to 
(positive improvisation).  
 
As a sixth point, one should be careful about the language one chooses to describe everyday 
practice through. Systems metaphors, for instance, are powerful and seductive. It is easy to be 
tempted to view organizations as networks or systems, to see plan before context, and parts or 
wholes instead of processes. In practical philosophy, however, objects are temporary and 
emotionally infused, and should not be seen as ontological frames or constituents (Dewey 
1929). Objects are instruments and must be breathed into life by practitioners (Ciborra 1999). 
“The improvising man” depicts that a routine, a structure, a system does not feel or live in any 
way - it is perpetually brought to life. An organizational structure does not get emotional, but 
it can only come to life via emotion (Hatch 1999). A technical-rational measure can therefore 
not be expected to capture the richness of emotional exchange. Organizing as seen through the 
lenses of “The improvising man” may provide a framework that is close to actual practice, 
allowing for a realistic, balanced and multifaceted conversation on everyday practice, and as a 
result of that, potentially contribute towards effective performance. 
 
To summarise these implications, this study indicates that improvisation is found in 
organizing practice in ways not usually addressed. The fact that jazz musicians and actors 
improvise in their jobs is commonly accepted. Using these professions as metaphors applied 
to everyday organizing may be problematic, however, as they might create a biased image of 
improvisation. They might invite us to see improvisation only as something extraordinary; as 
a rare feature belonging to just a few groups of people. And indeed it is true that the degree of 
improvisation varies between contexts, and that some improvise more and better than others, 
but this is no reason why improvisation should be made into some exceptional attribute of 
certain contexts or professions; as if it rarely happens elsewhere. “The improvising man” 
suggests that improvisation is not an exceptional phenomenon, but a natural part of everyday 
work life for most people, something which is supported by my empirical study of managers.  
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Implications for research 
With more time on my hands I would have taken the results of this study back to the 
respondents for further discussion and validation. One way of seeing my project is as a 
starting phase of an action research project, and if subjected to further interaction between 
thought and action (Greenwood and Levin 1998), a more practically applicable result might 
emerge.  
 
Research such as mine is about definition and framing; about building language and a way of 
seeing organizing-in-the-becoming. As such it provides windows for looking into the 
frequently grey everydayness that is easily taken for granted and not usually given much 
attention. It is my hope that the kind of research conducted in this project can contribute 
towards keeping some windows open, so as to facilitate an ongoing conversation on the 
difficult and complex nature of everyday organizing. And in that regard I would once again 
like to refer to Mary Jo Hatch (1999) by repeating that my project is less about doing 
something that has not been done before, than about doing something worth doing again.  
 
As a last comment, having a rich empirical base from which to perform comparisons between 
contexts could create better underpinnings for the understanding of everyday improvisation. It 
is therefore my view that there is need of more empirical research on improvisation and how 
it relates to specific contexts. Both empirically and theoretically there might be facets of 
improvisation that need further elaboration, and I suspect that much could be gained from 
discussing in greater detail the role of improvisation in other research disciplines such as 
organizational learning, group dynamics, leadership and strategy. In that regard it is 
encouraging to notice that however young improvisation may be as an academic field, there is 
a living and growing interdisciplinary awareness of the phenomenon, and improvisation has 
already become the centre of attention for a variety of disciplines including organizing, 
leadership, pedagogy, music and philosophy.   
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